General

  • Target

    46fe13f0c740fa954950b7d949416add06b3132626f4135d7eef9e0237cc7c4d.bin

  • Size

    964KB

  • Sample

    250223-1xdt4axkgj

  • MD5

    5096578c781d9dfc685c5a44aefe7d50

  • SHA1

    f60e5cc00feb81a018e8fc6bee474d9737d13689

  • SHA256

    46fe13f0c740fa954950b7d949416add06b3132626f4135d7eef9e0237cc7c4d

  • SHA512

    972b7c212c6fcdf63970ebf78f24c2aa07d4c30be5cd2020c7977ef361ded1f314702095b558cb94407e03108cbad566001e29064f8f691f6f9eb295fab90f14

  • SSDEEP

    24576:9y5bZfBeuAYFaQpHEKgQLSqdF9SOVIYpg/DVxp:Y5bZpeuFmPQ+qEOOYpg/fp

Malware Config

Extracted

Family

ermac

C2

http://176.65.137.197

AES_key
1
736f73695f736f7369736f6e5f5f5f5f
AES_key
1
3141317a5031655035514765666932444d505466544c35534c6d763744697666

Targets

    • Target

      46fe13f0c740fa954950b7d949416add06b3132626f4135d7eef9e0237cc7c4d.bin

    • Size

      964KB

    • MD5

      5096578c781d9dfc685c5a44aefe7d50

    • SHA1

      f60e5cc00feb81a018e8fc6bee474d9737d13689

    • SHA256

      46fe13f0c740fa954950b7d949416add06b3132626f4135d7eef9e0237cc7c4d

    • SHA512

      972b7c212c6fcdf63970ebf78f24c2aa07d4c30be5cd2020c7977ef361ded1f314702095b558cb94407e03108cbad566001e29064f8f691f6f9eb295fab90f14

    • SSDEEP

      24576:9y5bZfBeuAYFaQpHEKgQLSqdF9SOVIYpg/DVxp:Y5bZpeuFmPQ+qEOOYpg/fp

    • Ermac

      An Android banking trojan first seen in July 2021.

    • Ermac family

    • Removes its main activity from the application launcher

    • Makes use of the framework's Accessibility service

      Retrieves information displayed on the phone screen using AccessibilityService.

    • Obtains sensitive information copied to the device clipboard

      Application may abuse the framework's APIs to obtain sensitive information copied to the device clipboard.

    • Queries a list of all the installed applications on the device (Might be used in an attempt to overlay legitimate apps)

    • Queries the phone number (MSISDN for GSM devices)

    • Acquires the wake lock

    • Makes use of the framework's foreground persistence service

      Application may abuse the framework's foreground service to continue running in the foreground.

    • Performs UI accessibility actions on behalf of the user

      Application may abuse the accessibility service to prevent their removal.

    • Queries the mobile country code (MCC)

    • Queries the unique device ID (IMEI, MEID, IMSI)

    • Requests disabling of battery optimizations (often used to enable hiding in the background).

MITRE ATT&CK Mobile v15

Tasks

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