General
- Target 38e59c9876d09730d7e5d03204ebff9d9b6072108838354e62ab4b62e28bb839.apk
- Size 3.6MB
- Sample260813-cqf4waysax
- SHA256 38e59c9876d09730d7e5d03204ebff9d9b6072108838354e62ab4b62e28bb839
- MD5 ebcc01dc4c4f5b5a1d691c5684b4b197
- SHA1 81b0a11fa3344e57d37fc97f268532d8339fbbe3
- SHA512 ec7de69877ee767062fdf4ad375324f22c00b44675c9e037ad07e01a72441f3ef7f4b52048d8c4e62bb8c331ccd52cd85ec0482b6def34944b08d61225bf93e6
- SSDEEP 98304:5oC2wEsPVsbtNw5KbRQx8/msu+t+v5g6NQjaTZtC:5oC2TsP6bbbRQdsuRv5g6NQj2XC
- TLSH T1C8063349E6A1CC68D9B7623742C32E67BE1D38484795AA2F97F10DE81D53DA4DE02CF0
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
38e59c9876d09730d7e5d03204ebff9d9b6072108838354e62ab4b62e28bb839.apk
Resource
android-x86-arm-20260325-en
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
38e59c9876d09730d7e5d03204ebff9d9b6072108838354e62ab4b62e28bb839.apk
Resource
android-x64-20260325-en
Behavioral task
behavioral3
Sample
38e59c9876d09730d7e5d03204ebff9d9b6072108838354e62ab4b62e28bb839.apk
Resource
android-x64-arm64-20260325-en
Malware Config
Targets
-
- Target 38e59c9876d09730d7e5d03204ebff9d9b6072108838354e62ab4b62e28bb839.apk
- Size 3.6MB
- SHA256 38e59c9876d09730d7e5d03204ebff9d9b6072108838354e62ab4b62e28bb839
- MD5 ebcc01dc4c4f5b5a1d691c5684b4b197
- SHA1 81b0a11fa3344e57d37fc97f268532d8339fbbe3
- SHA512 ec7de69877ee767062fdf4ad375324f22c00b44675c9e037ad07e01a72441f3ef7f4b52048d8c4e62bb8c331ccd52cd85ec0482b6def34944b08d61225bf93e6
- SSDEEP 98304:5oC2wEsPVsbtNw5KbRQx8/msu+t+v5g6NQjaTZtC:5oC2TsP6bbbRQdsuRv5g6NQj2XC
- TLSH T1C8063349E6A1CC68D9B7623742C32E67BE1D38484795AA2F97F10DE81D53DA4DE02CF0
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
-
Cerberus payload
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Family: Alienbot
Alienbot is a fork of Cerberus banker first seen in January 2020.
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Contact harvesting with SMS self-propagation
Reads the device contact list and sends messages to the retrieved numbers, the distribution mechanism behind SMS worm campaigns. The victim's own address book becomes the delivery channel, which is why these campaigns spread rapidly within a region.
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Covert microphone or camera capture with exfiltration
Opens audio or camera capture outside any user-facing recording feature and pairs it with file staging and network transmission. The absence of a foreground recording interface alongside these primitives indicates surveillance rather than a legitimate media function.
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Encrypted or packed staged payload inside Android package
Extracted asset shows near-random entropy without a recognised container header, indicating an encrypted secondary payload staged for runtime decryption and loading. Correlate with any runtime class-loading detection on the same sample.
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Notification listener abuse for OTP and message theft
Binds a notification listener service and reads posted notification content, optionally dismissing notifications afterwards to hide them. This harvests one-time passcodes and private messages without ever requesting SMS permissions, which is why it has largely replaced SMS interception in modern ban
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Makes use of the framework's Accessibility service
Retrieves information displayed on the phone screen using AccessibilityService.
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Queries account information for other applications stored on the device
Application may abuse the framework's APIs to collect account information stored on the device.
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Queries the phone number (MSISDN for GSM devices)
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Performs UI accessibility actions on behalf of the user
Application may abuse the accessibility service to prevent their removal.
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Queries the mobile country code (MCC)
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Requests disabling of battery optimizations (often used to enable hiding in the background).
MITRE ATT&CK Mobile v16
Persistence
Event Triggered Execution
1Broadcast Receivers
1Scheduled Task/Job
1Defense Evasion
Download New Code at Runtime
1Hide Artifacts
2Suppress Application Icon
1User Evasion
1Impair Defenses
1Prevent Application Removal
1Input Injection
1Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
2System Checks
2