quest | cbc0460c7a660f5678e0f6a0586b3e2deed83bc15481ce2c0017ab7217dbe9a3

General

Target
launcher.exe
Size 67.3MB
Sample261105-1n8m4she86
SHA256 cbc0460c7a660f5678e0f6a0586b3e2deed83bc15481ce2c0017ab7217dbe9a3
MD5 5df8b3b9975bcad67f2ccd120d6447eb
SHA1 5c8849613caaec3fb8bcf05adf1a2225b9d1115f
SHA512 593a37bb68a3a95a2eb7a150b53d0fd2c1c15995189ee507c05b59aa9091bc97690897b1e5a2512019ab18d8c2f270f939836abbb20ced0e527b2f4a0874a043
SSDEEP 1572864:1ejOYfxhXQD5WSecEldBRzZhNSKb85sqSUDV8oQ1TrP33:14XAecElrRzQKbFNUDV8oQ1ff3
TLSH
T140F733ECAEBCCE35F4C055B5E21667792EAEE98316AF284D7FFD4C0432A1445C648E18
MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH

Score

10^/10

Malware Config

Extracted

Path

C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\WinGet_Repaired\tools\Lib\site-packages\Crypto\Cipher\__pycache__\_mode_siv.cpython-310.pyc

Ransom Note

o ��e��j�4��@��s��d�Z�ddlmZ�ddlmZ�ddlmZmZmZm Z �dgZ ddlmZ�ddl mZ�ddlmZ�dd lmZ�dd lmZ�erCddlmZ�eeeef�ZG�dd��d�Zd d��ZdS�)z- Synthetic Initialization Vector (SIV) mode. ��)�annotations)�compare_digest)� TYPE_CHECKING�Optional�Union�overload�SivMode)� unhexlify)�Method)�_S2V)� is_buffer)� bytes_to_long)� ModuleTypec��@��s��e�Zd�ZdZd5dd�Zd d��Zd6dd�Zd7dd�Zd8dd�Zd9dd�Z d:dd�Z d;dd �Zd<d"d#�Ze d=d%d&��Ze d>d*d&��Z +[email protected]&�Ze dAd0d1��Ze dBd2d1��Z +d?dCd4d1�Zd+S�)Dr��a��Synthetic Initialization Vector (SIV). This is an Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (`AEAD`_) mode. It provides both confidentiality and authenticity. The header of the message may be left in the clear, if needed, and it will still be subject to authentication. The decryption step tells the receiver if the message comes from a source that really knows the secret key. Additionally, decryption detects if any part of the message - including the header - has been modified or corrupted. Unlike other AEAD modes such as CCM, EAX or GCM, accidental reuse of a nonce is not catastrophic for the confidentiality of the message. The only effect is that an attacker can tell when the same plaintext (and same associated data) is protected with the same key. The length of the MAC is fixed to the block size of the underlying cipher. The key size is twice the length of the key of the underlying cipher. This mode is only available for AES ciphers. +--------------------+---------------+-------------------+ | Cipher | SIV MAC size | SIV key length | | | (bytes) | (bytes) | +====================+===============+===================+ | AES-128 | 16 | 32 | +--------------------+---------------+-------------------+ | AES-192 | 16 | 48 | +--------------------+---------------+-------------------+ | AES-256 | 16 | 64 | +--------------------+---------------+-------------------+ See `RFC5297`_ and the `original paper`__. .. _RFC5297: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5297 .. _AEAD: http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2012/05/how-to-choose-authenticated-encryption.html .. __: http://www.cs.ucdavis.edu/~rogaway/papers/keywrap.pdf �factoryr��key�Buffer�nonce�kwargs�dict�return�Nonec��C��s��|j�|�_� �||�_||�_t|�dvrtdt|��|d�ur5t|�s%td��t|�dkr/td��t|�|�_ �t|�d�}d�|�_ t |d�|��||�jd�|�_||d��|�_|j |d�|��|jfi�|��tjtjtjtjtjg|�_d�S�)N)� ��0��@��zIncorrect key length (%d bytes)z?When provided, the nonce must be bytes, bytearray or memoryviewr��z*When provided, the nonce must be non-empty��)Z ciphermodZ cipher_params)� block_size�_factory�_cipher_params�len� ValueErrorr�� TypeError�bytesr��_mac_tagr��_kdf�_subkey_cipher�newZMODE_ECBr ��UPDATE�ENCRYPT�DECRYPT�DIGEST�VERIFY�_next)�selfr��r��r��r��Zsubkey_size��r-��dC:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\WinGet_Repaired\tools\Lib\site-packages\Crypto/Cipher/_mode_siv.py�__init__D��s&�� zSivMode.__init__c��C��s4��t�|�}|d@�}|�jj|�j|�jjf|dd�|�j��S�)z*Create a new CTR cipher from V in SIV model ��)� initial_valuer��N)r ��r��r%��r$��ZMODE_CTRr��)r,��vZv_int�qr-��r-��r.��_create_ctr_cipherf��s�� zSivMode._create_ctr_cipher� componentc��C��s>��t�j|�jvr td��t�jt�jt�jt�jt�jg|�_|�j� |��|�S�)a��Protect one associated data component For SIV, the associated data is a sequence (*vector*) of non-empty byte strings (*components*). This method consumes the next component. It must be called once for each of the components that constitue the associated data. Note that the components have clear boundaries, so that: >>> cipher.update(b"builtin") >>> cipher.update(b"securely") is not equivalent to: >>> cipher.update(b"built") >>> cipher.update(b"insecurely") If there is no associated data, this method must not be called. Args: component (bytes/bytearray/memoryview): The next associated data component. z<update() can only be called immediately after initializationN) r ��r&��r+��r ��r'��r(��r)��r*��r#��update)r,��r5��r-��r-��r.��r6��o��s ��zSivMode.update� plaintextr!��c��C��t�d��)z� For SIV, encryption and MAC authentication must take place at the same point. This method shall not be used. Use `encrypt_and_digest` instead. zEencrypt() not allowed for SIV mode. Use encrypt_and_digest() instead.N�r ��r,��r7��r-��r-��r.��encrypt��zSivMode.encrypt� ciphertextc��C��r8��)z� For SIV, decryption and verification must take place at the same point. This method shall not be used. Use `decrypt_and_verify` instead. zEdecrypt() not allowed for SIV mode. Use decrypt_and_verify() instead.Nr9��)r,��r=��r-��r-��r.��decrypt��r<��zSivMode.decryptc��C��s:��t�j|�jvr td��t�jg|�_|�jdu�r|�j��|�_|�jS�)a ��Compute the *binary* MAC tag. The caller invokes this function at the very end. This method returns the MAC that shall be sent to the receiver, together with the ciphertext. Returns: the MAC, as a byte string. zAdigest() cannot be called when decrypting or validating a messageN)r ��r)��r+��r ��r"��r#��derive�r,��r-��r-��r.��digest��s�� zSivMode.digest�strc��C��s��|��S�)z�Compute the *printable* MAC tag. This method is like `digest`. Returns: the MAC, as a hexadecimal string. N)rA��hexr@��r-��r-��r.�� hexdigest��s��zSivMode.hexdigest�received_mac_tagc��C��sL��t�j|�jvr td��t�jg|�_|�jdu�r|�j��|�_t|�j|�s$td��dS�)a<��Validate the *binary* MAC tag. The caller invokes this function at the very end. This method checks if the decrypted message is indeed valid (that is, if the key is correct) and it has not been tampered with while in transit. Args: received_mac_tag (bytes/bytearray/memoryview): This is the *binary* MAC, as received from the sender. Raises: ValueError: if the MAC does not match. The message has been tampered with or the key is incorrect. z3verify() cannot be called when encrypting a messageNzMAC check failed) r ��r*��r+��r ��r"��r#��r?��r��r��)r,��rE��r-��r-��r.��verify��s�� zSivMode.verify�hex_mac_tagc��C��s��|��t|��dS�)ak��Validate the *printable* MAC tag. This method is like `verify`. Args: hex_mac_tag (string): This is the *printable* MAC, as received from the sender. Raises: ValueError: if the MAC does not match. The message has been tampered with or the key is incorrect. N)rF��r ��)r,��rG��r-��r-��r.�� hexverify��s��zSivMode.hexverify�tuple[bytes, bytes]c��C��d�S��Nr-��r:��r-��r-��r.��encrypt_and_digest��zSivMode.encrypt_and_digest�output�Union[bytearray, memoryview]�tuple[None, bytes]c��C��rJ��rK��r-��)r,��r7��rN��r-��r-��r.��rL��N�&Optional[Union[bytearray, memoryview]]�tuple[Optional[bytes], bytes]c��C��sn��t�j|�jvr td��t�jg|�_t|�d�r|�j�|�j��|�j�|��|�j� ��|�_ |��|�j �}|j||d�|�j fS�)a)��Perform encrypt() and digest() in one step. Args: plaintext (bytes/bytearray/memoryview): The piece of data to encrypt. Keyword Args: output (bytearray/memoryview): The location where the ciphertext must be written to. If ``None``, the ciphertext is returned. Returns: The tuple ``(ciphertext, tag)``, both ``bytes``. The ciphertext is ``None`` when the ``output`` parameter specified a location for the result. z@encrypt() can only be called after initialization or an update()r��rN��N) r ��r'��r+��r ��r)��hasattrr#��r6��r��r?��r"��r4��r;��)r,��r7��rN��cipherr-��r-��r.��rL��s�� mac_tagc��C��rJ��rK��r-��)r,��r=��rW��r-��r-��r.��decrypt_and_verify��rM��zSivMode.decrypt_and_verifyc��C��rJ��rK��r-��)r,��r=��rW��rN��r-��r-��r.��rX��rQ��Optional[bytes]c��C��sx��t�j|�jvr td��t�jg|�_|��|�|�_|�jj||d�}t|�d�r)|�j � |�j��|�j � |du�r2|n|��|��|��|S�)a��Perform decryption and verification in one step. A cipher object is stateful: once you have decrypted a message you cannot decrypt (or encrypt) another message with the same object. You cannot reuse an object for encrypting or decrypting other data with the same key. This function does not remove any padding from the plaintext. Args: ciphertext (bytes/bytearray/memoryview): The piece of data to decrypt. It can be of any length. mac_tag (bytes/bytearray/memoryview): This is the *binary* MAC, as received from the sender. Keyword Args: output (bytearray/memoryview): The location where the plaintext must be written to. If ``None``, the plaintext is returned. Returns: the plaintext as ``bytes`` or ``None`` when the ``output`` parameter specified a location for the result. Raises: ValueError: if the MAC does not match. The message has been tampered with or the key is incorrect. z@decrypt() can only be called after initialization or an update()rT��r��N) r ��r(��r+��r ��r*��r4��Z_cipherr>��rU��r#��r6��r��rF��)r,��r=��rW��rN��r7��r-��r-��r.��rX��s��! ) r��r��r��r��r��r��r��r��r��r��)r5��r��r��r��)r7��r��r��r!��)r=��r��r��r!��)r��r!��)r��rB��)rE��r��r��r��)rG��rB��r��r��)r7��r��r��rI��)r7��r��rN��rO��r��rP��rK��)r7��r��rN��rR��r��rS��)r=��r��rW��r��r��r!��)r=��r��rW��r��rN��rO��r��r��)r=��r��rW��r��rN��rR��r��rY��)�__name__� __module__�__qualname__�__doc__r/��r4��r6��r;��r>��rA��rD��rF��rH��r��rL��rX��r-��r-��r-��r.��r��s.�� '" " �!�c�� K��sR��z|��d�}W�n�ty�}�ztdt|��d}~ww�|��dd�}t|�|||�S�)a^��Create a new block cipher, configured in Synthetic Initializaton Vector (SIV) mode. Args: factory (object): A symmetric cipher module from `Crypto.Cipher` (like `Crypto.Cipher.AES`). Keyword Args: key (bytes/bytearray/memoryview): The secret key to use in the symmetric cipher. It must be 32, 48 or 64 bytes long. If AES is the chosen cipher, the variants *AES-128*, *AES-192* and or *AES-256* will be used internally. nonce (bytes/bytearray/memoryview): For deterministic encryption, it is not present. Otherwise, it is a value that must never be reused for encrypting message under this key. There are no restrictions on its length, but it is recommended to use at least 16 bytes. r��zMissing parameter: Nr��)�pop�KeyErrorr ��rB��r��)r��r��r��er��r-��r-��r.��_create_siv_cipherQ��s��ra��N)r]�� __future__r��hmacr��typingr��r��r��r��__all__�binasciir ��ZCrypto.Cipher._state_machiner ��ZCrypto.Protocol.KDFr��ZCrypto.Util._raw_apir��ZCrypto.Util.numberr ��typesr��r!�� bytearray� memoryviewr��r��ra��r-��r-��r-��r.��<module>��s"��7

Emails

+[email protected]&�Ze

Extracted

Path

C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\WinGet_Repaired\tools\Lib\site-packages\Crypto\Cipher\__pycache__\_mode_siv.cpython-310.pyc

Ransom Note

o ��`��j�4��@��s��d�Z�ddlmZ�ddlmZ�ddlmZmZmZm Z �dgZ ddlmZ�ddl mZ�ddlmZ�dd lmZ�dd lmZ�erCddlmZ�eeeef�ZG�dd��d�Zd d��ZdS�)z- Synthetic Initialization Vector (SIV) mode. ��)�annotations)�compare_digest)� TYPE_CHECKING�Optional�Union�overload�SivMode)� unhexlify)�Method)�_S2V)� is_buffer)� bytes_to_long)� ModuleTypec��@��s��e�Zd�ZdZd5dd�Zd d��Zd6dd�Zd7dd�Zd8dd�Zd9dd�Z d:dd�Z d;dd �Zd<d"d#�Ze d=d%d&��Ze d>d*d&��Z +[email protected]&�Ze dAd0d1��Ze dBd2d1��Z +d?dCd4d1�Zd+S�)Dr��a��Synthetic Initialization Vector (SIV). This is an Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (`AEAD`_) mode. It provides both confidentiality and authenticity. The header of the message may be left in the clear, if needed, and it will still be subject to authentication. The decryption step tells the receiver if the message comes from a source that really knows the secret key. Additionally, decryption detects if any part of the message - including the header - has been modified or corrupted. Unlike other AEAD modes such as CCM, EAX or GCM, accidental reuse of a nonce is not catastrophic for the confidentiality of the message. The only effect is that an attacker can tell when the same plaintext (and same associated data) is protected with the same key. The length of the MAC is fixed to the block size of the underlying cipher. The key size is twice the length of the key of the underlying cipher. This mode is only available for AES ciphers. +--------------------+---------------+-------------------+ | Cipher | SIV MAC size | SIV key length | | | (bytes) | (bytes) | +====================+===============+===================+ | AES-128 | 16 | 32 | +--------------------+---------------+-------------------+ | AES-192 | 16 | 48 | +--------------------+---------------+-------------------+ | AES-256 | 16 | 64 | +--------------------+---------------+-------------------+ See `RFC5297`_ and the `original paper`__. .. _RFC5297: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5297 .. _AEAD: http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2012/05/how-to-choose-authenticated-encryption.html .. __: http://www.cs.ucdavis.edu/~rogaway/papers/keywrap.pdf �factoryr��key�Buffer�nonce�kwargs�dict�return�Nonec��C��s��|j�|�_� �||�_||�_t|�dvrtdt|��|d�ur5t|�s%td��t|�dkr/td��t|�|�_ �t|�d�}d�|�_ t |d�|��||�jd�|�_||d��|�_|j |d�|��|jfi�|��tjtjtjtjtjg|�_d�S�)N)� ��0��@��zIncorrect key length (%d bytes)z?When provided, the nonce must be bytes, bytearray or memoryviewr��z*When provided, the nonce must be non-empty��)Z ciphermodZ cipher_params)� block_size�_factory�_cipher_params�len� ValueErrorr�� TypeError�bytesr��_mac_tagr��_kdf�_subkey_cipher�newZMODE_ECBr ��UPDATE�ENCRYPT�DECRYPT�DIGEST�VERIFY�_next)�selfr��r��r��r��Zsubkey_size��r-��dC:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\WinGet_Repaired\tools\Lib\site-packages\Crypto/Cipher/_mode_siv.py�__init__D��s&�� zSivMode.__init__c��C��s4��t�|�}|d@�}|�jj|�j|�jjf|dd�|�j��S�)z*Create a new CTR cipher from V in SIV model ��)� initial_valuer��N)r ��r��r%��r$��ZMODE_CTRr��)r,��vZv_int�qr-��r-��r.��_create_ctr_cipherf��s�� zSivMode._create_ctr_cipher� componentc��C��s>��t�j|�jvr td��t�jt�jt�jt�jt�jg|�_|�j� |��|�S�)a��Protect one associated data component For SIV, the associated data is a sequence (*vector*) of non-empty byte strings (*components*). This method consumes the next component. It must be called once for each of the components that constitue the associated data. Note that the components have clear boundaries, so that: >>> cipher.update(b"builtin") >>> cipher.update(b"securely") is not equivalent to: >>> cipher.update(b"built") >>> cipher.update(b"insecurely") If there is no associated data, this method must not be called. Args: component (bytes/bytearray/memoryview): The next associated data component. z<update() can only be called immediately after initializationN) r ��r&��r+��r ��r'��r(��r)��r*��r#��update)r,��r5��r-��r-��r.��r6��o��s ��zSivMode.update� plaintextr!��c��C��t�d��)z� For SIV, encryption and MAC authentication must take place at the same point. This method shall not be used. Use `encrypt_and_digest` instead. zEencrypt() not allowed for SIV mode. Use encrypt_and_digest() instead.N�r ��r,��r7��r-��r-��r.��encrypt��zSivMode.encrypt� ciphertextc��C��r8��)z� For SIV, decryption and verification must take place at the same point. This method shall not be used. Use `decrypt_and_verify` instead. zEdecrypt() not allowed for SIV mode. Use decrypt_and_verify() instead.Nr9��)r,��r=��r-��r-��r.��decrypt��r<��zSivMode.decryptc��C��s:��t�j|�jvr td��t�jg|�_|�jdu�r|�j��|�_|�jS�)a ��Compute the *binary* MAC tag. The caller invokes this function at the very end. This method returns the MAC that shall be sent to the receiver, together with the ciphertext. Returns: the MAC, as a byte string. zAdigest() cannot be called when decrypting or validating a messageN)r ��r)��r+��r ��r"��r#��derive�r,��r-��r-��r.��digest��s�� zSivMode.digest�strc��C��s��|��S�)z�Compute the *printable* MAC tag. This method is like `digest`. Returns: the MAC, as a hexadecimal string. N)rA��hexr@��r-��r-��r.�� hexdigest��s��zSivMode.hexdigest�received_mac_tagc��C��sL��t�j|�jvr td��t�jg|�_|�jdu�r|�j��|�_t|�j|�s$td��dS�)a<��Validate the *binary* MAC tag. The caller invokes this function at the very end. This method checks if the decrypted message is indeed valid (that is, if the key is correct) and it has not been tampered with while in transit. Args: received_mac_tag (bytes/bytearray/memoryview): This is the *binary* MAC, as received from the sender. Raises: ValueError: if the MAC does not match. The message has been tampered with or the key is incorrect. z3verify() cannot be called when encrypting a messageNzMAC check failed) r ��r*��r+��r ��r"��r#��r?��r��r��)r,��rE��r-��r-��r.��verify��s�� zSivMode.verify�hex_mac_tagc��C��s��|��t|��dS�)ak��Validate the *printable* MAC tag. This method is like `verify`. Args: hex_mac_tag (string): This is the *printable* MAC, as received from the sender. Raises: ValueError: if the MAC does not match. The message has been tampered with or the key is incorrect. N)rF��r ��)r,��rG��r-��r-��r.�� hexverify��s��zSivMode.hexverify�tuple[bytes, bytes]c��C��d�S��Nr-��r:��r-��r-��r.��encrypt_and_digest��zSivMode.encrypt_and_digest�output�Union[bytearray, memoryview]�tuple[None, bytes]c��C��rJ��rK��r-��)r,��r7��rN��r-��r-��r.��rL��N�&Optional[Union[bytearray, memoryview]]�tuple[Optional[bytes], bytes]c��C��sn��t�j|�jvr td��t�jg|�_t|�d�r|�j�|�j��|�j�|��|�j� ��|�_ |��|�j �}|j||d�|�j fS�)a)��Perform encrypt() and digest() in one step. Args: plaintext (bytes/bytearray/memoryview): The piece of data to encrypt. Keyword Args: output (bytearray/memoryview): The location where the ciphertext must be written to. If ``None``, the ciphertext is returned. Returns: The tuple ``(ciphertext, tag)``, both ``bytes``. The ciphertext is ``None`` when the ``output`` parameter specified a location for the result. z@encrypt() can only be called after initialization or an update()r��rN��N) r ��r'��r+��r ��r)��hasattrr#��r6��r��r?��r"��r4��r;��)r,��r7��rN��cipherr-��r-��r.��rL��s�� mac_tagc��C��rJ��rK��r-��)r,��r=��rW��r-��r-��r.��decrypt_and_verify��rM��zSivMode.decrypt_and_verifyc��C��rJ��rK��r-��)r,��r=��rW��rN��r-��r-��r.��rX��rQ��Optional[bytes]c��C��sx��t�j|�jvr td��t�jg|�_|��|�|�_|�jj||d�}t|�d�r)|�j � |�j��|�j � |du�r2|n|��|��|��|S�)a��Perform decryption and verification in one step. A cipher object is stateful: once you have decrypted a message you cannot decrypt (or encrypt) another message with the same object. You cannot reuse an object for encrypting or decrypting other data with the same key. This function does not remove any padding from the plaintext. Args: ciphertext (bytes/bytearray/memoryview): The piece of data to decrypt. It can be of any length. mac_tag (bytes/bytearray/memoryview): This is the *binary* MAC, as received from the sender. Keyword Args: output (bytearray/memoryview): The location where the plaintext must be written to. If ``None``, the plaintext is returned. Returns: the plaintext as ``bytes`` or ``None`` when the ``output`` parameter specified a location for the result. Raises: ValueError: if the MAC does not match. The message has been tampered with or the key is incorrect. z@decrypt() can only be called after initialization or an update()rT��r��N) r ��r(��r+��r ��r*��r4��Z_cipherr>��rU��r#��r6��r��rF��)r,��r=��rW��rN��r7��r-��r-��r.��rX��s��! ) r��r��r��r��r��r��r��r��r��r��)r5��r��r��r��)r7��r��r��r!��)r=��r��r��r!��)r��r!��)r��rB��)rE��r��r��r��)rG��rB��r��r��)r7��r��r��rI��)r7��r��rN��rO��r��rP��rK��)r7��r��rN��rR��r��rS��)r=��r��rW��r��r��r!��)r=��r��rW��r��rN��rO��r��r��)r=��r��rW��r��rN��rR��r��rY��)�__name__� __module__�__qualname__�__doc__r/��r4��r6��r;��r>��rA��rD��rF��rH��r��rL��rX��r-��r-��r-��r.��r��s.�� '" " �!�c�� K��sR��z|��d�}W�n�ty�}�ztdt|��d}~ww�|��dd�}t|�|||�S�)a^��Create a new block cipher, configured in Synthetic Initializaton Vector (SIV) mode. Args: factory (object): A symmetric cipher module from `Crypto.Cipher` (like `Crypto.Cipher.AES`). Keyword Args: key (bytes/bytearray/memoryview): The secret key to use in the symmetric cipher. It must be 32, 48 or 64 bytes long. If AES is the chosen cipher, the variants *AES-128*, *AES-192* and or *AES-256* will be used internally. nonce (bytes/bytearray/memoryview): For deterministic encryption, it is not present. Otherwise, it is a value that must never be reused for encrypting message under this key. There are no restrictions on its length, but it is recommended to use at least 16 bytes. r��zMissing parameter: Nr��)�pop�KeyErrorr ��rB��r��)r��r��r��er��r-��r-��r.��_create_siv_cipherQ��s��ra��N)r]�� __future__r��hmacr��typingr��r��r��r��__all__�binasciir ��ZCrypto.Cipher._state_machiner ��ZCrypto.Protocol.KDFr��ZCrypto.Util._raw_apir��ZCrypto.Util.numberr ��typesr��r!�� bytearray� memoryviewr��r��ra��r-��r-��r-��r.��<module>��s"��7

Emails

+[email protected]&�Ze

Targets

- Target
  launcher.exe
- Size 67.3MB
- SHA256 cbc0460c7a660f5678e0f6a0586b3e2deed83bc15481ce2c0017ab7217dbe9a3
- MD5 5df8b3b9975bcad67f2ccd120d6447eb
- SHA1 5c8849613caaec3fb8bcf05adf1a2225b9d1115f
- SHA512 593a37bb68a3a95a2eb7a150b53d0fd2c1c15995189ee507c05b59aa9091bc97690897b1e5a2512019ab18d8c2f270f939836abbb20ced0e527b2f4a0874a043
- SSDEEP 1572864:1ejOYfxhXQD5WSecEldBRzZhNSKb85sqSUDV8oQ1TrP33:14XAecElrRzQKbFNUDV8oQ1ff3
- TLSH
  T140F733ECAEBCCE35F4C055B5E21667792EAEE98316AF284D7FFD4C0432A1445C648E18
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
Score

10^/10

defense_evasion discovery execution quest ransomware rat spyware stealer
- Family: Quest,Voog,Frost
  Quest aka VoogStealer and FrostStealer is a Windows stealer based on ElectronJS.
  stealer rat quest
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
  Run Powershell and hide display window.
  execution
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
  Using powershell.exe command.
  execution
- Checks computer location settings
  Looks up country code configured in the registry, likely geofence.
- Executes dropped EXE
- Loads dropped DLL
- Reads user/profile data of web browsers
  Infostealers often target stored browser data, which can include saved credentials etc.
  spyware stealer
- Contacts third-party web service commonly abused for C2
  Legitimate web (hosting) services can be abused by malware authors to host malware or C2s.
- Looks up external IP address via web service
  Uses a legitimate IP lookup service to find the infected system's external IP.
  discovery
- Uses WMI to collect hardware manufacturer information
  Uses WMI to read the system manufacturer, model, baseboard or display adapter, which is often used to detect virtual machines and evade sandboxes.
  defense_evasion
- Discovers running processes
  Running process information can be used to identify security tools or plan follow-on actions.
  discovery
behavioral1 behavioral2