General

  • Target
    ee5632e3c0717693c9ab993c2b0c5b6edb503383215895f99800d915d92d1b8e.apk
  • Size 3.3MB
  • Sample260819-ce4e2ack9y
  • SHA256 ee5632e3c0717693c9ab993c2b0c5b6edb503383215895f99800d915d92d1b8e
  • MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH

Malware Config

Targets

    • Target
      ee5632e3c0717693c9ab993c2b0c5b6edb503383215895f99800d915d92d1b8e.apk
    • Size 3.3MB
    • SHA256 ee5632e3c0717693c9ab993c2b0c5b6edb503383215895f99800d915d92d1b8e
    • MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
    • Cerberus payload

    • Family: Alienbot

      Alienbot is a fork of Cerberus banker first seen in January 2020.

    • Family: Cerberus

      An Android banker that is being rented to actors beginning in 2019.

    • Contact harvesting with SMS self-propagation

      Reads the device contact list and sends messages to the retrieved numbers, the distribution mechanism behind SMS worm campaigns. The victim's own address book becomes the delivery channel, which is why these campaigns spread rapidly within a region.

    • Covert microphone or camera capture with exfiltration

      Opens audio or camera capture outside any user-facing recording feature and pairs it with file staging and network transmission. The absence of a foreground recording interface alongside these primitives indicates surveillance rather than a legitimate media function.

    • Encrypted or packed staged payload inside Android package

      Extracted asset shows near-random entropy without a recognised container header, indicating an encrypted secondary payload staged for runtime decryption and loading. Correlate with any runtime class-loading detection on the same sample.

    • Notification listener abuse for OTP and message theft

      Binds a notification listener service and reads posted notification content, optionally dismissing notifications afterwards to hide them. This harvests one-time passcodes and private messages without ever requesting SMS permissions, which is why it has largely replaced SMS interception in modern ban

    • Removes its main activity from the application launcher

    • Loads dropped Dex/Jar

      Runs executable file dropped to the device during analysis.

    • Makes use of the framework's Accessibility service

      Retrieves information displayed on the phone screen using AccessibilityService.

    • Queries account information for other applications stored on the device

      Application may abuse the framework's APIs to collect account information stored on the device.

    • Queries the phone number (MSISDN for GSM devices)

    • Acquires the wake lock

    • Makes use of the framework's foreground persistence service

      Application may abuse the framework's foreground service to continue running in the foreground.

    • Performs UI accessibility actions on behalf of the user

      Application may abuse the accessibility service to prevent their removal.

    • Queries the mobile country code (MCC)

    • Requests disabling of battery optimizations (often used to enable hiding in the background).

MITRE ATT&CK Mobile v16

Tasks