Analysis
- custom tags
- max time kernel
25s - max time network
32s - platform
android-10_x64 - resource
android-x64-20260325-en - resource tags
- submitted
09/08/2026, 12:14
General
- Target 17f953c6362e451da1786816a0d8d7d1_0dc975df4f929ed0422fb5c9a9582d3d5e11ab176cc3176e269b2a456d48d571.apk
- Size 1.9MB
- Sample260809-pehjsaac95
- SHA256 0dc975df4f929ed0422fb5c9a9582d3d5e11ab176cc3176e269b2a456d48d571
Malware Config
Extracted
-
ermac
-
http://193.106.191.118
Signatures
- Family: Ermac
An Android banking trojan first seen in July 2021.
- Ermac2 payload 1 IoCs
- Android banker: accessibility service abuse with overlay injection 1 IoCs
DEX references AccessibilityService event hooks together with window-overlay creation and credential-capture primitives. This combination is the canonical Android banking-trojan pattern: the app reads screen content and injects fake login windows over legitimate banking apps.
- Clipboard monitoring with cryptocurrency address substitution 1 IoCs
Watches clipboard changes and matches the contents against cryptocurrency address formats before writing a replacement value. The embedded address patterns exist so the app can recognise a copied wallet and swap in the operator's own, redirecting outgoing transfers.
- Contact harvesting with SMS self-propagation 1 IoCs
Reads the device contact list and sends messages to the retrieved numbers, the distribution mechanism behind SMS worm campaigns. The victim's own address book becomes the delivery channel, which is why these campaigns spread rapidly within a region.
- Encrypted or packed staged payload inside Android package 1 IoCs
Extracted asset shows near-random entropy without a recognised container header, indicating an encrypted secondary payload staged for runtime decryption and loading. Correlate with any runtime class-loading detection on the same sample.
- Runtime string decryption with reflective method dispatch 1 IoCs
Combines symmetric decryption or base64 decoding of embedded string tables with reflective class and method resolution, so sensitive API names never appear in plaintext. This defeats naive string-based detection and indicates deliberate anti-analysis engineering.
- Removes its main activity from the application launcher 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
- Loads dropped Dex/Jar 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
Runs executable file dropped to the device during analysis.
- Makes use of the framework's Accessibility service 4 TTPs 3 IoCs
Retrieves information displayed on the phone screen using AccessibilityService.
- Obtains sensitive information copied to the device clipboard 2 TTPs 1 IoCs
Application may abuse the framework's APIs to obtain sensitive information copied to the device clipboard.
- Queries the phone number (MSISDN for GSM devices) 1 TTPs
- Acquires the wake lock 1 IoCs
- Makes use of the framework's foreground persistence service 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
Application may abuse the framework's foreground service to continue running in the foreground.
- Performs UI accessibility actions on behalf of the user 1 TTPs 5 IoCs
Application may abuse the accessibility service to prevent their removal.
- Queries the mobile country code (MCC) 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
- Queries the unique device ID (IMEI, MEID, IMSI) 1 TTPs
- Reads information about phone network operator. 1 TTPs
- Registers a broadcast receiver at runtime (usually for listening for system events) 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
- Uses Crypto APIs (Might try to encrypt user data) 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
- Checks CPU information 2 TTPs 1 IoCs
- Checks memory information 2 TTPs 1 IoCs
Processes
-
com.mazocexayori.kute1⤵
- Removes its main activity from the application launcher
- Loads dropped Dex/Jar
- Makes use of the framework's Accessibility service
- Obtains sensitive information copied to the device clipboard
- Acquires the wake lock
- Makes use of the framework's foreground persistence service
- Performs UI accessibility actions on behalf of the user
- Queries the mobile country code (MCC)
- Registers a broadcast receiver at runtime (usually for listening for system events)
- Uses Crypto APIs (Might try to encrypt user data)
- Checks CPU information
- Checks memory information
Network
MITRE ATT&CK Mobile v16
Persistence
Event Triggered Execution
1Broadcast Receivers
1Foreground Persistence
1Defense Evasion
Download New Code at Runtime
1Foreground Persistence
1Hide Artifacts
1Suppress Application Icon
1Impair Defenses
1Prevent Application Removal
1Input Injection
1Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
2System Checks
2Credential Access
Clipboard Data
1Input Capture
2GUI Input Capture
1Keylogging
1Replay Monitor
Loading Replay Monitor...
Downloads
UjucuA.json
UjucuA.json
UjucuA.json