Analysis

  • custom tags

    stealerotpbankerdropperloaderevasionantivmobfuscated

General

  • Target
    afc0be54d90c0e3ffa73ac9078e8d37b086fc9088827b19fbb9f588a189d2fcf.apk
  • Size 32.1MB
  • Sample260820-nrsd3swcle
  • SHA256 afc0be54d90c0e3ffa73ac9078e8d37b086fc9088827b19fbb9f588a189d2fcf
  • MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH

Malware Config

Signatures

  • Android dropper: runtime DEX/class loading of a staged payload 2 IoCs

    Sample resolves and loads executable code at runtime via DexClassLoader/InMemoryDexClassLoader combined with reflection and asset or network payload retrieval. Legitimate apps rarely need in-memory DEX loading; this is the standard staging mechanism for Android droppers evading store review.

  • Notification listener abuse for OTP and message theft 1 IoCs

    Binds a notification listener service and reads posted notification content, optionally dismissing notifications afterwards to hide them. This harvests one-time passcodes and private messages without ever requesting SMS permissions, which is why it has largely replaced SMS interception in modern ban

  • Root, emulator and instrumentation-framework detection 3 IoCs

    Probes for superuser binaries, emulator build properties and dynamic instrumentation frameworks. Malware uses these checks to stay dormant inside analysis environments, so a sample matching this rule with an otherwise empty behavioural report should be treated as evasive rather than benign.

  • Runtime string decryption with reflective method dispatch 2 IoCs

    Combines symmetric decryption or base64 decoding of embedded string tables with reflective class and method resolution, so sensitive API names never appear in plaintext. This defeats naive string-based detection and indicates deliberate anti-analysis engineering.

  • Declares services with permission to bind to the system 1 IoCs
  • Requests dangerous framework permissions 10 IoCs
  • Untrusted Codesign Signers 1 IoCs

    Codesigned file was signed by an untrusted entity.

File Explorer

  • afc0be54d90c0e3ffa73ac9078e8d37b086fc9088827b19fbb9f588a189d2fcf.apk
    .apk 32.1MB

afc0be54d90c0e3ffa73ac9078e8d37b086fc9088827b19fbb9f588a189d2fcf.apk

  • SHA256 afc0be54d90c0e3ffa73ac9078e8d37b086fc9088827b19fbb9f588a189d2fcf
  • MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
  • Android dropper: runtime DEX/class loading of a staged payload

    Sample resolves and loads executable code at runtime via DexClassLoader/InMemoryDexClassLoader combined with reflection and asset or network payload retrieval. Legitimate apps rarely need in-memory DEX loading; this is the standard staging mechanism for Android droppers evading store review.

  • Notification listener abuse for OTP and message theft

    Binds a notification listener service and reads posted notification content, optionally dismissing notifications afterwards to hide them. This harvests one-time passcodes and private messages without ever requesting SMS permissions, which is why it has largely replaced SMS interception in modern ban

  • Root, emulator and instrumentation-framework detection

    Probes for superuser binaries, emulator build properties and dynamic instrumentation frameworks. Malware uses these checks to stay dormant inside analysis environments, so a sample matching this rule with an otherwise empty behavioural report should be treated as evasive rather than benign.

  • Runtime string decryption with reflective method dispatch

    Combines symmetric decryption or base64 decoding of embedded string tables with reflective class and method resolution, so sensitive API names never appear in plaintext. This defeats naive string-based detection and indicates deliberate anti-analysis engineering.

  • Untrusted Codesign Signers

    Codesigned file was signed by an untrusted entity.

File Signature issue

Digest
d77304b1dc6d229d452b3219b25c8500135f5e7db17d27f0b2f6ab6d97506afe88f60da4eee2d4c1652266e5499acc1a0478572aee06ab288b2989e7a2fd8178
Digest Algorithm
sha512
Digest Matches
Trusted
Not trusted
Signer
CN=Android,OU=Android,O=Google Inc.,L=Mountain View,ST=California,C=US
com.bilcicore.cleaner

Android Permissions

afc0be54d90c0e3ffa73ac9078e8d37b086fc9088827b19fbb9f588a189d2fcf.apk

Permissions

android.permission.INTERNET

android.permission.POST_NOTIFICATIONS

android.permission.WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE

android.permission.MANAGE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE

android.permission.ACTIVITY_RECOGNITION

android.permission.VIBRATE

android.permission.REQUEST_DELETE_PACKAGES

android.permission.PACKAGE_USAGE_STATS

android.permission.FOREGROUND_SERVICE

android.permission.QUICKBOOT_POWERON

android.permission.RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED

android.permission.CHANGE_NETWORK_STATE

oppo.permission.OPPO_COMPONENT_SAFE

com.oppo.launcher.permission.READ_SETTINGS

com.oppo.launcher.permission.WRITE_SETTINGS

android.permission.READ_APP_BADGE

com.google.android.launcher.permission.READ_SETTINGS

com.huawei.permission.external_app_settings.USE_COMPONENT

android.permission.USE_BIOMETRIC

android.permission.SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW

android.permission.ACTION_MANAGE_OVERLAY_PERMISSION

android.permission.WAKE_LOCK

android.permission.VIBRATE

android.permission.BLUETOOTH

android.permission.BLUETOOTH_SCAN

android.permission.BLUETOOTH_ADMIN

android.permission.BLUETOOTH_CONNECT

android.permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION

android.permission.ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION

android.permission.ACCESS_WIFI_STATE

android.permission.CHANGE_WIFI_STATE

android.permission.USE_FINGERPRINT

android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE

com.google.android.gms.permission.AD_ID

com.applovin.array.apphub.permission.BIND_APPHUB_SERVICE

com.google.android.finsky.permission.BIND_GET_INSTALL_REFERRER_SERVICE

android.permission.ACCESS_ADSERVICES_ATTRIBUTION

android.permission.ACCESS_ADSERVICES_AD_ID

android.permission.ACCESS_ADSERVICES_TOPICS

com.bilcicore.cleaner.DYNAMIC_RECEIVER_NOT_EXPORTED_PERMISSION

com.samsung.android.mapsagent.permission.READ_APP_INFO

com.huawei.appmarket.service.commondata.permission.GET_COMMON_DATA

com.android.vending.CHECK_LICENSE