Analysis
- custom tags
dropperexfiltrationobfuscatedotpsmsspywarestealer - max time kernel
148s - max time network
153s - platform
android-10_x64 - resource
android-x64-20260325-en - resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:android-x64-20260325-enlocale:en-usos:android-10-x64system - submitted
13/08/2026, 02:16
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
38e59c9876d09730d7e5d03204ebff9d9b6072108838354e62ab4b62e28bb839.apk
Resource
android-x86-arm-20260325-en
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
38e59c9876d09730d7e5d03204ebff9d9b6072108838354e62ab4b62e28bb839.apk
Resource
android-x64-20260325-en
Behavioral task
behavioral3
Sample
38e59c9876d09730d7e5d03204ebff9d9b6072108838354e62ab4b62e28bb839.apk
Resource
android-x64-arm64-20260325-en
General
- Target 38e59c9876d09730d7e5d03204ebff9d9b6072108838354e62ab4b62e28bb839.apk
- Size 3.6MB
- Sample260813-cqf4waysax
- SHA256 38e59c9876d09730d7e5d03204ebff9d9b6072108838354e62ab4b62e28bb839
- MD5 ebcc01dc4c4f5b5a1d691c5684b4b197
- SHA1 81b0a11fa3344e57d37fc97f268532d8339fbbe3
- SHA512 ec7de69877ee767062fdf4ad375324f22c00b44675c9e037ad07e01a72441f3ef7f4b52048d8c4e62bb8c331ccd52cd85ec0482b6def34944b08d61225bf93e6
- SSDEEP 98304:5oC2wEsPVsbtNw5KbRQx8/msu+t+v5g6NQjaTZtC:5oC2TsP6bbbRQdsuRv5g6NQj2XC
- TLSH T1C8063349E6A1CC68D9B7623742C32E67BE1D38484795AA2F97F10DE81D53DA4DE02CF0
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
Malware Config
Signatures
- Family: Alienbot
Alienbot is a fork of Cerberus banker first seen in January 2020.
- Cerberus payload 1 IoCs
resource yara_rule behavioral2/files/fstream-2.dat family_cerberus - Contact harvesting with SMS self-propagation 1 IoCs
Reads the device contact list and sends messages to the retrieved numbers, the distribution mechanism behind SMS worm campaigns. The victim's own address book becomes the delivery channel, which is why these campaigns spread rapidly within a region.
resource yara_rule behavioral2/files/fstream-2.dat ANDROID_Contacts_SMS_Propagation - Covert microphone or camera capture with exfiltration 1 IoCs
Opens audio or camera capture outside any user-facing recording feature and pairs it with file staging and network transmission. The absence of a foreground recording interface alongside these primitives indicates surveillance rather than a legitimate media function.
resource yara_rule behavioral2/files/fstream-2.dat ANDROID_Surveillance_AudioCamera_Capture - Encrypted or packed staged payload inside Android package 1 IoCs
Extracted asset shows near-random entropy without a recognised container header, indicating an encrypted secondary payload staged for runtime decryption and loading. Correlate with any runtime class-loading detection on the same sample.
resource yara_rule behavioral2/files/fstream-1.dat ANDROID_Encrypted_Staged_Asset - Notification listener abuse for OTP and message theft 1 IoCs
Binds a notification listener service and reads posted notification content, optionally dismissing notifications afterwards to hide them. This harvests one-time passcodes and private messages without ever requesting SMS permissions, which is why it has largely replaced SMS interception in modern ban
resource yara_rule behavioral2/files/fstream-2.dat ANDROID_NotificationListener_OTP_Theft -
pid Process 5073 custom.best.orchard 5073 custom.best.orchard 5073 custom.best.orchard 5073 custom.best.orchard 5073 custom.best.orchard - Loads dropped Dex/Jar 1 TTPs 2 IoCs
Runs executable file dropped to the device during analysis.
ioc pid Process /data/user/0/custom.best.orchard/app_DynamicOptDex/jEc.json 5073 custom.best.orchard /data/user/0/custom.best.orchard/app_DynamicOptDex/jEc.json 5073 custom.best.orchard - Makes use of the framework's Accessibility service 4 TTPs 2 IoCs
Retrieves information displayed on the phone screen using AccessibilityService.
description ioc Process Framework service call android.accessibilityservice.IAccessibilityServiceConnection.findAccessibilityNodeInfosByViewId custom.best.orchard Framework service call android.accessibilityservice.IAccessibilityServiceConnection.findAccessibilityNodeInfoByAccessibilityId custom.best.orchard - Queries account information for other applications stored on the device 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
Application may abuse the framework's APIs to collect account information stored on the device.
description ioc Process Framework service call android.accounts.IAccountManager.getAccountsAsUser custom.best.orchard - Queries the phone number (MSISDN for GSM devices) 1 TTPs
- Performs UI accessibility actions on behalf of the user 1 TTPs 2 IoCs
Application may abuse the accessibility service to prevent their removal.
ioc Process android.accessibilityservice.IAccessibilityServiceConnection.performGlobalAction custom.best.orchard android.accessibilityservice.IAccessibilityServiceConnection.performGlobalAction custom.best.orchard - Registers a broadcast receiver at runtime (usually for listening for system events) 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
description ioc Process Framework service call android.app.IActivityManager.registerReceiver custom.best.orchard - Schedules tasks to execute at a specified time 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
Application may abuse the framework's APIs to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code.
description ioc Process Framework service call android.app.job.IJobScheduler.schedule custom.best.orchard
Processes
-
custom.best.orchard1⤵
- Removes its main activity from the application launcher
- Loads dropped Dex/Jar
- Makes use of the framework's Accessibility service
- Queries account information for other applications stored on the device
- Performs UI accessibility actions on behalf of the user
- Registers a broadcast receiver at runtime (usually for listening for system events)
- Schedules tasks to execute at a specified time
PID:5073 -
getprop ro.miui.ui.version.name2⤵PID:5200
-
-
getprop ro.miui.ui.version.name2⤵PID:5283
-
-
getprop ro.miui.ui.version.name2⤵PID:5315
-
-
getprop ro.miui.ui.version.name2⤵PID:5341
-
Network
MITRE ATT&CK Mobile v16
Persistence
Event Triggered Execution
1Broadcast Receivers
1Scheduled Task/Job
1Defense Evasion
Download New Code at Runtime
1Hide Artifacts
1Suppress Application Icon
1Impair Defenses
1Prevent Application Removal
1Input Injection
1Replay Monitor
Loading Replay Monitor...
Downloads
- Path /data/data/custom.best.orchard/app_DynamicOptDex/jEc.json
- Size 724KB
- SHA256 04fee12db243334767cf584607a509077a10a55f999a26b35137920abd1a738c
- MD5 466a33fd77d47abeeddde084b0210e30
- SHA1 ed0fc88b4799f9c9b28e1581757dbbdbb22b7c69
- SHA512 b5b0cc3610caaa7e89fcb0548ac01d175f734f0c8ba90465261ab492f359fba9294c70cae5bf155f8f084aaa9a11c7e94a9e29102de7c752503d4b2b7b70906b
- SSDEEP 12288:iwDatnxt4cEmnpKbAD7rVbf/o3F+2H+VUfbw9xiMsAKIquQN9/OtutdlTypYhb:irocEqpKbAfrVbSF+2H+gJMsAcFOtGlP
- TLSH T13FF42323A3098AC7CD95237F62FB4F9C896D8A1CB61B1B32F5D07E6553A6F07E850409
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
- Path /data/data/custom.best.orchard/app_DynamicOptDex/jEc.json
- Size 724KB
- SHA256 b8bee9641b7b59e2b2649c46e43cf3f0bb489ef57bbfe08061974f7804aa9328
- MD5 cf36de8993386b6609c965319ccaea1e
- SHA1 6aeabcdb1a782831a45c5bbed3f6bf3df8d95b8f
- SHA512 039ac96b5d02bef8d8cbaf0b79d31a4b9ff4251f659635f015e00d73e459d70736d4bde227af78eb86597eb9aca78bfa6cbce6af9d78a90b1b260b1b361615de
- SSDEEP 12288:8UvH7Uzon6HXv9ibKdnE1evcmAxKKv+imn7DJIAW7:8UvH7SlibD1eqxp+1nBu
- TLSH T15AF4393AF7C68E77CDA9063814E167A06F34E85727578B4B9604F07EAC537E93AC8148
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
- Path /data/data/custom.best.orchard/app_DynamicOptDex/oat/jEc.json.cur.prof
- Size 388B
- SHA256 6a08aae976a3df2b2b232d48c5dd95c8563adb8a3e8adbf4de60dda7ffc1ef23
- MD5 5c711e8659b8afe8a1deff0a30fa3a53
- SHA1 80476664725339d7e9e82ca01a5de8ebaa2336a3
- SHA512 377955665fd01ddcf863e5f14af05a123f06c21979f2f6147fb41aee294053ecac8b8349f1aa71bc478844366cf455fef11c6ba57c6c017a35386b31effa96c3
- TLSH T120E0F880A7AE160018878488000AEB96680328229E9B81E073AF0A37A1206385AA88B2
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 TLSH