General

  • Target

    2d5acb15c60661a14d261d8154d52c3d3f6504a56311d49b7c55f6c4bbd210ba.bin

  • Size

    2.1MB

  • Sample

    250108-1xqtnaxphk

  • MD5

    a9366e278964efbf2fdf54057355fcea

  • SHA1

    4b99fb34e6fd8ab9c7ac36db40ba46e57d8b0b29

  • SHA256

    2d5acb15c60661a14d261d8154d52c3d3f6504a56311d49b7c55f6c4bbd210ba

  • SHA512

    82e626c108851bc367528f0b26fd37a29e0a787cd0c2bdaa25d6be95b118f3f1547692282007f2f590d24eaff9a409957c96f910c4cfb114944dadeae77d9182

  • SSDEEP

    49152:anfOtaUWQZM7N3MyG4K1pHZi7XUZ/5zX5zI2UcZ018HgxWPfC7YDn:afOaQ271Mxh1akPzJzOcWtxiK78n

Malware Config

Extracted

Family

octo

C2

https://yesmincanruslane.xyz/YjVmNGU0NmNhODlm/

https://kaderbaglantilarindayanisma.xyz/YjVmNGU0NmNhODlm/

https://sevgikadervedostlukhikayesi.xyz/YjVmNGU0NmNhODlm/

https://kaderseverleryolculuknotlari.xyz/YjVmNGU0NmNhODlm/

https://kadersohbetleriilepaylasim.xyz/YjVmNGU0NmNhODlm/

https://kaderinyansimalarindankareler.xyz/YjVmNGU0NmNhODlm/

https://kaderduygularivebaglantilar.xyz/YjVmNGU0NmNhODlm/

https://kadersevgininkalptenhikayesi.xyz/YjVmNGU0NmNhODlm/

https://kaderdostlukvegizemlianilar.xyz/YjVmNGU0NmNhODlm/

https://kadersozlerlehikayeveriyor.xyz/YjVmNGU0NmNhODlm/

https://kaderlerarasisamimiuyum.xyz/YjVmNGU0NmNhODlm/

https://kaderduygusalbagvetutkular.xyz/YjVmNGU0NmNhODlm/

https://kaderseverlerinrenklidunyasi.xyz/YjVmNGU0NmNhODlm/

https://kadersanatisozlerdeninsanlara.xyz/YjVmNGU0NmNhODlm/

https://kadersevgiyletasanumut.xyz/YjVmNGU0NmNhODlm/

https://kaderseverlerpaylasimbahcesi.xyz/YjVmNGU0NmNhODlm/

https://kaderdostlarivehayatbaglari.xyz/YjVmNGU0NmNhODlm/

https://kadersanatinrenkligolgeleri.xyz/YjVmNGU0NmNhODlm/

https://kaderinhayatdolasimbirligi.xyz/YjVmNGU0NmNhODlm/

https://kaderinsadekalptenyansimalari.xyz/YjVmNGU0NmNhODlm/

rc4.plain

Extracted

Family

octo

C2

https://yesmincanruslane.xyz/YjVmNGU0NmNhODlm/

https://kaderbaglantilarindayanisma.xyz/YjVmNGU0NmNhODlm/

https://sevgikadervedostlukhikayesi.xyz/YjVmNGU0NmNhODlm/

https://kaderseverleryolculuknotlari.xyz/YjVmNGU0NmNhODlm/

https://kadersohbetleriilepaylasim.xyz/YjVmNGU0NmNhODlm/

https://kaderinyansimalarindankareler.xyz/YjVmNGU0NmNhODlm/

https://kaderduygularivebaglantilar.xyz/YjVmNGU0NmNhODlm/

https://kadersevgininkalptenhikayesi.xyz/YjVmNGU0NmNhODlm/

https://kaderdostlukvegizemlianilar.xyz/YjVmNGU0NmNhODlm/

https://kadersozlerlehikayeveriyor.xyz/YjVmNGU0NmNhODlm/

https://kaderlerarasisamimiuyum.xyz/YjVmNGU0NmNhODlm/

https://kaderduygusalbagvetutkular.xyz/YjVmNGU0NmNhODlm/

https://kaderseverlerinrenklidunyasi.xyz/YjVmNGU0NmNhODlm/

https://kadersanatisozlerdeninsanlara.xyz/YjVmNGU0NmNhODlm/

https://kadersevgiyletasanumut.xyz/YjVmNGU0NmNhODlm/

https://kaderseverlerpaylasimbahcesi.xyz/YjVmNGU0NmNhODlm/

https://kaderdostlarivehayatbaglari.xyz/YjVmNGU0NmNhODlm/

https://kadersanatinrenkligolgeleri.xyz/YjVmNGU0NmNhODlm/

https://kaderinhayatdolasimbirligi.xyz/YjVmNGU0NmNhODlm/

https://kaderinsadekalptenyansimalari.xyz/YjVmNGU0NmNhODlm/

AES_key

Targets

    • Target

      2d5acb15c60661a14d261d8154d52c3d3f6504a56311d49b7c55f6c4bbd210ba.bin

    • Size

      2.1MB

    • MD5

      a9366e278964efbf2fdf54057355fcea

    • SHA1

      4b99fb34e6fd8ab9c7ac36db40ba46e57d8b0b29

    • SHA256

      2d5acb15c60661a14d261d8154d52c3d3f6504a56311d49b7c55f6c4bbd210ba

    • SHA512

      82e626c108851bc367528f0b26fd37a29e0a787cd0c2bdaa25d6be95b118f3f1547692282007f2f590d24eaff9a409957c96f910c4cfb114944dadeae77d9182

    • SSDEEP

      49152:anfOtaUWQZM7N3MyG4K1pHZi7XUZ/5zX5zI2UcZ018HgxWPfC7YDn:afOaQ271Mxh1akPzJzOcWtxiK78n

    • Octo

      Octo is a banking malware with remote access capabilities first seen in April 2022.

    • Octo family

    • Octo payload

    • Removes its main activity from the application launcher

    • Loads dropped Dex/Jar

      Runs executable file dropped to the device during analysis.

    • Makes use of the framework's Accessibility service

      Retrieves information displayed on the phone screen using AccessibilityService.

    • Queries a list of all the installed applications on the device (Might be used in an attempt to overlay legitimate apps)

    • Queries the phone number (MSISDN for GSM devices)

    • Acquires the wake lock

    • Makes use of the framework's foreground persistence service

      Application may abuse the framework's foreground service to continue running in the foreground.

    • Performs UI accessibility actions on behalf of the user

      Application may abuse the accessibility service to prevent their removal.

    • Queries the mobile country code (MCC)

    • Queries the unique device ID (IMEI, MEID, IMSI)

    • Reads information about phone network operator.

    • Requests accessing notifications (often used to intercept notifications before users become aware).

    • Requests disabling of battery optimizations (often used to enable hiding in the background).

    • Requests modifying system settings.

MITRE ATT&CK Mobile v15

Tasks