User tags
Assigned on submission by the user, not by sandbox detections.
General
- Target 17f953c6362e451da1786816a0d8d7d1_0dc975df4f929ed0422fb5c9a9582d3d5e11ab176cc3176e269b2a456d48d571.apk
- Size 1.9MB
- Sample260809-pehjsaac95
- SHA256 0dc975df4f929ed0422fb5c9a9582d3d5e11ab176cc3176e269b2a456d48d571
- MD5 49305965693a47cac8fe54d325d50d1f
- SHA1 7b7fbbe3f02ead6e985cf4619948ce003b4eb3f3
- SHA512 afdccaa0a03046355adfed5526cdec0881f68b6073eb0a574b21b08cc9abafda4ac8fe0ec6382881fb641a38b33b9f5f617ff822db7d8ef4bd5c32fbeec70322
- SSDEEP 49152:L7u2h4TxtyrD/V9oVrI1w4fmswmfC00Sql2x6I:Pu4Rv4E1AvKC00NlRI
- TLSH T1F595F112FBCAA82EECF3C335477A4A6A55429D668343E7838964717C0DBB5C08E46FC5
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
Static task
static1
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
17f953c6362e451da1786816a0d8d7d1_0dc975df4f929ed0422fb5c9a9582d3d5e11ab176cc3176e269b2a456d48d571.apk
Resource
android-x86-arm-20260325-en
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
17f953c6362e451da1786816a0d8d7d1_0dc975df4f929ed0422fb5c9a9582d3d5e11ab176cc3176e269b2a456d48d571.apk
Resource
android-x64-20260325-en
Behavioral task
behavioral3
Sample
17f953c6362e451da1786816a0d8d7d1_0dc975df4f929ed0422fb5c9a9582d3d5e11ab176cc3176e269b2a456d48d571.apk
Resource
android-x64-arm64-20260325-en
Malware Config
Extracted
-
ermac
-
http://193.106.191.118
Targets
-
- Target 17f953c6362e451da1786816a0d8d7d1_0dc975df4f929ed0422fb5c9a9582d3d5e11ab176cc3176e269b2a456d48d571.apk
- Size 1.9MB
- SHA256 0dc975df4f929ed0422fb5c9a9582d3d5e11ab176cc3176e269b2a456d48d571
- MD5 49305965693a47cac8fe54d325d50d1f
- SHA1 7b7fbbe3f02ead6e985cf4619948ce003b4eb3f3
- SHA512 afdccaa0a03046355adfed5526cdec0881f68b6073eb0a574b21b08cc9abafda4ac8fe0ec6382881fb641a38b33b9f5f617ff822db7d8ef4bd5c32fbeec70322
- SSDEEP 49152:L7u2h4TxtyrD/V9oVrI1w4fmswmfC00Sql2x6I:Pu4Rv4E1AvKC00NlRI
- TLSH T1F595F112FBCAA82EECF3C335477A4A6A55429D668343E7838964717C0DBB5C08E46FC5
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
-
Ermac2 payload
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Android banker: accessibility service abuse with overlay injection
DEX references AccessibilityService event hooks together with window-overlay creation and credential-capture primitives. This combination is the canonical Android banking-trojan pattern: the app reads screen content and injects fake login windows over legitimate banking apps.
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Clipboard monitoring with cryptocurrency address substitution
Watches clipboard changes and matches the contents against cryptocurrency address formats before writing a replacement value. The embedded address patterns exist so the app can recognise a copied wallet and swap in the operator's own, redirecting outgoing transfers.
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Contact harvesting with SMS self-propagation
Reads the device contact list and sends messages to the retrieved numbers, the distribution mechanism behind SMS worm campaigns. The victim's own address book becomes the delivery channel, which is why these campaigns spread rapidly within a region.
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Encrypted or packed staged payload inside Android package
Extracted asset shows near-random entropy without a recognised container header, indicating an encrypted secondary payload staged for runtime decryption and loading. Correlate with any runtime class-loading detection on the same sample.
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Runtime string decryption with reflective method dispatch
Combines symmetric decryption or base64 decoding of embedded string tables with reflective class and method resolution, so sensitive API names never appear in plaintext. This defeats naive string-based detection and indicates deliberate anti-analysis engineering.
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Checks Android system properties for emulator presence.
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Makes use of the framework's Accessibility service
Retrieves information displayed on the phone screen using AccessibilityService.
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Obtains sensitive information copied to the device clipboard
Application may abuse the framework's APIs to obtain sensitive information copied to the device clipboard.
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Queries the phone number (MSISDN for GSM devices)
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Acquires the wake lock
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Makes use of the framework's foreground persistence service
Application may abuse the framework's foreground service to continue running in the foreground.
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Performs UI accessibility actions on behalf of the user
Application may abuse the accessibility service to prevent their removal.
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Queries the mobile country code (MCC)
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Queries the unique device ID (IMEI, MEID, IMSI)
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Reads information about phone network operator.
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Requests disabling of battery optimizations (often used to enable hiding in the background).
MITRE ATT&CK Mobile v16
Persistence
Event Triggered Execution
1Broadcast Receivers
1Foreground Persistence
1Defense Evasion
Download New Code at Runtime
1Foreground Persistence
1Hide Artifacts
2Suppress Application Icon
1User Evasion
1Impair Defenses
1Prevent Application Removal
1Input Injection
1Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
3System Checks
3Credential Access
Clipboard Data
1Input Capture
2GUI Input Capture
1Keylogging
1