Analysis
- custom tags
antivmclipperdropperexfiltrationobfuscatedotpoverlaysmsspywarestealer - max time kernel
148s - max time network
151s - platform
android-10_x64 - resource
android-x64-20260325-en - resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:android-x64-20260325-enlocale:en-usos:android-10-x64system - submitted
18/08/2026, 22:35
Static task
static1
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
e29def53e832ca9ca4d5a6c80d1c3c6d4f801c5f3f2ba50cc7f528fafee21b65.apk
Resource
android-x86-arm-20260325-en
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
e29def53e832ca9ca4d5a6c80d1c3c6d4f801c5f3f2ba50cc7f528fafee21b65.apk
Resource
android-x64-20260325-en
Behavioral task
behavioral3
Sample
e29def53e832ca9ca4d5a6c80d1c3c6d4f801c5f3f2ba50cc7f528fafee21b65.apk
Resource
android-x64-arm64-20260325-en
General
- Target e29def53e832ca9ca4d5a6c80d1c3c6d4f801c5f3f2ba50cc7f528fafee21b65.apk
- Size 2.5MB
- Sample260818-2hrcbatvbx
- SHA256 e29def53e832ca9ca4d5a6c80d1c3c6d4f801c5f3f2ba50cc7f528fafee21b65
- MD5 9c1144619e745e493d025a54bfc5be69
- SHA1 041564eca0cad7d70363f71ff25fd0ddfd6c08ef
- SHA512 06eba882094817d04d70b43e60250cb5c130c32acc8ed4061063083891e35cb1870d474e1ed82dfdc2138bfef8cb81dedb6c8fbe5a3d7cc3c02b27a504d3e38a
- SSDEEP 49152:GTRWUxSgSTFYhnMDzRPKi6xvw4KNJ5A8TfM6Gwe6UIuL:G0U0YZM9qwdy6zebL
- TLSH T1BCC50173E784A02EECF38333977A0D6264027D558753C6879964B23C29B79CC5A89FD8
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
Malware Config
Extracted
-
hook
-
http://91.200.14.203
-
user_agent
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/53.0.2785.116 Safari/537.36
Extracted
-
ermac
-
http://91.200.14.203
Extracted
-
hook
-
http://91.200.14.203
Signatures
- Family: Ermac
An Android banking trojan first seen in July 2021.
- Family: Hook
Hook is an Android malware that is based on Ermac with RAT capabilities.
- Ermac2 payload 1 IoCs
resource yara_rule behavioral2/memory/5030-0.dex family_ermac2 - Accessibility-driven UI automation to self-grant permissions 1 IoCs
Locates nodes in the Settings or package-installer user interface by text or view identifier and dispatches synthetic clicks. This lets the application approve its own permission dialogs, complete side-loading, and intercept attempts to reach the uninstall screen without any real user consent.
resource yara_rule behavioral2/memory/5030-0.dex ANDROID_Accessibility_AutoClick_SelfGrant - Android banker: accessibility service abuse with overlay injection 1 IoCs
DEX references AccessibilityService event hooks together with window-overlay creation and credential-capture primitives. This combination is the canonical Android banking-trojan pattern: the app reads screen content and injects fake login windows over legitimate banking apps.
resource yara_rule behavioral2/memory/5030-0.dex ANDROID_Overlay_Banker_AccessibilityAbuse - Boot-triggered restart with disguised foreground service 1 IoCs
Restarts itself on device boot and holds a foreground service with a low-visibility notification channel, keeping the process alive across reboots and outside normal background limits. Malicious use is distinguished by pairing this with surveillance or remote-control primitives.
resource yara_rule behavioral2/memory/5030-0.dex ANDROID_Persistence_BootForegroundService - Clipboard monitoring with cryptocurrency address substitution 1 IoCs
Watches clipboard changes and matches the contents against cryptocurrency address formats before writing a replacement value. The embedded address patterns exist so the app can recognise a copied wallet and swap in the operator's own, redirecting outgoing transfers.
resource yara_rule behavioral2/memory/5030-0.dex ANDROID_Clipboard_CryptoClipper - Contact harvesting with SMS self-propagation 1 IoCs
Reads the device contact list and sends messages to the retrieved numbers, the distribution mechanism behind SMS worm campaigns. The victim's own address book becomes the delivery channel, which is why these campaigns spread rapidly within a region.
resource yara_rule behavioral2/memory/5030-0.dex ANDROID_Contacts_SMS_Propagation - Covert microphone or camera capture with exfiltration 1 IoCs
Opens audio or camera capture outside any user-facing recording feature and pairs it with file staging and network transmission. The absence of a foreground recording interface alongside these primitives indicates surveillance rather than a legitimate media function.
resource yara_rule behavioral2/memory/5030-0.dex ANDROID_Surveillance_AudioCamera_Capture - Encrypted or packed staged payload inside Android package 1 IoCs
Extracted asset shows near-random entropy without a recognised container header, indicating an encrypted secondary payload staged for runtime decryption and loading. Correlate with any runtime class-loading detection on the same sample.
resource yara_rule behavioral2/files/fstream-1.dat ANDROID_Encrypted_Staged_Asset - Keylogging via accessibility text-change events 1 IoCs
Subscribes to text-change and view-focus accessibility events and reads the text of nodes belonging to other applications, capturing everything typed on the device including passwords entered into unrelated apps. Password-field flags are typically inspected so credential entry can be prioritised.
resource yara_rule behavioral2/memory/5030-0.dex ANDROID_Keylogger_AccessibilityTextCapture - Notification listener abuse for OTP and message theft 1 IoCs
Binds a notification listener service and reads posted notification content, optionally dismissing notifications afterwards to hide them. This harvests one-time passcodes and private messages without ever requesting SMS permissions, which is why it has largely replaced SMS interception in modern ban
resource yara_rule behavioral2/memory/5030-0.dex ANDROID_NotificationListener_OTP_Theft - Root, emulator and instrumentation-framework detection 1 IoCs
Probes for superuser binaries, emulator build properties and dynamic instrumentation frameworks. Malware uses these checks to stay dormant inside analysis environments, so a sample matching this rule with an otherwise empty behavioural report should be treated as evasive rather than benign.
resource yara_rule behavioral2/memory/5030-0.dex ANDROID_AntiAnalysis_Root_Emulator_Frida - Runtime string decryption with reflective method dispatch 1 IoCs
Combines symmetric decryption or base64 decoding of embedded string tables with reflective class and method resolution, so sensitive API names never appear in plaintext. This defeats naive string-based detection and indicates deliberate anti-analysis engineering.
resource yara_rule behavioral2/memory/5030-0.dex ANDROID_Obfuscation_EncryptedStrings_Reflection - Silent screen capture via MediaProjection 1 IoCs
Acquires a MediaProjection session and pipes the virtual display into an image reader or encoder, enabling continuous capture of everything shown on screen including credentials and one-time codes. Combined with accessibility auto-approval this runs without further user interaction.
resource yara_rule behavioral2/memory/5030-0.dex ANDROID_MediaProjection_ScreenCapture - Loads dropped Dex/Jar 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
Runs executable file dropped to the device during analysis.
ioc pid Process /data/user/0/com.taramasdan.cm/app_comic/gqqd.json 5030 com.taramasdan.cm - Makes use of the framework's Accessibility service 4 TTPs 3 IoCs
Retrieves information displayed on the phone screen using AccessibilityService.
description ioc Process Framework service call android.accessibilityservice.IAccessibilityServiceConnection.findAccessibilityNodeInfoByAccessibilityId com.taramasdan.cm Framework service call android.accessibilityservice.IAccessibilityServiceConnection.findAccessibilityNodeInfosByText com.taramasdan.cm Framework service call android.accessibilityservice.IAccessibilityServiceConnection.findAccessibilityNodeInfosByViewId com.taramasdan.cm - Obtains sensitive information copied to the device clipboard 2 TTPs 1 IoCs
Application may abuse the framework's APIs to obtain sensitive information copied to the device clipboard.
description ioc Process Framework service call android.content.IClipboard.addPrimaryClipChangedListener com.taramasdan.cm - Queries information about running processes on the device 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
Application may abuse the framework's APIs to collect information about running processes on the device.
description ioc Process Framework service call android.app.IActivityManager.getRunningAppProcesses com.taramasdan.cm - Queries the phone number (MSISDN for GSM devices) 1 TTPs
- Acquires the wake lock 1 IoCs
description ioc Process Framework service call android.os.IPowerManager.acquireWakeLock com.taramasdan.cm - Makes use of the framework's foreground persistence service 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
Application may abuse the framework's foreground service to continue running in the foreground.
description ioc Process Framework service call android.app.IActivityManager.setServiceForeground com.taramasdan.cm - Performs UI accessibility actions on behalf of the user 1 TTPs 5 IoCs
Application may abuse the accessibility service to prevent their removal.
ioc Process android.accessibilityservice.IAccessibilityServiceConnection.performGlobalAction com.taramasdan.cm android.accessibilityservice.IAccessibilityServiceConnection.performGlobalAction com.taramasdan.cm android.accessibilityservice.IAccessibilityServiceConnection.performGlobalAction com.taramasdan.cm android.accessibilityservice.IAccessibilityServiceConnection.performGlobalAction com.taramasdan.cm android.accessibilityservice.IAccessibilityServiceConnection.performGlobalAction com.taramasdan.cm - Queries information about the current Wi-Fi connection 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
Application may abuse the framework's APIs to collect information about the current Wi-Fi connection.
description ioc Process Framework service call android.net.wifi.IWifiManager.getConnectionInfo com.taramasdan.cm - Queries the mobile country code (MCC) 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
description ioc Process Framework service call com.android.internal.telephony.ITelephony.getNetworkCountryIsoForPhone com.taramasdan.cm - Reads information about phone network operator. 1 TTPs
- Registers a broadcast receiver at runtime (usually for listening for system events) 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
description ioc Process Framework service call android.app.IActivityManager.registerReceiver com.taramasdan.cm - Schedules tasks to execute at a specified time 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
Application may abuse the framework's APIs to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code.
description ioc Process Framework service call android.app.job.IJobScheduler.schedule com.taramasdan.cm - Uses Crypto APIs (Might try to encrypt user data) 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
description ioc Process Framework API call javax.crypto.Cipher.doFinal com.taramasdan.cm - Checks CPU information 2 TTPs 1 IoCs
description ioc Process File opened for read /proc/cpuinfo com.taramasdan.cm - Checks memory information 2 TTPs 1 IoCs
description ioc Process File opened for read /proc/meminfo com.taramasdan.cm
Processes
-
com.taramasdan.cm1⤵
- Loads dropped Dex/Jar
- Makes use of the framework's Accessibility service
- Obtains sensitive information copied to the device clipboard
- Queries information about running processes on the device
- Acquires the wake lock
- Makes use of the framework's foreground persistence service
- Performs UI accessibility actions on behalf of the user
- Queries information about the current Wi-Fi connection
- Queries the mobile country code (MCC)
- Registers a broadcast receiver at runtime (usually for listening for system events)
- Schedules tasks to execute at a specified time
- Uses Crypto APIs (Might try to encrypt user data)
- Checks CPU information
- Checks memory information
PID:5030
Network
MITRE ATT&CK Mobile v16
Persistence
Event Triggered Execution
1Broadcast Receivers
1Foreground Persistence
1Scheduled Task/Job
1Defense Evasion
Download New Code at Runtime
1Foreground Persistence
1Impair Defenses
1Prevent Application Removal
1Input Injection
1Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
2System Checks
2Credential Access
Clipboard Data
1Input Capture
2GUI Input Capture
1Keylogging
1Discovery
Process Discovery
1System Information Discovery
2System Network Configuration Discovery
3System Network Connections Discovery
1Replay Monitor
Loading Replay Monitor...
Downloads
- Path /data/data/com.taramasdan.cm/app_comic/gqqd.json
- Size 735KB
- SHA256 9f42f34c9271294df559557e96c7f3a5bd6c5b9074fe8aeb60195e87f43fcd37
- MD5 ac2137373d0648c4023403f12929429a
- SHA1 f065a19a4e4acb3ba8ac7639b2bee61d75d53b99
- SHA512 949ad4db353ef6316837825e605822a62f1634c5eee0849b3cc2638183a0c8a2970fc84f42ddf3a533896992822ec143eb6453ed26ce1f3d87e8c4d577e939d4
- SSDEEP 12288:ddMVXoB/SzUkXlqg5eDq92tcDwSFux5PM9WsMchr4aOtTq0gQGDUHr3ytnq:dqVXmqQQqg5euVDve0hMaStTq06DUMq
- TLSH T127F4233912177572706A4D53348E8F934DB43C9249FE6FA2730A8732A7112F8A6AFD19
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
- Path /data/data/com.taramasdan.cm/app_comic/gqqd.json
- Size 735KB
- SHA256 5c89a5afe56c7b1b3c1491388eef7039ee73d48c0ea39b69afbf63110f93c529
- MD5 29f6222fcff9e46c7be872a998985b91
- SHA1 2bdb531b0634b567d189c18a8d04c0316d27bc42
- SHA512 346051a583ec64df02dd001e359be874490ad3066969db526e52f8cc69bceeffac1795c0aa5c12c276aff85585977e7098ae395f3739eefbc8abafd1cb6e1cc4
- SSDEEP 12288:HVx3HjQSUcp6dGsI5dgwPvjTUnjDeCPUIGshMtjQS/HUIoLkBf35Ts:HHdX4G7Hav+rcMtJfUIy0fRs
- TLSH T18DF4230AD8537E134134C391176CCEE21E1B88A1E43A6C11693752DD7978E94B7EB6FC
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
- Path /data/data/com.taramasdan.cm/app_comic/oat/gqqd.json.cur.prof
- Size 3KB
- SHA256 c3132f1fe2043245d7d848eea821967d18b9c1c425afb1e857e738e54e4d4b82
- MD5 203a814fb0150fe1262b8aabbf5407c5
- SHA1 3da4f83f1def4ca065f9283c2b6d8993218296fa
- SHA512 1224710a868adba409392a60f843f90875cc63c428a466ecc334cc63e82f2e47cda804dd73a7fc91b5aab15b246e896d7bb792dcaff8d16bdbb4b205684d44f0
- TLSH T1D551A08007B8FD25F8265DC2B79ED15099D4F9D10A2D1793144D7FC2B7155D174AA30D
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 TLSH
- Path /data/data/com.taramasdan.cm/no_backup/androidx.work.workdb
- Size 4KB
- SHA256 0a8ffb6b327963558716e87db8946016d143e39f895fa1b43e95ba7032ce2514
- MD5 f2b4b0190b9f384ca885f0c8c9b14700
- SHA1 934ff2646757b5b6e7f20f6a0aa76c7f995d9361
- SHA512 ec12685fc0d60526eed4d38820aad95611f3e93ae372be5a57142d8e8a1ba17e6e5dfe381a4e1365dddc0b363c9c40daaffdc1245bd515fddac69bf1abacd7f1
- TLSH T1CD810441534000F1D05407F354D1130C1F47D1D5D5410F03351100C5DC415C40C70FC5
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 TLSH
- Path /data/data/com.taramasdan.cm/no_backup/androidx.work.workdb-journal
- Size 512B
- SHA256 977da4dff4310519c8555a39f02a0706468f66118923d63befaa2bab9d673c27
- MD5 6ec368865738a7c81cb6b4cc3c41d66e
- SHA1 89bf0245dc1079e7dfeb58f1ecc952c9cb3363e2
- SHA512 0df68c6939bc9a9afc251d6b4d5609185f5f62c3d63e82f733864327fd0a52693470502071ee2089d4b29a2f3c26b0a1aac3fee3827c1063d476d3cbb3ab7705
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512
- Path /data/data/com.taramasdan.cm/no_backup/androidx.work.workdb-shm
- Size 32KB
- SHA256 c35020473aed1b4642cd726cad727b63fff2824ad68cedd7ffb73c7cbd890479
- MD5 bb7df04e1b0a2570657527a7e108ae23
- SHA1 5188431849b4613152fd7bdba6a3ff0a4fd6424b
- SHA512 768007e06b0cd9e62d50f458b9435c6dda0a6d272f0b15550f97c478394b743331c3a9c9236e09ab5b9cb3b423b2320a5d66eb3c7068db9ea37891ca40e47012
- SSDEEP 3::
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP
- Path /data/data/com.taramasdan.cm/no_backup/androidx.work.workdb-wal
- Size 16KB
- SHA256 8ccc0f02fa4dd0bab49f0144cd35b3d2a58f79580c9b95db66b81410c9369e05
- MD5 c61ec64cb7b0bdcb13d6531eacfcf722
- SHA1 ec468fc0f393ef3c050382b2803854d1fb67bb78
- SHA512 62014cf8501000128d79306250bc47273cf1f741b3342a4b5bee46cc9a25b668f278cec07d59af4ee9b3971959064746c82188f598a7ac0ae98187f27cd1fe9c
- SSDEEP 6:Ks80Jw8deRg9FZdrlOERX4PBX4ogLugMBX4suuK+/G8Yll/e8mlts8M3iOw2:KoJwKOqzdTRmBEyPbP/W//MOw2
- TLSH T15D72C2B0F3A02963C96A527EA0D7C3091F70568A6363CBCB13500610BD4338C69A4D08
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
- Path /data/data/com.taramasdan.cm/no_backup/androidx.work.workdb-wal
- Size 108KB
- SHA256 686233eb4cda680c2b1fe1629ef350bac340562aee6917247908d8ef0da695f2
- MD5 01b5802af5f2da5cf4286a845866794b
- SHA1 83f22635d670bd27463a91c4ed2237389e1ad855
- SHA512 2d1749178b5ff8736876c0e8dbee9aa442e89aea24231613f4a28a52cb61b16fb0ca58af3d256f5b854ebc78c84e71288bbe2bdeacb1958eb1184c181619afbb
- SSDEEP 96:5kZ6+hdjnHtDRMpf8UzS5+TD8q0ExP2lFbWgcd:KVdjnHt9Mpf8UzS5+TD8q0E52lF8
- TLSH T11AB3205E2F693500C099A8F4D1910FB17A3E416EE393E3E56A910175BEC7920DE29CFA
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
- Path /data/data/com.taramasdan.cm/no_backup/androidx.work.workdb-wal
- Size 173KB
- SHA256 1b93da50822e3bff9dde9cc74b6ce1df3e7db49f8ab4a36a8206611c03df56a8
- MD5 c774ab14a6db8346ae0385f7bad647b9
- SHA1 8f5fc0c578902d5cb5f3609c43dc0eb54b434bdf
- SHA512 b31e8a4e070ebd50cc39a5c4f1491427096bac14510c7f6aa24720b112ef60977f9b5124e945ad658ecca7e9a483d300d020db54e76abe6eac93e6a41f5bc6af
- SSDEEP 24:OOfZtGYfECUlgEL1E+afSKkZtGY5mlI73fp:O+ZtGYMCNEL1E+eSKkZtGYmIbp
- TLSH T17D048FFAB664A030D5E4057FE6EB13B14B308BDDFC4472E566AB6F61BC8244E015DB50
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
- Path /data/user/0/com.taramasdan.cm/app_comic/gqqd.json
- Size 1.7MB
- SHA256 dd79c4a8aef69da08e73589eaf7a64209fcc523d5514b0d2abe4fca83cced168
- MD5 f1625d4ff611d678a95ae7e1d6eb9cc0
- SHA1 5501a2a3f51842ad90f72c11fa132d19ceb77c2e
- SHA512 4f29f65011e2c700a2f4576a67fa94b81e8df974542bd3d853510978a2de0a7f57e3c02b01a064f035988f90d4b00231d6b7106df93f56f2aa5732a3beb53f36
- SSDEEP 24576:N1kRw2EC2Hx/LapZT9YyJXJAp3vTDcupK8Oc:Yw2X2HxD16ZEth
- TLSH T18A85C5F5BB5119A0D4D8723A7CFE8F40F73D698DD6CA7746110863B0AD0A2F53AA0687
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH