Analysis

  • custom tags

    antivmclipperdropperexfiltrationobfuscatedotpoverlaysmsspywarestealer
  • max time kernel
    148s
  • max time network
    151s
  • platform
    android-10_x64
  • resource
    android-x64-20260325-en
  • resource tags

    arch:x64arch:x86image:android-x64-20260325-enlocale:en-usos:android-10-x64system
  • submitted
    18/08/2026, 22:35

General

  • Target
    e29def53e832ca9ca4d5a6c80d1c3c6d4f801c5f3f2ba50cc7f528fafee21b65.apk
  • Size 2.5MB
  • Sample260818-2hrcbatvbx
  • SHA256 e29def53e832ca9ca4d5a6c80d1c3c6d4f801c5f3f2ba50cc7f528fafee21b65
  • MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH

Malware Config

Extracted

Family
  • hook

C2
  • http://91.200.14.203

Attributes
  • user_agent

    Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/53.0.2785.116 Safari/537.36

Extracted

Family
  • ermac

C2
  • http://91.200.14.203

AES_key

Extracted

Family
  • hook

C2
  • http://91.200.14.203

AES_key

Signatures

  • Family: Ermac

    An Android banking trojan first seen in July 2021.

  • Family: Hook

    Hook is an Android malware that is based on Ermac with RAT capabilities.

  • Ermac2 payload 1 IoCs
  • Accessibility-driven UI automation to self-grant permissions 1 IoCs

    Locates nodes in the Settings or package-installer user interface by text or view identifier and dispatches synthetic clicks. This lets the application approve its own permission dialogs, complete side-loading, and intercept attempts to reach the uninstall screen without any real user consent.

  • Android banker: accessibility service abuse with overlay injection 1 IoCs

    DEX references AccessibilityService event hooks together with window-overlay creation and credential-capture primitives. This combination is the canonical Android banking-trojan pattern: the app reads screen content and injects fake login windows over legitimate banking apps.

  • Boot-triggered restart with disguised foreground service 1 IoCs

    Restarts itself on device boot and holds a foreground service with a low-visibility notification channel, keeping the process alive across reboots and outside normal background limits. Malicious use is distinguished by pairing this with surveillance or remote-control primitives.

  • Clipboard monitoring with cryptocurrency address substitution 1 IoCs

    Watches clipboard changes and matches the contents against cryptocurrency address formats before writing a replacement value. The embedded address patterns exist so the app can recognise a copied wallet and swap in the operator's own, redirecting outgoing transfers.

  • Contact harvesting with SMS self-propagation 1 IoCs

    Reads the device contact list and sends messages to the retrieved numbers, the distribution mechanism behind SMS worm campaigns. The victim's own address book becomes the delivery channel, which is why these campaigns spread rapidly within a region.

  • Covert microphone or camera capture with exfiltration 1 IoCs

    Opens audio or camera capture outside any user-facing recording feature and pairs it with file staging and network transmission. The absence of a foreground recording interface alongside these primitives indicates surveillance rather than a legitimate media function.

  • Encrypted or packed staged payload inside Android package 1 IoCs

    Extracted asset shows near-random entropy without a recognised container header, indicating an encrypted secondary payload staged for runtime decryption and loading. Correlate with any runtime class-loading detection on the same sample.

  • Keylogging via accessibility text-change events 1 IoCs

    Subscribes to text-change and view-focus accessibility events and reads the text of nodes belonging to other applications, capturing everything typed on the device including passwords entered into unrelated apps. Password-field flags are typically inspected so credential entry can be prioritised.

  • Notification listener abuse for OTP and message theft 1 IoCs

    Binds a notification listener service and reads posted notification content, optionally dismissing notifications afterwards to hide them. This harvests one-time passcodes and private messages without ever requesting SMS permissions, which is why it has largely replaced SMS interception in modern ban

  • Root, emulator and instrumentation-framework detection 1 IoCs

    Probes for superuser binaries, emulator build properties and dynamic instrumentation frameworks. Malware uses these checks to stay dormant inside analysis environments, so a sample matching this rule with an otherwise empty behavioural report should be treated as evasive rather than benign.

  • Runtime string decryption with reflective method dispatch 1 IoCs

    Combines symmetric decryption or base64 decoding of embedded string tables with reflective class and method resolution, so sensitive API names never appear in plaintext. This defeats naive string-based detection and indicates deliberate anti-analysis engineering.

  • Silent screen capture via MediaProjection 1 IoCs

    Acquires a MediaProjection session and pipes the virtual display into an image reader or encoder, enabling continuous capture of everything shown on screen including credentials and one-time codes. Combined with accessibility auto-approval this runs without further user interaction.

  • Loads dropped Dex/Jar 1 TTPs 1 IoCs

    Runs executable file dropped to the device during analysis.

  • Makes use of the framework's Accessibility service 4 TTPs 3 IoCs

    Retrieves information displayed on the phone screen using AccessibilityService.

  • Obtains sensitive information copied to the device clipboard 2 TTPs 1 IoCs

    Application may abuse the framework's APIs to obtain sensitive information copied to the device clipboard.

  • Queries information about running processes on the device 1 TTPs 1 IoCs

    Application may abuse the framework's APIs to collect information about running processes on the device.

  • Queries the phone number (MSISDN for GSM devices) 1 TTPs
  • Acquires the wake lock 1 IoCs
  • Makes use of the framework's foreground persistence service 1 TTPs 1 IoCs

    Application may abuse the framework's foreground service to continue running in the foreground.

  • Performs UI accessibility actions on behalf of the user 1 TTPs 5 IoCs

    Application may abuse the accessibility service to prevent their removal.

  • Queries information about the current Wi-Fi connection 1 TTPs 1 IoCs

    Application may abuse the framework's APIs to collect information about the current Wi-Fi connection.

  • Queries the mobile country code (MCC) 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
  • Reads information about phone network operator. 1 TTPs
  • Registers a broadcast receiver at runtime (usually for listening for system events) 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
  • Schedules tasks to execute at a specified time 1 TTPs 1 IoCs

    Application may abuse the framework's APIs to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code.

  • Uses Crypto APIs (Might try to encrypt user data) 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
  • Checks CPU information 2 TTPs 1 IoCs
  • Checks memory information 2 TTPs 1 IoCs

Processes

  • com.taramasdan.cm
    1⤵
    • Loads dropped Dex/Jar
    • Makes use of the framework's Accessibility service
    • Obtains sensitive information copied to the device clipboard
    • Queries information about running processes on the device
    • Acquires the wake lock
    • Makes use of the framework's foreground persistence service
    • Performs UI accessibility actions on behalf of the user
    • Queries information about the current Wi-Fi connection
    • Queries the mobile country code (MCC)
    • Registers a broadcast receiver at runtime (usually for listening for system events)
    • Schedules tasks to execute at a specified time
    • Uses Crypto APIs (Might try to encrypt user data)
    • Checks CPU information
    • Checks memory information
    PID:5030

Network

        MITRE ATT&CK Mobile v16

        Replay Monitor

        Loading Replay Monitor...

        Downloads

        gqqd.json

        • Path /data/data/com.taramasdan.cm/app_comic/gqqd.json
        • Size 735KB
        • SHA256 9f42f34c9271294df559557e96c7f3a5bd6c5b9074fe8aeb60195e87f43fcd37
        • MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH

        gqqd.json

        • Path /data/data/com.taramasdan.cm/app_comic/gqqd.json
        • Size 735KB
        • SHA256 5c89a5afe56c7b1b3c1491388eef7039ee73d48c0ea39b69afbf63110f93c529
        • MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH

        gqqd.json.cur.prof

        • Path /data/data/com.taramasdan.cm/app_comic/oat/gqqd.json.cur.prof
        • Size 3KB
        • SHA256 c3132f1fe2043245d7d848eea821967d18b9c1c425afb1e857e738e54e4d4b82
        • MD5 SHA1 SHA512 TLSH

        androidx.work.workdb

        • Path /data/data/com.taramasdan.cm/no_backup/androidx.work.workdb
        • Size 4KB
        • SHA256 0a8ffb6b327963558716e87db8946016d143e39f895fa1b43e95ba7032ce2514
        • MD5 SHA1 SHA512 TLSH

        androidx.work.workdb-journal

        • Path /data/data/com.taramasdan.cm/no_backup/androidx.work.workdb-journal
        • Size 512B
        • SHA256 977da4dff4310519c8555a39f02a0706468f66118923d63befaa2bab9d673c27
        • MD5 SHA1 SHA512

        androidx.work.workdb-shm

        • Path /data/data/com.taramasdan.cm/no_backup/androidx.work.workdb-shm
        • Size 32KB
        • SHA256 c35020473aed1b4642cd726cad727b63fff2824ad68cedd7ffb73c7cbd890479
        • MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP

        androidx.work.workdb-wal

        • Path /data/data/com.taramasdan.cm/no_backup/androidx.work.workdb-wal
        • Size 16KB
        • SHA256 8ccc0f02fa4dd0bab49f0144cd35b3d2a58f79580c9b95db66b81410c9369e05
        • MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH

        androidx.work.workdb-wal

        • Path /data/data/com.taramasdan.cm/no_backup/androidx.work.workdb-wal
        • Size 108KB
        • SHA256 686233eb4cda680c2b1fe1629ef350bac340562aee6917247908d8ef0da695f2
        • MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH

        androidx.work.workdb-wal

        • Path /data/data/com.taramasdan.cm/no_backup/androidx.work.workdb-wal
        • Size 173KB
        • SHA256 1b93da50822e3bff9dde9cc74b6ce1df3e7db49f8ab4a36a8206611c03df56a8
        • MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH

        gqqd.json

        • Path /data/user/0/com.taramasdan.cm/app_comic/gqqd.json
        • Size 1.7MB
        • SHA256 dd79c4a8aef69da08e73589eaf7a64209fcc523d5514b0d2abe4fca83cced168
        • MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH