User tags

Assigned on submission by the user, not by sandbox detections.

scan:0dc975df4f929ed0422fb5c9a9582d3d5e11ab176cc3176e269b2a456d48d571

Resubmissions

09/08/2026, 12:19

260809-phfvcsz1g110

09/08/2026, 12:14

260809-pehjsaac9510

General

  • Target
    17f953c6362e451da1786816a0d8d7d1_0dc975df4f929ed0422fb5c9a9582d3d5e11ab176cc3176e269b2a456d48d571.apk
  • Size 1.9MB
  • Sample260809-pehjsaac95
  • SHA256 0dc975df4f929ed0422fb5c9a9582d3d5e11ab176cc3176e269b2a456d48d571
  • MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH

Malware Config

Extracted

Family
  • ermac

C2
  • http://193.106.191.118

AES_key
AES_key

Targets

    • Target
      17f953c6362e451da1786816a0d8d7d1_0dc975df4f929ed0422fb5c9a9582d3d5e11ab176cc3176e269b2a456d48d571.apk
    • Size 1.9MB
    • SHA256 0dc975df4f929ed0422fb5c9a9582d3d5e11ab176cc3176e269b2a456d48d571
    • MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
    • Ermac2 payload

    • Family: Ermac

      An Android banking trojan first seen in July 2021.

    • Android banker: accessibility service abuse with overlay injection

      DEX references AccessibilityService event hooks together with window-overlay creation and credential-capture primitives. This combination is the canonical Android banking-trojan pattern: the app reads screen content and injects fake login windows over legitimate banking apps.

    • Clipboard monitoring with cryptocurrency address substitution

      Watches clipboard changes and matches the contents against cryptocurrency address formats before writing a replacement value. The embedded address patterns exist so the app can recognise a copied wallet and swap in the operator's own, redirecting outgoing transfers.

    • Contact harvesting with SMS self-propagation

      Reads the device contact list and sends messages to the retrieved numbers, the distribution mechanism behind SMS worm campaigns. The victim's own address book becomes the delivery channel, which is why these campaigns spread rapidly within a region.

    • Encrypted or packed staged payload inside Android package

      Extracted asset shows near-random entropy without a recognised container header, indicating an encrypted secondary payload staged for runtime decryption and loading. Correlate with any runtime class-loading detection on the same sample.

    • Runtime string decryption with reflective method dispatch

      Combines symmetric decryption or base64 decoding of embedded string tables with reflective class and method resolution, so sensitive API names never appear in plaintext. This defeats naive string-based detection and indicates deliberate anti-analysis engineering.

    • Removes its main activity from the application launcher

    • Checks Android system properties for emulator presence.

    • Loads dropped Dex/Jar

      Runs executable file dropped to the device during analysis.

    • Makes use of the framework's Accessibility service

      Retrieves information displayed on the phone screen using AccessibilityService.

    • Obtains sensitive information copied to the device clipboard

      Application may abuse the framework's APIs to obtain sensitive information copied to the device clipboard.

    • Queries the phone number (MSISDN for GSM devices)

    • Acquires the wake lock

    • Makes use of the framework's foreground persistence service

      Application may abuse the framework's foreground service to continue running in the foreground.

    • Performs UI accessibility actions on behalf of the user

      Application may abuse the accessibility service to prevent their removal.

    • Queries the mobile country code (MCC)

    • Queries the unique device ID (IMEI, MEID, IMSI)

    • Reads information about phone network operator.

    • Requests disabling of battery optimizations (often used to enable hiding in the background).

MITRE ATT&CK Mobile v16

Tasks