Analysis

  • custom tags

    dropperloaderpersistencestealersmsotpevasionantivmtrojanexfiltrationobfuscated

General

  • Target
    b008e30590725d6a5bde09ebad2cfe6ff0b002b16b3b93fe9150a608a180f511.apk
  • Size 11.8MB
  • Sample260820-nwbbcsda47
  • SHA256 b008e30590725d6a5bde09ebad2cfe6ff0b002b16b3b93fe9150a608a180f511
  • MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH

Malware Config

Signatures

  • Android SMS interception and OTP exfiltration 1 IoCs

    Registers a high-priority SMS_RECEIVED receiver, parses inbound message bodies and aborts the broadcast to hide messages from the user, alongside network exfiltration primitives. This is the standard 2FA/OTP theft pattern used to complete fraudulent transactions.

  • Android dropper: runtime DEX/class loading of a staged payload 1 IoCs

    Sample resolves and loads executable code at runtime via DexClassLoader/InMemoryDexClassLoader combined with reflection and asset or network payload retrieval. Legitimate apps rarely need in-memory DEX loading; this is the standard staging mechanism for Android droppers evading store review.

  • Boot-triggered restart with disguised foreground service 1 IoCs

    Restarts itself on device boot and holds a foreground service with a low-visibility notification channel, keeping the process alive across reboots and outside normal background limits. Malicious use is distinguished by pairing this with surveillance or remote-control primitives.

  • Contact harvesting with SMS self-propagation 1 IoCs

    Reads the device contact list and sends messages to the retrieved numbers, the distribution mechanism behind SMS worm campaigns. The victim's own address book becomes the delivery channel, which is why these campaigns spread rapidly within a region.

  • Root, emulator and instrumentation-framework detection 1 IoCs

    Probes for superuser binaries, emulator build properties and dynamic instrumentation frameworks. Malware uses these checks to stay dormant inside analysis environments, so a sample matching this rule with an otherwise empty behavioural report should be treated as evasive rather than benign.

  • Runtime string decryption with reflective method dispatch 1 IoCs

    Combines symmetric decryption or base64 decoding of embedded string tables with reflective class and method resolution, so sensitive API names never appear in plaintext. This defeats naive string-based detection and indicates deliberate anti-analysis engineering.

  • Requests dangerous framework permissions 10 IoCs
  • Untrusted Codesign Signers 1 IoCs

    Codesigned file was signed by an untrusted entity.

File Explorer

  • b008e30590725d6a5bde09ebad2cfe6ff0b002b16b3b93fe9150a608a180f511.apk
    .apk 11.8MB

b008e30590725d6a5bde09ebad2cfe6ff0b002b16b3b93fe9150a608a180f511.apk

  • SHA256 b008e30590725d6a5bde09ebad2cfe6ff0b002b16b3b93fe9150a608a180f511
  • MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
  • Android SMS interception and OTP exfiltration

    Registers a high-priority SMS_RECEIVED receiver, parses inbound message bodies and aborts the broadcast to hide messages from the user, alongside network exfiltration primitives. This is the standard 2FA/OTP theft pattern used to complete fraudulent transactions.

  • Android dropper: runtime DEX/class loading of a staged payload

    Sample resolves and loads executable code at runtime via DexClassLoader/InMemoryDexClassLoader combined with reflection and asset or network payload retrieval. Legitimate apps rarely need in-memory DEX loading; this is the standard staging mechanism for Android droppers evading store review.

  • Boot-triggered restart with disguised foreground service

    Restarts itself on device boot and holds a foreground service with a low-visibility notification channel, keeping the process alive across reboots and outside normal background limits. Malicious use is distinguished by pairing this with surveillance or remote-control primitives.

  • Contact harvesting with SMS self-propagation

    Reads the device contact list and sends messages to the retrieved numbers, the distribution mechanism behind SMS worm campaigns. The victim's own address book becomes the delivery channel, which is why these campaigns spread rapidly within a region.

  • Root, emulator and instrumentation-framework detection

    Probes for superuser binaries, emulator build properties and dynamic instrumentation frameworks. Malware uses these checks to stay dormant inside analysis environments, so a sample matching this rule with an otherwise empty behavioural report should be treated as evasive rather than benign.

  • Runtime string decryption with reflective method dispatch

    Combines symmetric decryption or base64 decoding of embedded string tables with reflective class and method resolution, so sensitive API names never appear in plaintext. This defeats naive string-based detection and indicates deliberate anti-analysis engineering.

  • Untrusted Codesign Signers

    Codesigned file was signed by an untrusted entity.

File Signature issue

Digest
dccebb279aa118147883f4534286709f4dbe46cd312f2b52d63945b9d93f2c369f3c69fad0794ca4269b3e6702bd29a9ca7c549e416102e6b109cbcd0bab4d2a
Digest Algorithm
sha512
Digest Matches
Trusted
Not trusted
Signer
CN=Android,OU=Android,O=Google Inc.,L=Mountain View,ST=California,C=US
com.text.chatting.messaging.messagebox

Android Permissions

b008e30590725d6a5bde09ebad2cfe6ff0b002b16b3b93fe9150a608a180f511.apk

Permissions

android.permission.READ_SMS

android.permission.RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED

android.permission.SCHEDULE_EXACT_ALARM

android.permission.WRITE_SMS

android.permission.SEND_SMS

android.permission.RECEIVE_SMS

android.permission.RECEIVE_MMS

android.provider.Telephony.SMS_RECEIVED

android.permission.READ_CONTACTS

android.permission.POST_NOTIFICATIONS

android.permission.RECEIVE_WAP_PUSH

android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE

android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE

android.permission.WAKE_LOCK

android.permission.SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW

android.permission.CHANGE_NETWORK_STATE

android.permission.INTERNET

com.google.android.gms.permission.AD_ID

android.permission.ACCESS_ADSERVICES_AD_ID

android.permission.ACCESS_ADSERVICES_ATTRIBUTION

android.permission.ACCESS_ADSERVICES_TOPICS

android.permission.FOREGROUND_SERVICE

com.android.vending.BILLING

com.google.android.c2dm.permission.RECEIVE

com.google.android.finsky.permission.BIND_GET_INSTALL_REFERRER_SERVICE

com.text.chatting.messaging.messagebox.DYNAMIC_RECEIVER_NOT_EXPORTED_PERMISSION

com.android.vending.CHECK_LICENSE