Extracted

Extracted

Extracted

• • Target
    e29def53e832ca9ca4d5a6c80d1c3c6d4f801c5f3f2ba50cc7f528fafee21b65.apk
  • Size 2.5MB
  • SHA256 e29def53e832ca9ca4d5a6c80d1c3c6d4f801c5f3f2ba50cc7f528fafee21b65
  • MD5 9c1144619e745e493d025a54bfc5be69
  • SHA1 041564eca0cad7d70363f71ff25fd0ddfd6c08ef
  • SHA512 06eba882094817d04d70b43e60250cb5c130c32acc8ed4061063083891e35cb1870d474e1ed82dfdc2138bfef8cb81dedb6c8fbe5a3d7cc3c02b27a504d3e38a
  • SSDEEP 49152:GTRWUxSgSTFYhnMDzRPKi6xvw4KNJ5A8TfM6Gwe6UIuL:G0U0YZM9qwdy6zebL
  • TLSH
    T1BCC50173E784A02EECF38333977A0D6264027D558753C6879964B23C29B79CC5A89FD8
  • MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH

  Score

  10^/10

  antivmbankerclippercollectioncredential_accessdefense_evasiondiscoverydropperevasionexecutionexfiltrationermachookimpactinfostealerobfuscatedotpoverlaypersistenceratsmsspywarestealertrojan

  • Ermac2 payload

  • Family: Ermac

    An Android banking trojan first seen in July 2021.

    bankertrojaninfostealerermac

  • Family: Hook

    Hook is an Android malware that is based on Ermac with RAT capabilities.

    rattrojaninfostealerhook

  • Accessibility-driven UI automation to self-grant permissions

    Locates nodes in the Settings or package-installer user interface by text or view identifier and dispatches synthetic clicks. This lets the application approve its own permission dialogs, complete side-loading, and intercept attempts to reach the uninstall screen without any real user consent.

    evasionpersistencedropper

  • Android banker: accessibility service abuse with overlay injection

    DEX references AccessibilityService event hooks together with window-overlay creation and credential-capture primitives. This combination is the canonical Android banking-trojan pattern: the app reads screen content and injects fake login windows over legitimate banking apps.

    bankertrojanoverlay

  • Boot-triggered restart with disguised foreground service

    Restarts itself on device boot and holds a foreground service with a low-visibility notification channel, keeping the process alive across reboots and outside normal background limits. Malicious use is distinguished by pairing this with surveillance or remote-control primitives.

    persistence

  • Clipboard monitoring with cryptocurrency address substitution

    Watches clipboard changes and matches the contents against cryptocurrency address formats before writing a replacement value. The embedded address patterns exist so the app can recognise a copied wallet and swap in the operator's own, redirecting outgoing transfers.

    stealerclipper

  • Contact harvesting with SMS self-propagation

    Reads the device contact list and sends messages to the retrieved numbers, the distribution mechanism behind SMS worm campaigns. The victim's own address book becomes the delivery channel, which is why these campaigns spread rapidly within a region.

    smstrojanexfiltration

  • Covert microphone or camera capture with exfiltration

    Opens audio or camera capture outside any user-facing recording feature and pairs it with file staging and network transmission. The absence of a foreground recording interface alongside these primitives indicates surveillance rather than a legitimate media function.

    spywareratexfiltration

  • Encrypted or packed staged payload inside Android package

    Extracted asset shows near-random entropy without a recognised container header, indicating an encrypted secondary payload staged for runtime decryption and loading. Correlate with any runtime class-loading detection on the same sample.

    obfuscateddropper

  • Keylogging via accessibility text-change events

    Subscribes to text-change and view-focus accessibility events and reads the text of nodes belonging to other applications, capturing everything typed on the device including passwords entered into unrelated apps. Password-field flags are typically inspected so credential entry can be prioritised.

    stealerspywarebanker

  • Notification listener abuse for OTP and message theft

    Binds a notification listener service and reads posted notification content, optionally dismissing notifications afterwards to hide them. This harvests one-time passcodes and private messages without ever requesting SMS permissions, which is why it has largely replaced SMS interception in modern ban

    stealerotpbanker

  • Root, emulator and instrumentation-framework detection

    Probes for superuser binaries, emulator build properties and dynamic instrumentation frameworks. Malware uses these checks to stay dormant inside analysis environments, so a sample matching this rule with an otherwise empty behavioural report should be treated as evasive rather than benign.

    evasionantivm

  • Runtime string decryption with reflective method dispatch

    Combines symmetric decryption or base64 decoding of embedded string tables with reflective class and method resolution, so sensitive API names never appear in plaintext. This defeats naive string-based detection and indicates deliberate anti-analysis engineering.

    obfuscatedevasion

  • Silent screen capture via MediaProjection

    Acquires a MediaProjection session and pipes the virtual display into an image reader or encoder, enabling continuous capture of everything shown on screen including credentials and one-time codes. Combined with accessibility auto-approval this runs without further user interaction.

    spywareratexfiltration

  • Loads dropped Dex/Jar

    Runs executable file dropped to the device during analysis.

    evasion

  • Makes use of the framework's Accessibility service

    Retrieves information displayed on the phone screen using AccessibilityService.

    collectiondefense_evasioncredential_access

  • Obtains sensitive information copied to the device clipboard

    Application may abuse the framework's APIs to obtain sensitive information copied to the device clipboard.

    collectioncredential_accessimpact

  • Queries information about running processes on the device

    Application may abuse the framework's APIs to collect information about running processes on the device.

    discovery

  • Queries the phone number (MSISDN for GSM devices)

    discovery

  • Acquires the wake lock

  • Makes use of the framework's foreground persistence service

    Application may abuse the framework's foreground service to continue running in the foreground.

    defense_evasionpersistence

  • Performs UI accessibility actions on behalf of the user

    Application may abuse the accessibility service to prevent their removal.

    evasion

  • Queries information about the current Wi-Fi connection

    Application may abuse the framework's APIs to collect information about the current Wi-Fi connection.

    discovery

  • Queries the mobile country code (MCC)

    discovery

  • Reads information about phone network operator.

    discovery
  behavioral1behavioral2behavioral3