General
- Target 25939268046.zip
- Size 480KB
- Sample260909-rwgd6ace49
- SHA256 835c80e3951d85d574d6c081e5f75f65727709fb259090a44337e8c6dc381ebb
- MD5 465d87985174170ffb1cd4666e7175fe
- SHA1 c47277abd5d80eb086a350a6bb1e9a018140ab74
- SHA512 f3a7fcc9d473f75cd6a2e1a94ed764987dd8f3715bd1c5342201fe2f638917c57a2f67c2923e010e243ec15cb94edf28daaea0f35d4c39f0ec228e9af1e965e8
- SSDEEP 12288:IYGvG/CECAUyuG8h/fmIFAGikBkw7E+ELos:jxCJjGw/f3mikrTLv
- TLSH T1DCA4233D46AA3E54546274C35512020B9FE4A37A228A82FF4711659B4FC4FFF12B4FEA
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
Static task
static1
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
0fe1abbc7e54811754b072a177551ad257b4b65d67e0d40c61dce73660b50691.exe
Resource
win10v2004-20260513-en
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
0fe1abbc7e54811754b072a177551ad257b4b65d67e0d40c61dce73660b50691.exe
Resource
win11ltsc2024-20260709-en
Malware Config
Extracted
-
gozi
Targets
-
- Target 0fe1abbc7e54811754b072a177551ad257b4b65d67e0d40c61dce73660b50691
- Size 1014KB
- SHA256 0fe1abbc7e54811754b072a177551ad257b4b65d67e0d40c61dce73660b50691
- MD5 b12b48c1ca8ab7d97600e0ec3aeab4c8
- SHA1 16a2f2b949a4872f78a18ef5abd16815da5bfed2
- SHA512 2cc1abfd7da434cd89e89ec84a005b24f396aff15e8d54e6a157905e4ad7d38db49c03ec4ac7572d9324318dcababe6d18fd9480b740d959dfa670b5043ae435
- SSDEEP 24576:fQ1lIIAJFPFW/g+QpY4Bnw8aEOo0+YyQQQQQQQQQQ+QQQQQQQQQQQQQQlQQQQQQ1:KhAJFP4/yc/1oWyQQQQQQQQQQ+QQQQQK
- TLSH T145256B11F1B2F03ADD96C0FD86FB937A582C9B254B94BCC7A2C44D6E6B103D1B671289
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
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Checks for common network interception software
Looks in the registry for tools like Wireshark or Fiddler commonly used to analyze network activity.
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Enumerates VirtualBox registry keys
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Identifies VirtualBox via ACPI registry values (likely anti-VM)
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Drops file in Drivers directory
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Looks for VMWare services registry key.
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Sets service image path in registry
This determines the executable launched when a service starts. It can be used to establish persistence.
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Checks BIOS information in registry
BIOS information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
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Unexpected DNS network traffic destination
Network traffic to other servers than the configured DNS servers was detected on the DNS port.
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Adds Run key to start application
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Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Active Setup
Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a Registry key to the Active Setup of the local machine.
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Checks for any installed AV software in registry
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Enumerates connected drives
Attempts to read the root path of hard drives other than the default C: drive.
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Maps connected drives based on registry
Disk information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
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Writes to the Master Boot Record (MBR)
Bootkits write to the MBR to gain persistence at a level below the operating system.
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Drops file in System32 directory
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Event Triggered Execution: Component Object Model Hijacking
Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by hijacked references to Component Object Model (COM) objects.
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Suspicious use of NtSetInformationThreadHideFromDebugger
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Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v16
Persistence
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
3Active Setup
1Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
2Browser Extensions
1Create or Modify System Process
1Windows Service
1Event Triggered Execution
2Change Default File Association
1Component Object Model Hijacking
1Pre-OS Boot
1Bootkit
1Privilege Escalation
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
3Active Setup
1Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
2Create or Modify System Process
1Windows Service
1Event Triggered Execution
2Change Default File Association
1Component Object Model Hijacking
1Defense Evasion
Modify Registry
8Pre-OS Boot
1Bootkit
1Subvert Trust Controls
2Install Root Certificate
2Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
3Credential Access
Credentials from Password Stores
1Credentials from Web Browsers
1Unsecured Credentials
1Credentials In Files
1